

functions that need to be performed at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels will be identified. A key component of this analysis will be a clear description of the crucial interrelationships among these levels, based on the premise that deficiencies and inadequacies in any one sphere directly influence success or failure throughout the system. For example, the ready availability of an operational element remains dependent upon both the generation of political will, and adequate ongoing strategic planning and direction for its effectiveness.

The focus of the study will be at the operational and tactical levels. The greatest challenges lie here, given the virtually complete ad hoc nature of mounting today's peace operations and the slow, inefficient assembly of disparate tactical units in the theatre of operations. Even given adequate warning and the existence of strategic plans to react, there is a virtual vacuum at the operational level in the UN system. At present, there is no standing headquarters that is capable of organizing, integrating and directing forces based on common doctrine and standards.

In keeping with the requirement to make practical recommendations that respond to today's needs, as well as the achievement of potential advances in the future, the study will develop proposals for the short, medium and long terms. In this context, the study of the concept of a UN standing force will involve both its feasibility and *modus operandi* once established over the long term, as well as the relationship between short- and medium-term projects and their possible cumulative contributions to its ultimate creation.

Finally, the study will look at the impact of a standing force on the activities of regional organizations and their capabilities in this area. Regional actors and organizations should have a high motivation to react quickly to emerging crises in their own regions. Similarly, in some important respects at least, they should be inherently more capable of moving quickly into a theatre of operations. The comparative advantages of operating at a global or regional level will be addressed, and proposals will be developed to achieve a balanced effort in accordance with the intent of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and along the lines recently advocated by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

STRUCTURE

The study will be guided by a steering group of senior officials and military officers, co-chaired by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Department of National Defense. The steering group will oversee the study and commission supporting technical studies as appropriate.

In order to provide the broadest possible international input into the study, an international consultative group is being established. This group, drawn from well-known and accomplished diplomats, government officials, soldiers and academics, will review the work in progress and exchange views as the study proceeds. Three conferences will also be organized under the aegis of the study, to which various member states, non-governmental authorities and specialists will be invited. The first two conferences will draw primarily on Canadian experts, and will focus on the operational/technical and the strategic/political levels, respectively. The third conference will be international in scope, and will be organized around a meeting of the international consultative group in April 1995. The results of all of these conferences will be incorporated into the final report.

Throughout the study process, Canada will consult on a bilateral basis with member

states interested in monitoring the progress of and exchanging views on the study. Canada would also hope to collaborate with other member states pursuing similar or complementary ideas.

A key consultative partner during the study will be the UN Secretariat. The steering group will keep the Secretary-General informed of the progress of the study, seek his views as appropriate, and invite relevant Secretariat officials to the conferences.

CONTENT

The study is intended to focus on enhancing the UN's rapid reaction capability. It is not a study on how to improve UN peacekeeping generally. Nonetheless, these two themes have much in common that must be taken into account in the overall context of the study. Therefore, the study will review past experience relevant to the aim of this project, including a review of major concepts and initiatives that represent significant milestones on the road to the present. Particular attention will be paid to developments since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, the study will be guided by the orientation and concepts articulated by the Secretary-General in An Agenda for Peace. Due regard will be accorded to non-military aspects of peace operations, such as prevention diplomacy, the political component of all such operations and peacebuilding. Peacekeeping will be treated in its broadest context.

The study will focus on the specific issue of improved responsiveness, given the structure and nature of contemporary peacekeeping. This will take account of the interrelationships among the political, strategic, operational and tactical components of any peace operation, as well as the relevance for rapid reaction of the integration of political, humanitarian, police and military elements, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Similarly, the study will address the question of command and control systems and their contribution to an improved rapid reaction capability. The conditions under which nations are willing to make their resources available to the UN are crucial to their political commitment and readiness to act. Paramount among these concerns is the nature and competence of command and control structures and relationships. The role of the Security Council in mobilizing political support and providing ongoing guidance is essential.

The study will elaborate the component elements of a rapid reaction capability in a generic sense. This section of the study will address the requirement for, and provision of, among other things, early warning, integrated planning capability, command and control systems, logistics capability and doctrine/standards/interoperability. An important element will be the nature of standing forces, options for their development and a discussion of their potential utility.

Having established the basis for rapid reaction, the study will address in concrete terms what can be done to achieve this capability. The study will outline proposals that logically fit into one of the three time frames envisaged. The implications of a given proposal at one of the four levels (political, strategic, operational and tactical) for the remaining levels will be explored. For example, the establishment of regional stocks in two or more locations has direct implications for how these stocks will be allocated and co-ordinated at the strategic level in New York.

In many cases, short-term proposals will suggest additional measures that might logically follow in the medium and long terms. For example, virtually all proposals for the medium and long term imply an increased

capability in the UN Secretariat to cope with additional responsibilities. Therefore, reform and enhancement of the UN Secretariat, a necessary stand-alone requirement to enhance the UN's rapid reaction capability, will also cumulatively establish the necessary strategic apparatus to handle a series of additional medium- and long-term improvements.

Any plan to operate a standing force presupposes adjustments at the political, strategic and tactical levels, which in many cases must be put in place on an incremental basis, starting as soon as possible.

The study will arrive at recommendations and conclusions regarding the desirability and feasibility of implementing a variety of potential measures. It will also make observations and recommendations as to their associated costs.

The study will be submitted to the membership of the UN at the General Assembly in September 1995, and presented to the Secretary-General for his consideration.

NOTICE OF DETERMINATION BY THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS UNDER RULE 35, PARAGRAPH 4, REGARDING EDUCATIONAL TRAVEL

• Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, it is required by paragraph 4 of rule 35 that I place in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD notices of Senate employees who participate in programs, the principal objective of which is educational, sponsored by a foreign government or a foreign educational or charitable organization involving travel to a foreign country paid for by that foreign government or organization.

The select committee received notification under rule 35 for Robert McArthur, a member of the staff of Senator COCHRAN, to participate in a program in Germany sponsored by the Hanns Seidel Foundation from July 1 to 8, 1995.

The committee determined that no Federal statute or Senate rule would prohibit participation by Mr. McArthur in this program.

The select committee received notification under rule 35 for Mary Parke, a member of the staff of Senator SIMON, to participate in a program in Germany sponsored by the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung Foundation from May 27 to June 3, 1995.

The committee determined that no Federal statute or Senate rule would prohibit participation by Ms. Parke in this program.

The select committee received notification under rule 35 for Jonathan M. Harris, a member of the staff of Senator D'AMATO, to participate in a program sponsored by the Korea Economic Institute of America to be held in Korea from May 28 to June 4, 1995.

The committee determined that no Federal statute or Senate rule would prohibit participation by Mr. Harris in this program.

The select committee received notification under rule 35 for Reid Cavnar, a member of the staff of Senator SHELBY, to participate in a program in Taiwan sponsored by the Tamkang University from July 1 to 8, 1995.

The committee determined that no Federal statute or Senate rule would prohibit participation by Mr. Cavnar in this program.

The select committee received notification under rule 35 for Ridge Schuyler, a member of the staff of Senator ROBB, to participate in a program in Taiwan sponsored by the Tamkang University from July 1 to 8, 1995.

The committee determined that no Federal statute or Senate rule would prohibit participation by Mr. Schuyler in this program.

The select committee received notification under rule 35 for Pamela Sellars, a member of the staff of Senator COATS, to participate in a program in Germany sponsored by the Hanns Seidel Foundation from July 1 to 8, 1995.

The committee determined that no Federal statute or Senate rule would prohibit participation by Ms. Sellars in this program.

The select committee received notification under rule 35 for John Luddy, a member of the staff of Senator INHOFE, to participate in a program in Germany sponsored by the Hanns Seidel Foundation from July 1 to 8, 1995.

The committee determined that no Federal statute or Senate rule would prohibit participation by Mr. Luddy in this program.

The select committee received notification under rule 35 for Robert H. Carey, Jr., a member of the staff of Senator ABRAHAM, to participate in a program in Germany sponsored by the Hanns Seidel Foundation's Institute for Foreign Relations from July 1 to 8, 1995.

The committee determined that no Federal statute or Senate rule would prohibit participation by Mr. Carey in this program.

The select committee received notification under rule 35 for Chad Calvert, a member of the staff of Senator SIMPSON to participate in a program in Japan sponsored by the Association for Communication of Transcultural Study Foundation.

The committee determined that no Federal statute or Senate rule would prohibit participation by Mr. Calvert in this program.

The select committee received notification under rule 35 for Dr. William Spriggs, a member of the staff of Senator MACK, to participate in a program in Berlin sponsored by Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung from June 29 to July 3, 1995.

The committee determined that no Federal statute or Senate rule would prohibit participation by Dr. Spriggs in this program.

The select committee received notification under rule 35 for Wayne Abernathy, a member of the staff of Senator GRAMM, to participate in a program in Mexico sponsored by the Mexican Business Coordinating Council from July 4 to 7, 1995.

The committee determined that no Federal statute or Senate rule would

prohibit participation by Mr. Abernathy in this program.

The select committee received notification under rule 35 for Derek L. Schmidt, a member of the staff of Senator KASSEBAUM, to participate in a program in Korea sponsored by the Korea Economic Institute of America from May 28 to June 4, 1995.

The committee determined that no Federal statute or Senate rule would prohibit participation by Mr. Schmidt in this program.●

METAMORPHOSIS OF A CONTINENT

Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, the Chicago Tribune carried a remarkable story from Timbuktu, Mali by Liz Sly on what is happening in Africa. Really, it is two stories that are intertwined.

I wish it were possible to put into the RECORD the maps and color shadings to provide a more accurate picture of some of the things that are illustrated in this article.

But those who read the article will note that Africa is a place of hope and promise and despair.

The little-known story of the spread of democracy in Africa is the story of progress that could be reversed easily. Africa needs our helping hand.

I ask that the Liz Sly article be printed in the RECORD.

The article follows:

[From the Chicago Tribune, July 9, 1995]

METAMORPHOSIS OF A CONTINENT—DEMOCRACY SEEKS HOLD AMID POVERTY, VIOLENCE

(By Liz Sly)

TIMBUKTU, MALI.—Not all of the news out of Africa is bad.

For the first time in its long history, this remote town on the edge of the Sahara has a mayor elected by the people, Harber Sabane, 51, who has high hopes that democracy will help Timbuktu reclaim its status as one of the world's great cities.

First, he acknowledged, there are a number of problems to be ironed out.

"We have problems of development," Sabane said. "We don't have roads. We have a problem of water. We don't have infrastructure. Our ecological system is destroyed because of a lot of droughts and we have a problem of deforestation.

"Another problem is unemployment. We have no industry. We are very, very, very poor. Most people are illiterate and 60 percent of our children don't go to school."

Unfortunately, Sabane could have been describing just about anywhere in sub-Saharan Africa. Once synonymous with everything that was exotic and alluring about the continent, Timbuktu today is typical of everything that is wrong with it—even down to the ethnic fighting last year that killed an estimated 600 people and scared away the tourists, the town's only source of outside income.

By 1990, it had long been clear that sub-Saharan Africa was torn by crises. Poverty, conflict and underdevelopment were compounded by corrupt dictators who enjoyed the backing of rival superpowers concerned more with their own strategic agendas than with human rights or economic progress.

This, however, was supposed to be Africa's "democracy decade" in which the dictators, bereft of their Cold War relevance, would be replaced by elected, accountable govern-

ments heralding a new era of freedom and prosperity.

Halfway through the 1990s, those goals are elusive as ever for most parts of the continent. Instead, Africa's democracy decade risks becoming yet another decade of disappointment. Millions of Africans are still waiting for life to improve after more than three decades of freedom from colonialism.

A woeful array of collapsed states, hijacked elections and ethnic conflicts litter the landscape south of the Sahara. And even where democracy is taking root, Africa's hopes of a brighter future are in danger of being buried under the weight of its multiple problems, as Sabane is discovering in Timbuktu.

"The world around Africa is fast coming together and this continent risks being the odd man out," warned U.S. National Security Adviser Anthony Lake on a recent visit to the continent, summing up the world's growing impatience with Africa's failure to find its way in the post-Cold war world.

Chaotic Liberia, Somalia and Rwanda stand out as worst case examples of that failure. The 1990s saw Cold War-inspired conflicts in Ethiopia and Mozambique come to and end. But 2 million Africans have died since the collapse of the Berlin Wall as a result of new wars unleashed directly or indirectly by pressures from the democratic reforms that were supposed to bring them new hope—10 times the number who have died in the war in Bosnia.

A recent report from the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies found some form of conflict in 26 of sub-Saharan Africa's 48 countries, offering a gloomy assessment for the future. "The potential for sudden outbursts of violence exists in most [African] countries as rising populations meet falling living standards and weak governments confront regional or ethnic movements," it said.

But is Africa's outlook really that bleak? It is just 50 years since the world ended a war that killed 60 million people, and many Africans plead that it is unfair to write off Africa now just because it is going through a period of upheaval.

"From the outside, the universal view is one of despair, and it must be tempting to repudiate the whole continent," said political scientist Mahmood Mamdani, director of the Center for Basic Research in Uganda's capital, Jampala. "But when one lives here, one recognizes the extent of the problems but also the small improvements that are taking place."

For better or worse, the 1990s already have proved revolutionary for Africa. Until 1990, Africa had only three governments that could be considered authentically democratic. Since then, multiparty elections have been held in 35 of sub-Saharan Africa's 48 nations.

From the sandswept streets of Timbuktu to the stately monuments of Cape Town, South Africa, new leaders are experimenting with new ways to address Africa's problems, and new freedoms are flourishing in places that once knew only repression and dictatorship.

Some have proved unexpected success stories, such as South Africa, where the leadership of President Nelson Mandela and the spirit of reconciliation that he represents shine like a beacon of hope for the rest of the continent. Benin, Malawi, Zambia and Namibia are among other countries that have peacefully managed the transition to democracy.

Africa's seeming tendency toward violence should be seen in the context of these seismic changes, argues Gen. Amadou Toumani Toure. He helped bring democracy to Mali,