

good, and some of it is bad. The information highway includes ever-increasing numbers of television channels. These new and changing channels and the programs they broadcast are coming into our living rooms.

There is a good side to this growing technology and information, but we also know there is a bad side. Studies tell us that by the time a child enters high school, that child will watch over 8,000 murders and 100,000 acts of violence on television. How can parents know and control what their kids are watching. How can they control it when they are away from home working? How can they control what their kids see on the living room television when they are busy in the kitchen?

For some the solution is simple, just censor the networks or moviemakers. I believe there is a better way. It is the approach I believe in, and that is the approach that uses technology and information.

Mr. President, I am proud to cosponsor the Media Protection Act of 1995. This is the V-chip bill. A television that has this V chip will allow parents to block out programming that they don't want their children to see when they are away or in another room. This automatic blocking device will be triggered by a rating system that the networks can develop themselves. This is not censorship. It is no more censorship than the current movie theater rating system that was created by the movie industry less than three decades ago.

I am also pleased to cosponsor the Television Violence Report Card Act of 1995. This is the information part of what parents need. This legislation will encourage an evaluation of programming to let parents know just what to watch for or watch out for.

Some call this legislation censorship, but it is not. It is parental empowerment and parental involvement, and maybe a way to stem the tide of violence that kids are exposed to every day and evening they watch television.●

"WHY NOT ATOM TESTS IN FRANCE?"

● Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, the Washington Post had an editorial titled, "Why Not Atom Tests in France?"

The policy of France is unwise, just as our earlier policy of continuing tests was unwise.

France is not doing a favor to stability in the world with these tests.

I hope that the French Government will reconsider this unwise course.

At this point, I ask unanimous consent that this op-ed piece be printed in the RECORD.

The material follows:

WHY NOT ATOM TESTS IN FRANCE?

France's unwise decision to resume nuclear testing was an invitation to the kind of protests and denunciations being generated by Greenpeace's skillful demonstration of political theater. But even before Greenpeace set sail for the test site, several Pacific countries had vehemently objected to France's intention of carrying out the explosions at a

Pacific atoll. The most cutting comment came from Japan's prime minister, Tomiichi Murayama. At a recent meeting in Cannes the newly installed president of France, Jacques Chirac, confidently explained to him that the tests will be entirely safe. If they are so safe, Mr. Murayama replied, why doesn't Mr. Chirac hold them in France?

The dangers of these tests to France are, in fact, substantial. The chances of physical damage and the release of radioactivity to the atmosphere are very low. But the symbolism of a European country holding its tests on the other side of the earth, in a vestige of its former colonial empire, is proving immensely damaging to France's standing among its friends in Asia.

France says that it needs to carry out the tests to ensure the reliability of its nuclear weapons. Those weapons, like most of the American nuclear armory, were developed to counter a threat from a power that has collapsed. The great threat now, to France and the rest of the world, is the possibility of nuclear bombs in the hands of reckless and aggressive governments elsewhere. North Korea, Iraq and Iran head the list of possibilities. The tests will strengthen France's international prestige, in the view of many French politicians, by reminding others that it possesses these weapons. But in less stable and non-democratic countries, there are many dictators, juntas and nationalist fanatics who similarly aspire to improve their countries' standing in the world.

The international effort to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons is a fragile enterprise, depending mainly on trust and goodwill. But over the past half-century, the effort has been remarkably and unexpectedly successful. It depends on a bargain in which the nuclear powers agree to move toward nuclear disarmament at some indefinite point in the future, and in the meantime to avoid flaunting these portentous weapons or to use them merely for displays of one-upmanship. That's the understanding that France is now undermining. The harassment by Greenpeace is the least of the costs that these misguided tests will exact.●

ON THE RELEASE OF AUNG SAN SUU KYI

● Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, after 6 years of unjust detention by the Burmese military, Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi is free. While this is cause for celebration and great relief from those of us who have long called for her release, one cannot fail to stress that there is also great outrage that she was incarcerated in the first instance. The State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC], the military Junta in Burma, has sought to thwart democracy at every turn.

Led by Aung San Suu Kyi, the National League for Democracy [NLD] party won a democratic election in 1990, while she was under house arrest, yet the SLORC has never allowed the elected leaders of Burma to take office. Instead they have forced these leaders to flee their country to escape arrest and death.

The United States Senate has often spoken in support of those brave Burmese democracy leaders. We have withheld aid and weapons to the military regime, and have provided some, albeit modest amounts, of assistance to the

Burmese refugees who have fled the ruthless SLORC. Pro-democracy demonstrators were particularly vulnerable, yet having fled the country they found themselves denied political asylum by Western governments. In 1989, Senator KENNEDY and I rose in support of the demonstrators and won passage of an amendment to the Immigration Act of 1990 requiring the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to clearly define the immigration policy of the United States toward Burmese pro-democracy demonstrators. Congress acted again on the Customs and Trade Act of 1990 to adopt a provision I introduced requiring the President to impose appropriate economic sanctions on Burma. The Bush administration utilized this provision to sanction Burmese textiles. Unfortunately these powers have never been exercised by the current administration.

The SLORC regime had to be denounced. The Senate continued to press for stronger actions. On March 12, 1992, the Foreign Relations Committee unanimously voted to adopt a report submitted by myself and Senator MCCONNELL detailing specific actions that should be taken before the nomination of a United States Ambassador to Burma would be considered in the Senate.

Last year the State Department Authorization Act for 1994-95 contained a provision I introduced placing Burma on the list of international outlaw states such as Libya, North Korea, and Iraq, an indication that the United States Congress considers the SLORC regime to be one of the very worst in the world. The Senate also unanimously adopted S. 234 on July 15, 1994, calling for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and for increased international pressure on the SLORC to achieve the transfer of power to the winners of the 1990 democratic election.

Thankfully, Aung San Suu Kyi has now been released. But the struggle in Burma is not over. The SLORC continues to wage war against its own people. Illegal heroin continues to be produced with their complicity. And the SLORC continues to thwart the transfer to democracy in Burma. The New York Times concludes appropriately:

The end of Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi's detention must be followed by other steps toward democracy before Myanmar is deemed eligible for loans from multilateral institutions or closer ties with the United States. It is too soon to welcome Yangon back into the democratic community.

We in the Senate must rededicate ourselves to the strong support of those in Burma working to overcome this tyranny. I congratulate Aung San Suu Kyi on her extraordinary bravery and determination, and celebrate with her family the news of her release.

I ask that the July 13, 1995, editorial be printed in the RECORD.

The editorial follows:

[The New York Times, July 13, 1995]

NEW HOPE FOR BURMESE DEMOCRACY

The release of the political prisoner Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in Yangon, formerly Rangoon, is good news. Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991, had been under house arrest for nearly six years. The next test for the regime, which changed the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar, will be to follow Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi's freedom with a return to some form of political pluralism and with other improvements in human rights.

Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy won elections under her leadership in 1990. The military refused to recognize the results, imprisoning and intimidating many of the newly elected legislators. Burmese expatriates say torture is still routinely used in prisons and by the military in its repression of ethnic minorities.

Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi's release has rekindled the hopes of many Burmese for a return to democracy. At her first public appearance, she stuck a conciliatory note, saying she wanted to promote dialogue with the military junta. She acted properly in cautioning against unrealistic expectations. Nevertheless, hundreds of people have made the pilgrimage to her home in Yangon since her release, demonstrating the deep loyalty of her followers.

But Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi is re-entering a society in which her own name has been a forbidden word, where personal freedoms are severely restricted and political life brutally curtailed. She refused to make any deals with the authorities to gain her freedom, and she has made it clear that she intends to pursue her democratic goals.

Myanmar is eager to break its isolation and join the region's economic boom. Japan, which covets its rich natural resources, is already preparing to warm up relations with Yangon. But Myanmar will need substantial help from agencies like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to join the international economy.

The end of Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi's detention must be followed by other steps toward democracy before Myanmar is deemed eligible for loans from multilateral institutions or closer ties with the United States. It is too soon to welcome Yangon back into the democratic community.

INSULAR AREAS APPROPRIATIONS AUTHORIZATION

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now turn to the consideration of Calendar No. 134, S. 638, regarding the insular areas, that the committee substitute be agreed to, that the bill be read for a third time, and passed, and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill (S. 638) to authorize appropriations for United States insular areas, and for other purposes, which had been reported from the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, with an amendment to strike all after the enacting clause and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

SECTION 1. TERRITORIAL AND FREELY ASSOCIATED STATE INFRASTRUCTURE ASSISTANCE.

Section 4(b) of Public Law 94-241 (90 Stat. 263) as added by section 10 of Public Law 99-

396 (99 Stat. 837, 841) is amended by deleting "until Congress otherwise provides by law." and inserting in lieu thereof: "except that, for fiscal years 1996 and thereafter, payments to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands pursuant to the multi-year funding agreements contemplated under the Covenant shall be limited to the amounts set forth in the Agreement of the Special Representatives on Future Federal Financial Assistance of the Northern Mariana Islands, executed on December 17, 1992 between the special representative of the President of the United States and special representatives of the Governor of the Northern Mariana Islands and shall be subject to all the requirements of such Agreement with any additional amounts otherwise made available under this section in any fiscal year and not required to meet the schedule of payments set forth in the Agreement to be provided as set forth in subsection (c) until Congress otherwise provides by law.

"(c) The additional amounts referred to in subsection (b) shall be made available to the Secretary for obligation as follows:

"(1) for fiscal year 1996, all such amounts shall be provided for capital infrastructure projects in American Samoa; and

"(2) for fiscal years 1997 and thereafter, all such amounts shall be available solely for capital infrastructure projects in Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands: Provided, That, in fiscal year 1997, \$3 million of such amounts shall be made available to the College of the Northern Marianas and beginning in fiscal year 1997, and in each year thereafter, not to exceed \$3 million may be allocated, as provided in Appropriation Acts, to the Secretary of the Interior for use by Federal agencies or the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands to address immigration, labor, and law enforcement issues in the Northern Mariana Islands, including, but not limited to detention and corrections needs. The specific projects to be funded shall be set forth in a five-year plan for infrastructure assistance developed by the Secretary of the Interior in consultation with each of the island governments and updated annually and submitted to the Congress concurrent with the budget justifications for the Department of the Interior. In developing and updating the five year plan for capital infrastructure needs, the Secretary shall indicate the highest priority projects, consider the extent to which particular projects are part of an overall master plan, whether such project has been reviewed by the Corps of Engineers and any recommendations made as a result of such review, the extent to which a set-aside for maintenance would enhance the life of the project, the degree to which a local cost-share requirement would be consistent with local economic and fiscal capabilities, and may propose an incremental set-aside, not to exceed \$2 million per year, to remain available without fiscal year limitation, as an emergency fund in the event of natural or other disasters to supplement other assistance in the repair, replacement, or hardening of essential facilities: *Provided further*, That the cumulative amount set aside for such emergency fund may not exceed \$10 million at any time.

"(d) Within the amounts allocated for infrastructure pursuant to this section, and subject to the specific allocations made in subsection (c), additional contributions may be made, as set forth in Appropriation Acts, to assist in the resettlement of Rongelap Atoll: *Provided*, That the total of all contributions from any Federal source after January 1, 1995 may not exceed \$32 million and shall be contingent upon an agreement,

satisfactory to the President, that such contributions are a full and final settlement of all obligations of the United States to assist in the resettlement of Rongelap Atoll and that such funds will be expended solely on resettlement activities and will be properly audited and accounted for. In order to provide such contributions in a timely manner, each Federal agency providing assistance or services, or conducting activities, in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, is authorized to make funds available, through the Secretary of the Interior, to assist in the resettlement of Rongelap. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit the provision of ex gratia assistance pursuant to section 105(c)(2) of the Compact of Free Association Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-239, 99 Stat. 1770, 1792) including for individuals choosing not to resettle at Rongelap, except that no such assistance for such individuals may be provided until the Secretary notifies the Congress that the full amount of all funds necessary for resettlement at Rongelap has been provided."

SEC. 2. FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE.

Effective thirty days after the date of enactment of this Act, the minimum wage provisions, including, but not limited to, the coverage and exemptions provisions, of section 6 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of June 25, 1938 (52 Stat. 1062), as amended, shall apply to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, except—

(a) on the effective date, the minimum wage rate applicable to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands shall be \$2.75 per hour;

(b) effective January 1, 1996, the minimum wage rate applicable to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands shall be \$3.05 per hour;

(c) effective January 1, 1997 and every January 1 thereafter, the minimum wage rate shall be raised by thirty cents per hour or the amount necessary to raise the minimum wage rate to the wage rate set forth in section 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards act, whichever is less; and

(d) once the minimum wage rate is equal to the wage rate set forth in section 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the minimum wage rate applicable to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands shall thereafter be the wage rate set forth in section 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

SEC. 3. REPORT.

The Secretary of the Interior, in consultation with the Attorney General and Secretaries of Treasury, Labor and State, shall report to the Congress by the March 15 following each fiscal year for which funds are allocated pursuant to section 4(c) of Public Law 94-241 for use by Federal agencies or the Commonwealth to address immigration, labor or law enforcement activities. The report shall include but not be limited to—

(1) pertinent immigration information provided by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, including the number of non-United States citizen contract workers in the CNMI, based on data the Immigration and Naturalization Service may require of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands on a semiannual basis, or more often if deemed necessary by the Immigration and Naturalization Service,

(2) the treatment and conditions of non-United States citizen contract workers, including foreign government interference with workers' ability to assert their rights under United States law,

(3) the effect of laws of the Northern Mariana Islands on Federal interests,

(4) the adequacy of detention facilities in the Northern Mariana Islands,

(5) the accuracy and reliability of the computerized alien identification and tracking