

Mr. HOKE. Mr. Speaker, I think that you are aware that as the Chairman of the Committee on the Budget Working Group on National Security, I have spent a great deal of time with respect to the Department of Energy and examining the needs and missions of the Department of Energy and making a full investigation into what is going on there.

As a result of that, it has been called to my attention, and I have found out a great deal about certain travel habits of the Secretary of Energy from the perspective of the monies that have been transferred from the accounts in the programs that safeguard nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, away from those programs and into the travel accounts.

I wanted, today, to talk about a different problem that has been brought to my attention with respect to the travel. The Secretary has justified these trips, among other reasons, for the benefit that they have brought to American companies that have been able to generate a great deal of commercial transactions as a result.

In fact, the Secretary has made claims of about \$20 billion with respect to the amount of transactions that have been entered into as a result of her travels.

□ 1600

In fact, it has not been brought to my attention that there have been any more than about \$400,000 or \$500,000 of actual committed contracts; and what I wanted to talk about today was the cancellation of the Enron contract, which I believe can be tried directly to the Secretary's involvement.

In other words, what I am saying is that not only has the Secretary of Energy not been able to catalyze these contracts, but in this case, has actually damaged the relationship between the United States and India to the extent that the Enron contract has been canceled.

Mr. Speaker, today there was a Washington Times article about the cancellation of what is nearly a \$2.8 billion power plant project at Dabhoi in Maharashtra, India. That is the state of which Bombay is the capital. This is where the Enron deal has been taking place.

They are building a nuclear plant there. It involves the Enron Corp., the U.S. corporation, General Electric, and Bechtel. This is a deal that had a great deal of support from OPIC and from the Export-Import Bank, and it has been the target of intense criticism by nationalists in India.

Nonetheless, President Clinton felt that it was necessary to sanction two trade missions to India, led by Secretary O'Leary, in July 1994 and then in February 1995, trips that served to raise the profile of the already controversial Enron deal.

In the wake of the February trade mission, the Maharashtra state government was defeated by a nationalist co-

alition that ran on its distinctly anti-American platform with particular venom reserved for the Enron deal.

Nevertheless, the new state government and Maharashtra did not immediately terminate the Enron deal. That came only very, very recently, in the last 3 days, after Secretary O'Leary very unwisely threatened the Indian Government, without Clinton administration approval, by stating that, "The failure to honor the agreements between the project partners and the various Indian governments will jeopardize not only the Dabhoi project, but also the other private power projects that are being proposed for international financing."

It has been widely reported in the Indian press that as a result of that, this blatant intimidation tactic on the part of Secretary O'Leary inflamed the national sentiments in this state of India during what was already a very, very tough and sensitive process in terms of trying to save this deal. Then the governments of Dabhoi and Maharashtra canceled this.

I want to share with my colleagues just two thoughts about this, because I think it is important to understand that the conducting of this trade mission has not only been an expensive boondoggle serving the Secretary's wanderlust, but in this case, the intimidating and blatant threats have actually killed the deal.

I want to show my colleagues that this is something that the Secretary sent to all of the people that were on the trade mission in February. It says, "A Mission to India." It is an alternative view by Carl Stoiber. Carl Stoiber is the director of international programs for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This was produced and distributed out of Secretary O'Leary's office.

As can be seen, there is a one cartoon, she says, "Yes, the Air Force runs a really great flying cocktail lounge." Here is another one, "Let's make sure we stop in Shannon on the return flight." They did, in fact, stop in Shannon.

The last one I want to show, and we can understand how perhaps the Indian Government might take some offense, there is a can of milk; it says, "not concentrated milk." It says, "simmered milk," and then it has a picture of a cow and it says "with cow dung patties."

This was distributed by the Secretary of Energy and sent out from her office. I think it is time that we had a full-scale investigation of the travel office and the travels of the Secretary of Energy.

KOREAN WAR MEMORIAL

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, with all the rush of events, before we take a

long 5-week break, I wanted to mention what will be one of my greatest memories serving in Washington, and that was the dedication a few days ago of the Korean War Memorial.

It was absolutely an inspiring day. Veterans of the Korean conflict came from all over the country, some from around the world, to be part of this memorial ceremony. Most of them were a bit hurt that it was not a Ronald Reagan or someone like that to officiate as the Commander in Chief.

They felt the speech that Mr. Clinton delivered could have been the very same speech with the word "Vietnam" transposed instead of the word "Korea." They are both small Asian countries, almost the same identical population, both divided as a fallout of World War II and the end of colonialism, whether it was French colonialism or Japanese imperial warlord colonialism.

One had a DMZ on either side of the 30th parallel; the other had a DMZ on either side of the 17th parallel. As we look across the reflecting ponds from this uplifting Korean War Memorial, we think how sad the struggle was, the birth pangs of the Vietnam Memorial which came chronologically, in a strange way ahead of the Korean Memorial. One can see that, by design, the Korean Memorial was to elicit not a feeling of inspiration, which turned out to be true the minute the first hero's name was etched into the black marble, but somehow or another was supposedly to evoke shame, a black gash in the ground the way it was described by its 21-year-old young architect.

No American flag was ever to be on top, in front of or at either end of that memorial.

I was in pilot training when the Korean War mercifully came to an end after two years and thousands of deaths while they argued over a negotiating table, the same way the Vietnam War dragged on for two or three years from 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, all over arguments, in the same city, Paris basically, P'anmunjom, Paris, the same type of communist negotiators, never negotiating in good faith. It was tragic.

Those of us who were veterans, in the House fought to get a flag at the Vietnam Memorial, and they made us take it off the top, put it down in front in the grassy courtyard area where the gash was to be cut into the earth, the depression. Then we fought for a statue of three Americans, a Hispanic-American, an African-American, a heritage soldier, a soldier representing all of the other various heritages.

Now, I can totally understand why Native Americans who fought in every one of our wars and on both sides of the so-called Plains Wars would like some sort of recognition with a memorial, and I promised the Native American Indian vets that I would fight for that.

Mr. Speaker, we finally got the statue approved. It is beautiful and inspirational. When we left the room, a source

told me later, they pushed the flag and the three beautiful soldiers into the woods where they are today, around the flag. It has a great memorial plaque. It says, These men fought wonderfully.

There are eight women's names on the Vietnam Wall, and it says, Under very difficult circumstances. This is Vietnam.

Yes, the same type of difficult circumstances with no win nor strategy for victory in Korea, but at least, in Korea, half a victory. Korea is now the 14th most vibrant economic nation in the world. There was a half a victory there, half the country is free.

But we walked out on our allies in Vietnam. The end result was the killing fields, 68,000 of our friends executed, in concentration camps, killing fields in Laos, 750,000 dead. In the South China Sea, pirates, rape, murder, sharks, drowning, all of that dismissed by Mr. Clinton when he tries to normalize with the communist congress in Hanoi.

Well, Mr. Speaker, yesterday in the Wall Street Journal, Thursday, August 3, there was an article, "How North Vietnam Won the War." I ask unanimous consent to put this in the RECORD. When we come back in, I will take a special order and read it word for word slowly.

I am not being humorous, Mr. Speaker. Every single question a young scholar would want to know about Vietnam is in this Wall Street Journal article. It will go in today's RECORD.

[From the Wall Street Journal, Aug. 3, 1995]

HOW NORTH VIETNAM WON THE WAR

What did the North Vietnamese leadership think of the American antiwar movement? What was the purpose of the Tet Offensive? How could the U.S. have been more successful in fighting the Vietnam War? Bui Tin, a former colonel in the North Vietnamese army, answers these questions in the following excerpts from an interview conducted by Stephen Young, a Minnesota attorney and human-rights activist. Bui Tin, who served on the general staff of North Vietnam's army, received the unconditional surrender of South Vietnam on April 30, 1975. He later became editor of the official newspaper of Vietnam, he now lives in Paris, where he immigrated after becoming disillusioned with the fruits of Vietnamese communism.

Question: How did Hanoi intend to defeat the Americans?

Answer: By fighting a long war which would break their will to help South Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh said.

Question: How did Hanoi intend to defeat the Americans?

Q: Was the American antiwar movement important to Hanoi's victory?

A: It was essential to our strategy. Support for the war from our rear was completely secure while the American rear was vulnerable. Every day our leadership would listen to world news over the radio at 9 a.m. to follow the growth of the American antiwar movement. Visits to Hanoi by people like Jane Fonda and former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and ministers gave us confidence that we should hold on in the face of battlefield reverses. We were elated when Jane Fonda, wearing a red Vietnamese dress, said at a press conference that she was ashamed of American actions in the war and that she would struggle along with us.

Q: Did the Politburo pay attention to these visits?

A: Keenly.

Q: Why?

A: Those people represented the conscience of America. The conscience of America was part of its war-making capability, and we were turning that power in our favor. America lost because of its democracy; through dissent and protest it lost the ability to mobilize a will to win.

Q: How could the Americans have won the war?

A: Cut the Ho Chi Minh trail inside Laos. If Johnson had granted [Gen. William] Westmoreland's requests to enter Laos and block the Ho Chi Minh trail, Hanoi could not have won the war.

Q: Anything else?

A: Train South Vietnam's generals. The junior South Vietnamese officers were good, competent and courageous, but the commanding general officers were inept.

Q: Did Hanoi expect that the National Liberation Front would win power in South Vietnam?

A: No. Gen. [Vo Nguyen] Glap [commander of the North Vietnamese army] believed that guerilla warfare was important but not sufficient for victory. Regular military divisions with artillery and armor would be needed. The Chinese believed in fighting only with guerrillas, but we had a different approach. The Chinese were reluctant to help us. Le Duan [secretary general of the Vietnamese Communist Party] once told Mao Tse-tung that if you help us, we are sure to win; if you don't, we will still win, but we will have to sacrifice one, or two million more soldiers to do so.

Q: Was the National Liberation Front an independent political movement of South Vietnamese?

A: No. It was set up by our Communist Party to implement a decision of the Third Party Congress of September 1960. We always said there was only one party, only one army in the war to liberate the South and unify the nation. At all times there was only one party commissar in command of the South.

Q: Why was the Ho Chi Minh trail so important?

A: It was the only way to bring sufficient military power to bear on the fighting in the South. Building and maintaining the trail was a huge effort, involving tens of thousands of soldiers, drivers, repair teams, medical stations, communication units.

A: Not very effective. Our operations were never compromised by attacks on the trail. At times, accurate B-52 strikes would cause real damage, but we put so much in at the top of the trail that enough men and weapons to prolong the war always came out the bottom. Bombing by smaller planes rarely hit significant targets.

Q: What of American bombing of North Vietnam?

A: If all the bombing has been concentrated at one time, it would have hurt our efforts. But the bombing was expanded in slow stages under Johnson and it didn't worry us. We had plenty of time to prepare alternative routes and facilities. We always had stockpiles of rice ready to feed the people for months if a harvest were damaged. The Soviets bought rice from Thailand for us.

Q: What was the purpose of the 1968 Tet Offensive?

A: To relieve the pressure Gen. Westmoreland was putting on us in late 1966 and 1967 and to weaken American resolve during a presidential election year.

Q: What about Gen. Westmoreland's strategy and tactics caused you concern?

A: Our senior commander in the South, Gen. Nguyen Chi Thanh, knew that we were

losing base areas, control of the rural population and that his main forces were being pushed out to the borders of South Vietnam. He also worried that Westmoreland might receive permission to enter Laos and cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

In January 1967, after discussions with Le Duan, Gen. Thanh proposed the Tet Offensive. Thanh was the senior member of the Politburo in South Vietnam. He supervised the entire war effort. Thanh's struggle philosophy was that "America is wealthy but not resolute," and "squeeze tight to the American chest and attack." He was invited up to Hanoi for further discussions. He went on commercial flights with a false passport from Cambodia to Hong Kong and then to Hanoi. Only in July was his plan adopted by the leadership. Then Johnson had rejected Westmoreland's request for 200,000 more troops. We realized that America had made its maximum military commitment to the war. Vietnam was not sufficiently important for the United States to call up its reserves. We had stretched American power to a breaking point. When more frustration set in, all the Americans could do would be to withdraw; they had no more troops to send over.

Tet was designed to influence American public opinion. We would attack poorly defended parts of South Vietnam cities during a holiday and a truce when few South Vietnamese troops would be on duty. Before the main attack, we would entice American units to advance close to the borders, away from the cities. By attacking all South Vietnam's major cities, we would spread out our forces and neutralize the impact of American firepower. Attacking on a broad front, we would lose some battles but win others. We used local forces nearby each target to frustrate discovery of our plans. Small teams like the one which attacked the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, would be sufficient. It was a guerrilla strategy of hit-and-run raids.

Q: What about the results?

A: Our losses were staggering and a complete surprise. Giap later told me that Tet had been a military defeat, though we had gained the planned political advantages when Johnson agreed to negotiate and did not run for re-election. The second and third waves in May and September were, in retrospect, mistakes. Our forces in the South were nearly wiped out by all the fighting in 1968. It took us until 1971 to re-establish our presence, but we had to use North Vietnamese troops as local guerrillas. If the American forces had not begun to withdraw under Nixon in 1969, they could have punished us severely. We suffered badly in 1969 and 1970 as it was.

Q: What of Nixon?

A: Well, when Nixon stepped down because of Watergate we knew we would win. Pham Van Dong [prime minister of North Vietnam] said of Gerald Ford, the new president, "he's the weakest president in U.S. history; the people didn't elect him; even if you gave him candy, he doesn't dare to intervene in Vietnam again." We tested Ford's resolve by attacking Phuoc Long in January 1995. When Ford kept American B-52's in their hangers our leadership decided on a big offensive against South Vietnam.

Q: What else?

A: We had the impression that American commanders had their hands tied by political factors. Your generals could never deploy a maximum force for greatest military effect.