

few weeks, first at a series of meetings in Brussels at the end of this month by the Association of South East Asian Nations, and then on the occasion of the August 6 and 9 anniversaries of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The Bosnian crisis does not appear to have contributed to the decline in Mr. Chirac's popularity.

But it was noteworthy yesterday that prime minister Alain Juppe, whose remit is mainly domestic policy, fared far better in the Ifop poll than his president. His "satisfaction" rating fell from 55 to 51 per cent over this past month.

A PENTAGON SHELL GAME WITH EVERYTHING TO LOSE

(By Frank von Hippel)

Around the world, expressions of outrage have greeted French President Jacques Chirac's decision to carry out major nuclear weapons tests—some perhaps as large as 100,000 tons TNT equivalent—in the South Pacific this winter. France characterizes the tests as the "last" before a comprehensive test ban is signed next year. Little attention, however, has been paid to France's determination to conduct powerful "small" tests—100 or 200 tons TNT-equivalent—forever.

This would be a perfect time for the United States to urge Chirac to reconsider this position. Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration is not doing so. Instead, its attention is focused on a Pentagon proposal to leapfrog the French position and require that the comprehensive test ban allow tests with even larger yields.

A test ban that allowed tests with yields of hundreds of tons would create an opening for efforts to develop "usable" "micro-nukes" and "mini-nukes." It would therefore be seen as a fraud by virtually all of the 170 non-nuclear states that agreed this spring to an indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty after receiving a commitment that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would be signed next year.

The Pentagon, like the French military, argues that it will lose confidence that its weapons will retain their destructive power if it cannot see their fission triggers tested now and then at partial yield. Lack of confidence is a psychological state, however, in this case largely self-inflicted by the Pentagon's requirement that the power of warheads be guaranteed to within a margin for which there is no military justification. Any objective assessment of the record of more than 1,000 U.S. nuclear tests would give great confidence that the immense destructive power of the current stockpile can be maintained without detonation tests. This confidence extends to faithful copies of these weapons if it becomes necessary to remanufacture them.

Those arguing the contrary position often ask rhetorically, "Would you expect your car to work if you stored it for 20 years without testing?" Of course not, but the analogy is misleading. A nuclear warhead "works" only one time. Still, if you supported multibillion-dollar laboratories to test the components of your car under stressful conditions, adjusting and replacing them as necessary, would it work? You bet it would.

The functioning of nuclear warheads is also checked by replacing the plutonium with an inert simulant and then using a powerful X-ray machine to verify that it implodes into a configuration that would produce a nuclear explosion of the desired yield. All of our nuclear weapons have been designed with these and other sophisticated implosion tests before actual testing. As a result, the nuclear tests were successful with remarkably few exceptions.

Test ban opponents have made much of the few cases where there were surprises in tests of new warhead designs. But in every case, a new feature—for example, a new type of chemical explosive—had been introduced whose performance was known by the designers to be questionable under some conditions. Such problems have little relevance to the well-tested designs in the enduring stockpile.

To the argument that use of a new plastic or a change in the technique used to manufacture plutonium components might degrade the performance of the warheads, we would respond, "Don't fiddle with them." At the same time, experience has shown that the designs are robust enough to tolerate the inevitable minor changes that would occur in remanufacture. There were more differences between the warheads in the stockpile and the prototypes made by the nuclear-weapons laboratories than there would be with future remanufactured warheads. Yet both worked.

Based on U.S. experience, the objective value of "reliability" tests is negligible in comparison with the cost of renegeing on the deal with the non-weapons state, which promises that we will all work together against the spread and to reduce the numbers of these terrible devices. President Clinton should reject the demands of those who would test forever and should urge President Chirac to do the same.

REPORT ON RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 1555, THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1995

Mr. LINDER, from the Committee on Rules, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 104-223) on the resolution (H. Res. 207) providing for consideration of the Communications Act of 1995, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

□ 1845

UNITED STATES-RUSSIAN JOINT EFFORTS

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. METCALF). Under the Speaker's announced policy of May 12, 1995, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WELDON] is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I will not take the entire hour, but rise this evening to focus on an issue that will be heavily discussed tomorrow and later this week as we vote on the next fiscal year Defense appropriation bill.

Mr. Speaker, I think it is important that we approach defense spending in this day and age with a very cautious eye to what is happening, not just in the Soviet Union, but around the world. To that extent, I will be entering some documents into the RECORD this evening. I think Members should especially focus on, not just for the votes that will occur tomorrow and the rest of the week, but also for debate that we will be having further on in this session of Congress, during the conference process and as we begin to debate the relative importance of continuing within the confines of the ABM Treaty.

First of all, Mr. Speaker, let me say I rise as a 9-year member of the National Security Committee and the current chairman of the Research and Development Subcommittee, and as someone who is not just a self-proclaimed hardliner when it comes to dealing with the former Soviet Union and now Russia, as well as those rogue nations around the world, but as someone who spent the bulk of my last 20 years working on building bridges with the Russian people.

My approach to Russia is one of pragmatism. Reach out to the Russian people, work with them, build relationships on trust and mutual cooperation, but hold them accountable when they violate treaties on defense and foreign policy issues.

My background is in Russian studies, my undergraduate degree is in that area. Twenty years ago I spoke the language fluently. I have traveled throughout the country, stayed in Russian people's homes, and I have this year hosted well over 100 members of the Duma in various meetings and sessions.

Mr. Speaker, currently I am the cochair of the Russian-American Energy Caucus with my colleagues, the gentleman from Texas, GREG LAUGHLIN, on the Republican side, and the gentleman from Maryland, STENY HOYER, and the gentleman from Illinois, GLENN POSHARD, on the Democratic side. Working with the 16 multinational energy corporations, we attempt to foster relationships that build bridges between our energy corporations and joint venture opportunities in Russia to allow them to bring in the hard currency they need. Most recently, this past year, we worked with our administration and members of the Duma to complete the final support and approval within the Duma for the Sakhalin project, a project that is in fact the largest energy project in the history of not just Russia, but the entire world, that will ultimately see approximately \$10 to \$15 billion of western investment through companies like McDermott Marathon go into the Sakhalin area for development of Russian energy resources.

Mr. Speaker, we are also working on the Caspian Sea project, which we hope will provide a force to unify some of the warring factions down in the Caspian Sea area, and also further help stabilize the Russian economy through development of their energy resources.

Mr. Speaker, I also cochair an effort working with the Duma members on environmental issues. Just last year I led a delegation of Members to Murmansk, the North Sea fleet, to talk about how we could work with them in finding ways of disposing of the Russian nuclear waste that is coming from the dismantlement of their ships and their submarines, as well as to try to help the Russians stop what has been a recurring practice over the past two decades of dumping nuclear reactors

and nuclear waste into the Bering Sea, the Arctic Ocean, and even out in the East, in the Sea of Japan. That effort is paying tremendous dividends, and there is an ongoing effort right now among members of the parliaments of not just Russia, but the European Parliament, the Japanese Diet, and our Congress to focus on this as one of our major priorities, the stopping of all dumping of waste, especially nuclear waste, in the oceans of the world. To that extent we held a conference here in Washington just a month ago where we had attendees from Russia, Japan, Europe, and the United States in trying to form a cooperative relationship in dealing with these problems.

Mr. Speaker, we are currently working with the Russian shipyard at St. Petersburg, the Baltic shipyard, to convert it to an environmental remediation center, where Russian workers who formerly built warships can be trained to dismantle old rusty vessels where the steel can be melted down and reused to benefit the Russian economy.

Mr. Speaker, we are working in Siberia, Nizhnyansk, in a joint venture to establish environmental opportunities with American firms and Russian firms to create jobs and economic opportunity and to also help stabilize environmental problems in Russia.

Third, Mr. Speaker, we are working on an effort to establish a joint Duma-Congress relationship between members of the Duma Defense Committee and members of our National Security Committee. Two months ago, the gentleman from South Carolina, FLOYD SPENCE, chairman of the Committee on National Security, the gentleman from Louisiana, BOB LIVINGSTON, chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, and the gentleman from California, DUNCAN HUNTER, chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Procurement, and I met for 3 hours with five members of the Russian Duma Defense Committee.

Mr. Speaker, the purpose of that meeting was to reach out to them and say look, we are not out to establish some kind of a dominant relationship over your people or your country, we are out to work with you, to change the whole notion of the way that we focus our efforts in the world, so that instead of building up more and more nuclear weapons and continuing this ridiculous posture of mutually assured destruction, to move toward a defensive posture where we asked the Russians and their leadership and their technical experts to work with us in developing defensive capabilities, much like Ronald Reagan first proposed some 10 years ago. In fact, we had that meeting, which was very successful, and we are currently planning on taking a group of similar leaders to Russia to continue that dialog with members of the Russia Duma Defense Committee.

Mr. Speaker, all of these efforts are designed to show that yes, we must reach out to the Russian people, to their government, to their leaders, to

show them that we sincerely want to work with them to bring about the economic reforms that they want, the political reforms, the freedoms that they long for. But at the same time, we must not underestimate what is happening within the former Soviet Union, and now Russian, military.

□ 2000

Many of those military leaders there today were in power during the Soviet regime. Many of the ideals and goals of those leaders are similar today to what they were then, and we must understand that.

We must deal with the Russian leadership from a position of understanding while showing compassion and willingness to work with them to help stabilize their economy and their country.

Mr. Speaker, before continuing, I yield to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. LINDER].

Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, the point being that we must continue to reach out to the Russian people and their leadership. As a Member of Congress, I pledge my efforts to reach out to members of their Duma. But we must also let them understand that we will not be shortsighted, that we will not allow blinders to be pulled over our eyes in terms of what is happening in their country.

Mr. Speaker, it is not just talk or rhetoric that is important; it is the substance and actual extent of involvement of both countries in bringing about long-term peaceful relations. My own fear as a member of the Committee on National Security is that our two biggest security threats, as we approach the next century, involve terrorism throughout the world and in this country, and the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. To that extent, we must understand what our threats are, what we can do about those threats and how we can work with our allies and countries like Russia to develop common defenses against those threats.

Some in this body would have us believe that the Russians are no longer putting money into sophisticated weapons systems. Mr. Speaker, that is just not true.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to submit for the RECORD an article taken from the FBIS reports, which I scan on a daily basis. This article is taken from Moscow Kommersant-Daily, printed in Russian on July 20 of this year, entitled "START II Treaty Ratification Seen Assured," and in it the author Aleksandr Koretskiy, goes through the determination that it is in Russia's best interest to ratify START II and, therefore, that will occur.

What is interesting in the article, that we should be aware of, is that the Russians are still developing state-of-the-art military technology.

A number of statements were made in the hearings,

these are hearings among the Duma members,

each of which, in fact, amounts to a sensation. First, Russia is developing, at the design stage so far, a new submarine missile cruiser. To all appearances, its technological performance will by far eclipse that of the American 'Ohio' type subs which form the basis of the U.S. nuclear forces until the year 2020 at a minimum. In other words, Russia plans for more than one day ahead despite the unprecedented cuts in funds for military R&D.

Second, a new missile for bombers is being developed which will make it possible to keep them effective also into the start of the next century at small cost. Work is in progress also in other fields.

The point of this article is that Russia, while it has certainly cut back its funds for the military, is still developing state-of-the-art technologies, not just to match what America has, but to give them an edge, an edge that we have to be able to deal with through the turn of the century.

Mr. Speaker, I include the article for the RECORD:

START II TREATY RATIFICATION SEEN ASSURED

[Report by Aleksandr Koretskiy: "START II Hearings. Cuts Are In Order Because There Are No Maintenance Funds"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The ratification of the START II treaty (on further cutting and limiting strategic offensive weapons) will help Russia minimize the difference between its nuclear potential and that of the United States. As for Russia's counter-force potential, it will even grow 20 percent despite the cuts as a result of the implementation of START II owing to a marked decrease in the corresponding potential of the United States. Such is only the smaller part of the arguments by those who advocate the ratification of the treaty voiced in the course of the first open hearings in the Duma. The final conclusions on the feasibility and, perhaps, additional terms of ratification will be drawn in September—there will be separate hearings on the financial aspects of START II implementation. One can already today, however, say with confidence: despite the pessimistic forecasts of its opponents, the treaty will be ratified with no special problems by the current State Duma.

The treaty was signed by Boris Yeltsin and George Bush in Moscow 3 January 1993. Many a lance has been broken since over the ratification problem both in Russia and the United States: some congressmen are sure that START II considerably lowers America's defense potential. A similar view, but as applied to Russia, is also voiced by a number of Russian deputies. The Russian politicians primarily doubt the feasibility of what is at first sight an abrupt change in the structure of the Russian strategic nuclear forces: under the treaty, the sea-based component of Russia's nuclear forces should be upped from 30 percent to between 50 and 58 percent. And this should be done by cutting the number of ground-based missiles. Russia will in fact have to scrap the new generation SS-18 and SS-19 ground-based intercontinental missiles. Shifting the center of gravity to sea-based missiles can take place only in theory: 90 percent of the submarine missile cruisers were built before 1990, which implies that their service life will be up in the year 2015. Russia actually does not build new subs—their keels have been laid but construction has been halted by lack of funds. A relative stability will only prevail in strategic aviation—the fleet of Tu-95 MS and Tu-160 bombers will be cut under the treaty by as little as 24 bombers. By 1998, the Air Force is supposed to have not more than 113 planes

whereas their number today is 137, and 53 of them are outside Russia (7 in Kazakhstan and 44 in Ukraine), for which reason no Russian planes should be scrapped. Incidentally, it came to light during the hearings that Moscow did not lose all interest in Ukrainian strategic aviation at all—the Russian Air Force is still counting on it.

All the military strategy doubts of the politicians were dispelled by Vladimir Zhurbenko, first deputy chief of the General Staff. He thinks that by cutting the number of warheads to 3,500, START II facilitates the formation of a grouping of strategic offensive forces which is adequate to that of the United States. Indeed, reducing the number of warheads mounted on intercontinental missiles and submarine-based missiles does not call for remodeling or replacing the MRV [multiple reentry vehicle] platform and the destruction of the warheads removed from them, which gives potential advantages—this creates the danger of a quick increase in nuclear potential if the United States pulls out of the treaty. In this case, the United States will have more warheads than Russia by 55 percent. But this is still less than what it would have had under START I. This is to say, the United States is not getting a real edge, while Russia retains the effectiveness of its nuclear forces in retaliatory actions.

As regards the change in the structure, Zhurbenko stated that it would have to be altered in any case—most ground-based missiles are at the end of their useful life. They are supposed to be replaced by new missiles which Russia does not have. More accurately, there is no base for building heavy missiles of the SS-18 and SS-19 type which are produced in the Ukrainian "Yuzhmash." In principle, industrial cooperation could be arranged, but after Kiev joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, this opportunity was lost. As a result, Russia is able today to produce on its own only one type of missile—the single warhead "Topol," on whose basis its ground based forces will be developing. Plans call for production of two versions of this missile—one for the existing mobile missile systems, and the new "Topol-M" system.

An important START II provision, the military thinks, is the fact that, in the number of warheads, the treaty brings U.S. nuclear forces down closer to a level which Russia is objectively capable of maintaining. The Russian military, one might say, dreamed of really counting in the warheads carried by bombers provided for by START II. The thing is that under START I, each Russian strategic bomber can carry 8 nuclear-tipped missiles (in reality this figure is 6), whereas a U.S. Air Force bomber can carry 10 missiles (in reality 20).

Generally, the military and diplomats convinced the deputies: START II is almost manna as far as Russia is concerned. At any rate, Russia cannot afford forces that the USSR could have hardly maintained. The problem is not so much direct funding but also the industrial and technological base that ended up on the territory of independent CIS republics. When all is said and done, we should also take account of Russia's new geostrategic situation, different foreign policy priorities, and the development of military technology.

Apropos of technology. A number of statements were made in the hearings, each of which, in fact, amounts to a sensation. First, Russia is developing (at the design stage so far) a new submarine missile cruiser. To all appearances, its technological performance will by far eclipse that of the American "Ohio" type subs which form the basis of the U.S. nuclear forces until the year 2020 at the minimum. In other words, Russia plans for more than one day ahead despite the unprec-

edented cuts in funds for military R&D. Second, a new missile for bombers is being developed which will make it possible to keep them effective also into the start of the next century at small cost. Work is in progress also in other fields.

The deputies' reaction to the reports of military and independent experts and the nature of the questions asked make it possible to claim: the Duma is not only going to ratify START II, but it may also pass a special Russian strategic nuclear forces development program with corresponding funds.

On the issue of a new superfighter, in a FBIS report summarizing a Moscow Interfax article, dated July 20 of this year, talking about the capabilities of the new Russian superfighter, and I will quote:

"The Sukhoy Design Bureau will exhibit its latest product, the superfighter Su-35, at the MAKS-95 Moscow air show in August," this month, "the bureau's designer-general, Mikhail Siminov, told a solemn meeting on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Pavel Sukhoy's birthday. Siminov told Interfax that Su-35 was a dramatically modified version of the Su-27 jet. However, the new aircraft differed from the original by its exceptional maneuverability, adjustable thrust vector, new armament system to simultaneously destroy 6 ground and naval targets and artificial-intelligence computer."

He goes on to say, "'In the West, such fighters do not yet exist,' Siminov said. 'The only exception is the U.S.-made X-31, but no other analogues will appear within the next five years,' he added.

"If sufficient funds are set aside by the state, Russia's superfighter Su-27 and versions of it will occupy the first position in the world's arms market in the third millennium, Western experts say.

"At present, Russia's Air Forces have over 250 Su-27 fighters."

Mr. Speaker, I include the article for the RECORD:

MILITARY, NUCLEAR & SPACE ISSUES

MOSCOW, July 20.—The Sukhoy Design Bureau will exhibit its latest product, the superfighter Su-35, at the MAKS-95 Moscow air show in August, the bureau's designer-general, Mikhail Simonov, told a solemn meeting on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Pavel Sukhoy's birthday.

Simonov told INTERFAX that Su-35 was a dramatically modified version of the well-known Su-27 jet. However, the new aircraft differed from the original by its exceptional maneuverability, adjustable thrust vector, new armament system to simultaneously destroy six ground and naval targets and artificial-intelligence computer.

"In the West such fighters do not yet exist," Simonov said. The only exception is the U.S.-made X-31, but no other analogues will appear within the next five years, he added.

If sufficient funds are set aside by the state, Russia's superfighter Su-27 and versions of it will occupy the first position on the world's arms market in the third millennium, western experts say.

At present, Russia's air forces have over 250 Su-27 fighters.

Mr. Speaker, evidence that Russia is still continuing to develop state-of-the-

art technology. Not just for its own protection, but perhaps more significantly to begin to sell these conventional arms to other nations that may not have the same peaceful intentions as Russia's current civilian leaders and we have.

Mr. Speaker, we witnessed this past year the selling of three Russian submarines to Iran. We have witnessed efforts to sell technology to China. As a matter of fact, I was aghast when I read that we were, in fact, allowing proliferation to occur involving the Russians in countries where we could have imposed sanctions and yet had backed down on repeated occasions.

Mr. Speaker, this is an issue that this body has got to deal with, an issue that we have got to confront. It is important for Members, as we get ready to debate the issue of defense appropriations levels for next year and the defense conference process that will unfold in the fall, that we understand what is happening, based on the facts. It is important that we understand proliferation that is occurring throughout the world, not just by Russia, but by other countries.

China is a perfect example. The Clinton administration, Mr. Speaker, to my mind, seems incapable of employing a toughness in terms of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

A good example of that is China's sale of missiles and missile technology to Iran and Pakistan. Classified evidence of these sanctionable transactions have been on the books since the President's first day in office.

What has been the President's response? First, the State Department tried to sanction China's missile maker, the Great Wall Industries, but not long after, withdrew those sanctions. Then United States officials claimed that they had secured Chinese pledges not to proliferate.

Evidence of Chinese missile proliferation to Iran and Pakistan continued and was leaked in the press last month. This evidence continues to mount. So far this administration has taken no new action.

And then there is Russia, Mr. Speaker. Here the administration lifted sanctions that were imposed by the Bush administration against Glavkosmos, a Russian firm that violated the MTCR, missile technology control regime, guidelines. It had exported sensitive upper-stage rocket technology to India's Indian Scientific Research Organization, including production and integration technology. This know-how could help India extend the range of its missiles to reach Beijing and improve Indian upper rocket stages in general.

In exchange for Russian pledges to stop such technology transfers to India, the administration, in September 1993, offered Moscow hundreds of millions of dollars in space cooperation projects.

Mr. Speaker, I am not saying that we should not cooperate, but we have got to set a tone of firmness. When countries, whether it be China or Russia,

violate proliferation agreements and violate understandings that we have, this administration has got to be firm. That has not worked.

What Clinton officials have chosen not to do about MTCR violations, however, is far less disturbing than what they recently announced that they are planning to do. That is to make MTCR members of the nations that are violating the regime. The Clinton administration hopes this will encourage problem proliferators to become part of the nonproliferation solution. In fact, I think it is shortsighted diplomatic public relations that will trivialize the MTCR and, worse, turn the regime into a major proliferation promotion organization.

How is this possible? Simple. Both U.S. law and the missile technology control regime guidelines discourage U.S. exporters and other members of the MTCR against selling missile technology to non-MTCR members who have missile projects of concern or who have had a bad track record proliferating missile technology to other nations.

Once these countries are made members of MTCR, which the Clinton administration proposes to do now, there is a legal presumption of approval for the very missile transfers that were previously barred, which means that once these countries are able to be a part of the MTCR, they can sell their missiles without any sanctions being available to the United States and other countries.

Under U.S. law, a nation that becomes a member of the MTCR can no longer be sanctioned for importing the hardware or technology needed to complete dangerous rockets or missiles or export it to any MTCR member.

What sort of nations might these be? Until the past few months, even the Clinton administration claimed that they included Brazil and Russia.

Mr. Speaker, I will enter into the RECORD, with unanimous consent, articles where Brazil, in fact, has been working on the capability for rocket technology which they have purchased from Russia through the black market. And I will provide an article once again from the FBIS documents that Members can read.

In addition, Brazil has made it known that they would like to have the capability that one of the most sophisticated Russian rockets offers in terms of a space launch capability.

SS-25 is perhaps the most sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missile that Russia has today. It has a range of 10,500 kilometers. It can hit any city in any part of America with that range. It is a mobile-launched system, launched off of the back of a mobile-launch tractor that can be moved around the country. Russia has somewhere less than a thousand of these launchers throughout Russia and the former Soviet republics.

Each missile battery has the potential of launching three missiles, which

currently have nuclear warheads on them. However, what Russia has been doing for the past 2 years is, it has been trying to sell a version, a modified version, of the SS-25 to any country that, in fact, would want to have a space launch capability.

What problems does this present for us? Well, imagine, Mr. Speaker, a missile that has a range of 10,500 kilometers. Take the nuclear warhead off of that missile and modify it to become a space launch vehicle, and you can offer it for sale to anyone.

Brazil has been very interested in acquiring this capability and, in fact, had a tentative deal worked out until the administration and Members of Congress, including myself, stepped up and said, "We cannot allow this to go forward;" and Brazil temporarily backed off. We understand Russia has had other discussions with other countries who would like to use this technology for space launch purposes.

Now, you are not going to have a nuclear warhead on this missile, but, Mr. Speaker, what we are talking about doing is giving other nations the capability that comes with a missile that has a range of 10,500 kilometers. Furthermore, if you believe what the Clinton administration tells us in terms of the current command and control of the Russian nuclear arsenal, that all dissipates when you take the SS-25, as modified, and you give it to a Russian profitmaking venture to market on the open market as a space launch vehicle.

That is exactly what is happening today. In fact, several months ago, the world witnessed the first unsuccessful launch of an SS-25 modified rocket with an Israeli satellite on board from the Pozitiskiya Aerodrome. It was not successful, and the rocket and the satellite fell into the Sea of Okhotsk. The fact remains, Mr. Speaker, that Russia is aggressively trying to export this technology.

Make no mistake about it, Mr. Speaker, I do not fear for the safety of our people from an all-out nuclear attack by Russia. That is not my concern. What I fear, Mr. Speaker, is the capability the Russians have with the SS-25 and the SS-18, which they are also currently trying to market for space launch purposes to a Third World rogue nation.

You give any of the rogue nations of this world one of those missile launch systems, allow them then to put a conventional weapon on board, a conventional bomb or perhaps a chemical or biological weapon, and with the range of an SS-18 or an SS-25, our country and our people are under direct threat.

Mr. Speaker, this is reality. This is not some hypothetical situation made up in some star wars movie. Mr. Speaker, this is what is occurring today inside of Russia as proliferation of these missiles is a top priority. As the Russians are looking for ways to bring in hard currency, they see one of the quickest ways as selling off this technology, like the SS-25 and the SS-18.

Mr. Speaker, here is the real problem, besides the lack of attention and focus by the administration and the clear and consistent policy to call these acts when they occur, like the recent sale of rocket motors to China by the Garrett Engine Co., which are being used for fighter planes.

But unless the administration takes some overt action this year, the technology will be transferred to China, which we think will allow them to increase the capability of their cruise missiles. This administration has remained silent on blocking that technology transfer.

Again, Mr. Speaker, what we are talking about, whether it is the SS-25, whether it is the SS-18, whether it is technology to help the Chinese improve their cruise missile capability, whether it is North Korea Taepo Dong-1 or -2, which has a range of 5,500 kilometers, which today could hit Guam or Alaska, Mr. Speaker, these are real situations that every Member of this body has to understand.

No longer can this body vote in a vacuum. We must understand and recognize the facts as they are. The documents that I am placing in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD today are factual statements by leaders in Russia, documented articles of situations occurring with China, North Korean developments in China. It will take only one of those systems to get in the hands of a rogue nation and then what do we do, Mr. Speaker?

□ 2015

General O'Neill, who is the administration's point person on missile defense, has said repeatedly in our congressional hearings this year that if a nation acquires the capability of an SS-25 or SS-18, or perhaps even a Taepo Dong II with a range of 5,500 kilometers, we, as a country, have no defense against an accidental or deliberate launch of one vehicle. We have no system available today, with all the money we spend on defense, with all the money we spend on military every year, we have no system available today to protect the American people from such a launch.

Mr. Speaker, to me that is outrageous, and to most of our colleagues in this body that is outrageous, and that is why this year, in our defense bills, we have plussed up missile defense accounts by about \$900 million in the House. Hopefully, through the conference process, we will come somewhere in between what the Senate plussed up, about \$600 or \$700 million, and what we plussed up.

We focused on four specific areas, Mr. Speaker. We focused on theater missile defense to give our troops protection when they are in a theater of operation against an incoming missile attack, like we saw in Desert Storm with the Scud. In the world today, 71 nations have cruise missiles, have the capability of attacking our soldiers and our allies. The only systems we have in

place today are the upgrades of the Patriot, quickly becoming outmoded. We have funded theater missile defense to allow us to continue to develop and deploy the most sophisticated theater based systems that money can buy, and our funding does that in this year's defense bill.

The second thing we did, Mr. Speaker, is we plussed up national missile defense spending. This will give us the eventual capability to protect the mainland of America against the kind of rogue launch that I talked about earlier. If a rogue nation were to get an SS-25 or an SS-18, or if North Korea would sell off a version of the Taepo Dong II, that we would be able to protect our people in this country from a single launch. We would not be able to protect our country if a massive launch were to occur, but, by all practical standards, we do not think that will happen.

No one can assure us, however, that a rogue nation will not get the capability of one, two, or three missiles, or, say, a battery of SS-25's that could be threatened to be launched against an American city. Today we have no protection for that, Mr. Speaker. Not one iota of protection. Our plus-up in the national missile defense account allows for \$400 million of increased funding that, even with this level of funding, will not allow us to deploy a program, in General O'Neill's estimation, until approximately 4 years. Four years of vulnerability.

If the people of this country see what has been happening around the world with terrorism, and see what happens when rogue nations and people like Saddam Hussein get capabilities beyond their ability to manage, we then are threatened, and for 4 years, under the administration's plan, we will have no protection, Mr. Speaker.

The third area that we plussed up funding was for a program called Brilliant Eyes. Brilliant Eyes is a space-based sensor program that will allow us to see a missile when it is launched. We do not have that capability today. If a rogue country launches a missile, and the ultimate destination is America, today we do not have a system in space that can tell us that launch has occurred. Why is that important? It is important because it gives us more time to take that missile out once it is launched, and to take it out on the rise as opposed to on the descent. We plus-up the Brilliant Eyes program to give us that technical capability.

The fourth thing we do in both the authorization and the appropriation bills is we plus-up funding for ballistic missiles by about \$75 million so that we can enhance our ability to protect our troops and our country against the very real threat of ballistic missiles that dominate the world today.

I mentioned, Mr. Speaker, 77 countries today have cruise missile capability. Seventy-seven countries. Twenty nations can build and are building cruise missiles today. Granted, some

are very crude, like the Scud system that we saw used by Iraq over in Desert Storm, but, Mr. Speaker, some of them are extremely sophisticated and present real challenges to us from a defensive posture.

Mr. Speaker, all the more reason why we have to focus on the threat that is out there and what is happening in these rogue nations. We have to understand that when we make a decision as to how much money we are going to spend on defense or on missile defense or missile proliferation activities that it must be based on sound scientific evidence.

Mr. Speaker, another article I want to submit for the RECORD is a recent publication appearing in the *Brooking Review* written by Bruce Blair entitled "Lengthening the Fuse", and, by the way, Mr. Blair has been a witness at hearings, primarily brought in by Democrats to testify on missile proliferation issues. This article is must reading for every member of this body, because Mr. Blair now makes the case that from the standpoint of operational safety, Russian's nuclear posture today is more dangerous than it was during the cold war.

He goes through the scenario of the possibilities for nuclear anarchy, from unauthorized use of weapons by rebellious commanders in the field, to political breakdown in Moscow, to a spread of nuclear weaponry and material on the global black-market.

Mr. Speaker, another article I will submit for publication in the RECORD today is an article within the Russian news media focusing on the problems of the control of the nuclear arsenal and the lack of adequate dollars to fund those military personnel who are monitoring on-site the Russian nuclear arsenal.

In that article there is discussion about the fact that you can have all the safeguards you want from a technology standpoint, but if the men and women who are monitoring those systems are not being paid, if they do have the quality of life issues that are important to them, the technical considerations go out the window, and that is the kind of threat that we have to fully assess.

Mr. Blair goes through that in great detail, and some of the quotes in here are the kinds of quotes that Members have to look at and understand, because they are critical to our posture in terms of defending our people in this country against what could happen in the former soviet Union. Let me quote just one piece from this article.

"The disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the dangers emerging from the attendant turmoil make loss of control the central problem of nuclear security. Indeed, the specter of nuclear anarchy in the former Soviet Union animates U.S. policy toward Russia."

He goes on to say, and I quote, "The specter of a catastrophic failure of nuclear command and control looms even larger."

Mr. Speaker, this is not some radical right wing conservation bashing the former Soviet Union. This is a respected individual who has studied the issue of command and control of the Russian nuclear arsenal. In fact, he goes on to say in his article that the Pentagon itself has conducted exercises to practice United States responses to nuclear anarchy in Russian, including scenarios that feature illicit strategic sites by Russian commanders. Can you imagine that, Mr. Speaker?

We now have evidence that our own Pentagon leaders have done practice sessions that, in fact, would have us assume that nuclear anarchy has broken out in Russia and that perhaps the American mainland is at threat. That is being done, Mr. Speaker, at a time where we have no capability to defend our mainland against a nuclear attack, either isolated or perhaps a multiweapon or multilaunched nuclear attack.

Another quote from Mr. Blair. "From the standpoint of operational safety, Russia's nuclear posture is more dangerous today than it was during the Cold 'War.'" Again a quote. "The Pentagon has so internalized deterrence as the essence of its mission that it simply cannot bring the two different conceptions of nuclear threat, the risk of deliberate attack and the danger of loss of control, into clear focus and perspective."

Another quote. "If safety is ever to be put first in U.S. nuclear planning, it will be because public discussion and broad public support, not the Pentagon, put it there."

Mr. Speaker, Bruce Blair has hit the nail on the head. We are not doing an adequate job of monitoring what is happening and what could happen in the former Soviet republics. Some would argue all is well.

Perhaps I will submit another article for the RECORD with unanimous consent again, Mr. Speaker, that talks about what has recently happened in Belarus. Belarus, Mr. Speaker, is one of those former Soviet republics that happens to have nuclear weapon capability. Just in July of this year less than 1 month ago, what did the President of Belarus say about his country's agreement to put all the SS-25's back into Russia? There are 18 remaining in Belarus. He said, and this article was printed on July 6, 1995, in Moscow's *Izvestiya*, in Russia, he said, and this is Alyaksandr Lukashenka, the President of Belarus, that he had made a decision to stop the movement of the SS-25's back to Russia; that he was going to leave the remaining 18 SS-25's in Belarus. He stated the reasons, which are in the article, which I will put in the RECORD, are twofold: First of all, it harms the national prestige of Belarus to give up the remaining parts of their nuclear arsenal; and, second, one day Russia and Belarus will be united again.

Now, Mr. Speaker, this is not me talking, this is the President of

Belarus. I asked our State Department if we had gotten any clarification to this statement made by President Lukashenka of Belarus. They told me verbally we had; that he had denied that statement was made, even though it was printed both in *Izvestiya* and as well as on Moscow TV. To this date, Mr. Speaker, I have not had any statement from the State Department to refute the statement from the State Department to refute the statement by Mr. Lukashenka in terms of not complying with the agreed terms that Russia, Belarus, the United States, and the other former Soviet republics entered into to return those SS-25's back to Russia for dismantlement.

Mr. Speaker, the problem continues. My bottom line concern is that the intelligence community is not giving us the full scoop and the full picture. I do not say this lightly, Mr. Speaker; and, in fact, in September of this year, we will have a full hearing on the command and control of the Russian nuclear arsenal. However, Mr. Speaker, we are also going to have something else in that hearing. We are going to look at what has been the posture of our intelligence community in bringing to the Members of Congress and to the American public the threat that exists.

Mr. Speaker, we in this body need to base our decisions on fact. I am not an alarmist. I am not here to demagogue this issue. I am not here to call the Russian people an evil empire, because they are not. As I started my comments tonight, I am one who has devoted a significant amount of my personal time to building relations inside of Russia. I will match my efforts in those categories with any Member of this body in the area of Russian joint energy ventures, environmental cooperation, defense cooperation, economic cooperation, and I will continue that as I did on the House floor when I sided with the ranking member of the Committee on Appropriations, Mr. OBEY and the chairman of that committee, Mr. LIVINGSTON, in fighting back an effort to decrease Russian aid because of the importance of stabilizing their economy.

However, Mr. Speaker, We cannot allow anyone to dumb down our intelligence. We cannot allow anyone to pull the cloud over our eyes to the extent that we do not know really what is happening. That would be the worst travesty that could be brought on this body, to have any administration, or the intelligence community, dumb down information that is important for us as we determine how much money to spend on the defense of the people of this country.

We should not, Mr. Speaker, ever have any intelligence body think that they have to answer politically to some broader agenda of the administration of supporting the current Russian leadership. I support Boris Yeltsin. I support whoever the Russian people decide to have as their elected President.

However, Mr. Speaker, we should never allow our support for the elected President of that country to downplay our understanding of the real threats that are there. That is my concern, Mr. Speaker. It is a concern that I think every American and every Member of this body has to understand and appreciate.

General O'Neill came in before our subcommittee earlier this year and he said, "Congressman, I am not satisfied with our intelligence assessment of the threat coming from Russia and other countries around the world in terms of nuclear proliferation, so I went to the intelligence community and I asked them to give me a new assessment, and that assessment is going to be published by the middle of June."

Mr. Speaker, the middle of June came, and then the end of June came, July 1 came, the middle of July, and yesterday July ended, and now this is August 1.

□ 2030

Mr. Speaker, we still have not gotten the upgraded intelligence assessment that General O'Neill asked for so that we can logically base our threat needs on what is out there.

Mr. Speaker, that is an outrage. The intelligence community has got to get its act together. They have got to give us the focus. They have got to give us the real facts, not sensationalized numbers, the real facts in terms of what is occurring. And they have got to give us real assessments about whether or not there is a potential for a nuclear anarchy, as Mr. Blair stated in his article.

Mr. Speaker, these issues go to the very core of what our Federal Government is all about, because in the end the primary purpose of a Federal Government is to protect and defend the American people, to protect and defend the American people from what I think are the two biggest threats that we are going to face in the next century: Terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially missiles and nuclear missiles.

Mr. Speaker, this is the first in what will be a series of discussions that we have to have in this body, and they will be based on fact. They will be based on articles published in Russian news media, reported in reports that every Member of Congress can get access to, and reported by other foundations and groups that are out there every day giving us the summaries of what is being said and what is occurring throughout Russia and the former Soviet republics.

It is extremely important, Mr. Speaker, as we approach our debate tomorrow, as we approach the conference process, the ultimate debate on the ABM Treaty, that we have good intelligence, that has not been filtered, has not been whitewashed, has not been dumbed down, so that we can make intelligent decisions that in the end will allow us to protect the American people, because that is what our job is all about, protecting the American people.

I hope my concerns will be shared by my colleagues in this body, and by the general public, who has to understand that today we have no protection in these areas. That is a shortcoming we are going to try to address in this budget process, which will hit the House floor tomorrow.

Mr. Speaker, I will put into the RECORD the items I highlighted during my comments.

[From the Brookings Review, Summer 1995]

LENGTHENING THE FUSE

(By Bruce G. Blair)

During the Cold War a massive array of opposing Soviet and U.S. nuclear forces stood ready for launch on a moment's notice. In accord with the perceived needs of deterrence, strategic and tactical nuclear weapons were scattered around the globe, carried by a host of ground, sea, and airborne delivery systems, and primed to inflict instant apocalyptic devastation in retaliation against any nuclear aggressor.

Today, the ideological tensions of the Cold War have dissolved, the urgency of the need for deterrence has diminished, and the Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals are smaller. Yet thousands of warheads on both sides remain on hair-trigger alert. And, by a bitter irony, the geopolitical revolution that defused the Cold War confrontation has posed a chilling new nuclear danger—loss of control. In an atmosphere of political turbulence and economic duress, Russia must now oversee the far-flung nuclear weaponry of the Soviet Union, much of it still ready for instant launch. The possibilities for nuclear anarchy are many—from unauthorized use of weapons by rebellious commanders in the field, to political breakdown in Moscow, to a spread of nuclear weaponry and material onto the global black market.

But dangerous as these scenarios are, an effective and realistic solution exists: an international agreement to take all nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert, remove warheads or other vital components from the weapons delivery systems, and institute monitoring arrangements to verify compliance. Such an agreement would drastically reduce the risk of a catastrophic failure of nuclear control. But it would also require nuclear planners to back away from their traditional focus on deterrence—and to make a commitment to safety instead.

SAFETY ALWAYS CAME SECOND

The vast nuclear arsenals maintained by the superpowers during the Cold War were a product, of course, of deep political and ideological antagonisms. But they were also a product of the adversaries' commitment to deterrence, their faith that rational decisionmakers would refrain from striking first if they knew an opponent could retaliate with devastating effect. War was to be prevented by ensuring that each of the opposing forces was capable of retaliation destructive enough and credible enough to override any potential gain from striking first. The two defense establishments deployed forces capable of retaliating against tens of thousands of enemy targets—and to do so in the moments between enemy missile lift-off and arrival.

In all this, deterrence came first. Safety came second. Not that safety's importance was lost on the rival strategic organizations. After all, neither would likely have survived the political repercussions of a major failure in safety. Much of their mundane activity revolved around safety during peacetime. They strove to prevent the accidental, inadvertent, or unauthorized detonation of even a single weapon. Nuclear weapons received

continuous scrutiny, augmented on occasion by high-level special investigations, to identify safety hazards and remedies. Both sides evolved sophisticated weapon design principles and operational procedures to preserve effective control. On the essential point—nuclear detonation—the record was perfect. On lesser but still critical points—notably, nuclear accidents resulting in the dispersal of toxic plutonium—it was nearly perfect.

That deterrence took precedence over safety is nonetheless demonstrable. If safety had been a governing influence at the planning level, the strategic deployments would not have been so large, so dispersed, and so geared to rapid use. At the design and daily operational level, too, trade-offs between safety and deterrence were regularly resolved in favor of deterrence. For example, locks to prevent low-level U.S. weapons commanders from firing strategic forces were not installed on heavy bombers until the early 1970s, on intercontinental ballistic missiles until the late 1970s. And they were installed only after a finding that they would not impede the wartime retaliatory mission. They were never installed on ballistic missile submarines because of fears that they would jeopardize the ability of submarine crews to carry out authorized launches. And although the missile propellants used in Trident and M-X missiles, as well as the conventional explosives used in Trident warheads, are relatively susceptible to accidental detonation, safety requirements were waived for the sake of wartime performance.

CHANGING PERSPECTIVES

Despite history's abrupt change of course with the end of the Cold War, the established practice of deterrence, with all its inherent danger, remains unchanged. Despite the rollback of the nuclear arsenals set in motion by the Strategic Arms Reduction treaties, nuclear policy and force deployment on both sides are still directed toward deterring deliberate attack. The nuclear confrontation is thus being sustained by a dubious rationale that sustains hair-trigger postures that undercut safety.

In key respects both the U.S. and Russian nuclear portfolios are actually being enlarged. Russia, for example, has dropped nuclear "no-first-use" policy from its new military doctrine and expanded the role of nuclear forces to compensate for the sharp decline in its conventional strength. The United States also appears reluctant to lower further its nuclear profile, despite the evaporation of the primary threat justifying nuclear vigilance during the Cold War: Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The United States now projects conventional superiority over all prospective adversaries and thus can rely more on conventional and less on nuclear forces. Accordingly, further reciprocal nuclear reductions would be beneficial. Yet the U.S. security establishment seems content with the numbers allowed under START II and shows little interest in another round of reductions.

Prompting that reluctance are fears that Russia may revert to authoritarian rule and revive nuclear hostility toward the West. Despite the grim outlook for the rejuvenation of Russia's economy and the projected steep decline in its defense spending for the next decade or more, uncertainty about the Kremlin's attitudes toward the outside world has assumed critical importance in U.S. estimations of the future nuclear threat and in planning U.S. nuclear posture through at least 2005. The Pentagon strongly supports the traditional U.S. strategic mission as an insurance policy. As Defense Secretary William Perry put it in the 1994 Defense Department annual report, "these Cold War tools of nuclear deterrence remain necessary to hedge against a resurgent Russian threat."

U.S. nuclear planners also envisage new missions tied loosely to contingencies in the third world. Although the Pentagon plans to use conventional weapons in dealing with weapons of mass destruction brandished by third-world states, U.S. nuclear forces will doubtless play a major retaliatory and deterrent role. The U.S. Air Force is identifying targets in third-world nations that are developing weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological, and nuclear. And the U.S. Strategic Command has assumed major responsibility for planning both nuclear and nonnuclear strikes against these targets, whose numbers could easily reach many hundreds and might approach a thousand. China will also figure more prominently in the global strategic balance as it modernizes its ballistic missile forces. Any significant increase in the nuclear threat China projects at the United States may well prompt a review of U.S. nuclear planning, particularly the decision in the early 1980s to remove China from the U.S. strategic war plan.

Like the United States and Russia, other charter nuclear states are also disposed to invoke deterrence to justify aggressive alert operations. Britain and France seem committed to maintain a large portion of their nuclear forces on active alert, while China's extensive program of strategic modernization could bring its ballistic missile forces to a comparable level of combat readiness. Other states such as India, Pakistan, and Israel appear heading down the same path. In spite of strenuous international efforts to deny membership in the nuclear club, de facto and aspiring members not only have nuclear weapons programs but also surely have plans if not current capabilities for "weaponization"—mating nuclear warheads with dispersed delivery vehicles capable of rapid use. Intentions and technical progress are difficult to gauge, but the general picture is clear enough and does not bode well.

The proliferation of advanced aircraft and ballistic missiles with increasing range and accuracy certainly expands delivery options. In the name of deterrence, emerging nuclear states can be expected to equip, or prepare to equip quickly, these delivery systems with nuclear weapons from their stockpile. And the decision by the United States, Russia, Great Britain, and France to preserve rapid reaction postures sets an international standard that encourages emulation. Moreover, if the history of the nuclear superpowers is a reliable guide, and the classical dilemmas of nuclear security come to bear strongly on regional dynamics, regional rivals will be induced to shorten the fuses on their arsenals. Absent effective international constraints, the standards for daily combat readiness seem destined to rise.

SAFETY FIRST?

There can no longer be any justification for putting operational safety second. Not only is deterring a deliberate nuclear attack a less demanding challenge today than it was during the Cold War; ensuring safety has become more demanding. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the dangers emerging from the attendant turmoil make loss of control the central problem of nuclear security. Indeed, the specter of nuclear anarchy in the former Soviet Union animates U.S. policy toward Russia and drives U.S. support for the Yeltsin government and Russia's fledgling democratic institutions. Nor are weaknesses in nuclear control confined to the former Soviet Union. Lacking sophisticated systems for safety managing their arsenals, the aspiring nuclear weapon states also face problems of control. And while deliberate nuclear aggression growing out of regional tensions in areas like South Asia, the Korean peninsula, the Middle East, and

other potential hot spots is conceivable, the specter of a catastrophic failure of nuclear command and control looms even larger.

If safety is to become the paramount goal of nuclear security policy, the operational stance of the world's nuclear forces—in particular, their high combat readiness—will have to change. The major defense establishments must lower their alert levels and coax the rest of the world to follow suit.

To de-alert the bomber forces, bomber payloads would be moved to storage facilities far away from the bombers' home bases. The retrieval and uploading of the payloads would require elaborate, time-consuming, and observable procedures. Similarly, warheads (or other vital components such as guidance sets) would be removed from land-based missiles and put in storage—a standard Soviet practice for all land-based strategic forces until the late 1960s. Although warheads could also be removed from ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), an attractive alternative is to take guidance sets off the sea-based missiles and place them in storage on board attack submarines (SSNs) deployed at sea. Under routine practices, the components would remain separated at all times and invulnerable to attack. If necessary during a nuclear crisis, the SSBNs and SSNs could rendezvous and quickly transfer the guidance sets. The SSBNs could then install the components on all missiles in about 24 hours.

We should strive to further lengthen the fuse on all nuclear forces, extending the time needed to bring them to launch-ready status to weeks, months, and ultimately years.

Taking all nuclear weapons off alert—adopting a stance of universal "zero alert" in which no weapons were poised for immediate launch—would not only create a strict international standard of safety for daily alert, but also ease nuclear tensions by removing the threat of sudden deliberate attack. Certainly, a surprise or short-notice nuclear strike by any of the major nuclear powers is already implausible. But because all of them except China can mount a strike with ease, their strategic nuclear forces, particularly those of the United States and Russia, maintain a daily posture of rapid reaction to deter it. A remote, hypothetical scenario thus induces alert operations that feed on themselves. Although designed only to deter, the operations confer the ability either to strike back in retaliation or to initiate a sudden attack. The opposing forces create and perpetuate the very threat they seek to thwart.

In fact, an internationally monitored agreement to remove all nuclear weapons from active alert status could serve much the same purpose as traditional deterrence. Any initial preparations to restore alert status prior to attack would be detected and disclosed by monitors, allowing for counterbalancing responses, thereby denying a decisive preemptive advantage to any side contemplating redeployment and sneak attack.

Zero alert would thus eliminate the technical pretext for sustaining tense nuclear vigils in the post-Cold War era. Besides improving safety, it would relax the nuclear stances, bringing them into harmony with improved political relations.

OVERCOMING INERTIA

Left to themselves, the nuclear establishments will never adopt a zero alert posture. The bureaucracies that created the standard practices of deterrence cannot be expected to put safety before deterrence.

Typical arms negotiations, for example, have little scope for reining in aggressive alert practices. Even with the low ceilings on strategic nuclear arsenals imposed by

START II at the turn of the century, the nuclear superpowers could still keep thousands of warheads poised for immediate release. The nuclear control systems that regulate force operations are still generally peripheral to mainstream arms control. If arms control were to proceed as usual, the numbers of weapons would continue to drop, but their reaction time would not change. The last weapon in the arsenal would still be cocked on hair-trigger alert.

The U.S. defense establishment is aware of the danger of nuclear anarchy. Recognizing the unstable and transitional character of the Russian political center, the Pentagon has quietly initiated extensive military-to-military contacts to nurture durable cooperation between the U.S. and Russian military establishments. It has also conducted exercises to practice U.S. responses to nuclear anarchy in Russia, including scenarios that feature illicit strategic strikes by Russian commanders. Furthermore, U.S. strategic war planners are devising options that allow selective nuclear strikes against breakaway units of the Russian nuclear forces as a last resort to neutralize such units. The Pentagon is also spearheading an effort to assist Russia in dismantling its nuclear arms, an endeavor it portrays as an urgent priority of U.S. national security.

Taken to its logical conclusion, this policy thrust would lead the Pentagon to make bold operational changes, including some form of zero alert, to ensure the safety of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. Yet the Pentagon's overriding commitment remains deterring Russian nuclear aggression.

The review of the U.S. nuclear posture completed last September exemplifies the Pentagon's parochial perspective. The review advocates aggressive hedging against a turn for the worse in U.S.-Russian relations. It ignores the safety hazards that persist or grow as a result of aggressive hedging. It advances a U.S. nuclear force structure and operational posture that will reinforce Russia's reliance on quick launch. From the standpoint of operational safety, Russia's nuclear posture is more dangerous today than it was during the Cold War. And current U.S. nuclear planning will likely induce Russia to take yet more operational risks to buttress deterrence.

The Pentagon has so internalized deterrence as the essence of its mission that it simply cannot bring the two different conceptions of nuclear threat—the risk of deliberate attack and the danger of loss of control—into clear focus and perspective. At the height of the Cold War nuclear planners could argue, with some justification, that the danger of deliberate attack necessitated putting safety second. Today they cannot.

Redirecting nuclear policy toward an emphasis on safety not only addresses the danger of nuclear anarchy but would also constrain the ability of any state to launch a sudden nuclear attack. But if safety is ever to be put first in U.S. nuclear planning, it will be because public discussion and broad public support—not the Pentagon—put it there.

[Russia National Affairs]

MILITARY, NUCLEAR & SPACE ISSUES

GRACHEV URGES YELTSIN TO RECTIFY FINANCE PROBLEMS

[Interview with Defense Minister Pavel Grachev by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given; from the "I Serve Russia" program—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Grachev] In the first half of the financial year the situation is such that for the month of June we were, for the first time this year, unable to finance the personnel of the Army and the Navy. We

were able to meet only forty percent of the allowance for servicemen and wages for blue and white-collar workers.

We were practically totally unable to finance the military complex enterprises. Food, fuel, and lubricating materials have been financed to a very small extent.

The president, therefore, as they say, ought to enter the battle now, and this active efforts we will try to rectify this problem.

ARMY'S FOOD SUPPLY SAID ON 'BRINK OF DISASTER'

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, July 17 (INTERFAX)—The food supply of the Russian armed forces is on the brink of disaster, chairman of the State Duma, or lower house, defense committee Sergeev Yushenkov (Russia's Choice) told INTERFAX Monday.

By July, the Russian army had "even used its emergency stocks" as the supply of food for both officers and soldiers became a "most grave issue."

The committee held a closed meeting Monday involving representatives of the Defense and Finance Ministries "To start stocking up with potatoes and vegetables for the winter, the army is asked to immediately pay over 500 billion rubles in advance," Yushenkov said.

According to Yushenkov, the Defense Ministry has used about 1.7 trillion rubles for the military operations in Chechnya, making its budget very restricted.

The committee will recommend the State Duma to ask the government to find means to supply the army with food and prepare a corresponding amendment to the 1995 federal budget.

GOVERNMENT APPROVES FUNDING FOR ITER PROJECT

[Russian Federation Government directive No. 924-r, signed by V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government; dated Moscow, 1 July 1995—from the "Document" section]

[FBIS Translated Text] With a view to honoring the Russian Federation's commitments arising from the quadripartite Agreement on the Joint Development of an International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor [ITER] of 21 July 1992:

1. The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy's proposal, coordinated with the Russian Ministry of Finance, regarding the allocation of \$1.55 million for the funding of the ITER project, including \$0.95 million for the upkeep of Russian specialists at international project development centers and for Russian experts' short-term assignment abroad and \$0.6 million for the payment of the Russian Federation's annual membership of the Joint Project Fund, is hereby adopted.

2. In 1996 the Russian Ministry of Finance is to allocate to the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy the federal budget appropriations necessary to honor the Russian Federation's commitments as mentioned in Point of this directive stemming from membership of the ITER project.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government

[Dated] Moscow, 1 July 1995

RS-18 ICBM UNDER CONVERSION INTO SPACE BOOSTER

(By Anna Bakina)

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow July 17 (ITAR-TASS)—The Russian Khrushchev space enterprise is converting the intercontinental ballistic RS-18 missile into a new space booster which is to be launched from the Russian northern Plesetsk cosmodrome and, possibly, from the missile base in the Far East which is also to become a space launching site.

The "Rokot" craft will use the boosters of the first and second stages of RS-18. Tass was told Monday by a spokesman of the Khrushchev enterprise.

Besides, the "Breeze" booster has been developed which will allow to increase the payload launched to medium orbits. Its equipment is capable of ensuring high-precision placing of spacecraft into orbit, the necessary orientation of the payload and power supplies to it during a seven-hour long space flight.

The spokesman said the new booster is planned to blast off from the Plesetsk cosmodrome and, possibly from silos at the Svobodny missile base in the Far East which is to be developed into a space launching site.

So far three successful "Rokot" test launches have been carried out from silos at the Baykonur cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. The latest launch orbited a RADIO-ROSTO satellite for radio amateurs.

Foreign offers of a joint use of the new booster have already been received. Thus, the German Daimler Benz Aerospace company and the Khrushchev enterprise created a joint venture to market the "Rokot" for launching satellites of up to 1.8 tonnes of weight to low orbits. The first commercial launches are expected from the Plesetsk cosmodrome in the end of 1997.

FEDERAL ASSEMBLY—POSTPONEMENT OF KOZYREV DUMA SPEECH DETAILED

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature by diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, July 14 (INTERFAX)—The State Duma, Russia's lower house of parliament, has put off till autumn a report by Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, originally scheduled for Friday.

Kozyrev, however, was ready to address the Duma on Friday, Valentina Matviyenko, a senior Foreign Ministry official told INTERFAX.

On Wednesday Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin informed the house that, at Duma's demand, Kozyrev has been invited to report on his ministry's performance during the so-called "government hour" at Friday's evening session of the house. On Thursday, however, the majority of leaders of Duma factions proposed deferring the report until the house reconvenes after the summer recess.

"The minister officially confirmed his readiness to speak at the scheduled time and made proper amendments to his schedule," said Matviyenko, head of the ministry department for contacts with the country's regions, parliament and public organizations.

Last week Kozyrev already spoke in the Federation Council, the upper house, she said. "Apparently the lower house deputies are busy with more important matters and found no time to hear a report by the head of the top foreign policy body of Russia," Matviyenko said ironically.

Another senior Foreign Ministry official said on Friday the postponement was "discourteous, to say the least."

Kozyrev is not only foreign minister but also deputy of the Duma, where he represents the Murmansk Region, the official stressed in an interview with INTERFAX.

"Before canceling their decision, the deputies should have thought about the fact that a minister's schedule is very tight and that he is busy every minute of his working day. So, if there was an arrangement for Kozyrev to speak in the State Duma on July 14, (the house) should have stuck to it, if only out of respect for the extreme business of the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation," the official said.

Moreover, Kozyrev was "carefully preparing" for the address. "Apparently in the autumn he will again have to look for spare time and make amendments to his report," he said.

DUMA DEPUTIES TREAT ELECTION NEWS 'POSITIVELY'

[Report by Petr Zhuravlev and Gleb Cherkasov under the "Start" rubric: "Duma Elections Set for 17 December. Lower House Finishes Forming Election Laws"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Boris Yeltsin has set 17 December as the date for the election of deputies to the Sixth (Second) State Duma of Russia. The signing of the corresponding edict was reported yesterday by the Kremlin press service, which had received the decision of the head of state, who is still in the hospital.

Many observers do not think there is anything surprising about the date itself—all election organizers and future rivals did set their beads at the first Sunday after 12 December. The surprising thing is that the edict should appear in July rather than in August. As a matter of fact, the election law says that the president is supposed to announce the voting day "not later" than four months in advance, meaning that it is not against the law that the elections have been called five months in advance. At the same time, this may spoil things for many parties and blocs, something Vyacheslav Nikonov (PRES) [Party of Russian Unity and Accord] cited yesterday.

EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

Belarus Stops Arms Reductions. Izvestiya on 6 July reported that Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka has announced that Belarus will suspend the withdrawal of nuclear missiles from Belarus to Russia. Lukashenka said the decision to withdraw the weapons was a political mistake made by the previous leadership. He also commented that it was unnecessary since Belarus and Russia may soon unite. RFE/RL reported Stanislau Shushkevich, former chairman of the Supreme Soviet, as saying the decision was a disgrace to Belarus's international image. Shushkevich was head of state when Belarus agreed to give up its inherited nuclear arsenal of 81 single-warhead mobile SS-25 Topol missiles. So far, 63 missiles have been withdrawn and the remaining 18 were to have been removed to Russia this month. Izvestiya commented that the decision to stop nuclear reductions was also prompted by financial considerations.—Ustina Markus, OMRI, Inc.

AZERBAIJAN—AZERBAIJAN: TRANSIT POINT FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS SMUGGLING

[Article by N. Medzhidova: "Our Borders Are Transparent to Nuclear Materials Transshipment: Azerbaijan Accused of Being One of the Main Routes for Nuclear Materials Smuggling"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian media have reported that the principal routes for transshipment of atomic bomb materials from Russia and other countries pass through Ukraine and Azerbaijan. In addition, the German Bundestag's Security Commission has prepared a report based on intelligence service data regarding the disappearance of nuclear materials and their sale on the black market. According to DER SPIEGEL, former military officers and KGB agents and corrupt officers in Russia's Northern Fleet, where nuclear submarines are fueled, are involved in the smuggling of radioactive materials. They are the ones who have created this "caravan rout" between West and East. The bomb-making materials are transshipped from Russia to other countries mainly through Ukraine and Azerbaijan, continuing on through the Bosphorus.

All transshipment into Western Europe passes through Turkey, says DER SPIEGEL. German experts report that a "specialized international mafia" is taking shape, and that it includes Russian radioactive materials dealers. Most likely this international mafia will find its place in a black market where the buyers are Third World countries.

We asked Fikret Aslanov, head of the Radiation Medicine Department of the Azerbaijani Republic Center of Hygiene and Epidemiology, a leading specialist on radiation safety and candidate of medical sciences, to comment on this report.

"Unless steps are taken to tighten control over radioactive materials, our republic could well be accused of facilitating international terrorism and dealings in and smuggling of these particularly dangerous substances. As a rule, it is impunity that leads to the kind of violations your newspaper has described."

One year ago in an article entitled "Azerbaijan at Risk of Becoming a Radioactive Dump" we wrote about the illegal importation of radioactive sources into the Azerbaijani Republic, and in particular about the fact that in December 1993 a plane owned by U.S. owned Buffalo Airways delivered a radioactive cargo from Amsterdam to Baku's Bina Airport in a container weighing 763 kilograms. The container was shipped by the French company Schlumberger under a contract with the Azerbaijani Republic State Oil Company.

The contract indicated that the customer and the executor held each blameless in the event of any consequences. It was unclear who was supposed to be liable in the event of a radiation accident and pollution resulting from it, something that would take a great deal of manpower and money to clean up," said Fikret Aslanov.

The airport's customs service did not note the fact that a radioactive cargo had arrived, and customers agents, lacking dosimeters, merely looked over the shipping documents that arrived with cargo.

A similar incident occurred in February 1994. Three boxes weighing a total of 196 kilograms arrived at Bina Airport on a charter flight from the United States, addressed to a company called Ponder International Servis [sic]. According to the bill of lading, the boxes contained radioactive materials. No permit had been received to transship or import these radiation sources. Furthermore, there was no document indicating that the freight was insured in the event of an accident or other unforeseen occurrence.

The illegality of both cases rests on the fact that importation of radiation sources into the republic was carried out without the knowledge of the republic's Ministry of Health and Ministry of Internal Affairs, which oversee imports, exports, storage, use, transportation and disposal of radioactive substances in accordance with "Radiation Safety Standards," "Fundamental Sanitary Regulations" and the Azerbaijani Republic law "On Sanitary and Epidemiological Health."

Another recent incident also escaped the attention of those agencies: a citizen of Azerbaijan was arrested by the Turkish security service attempting to sell 750 grams of enriched uranium. Our republic does not have any facility that would use that kind of nuclear material. Therefore it is clear that it was brought into Azerbaijan from somewhere else, passing through all border controls, then was transferred to Nakhichevan and subsequently carried to Turkey.

There is no guarantee that similar incidents will not occur over and over again. Currently the customs service does not have any dosimetric instruments, and customs agents are not informed about radioactively

hazardous shipments. All these things make our borders transparent not only for radiation sources and wastes, but also, so it seems, for nuclear materials.

There is another interesting fact: according to information from the Russian media, the removal of nuclear waste from the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant and its resupply with nuclear fuel is the responsibility of the Russian Atomic Energy Agency. The question arises: by what routes are the necessary equipment and other nuclear materials being delivered to Armenia? This cannot be done by air for technical reasons. It would have been impossible to deliver these materials by rail through Georgia, because deliveries coincided exactly with the height of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. That leaves only one direct route: through Azerbaijan.

Judging by all this, continued F. Aslanov, the transshipment of nuclear materials and fuels was carried out through Azerbaijani territory. The specially marked trains traveled through under "green light" status, without inspection. Even if Azerbaijan's government does not permit Russia to transport this freight after the reopening of rail connections, our republic is still not protected from this radiation hazard: Russia's government, under the guise of supplying military freight to the Russian separatist forces deployed in Georgia (taking part in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict) and in order to equip six military bases in Georgian territory (under the terms of a mutual agreement with Russia) may transport nuclear fuel, radioactive materials and wastes into Armenia in specially marked trains sealed as "particularly hazardous freight." (According to preliminary estimates, the operations of the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant will create approximately 14 metric tons of radioactive waste annually. And Armenia is not capable of disposing of that waste within its own territory).

According to F. Aslanov it is therefore essential to install automated radiation monitoring instruments at all border crossings as quickly as possible. This is the only solution to this situation. These installations will make it possible to inspect even special trains without opening them. The cost of each such instrument is \$3,000-3,500—less than the price of the foreign-manufactured automobiles that crowd the streets of Baku. Our republic needs at least six of these installations to ensure the public's safety from radiation and prevent Azerbaijan from becoming a radioactive waste dump.

It is quickly becoming obvious that if emergency measures are not taken we could find ourselves facing a variety of consequences all at once: accidents like Chernobyl, and an image as a country that facilitates international nuclear terrorism.

START II HEARINGS: 'PARADOXICAL SITUATION' SEEN

[Report by Gennadiy Obolenskiy: "Pentagon May State Its All"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The discussion of questions connected with the ratification of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms II [START II] in continuing in U.S. Congressional committees. In this connection, it would not be out of place to recall that the limitations and reductions of strategic offensive weapons envisaged in it, partially already implemented, have only become possible under conditions of the preservation of the 1972 ABM Treaty of unlimited duration.

This reminder is appropriate in connection with the paradoxical nature of the situation that has taken shape during the hearings. On the one hand, representatives of the Pentagon and the administration as a whole are expressing a clear desire for a real limitation of strategic offensive weapons (of course, primarily Russian ones). And on the other hand

they want to evade observing the basic provisions of the ABM Treaty through agreeing with Russia the kind of parameters of so-called non-strategic anti-missile defense (or theater ABM) which would make this system entirely capable of setting strategic tasks too.

The idea of conducting talks on demarcating strategic and non-strategic ABM defense and agreeing on the specifications of the latter in the form of a separate accord was proposed to us by the Americans. Even the specific time schedules for conducting them were outlined. Reports have appeared to the effect that within the Pentagon's apparatus the accelerated preparation of a draft of such an agreement has begun. But the Americans themselves unexpectedly refused to continue the talks. Why?

Undoubtedly the emergence of a republican majority in the U.S. Congress plays a fairly major role here. The Congressmen have obviously decided not to be hasty as regards expanding cooperation with Russia and will try to wring new concessions from it. And in this connection, [they have decided] not to be in any hurry with getting up the ABM accord proposed by Washington shortly beforehand.

But there is also another side to this matter. The Americans' proposals on ABM defense have proved to be in direct contradiction to the limitations on strategic offensive arms envisaged by the START-II Treaty, and may hinder its ratification. And after all, it is extremely advantageous for the United States, and Washington is very interested in its implementation. That is why it should be expected that following the conclusion of the ratification process, the Americans proceed to additional steps to "push through" ideas in the sphere of anti-missile defense that will in fact lead to the collapse of the ABM Treaty.

Discussions can also be heard among independent American experts to the effect that once it has achieved significant reductions of Russian strategic offensive weapons, the Pentagon will stake its all, and, using its own homespun interpretations of the provisions of the ABM Treaty, will de facto stop taking it into account. Particularly since in the Pentagon's understanding, the ABM Treaty will not restrict the theater ABM. Admittedly, at the same time, the fact that this is a question of mobile ground-, sea-, and air-based ABM systems, which are banned by this treaty, is being deliberately kept quiet.

And I would like to stress the following here. Until the sides agree where the distinction between authorized and banned activity lies in respect of such ABM systems, there are no grounds for stating unilaterally that the creation of a particular ABM theater of military operations systems corresponds to the treaty and does not undermine it. Otherwise, the entire process of arms control might as well be scrapped.

Although the rumors about a "Russian nuclear mafia" are somewhat exaggerated, according to Mikhail Kulik, Northern Fleet military prosecutor's office investigator for special cases, cited by the paper CHAS PIK, there are criminal groupings in the Northwest region that are busy trying to get into depots containing nuclear materials.

The conference in St. Petersburg was attended by atomic energy specialists from Russia, the CIS countries, and Lithuania, senior officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency European Commission, representatives of the European Fuel Cycle Consortium, and nuclear experts. It was noted that the EU spent \$400 million in 1991-1994 on improving the system of safeguarding nuclear safety in the countries on the territory of the former USSR. This involves training specialists at Obninsk and develop-

ing a robot capable of performing radioactivity measures, which is being designed at the Radium Institute in St. Petersburg. It was stressed that the EU is interested in importing nuclear materials from Russia on the basis of proper agreements, provided that effective international nonproliferation guarantees are found.

INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ON SECURITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service [FIS] is not aware of a single case of weapons-grade nuclear materials being smuggled out of Russia. This was stated by the press secretary of the FIS director to the Ekho Moskvy radio station.

To recall, STERN magazine alleges that Viktor Sidorenko, Russian deputy defense minister for nuclear energy, was involved in the 1994 scandal when 239 grams of weapons-grade plutonium was brought to Munich.

"There may be some minor theft from Russian civilian nuclear installations, but the military nuclear network so far appears to be sealed," Tatyana Samolis said.

"Only an expert analysis can reveal when the radioactive materials were manufactured and where they come from. These analyses have proved that there has been no smuggling of weapons-grade nuclear materials from Russian territory," she added. [passage omitted—reiteration of allegations that the Munich plutonium was of European origin]

NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS STILL NOT 'AS WE WOULD LIKE'

[Report by Yuriy Kukanov: "Rumors About a 'Russian Nuclear Mafia' Are Highly Exaggerated"]

ST. PETERSBURG.—Talk about the danger of nuclear terrorism has clearly alluded to a "Russian fingerprint" in the international smuggling of radioactive materials. Asked by your ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent to comment on reports about German special services' involvement in an incident at Munich airport in which a container of plutonium 239 from Moscow was detained late August, Rolf Linkohr, president of the European Energy Foundation and member of the European Parliament, replied that he knew nothing about it. If it had occurred, he said, there would have been a government crisis in Germany.

Anyway, he said, it is immaterial where nuclear materials are being stolen—in the East or in the West. This view was supported by his foreign colleagues attending the first international meeting on cooperation between the European Union, the CIS, and the Baltic countries in the sphere of control over the use of nuclear materials, held in St. Petersburg in mid-April. The main thing, they stressed, is to combat this evil, create reliable national systems for recording nuclear materials, and strengthen the rules controlling their nonproliferation on the territory of the CIS and the Baltic countries. The EU countries were not mentioned.

We must combat it, of course. But it is not very clear how, if we do not know where the thefts are taking place. Lev Ryabev, Russian first deputy minister of atomic energy, flatly denied the story of a "Russian fingerprint" on nuclear contraband. There are rigorous standards which enable us to tell who fissile materials belong to. The data on the isotope structures and composition of the permissible impurities of the highly enriched uranium and plutonium seized in West Europe unequivocally demonstrate their non-Russian origin.

But in the Russian nuclear house, too, all is not as well as we would like. The Atomic Energy Ministry representative cited earlier had to admit that there have been 18 thefts of nuclear materials in the past 18 months.

He was referring to the "Luch" enterprise near Moscow and a Moscow scientific research institution where several hundred grams of highly enriched uranium materials were stolen. Otherwise we are dealing with natural, depleted uranium with a low, 235 isotope content, which poses no real danger. In none of these cases has stolen material crossed the state border. But it is worth pointing out that in the 50-year existence of the Soviet nuclear industry there have been no incidents of that kind.

It is difficult to block for certain all escape routes. The country's checkpoints do not appear to be equipped with the proper apparatus to enable them to detect and prevent unauthorized exports of uranium and plutonium. Storage of nuclear materials at Army depots is a worry. Three officers are currently being tried in Severomorsk, accused of stealing three fuel assemblies for submarine nuclear reactors containing 4.5 kg of uranium. This is not the first time it has happened in the Northern Fleet. But nuclear fuel for submarines is still stored at depots like potatoes: The criminals only had to contend with a standard barn-door lock.

STRATEGIC MISSILE TROOPS SAID IN FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES

[From the "Vremya" newscast]
[FBIS Translated Text] Military experts have never doubted that the design of Russian missile silos would enable them to withstand any movement of the earth's crust. After all, these silos are designed to withstand a nuclear attack by a possible enemy. However, some experts point out that by the year 2003, when the period of storage of Russian missile rocket complexes which are kept in a combat-ready condition comes to an end, the facilities where they are kept in suspension will be rather dilapidated.

However, the high command of the Russian strategic missile troops, which is responsible for all land silos and mobile missiles, says there is no concern about the technical condition of the nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it also says that insufficient funding for new developments in the nuclear sector may lead to the complete nuclear disarmament of Russia as early as 2005, when SS-33 [as heard] type missiles will have outlived their potential.

Today, the missile troops, who are constantly monitoring the nuclear safety of Russia, live in accordance with the favorite expression of their commander in chief: anyone can be on combat alert when there is money, but try to do so without it.

Although the largest units of the Russian nuclear triad, the strategic missile troops, are supposed to use only eight percent of the Russian military budget, they say that they do not see even a small part of this money.

Yuriy Kononov, commander of the largest missile division in Europe and based near Saratov, says the danger lies not in earthquakes, but in the lack of money for the smallest part of the Russian Armed Forces. The administrative infrastructure is in disarray and there is a permanent danger of electricity power cuts at command points. It seems that Russia's nuclear safety does not depend on the design of missile silos after all. [Video shows missile silos which Russian strategic missile troops have for nuclear warheads; facility in an unidentified location, servicemen and women monitoring equipment, warheads being transported; Yuriy Kononov, identified as commander of a missile division stationed near Saratov, also shown]

VOTERS BILL OF RIGHTS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of May