

CUT IN LABOR-HHS APPROPRIATIONS IS ASSAULT ON AVERAGE WORKERS AND THEIR FAMILIES

(Mr. KLINK asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. KLINK. Mr. Speaker, this week the Labor-HHS appropriations bill is going to be taken up by this House. This really, Mr. Speaker, is an assault on average American working persons and their families.

This bill will come to the floor with a cut of 31 percent in enforcement for health and safety protections. At a time when 55,000 American workers a year are killed on the job, when tens of thousands more are permanently disabled each year from work-related injuries and diseases, we are going to cut the agency that enforces worker safety by 33 percent.

There is a cut in the dislocated workers' program of 31 percent. Now I happen to come from an area where, in 13 counties in southwestern Pennsylvania, about 150,000 workers were dislocated from the manufacturing industries. We have to retrain those workers. We are trying to cut back on welfare, we are trying to make sure that people have work at a time that we are saying if you are dislocated because your company shuts down or because something else has happened, that we are not going to retrain you for work anymore. We are going to cut that back by 31 percent.

Mr. Speaker, all the worker safety is being cut, including MSHA, which has really cut down on the number of mine deaths. In the 25 years before MSHA was created in the late 1960's, over 12,000 miners were killed. In the 25 years since then it is about 2,000. These are the kinds of cuts American workers cannot afford.

MEDICARE REFORM IS A BIPARTISAN ISSUE

(Mr. KINGSTON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Speaker, it has been almost 4 months now that the trustees of the Medicare plan, the Clinton trustees, have come out with a report saying that Medicare is going broke in the year 2002. About 2 months ago President Clinton said:

We cannot leave the system the way it is . . . when you think about what the baby boomers require . . . that's going to require significant long-term structural adjustment. We'll have to look at what we can do there. But the main thing we can't do—we can't have this thing go broke in the meanwhile.

I think, certainly, this is a very significant thing for all of us to realize, that Congress must, No. 1, fix Medicare. No. 2, we have got to do it in a fair way. It cannot be done on the back of one group over another one. No. 3, we have to save the system by strengthening it and preserving it. The proposal that we have in our budget is

to increase spending per recipient from \$4,800 today to \$6,700 in the year 2002. We are also probably going to have options on Medisave accounts, a choice of doctor, managed care plans, and so forth.

I think the most important thing for right now is for us to acknowledge that Medicare is going broke. It is a bipartisan problem. We welcome the ideas of all the Democrats, Republicans, and senior citizens throughout our great country.

EDUCATION CUTS NEVER HEAL

(Mr. BAESLER asked and was given permission to address the Houses for 1 minute.)

Mr. BAESLER. Mr. Speaker, as we begin to consider the Labor-HHS-Education appropriations bill, I am reminded of the oft-quoted and foreboding statement in the 1983 report "A Nation at Risk":

If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war. As it stands, we have allowed this to happen to ourselves. We have even squandered the gains in student achievement made in the wake of the Sputnik challenge. Moreover, we have dismantled essential support systems which helped make those gains possible. We have, in effect, been committing an act of unthinking, unilateral educational disarmament.

The spending bill that we are asked to consider is nothing less than a continuation of this disarmament. We are being asked by our colleagues on the other side of the aisle to cut spending on education and training by \$36 billion over 7 years—\$520 million in cuts to Kentucky alone. Ask any kid what cuts are. They know cuts hurt. We are being asked to believe that these are the kind of cuts that can heal this Nation. I believe these are the kind of cuts that will never heal. They will be with us for generations to come.

DEMAGOGUERY AND DECEPTION ON MEDICARE

(Mrs. SEASTRAND asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. SEASTRAND. Mr. Speaker, this weekend on "Meet the Press" the minority leader referred to this document as a hoax. This is the Medicare trustees' report. It was not written by conservatives, it was not written by Republicans, but was written by the very people who run Medicare, who are charged with administering the program. It is even signed by three of the President's Cabinet Secretaries: Robert Rubin, Robert Reich, and Donna Shalala. In case the minority leader had not noticed, none of the aforementioned are conservative or Republican. Indeed, most Washington insiders would consider them liberal Democrats.

What is the problem? Could it be that there is a huge split in the Democrat Party? That is part of it, but I think there is something more going on. This report undercuts the minority leader's effort to scare the American public about Medicare. Mr. Speaker, it is truly sad that the liberals in Congress are more concerned about demagoguery and deception than about saving Medicare for our children and our grandchildren.

CALLING FOR FULL HEARINGS ON NAFTA BEFORE PLANNING A NAFTA EXPANSION

(Ms. KAPTUR asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, most Members do not know, tomorrow the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means is going to do it to United States workers again: to strike a deal to add Chile to NAFTA, and then bring the matter up here for a vote under a closed rule, with no opportunity for us to amend. The subcommittee has been so secretive that even members of the subcommittee were only given the legislation last Friday, late in the afternoon.

This is just the latest example of what is wrong with U.S. trade policy: the handiwork of a few powerful people behind closed doors without full debate, and little public participation, and at the last minute, with no opportunity for us to fully debate or amend. Full debate is a precondition to representative democracy.

For this reason, I and 50 of my colleagues, Republicans and Democrats, are requesting full hearings to be held on the NAFTA record to date by the Committee on Ways and Means before expanding any proposed NAFTA accord to include yet another country. America cannot afford billions more of trade deficit and hundreds and hundreds of thousands of more lost good-paying jobs. America cannot afford another bad trade agreement.

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA SELF-DEFENSE ACT OF 1995

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 204 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 204

Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of the bill (S. 21) to terminate the United States arms embargo applicable to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed three hours equally divided and controlled

by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on International Relations. After general debate the bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. The bill shall be considered as read. No amendment shall be in order except an amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by the Minority Leader or his designee. That amendment shall be considered as read, shall be debatable for one hour equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, and shall not be subject to amendment. At the conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendment as may have been adopted. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and any amendment thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or without instructions. The motion to recommit may include instructions only if offered by the minority leader or his designee.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. BEILENSON], pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for purposes of debate only.

(Mr. DIAZ-BALART asked and was given permission to include extraneous material in the RECORD.)

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 204 is a structured rule providing for the consideration of S. 21, a bill to terminate the U.S. arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995. In addition to the 1 hour for debate on this rule, the rule provides for 3 hours of general debate, equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on International Relations. It also makes in order an amendment in the nature of a substitute, if offered, by the minority leader or his designee, which would be debatable for 1 hour, equally divided between the proponent and an opponent.

□ 1020

If the minority chooses not to offer a substitute, the additional hour allocated for a substitute may be added to the general debate time by mutual agreement.

House Resolution 204 also provides, Mr. Speaker, for one motion to recommit which, if including instructions, may only be offered by the minority leader or a designee.

I believe that the time allocated for the discussion of S. 21 is sufficient and it was arrived at in a fair and judicious manner. The Committee on Rules originally considered providing 1 hour on the rule, 2 hours for general debate, and 1 hour on a substitute, but at my suggestion, and I would like to thank the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON], the chairman, and all of the distinguished members of the Committee on Rules for their gracious consideration, the committee increased the general debate time by an additional

hour to provide for further discussion of this critical issue.

Mr. Speaker, the House has already spoken on the issue of lifting the arms embargo during consideration of H.R. 1561, the Overseas Investment Act. On June 8 of this year, the House voted overwhelmingly, 318 to 99 in favor of an amendment to require the President to unilaterally lift the arms embargo against Bosnia upon receiving a request for assistance from that government.

Mr. Speaker, the issue can wait no longer. That is why we need to act this week on an amendable bill that has already passed the Senate so that it can go straight to the President without the need for a conference. At this time I would like to thank the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], the chairman of the Committee on International Relations, as well as the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH], the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER], and other colleagues who have worked tirelessly to bring an end to what I believe is the ethically unjustifiable arms embargo on Bosnia.

Mr. Speaker, the arms embargo on Bosnia, as the Speaker knows, was morally questionable from the very beginning and I believe that legally it was questionable from the very beginning as well.

It was the Yugoslav regime, the regime in Belgrade, over 3 years ago when that country was already in an obvious process of disintegration that asked the U.N. Security Council to impose an arms embargo on what at that time was Yugoslavia. What happened consequently was that months afterward, when Yugoslavia broke up and the independent states of the former Yugoslavia achieved independence, and in fact Bosnia was recognized as a member nation of the United Nations, the arms embargo that had been applied to Yugoslavia was consequently applied to the independent states of the former Yugoslavia.

Now, the objective of the aggressors in Belgrade, I believe, Mr. Speaker, was clear from the beginning. Inheriting the great overwhelming majority of the resources, of the equipment of the former army of Yugoslavia, the armed forces of Yugoslavia and having in mind the goal of the so-called greater Serbia, a Serbian empire, Mr. Speaker, which would include great portions of what is now the independent and sovereign and recognized by the international community state of Bosnia, the goal was, in effect, to have a situation imposed by the international community where the hands of the new State of Bosnia would be tied, where they would be in effect not capable of arming themselves against overwhelming superiority by the aggressor, by the army controlled by Belgrade, by the resources that came from the former Communist Yugoslavia.

So what we have seen is really a very profound injustice, Mr. Speaker, that has been perpetrated upon a new, sov-

ereign, independent nation that is recognized by the international community, that is a member of the United Nations, and yet, in violation and contravention directly of article 51 of the U.N. Charter, it has not been allowed that most fundamental of the rights of any state, which is the right of self-defense.

Mr. Speaker, NATO and the United Nations have failed completely to enforce the Security Council resolutions which authorized the use of force to defend the so-called safe havens and to get humanitarian assistance through to the people who need it in Bosnia. As Margaret Thatcher stated in a letter just last week to Senator DOLE, the proponent of this very important measure in the Senate, "The safe havens," Margaret Thatcher wrote, "were never safe. Now they are actually falling to Serb assault. Murder, ethnic cleansing, mass rape, and torture are the legacy of the policy of the last 3 years to the people of Bosnia. It has failed utterly."

Mr. Speaker, we owe it to the victims, we owe it to the victims of Serb aggression at the very least to have them obtain at least the possibility of arming themselves, to defend themselves against what is without any doubt one of the most brutal forms of aggression that the Western World has witnessed since the Holocaust. If the international community is not willing to defend the Bosnian people, at the very least we should not prohibit them from defending themselves. That is the essence of the argument, of the extremely important argument, that the Congress will be debating today.

Despite the fact that we have so many important measures that we have to discuss and debate and vote upon this week, despite the fact that this is probably the busiest week since we have been in Congress since January, we are setting aside 5 hours today to debate this issue which very possibly, Mr. Speaker, may be the most critical issue that Members of this body will have an opportunity to vote on during this session of Congress.

If I may very briefly address three arguments that are used pretty consistently against the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia.

We will hear the argument, Mr. Speaker, that by lifting the arms embargo, we would be abandoning, in effect, the people of Bosnia because the United Nations and NATO have said that they oppose the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo by the United States. I think the key there is to ask the elected Government of Bosnia what they think. Ask the elected Government of Bosnia, the democratic Government of Bosnia if they think that by the United States unilaterally lifting the arms embargo, they would feel abandoned, or whether they feel abandoned today, when the U.N. Protection Forces are there either as spectators or as hostages, Mr. Speaker. What kind of protection is a force that is actually taken hostage by the thugs

and the aggressors from Belgrade and their allies within the Bosnian state?

A second argument that we hear often is that we will be fragmenting, that we will be hurting the unity of NATO and of the U.N. Protection Force. I think the key there, Mr. Speaker, is the question that follows: How can you pursue peacekeeping, which is what specifically and officially the mission of the United Nations in Bosnia is, peacekeeping, how can you pursue peacekeeping when there is no peace? I think the answer to that question is self-evident. The mission of NATO is not possible as it is conceived, there is no peacekeeping and even the safe havens that were offered to the Bosnian people, here are six safe havens, give up your heavy arms and you will be safe even though safe havens now are being attacked by the Serbs and two of them have already fallen, Mr. Speaker. The policy of the

United Nations and of NATO in effect, the promise to the people of Bosnia, has been but a farce and it is time that we admit it today.

Third, the argument is, if we let the Bosnians arm themselves, that will prolong the war. I submit, Mr. Speaker, that it is inherently immoral to say that. That contemplates that the war will inevitably be won by the aggressors, that the Serbs will soon overrun all of Bosnia, kill all of the refugees and destroy all the targets that they are seeking to destroy beforehand, and that by letting the Bosnians arm themselves, we will be prolonging the war. That argument, I maintain, is inherently immoral.

So I go back to the essential. What is the Government of Bosnia asking the United States to do? The Government of Bosnia is asking us to pass this bill today and when we pass this bill today, there will be no need for conference, it

will go straight to the President and it will, I think, strengthen his hand when he deals with the Europeans that have imposed the policy of appeasement, have imposed the policy that makes Neville Chamberlain look like Rambo, Mr. Speaker, upon the disarmed and defenseless people of Bosnia.

I submit that this is an extraordinarily important vote that we are going to take today. This is a fair rule, and I would ask that all of the Members not only realize the importance of the vote today but favorably consider and vote for the resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that House Resolution 204 is a correctly and fairly structured rule to provide for the thorough consideration of S. 21, and I would urge its adoption.

Mr. Speaker, I submit the following data from the Committee on Rules for inclusion at this point in the RECORD:

THE AMENDMENT PROCESS UNDER SPECIAL RULES REPORTED BY THE RULES COMMITTEE,¹ 103D CONGRESS V. 104TH CONGRESS

[As of July 31, 1995]

Rule type	103d Congress		104th Congress	
	Number of rules	Percent of total	Number of rules	Percent of total
Open/Modified-open ²	46	44	40	73
Modified Closed ³	49	47	13	23
Closed ⁴	9	9	2	4
Totals:	104	100	55	100

¹ This table applies only to rules which provide for the original consideration of bills, joint resolutions or budget resolutions and which provide for an amendment process. It does not apply to special rules which only waive points of order against appropriations bills which are already privileged and are considered under an open amendment process under House rules.

² An open rule is one under which any Member may offer a germane amendment under the five-minute rule. A modified open rule is one under which any Member may offer a germane amendment under the five-minute rule subject only to an overall time limit on the amendment process and/or a requirement that the amendment be preprinted in the Congressional Record.

³ A modified closed rule is one under which the Rules Committee limits the amendments that may be offered only to those amendments designated in the special rule or the Rules Committee report to accompany it, or which preclude amendments to a particular portion of a bill, even though the rest of the bill may be completely open to amendment.

⁴ A closed rule is one under which no amendments may be offered (other than amendments recommended by the committee in reporting the bill).

SPECIAL RULES REPORTED BY THE RULES COMMITTEE, 104TH CONGRESS

[As of July 31, 1995]

H. Res. No. (Date rept.)	Rule type	Bill No.	Subject	Disposition of rule
H. Res. 38 (1/18/95)	O	H.R. 5	Unfunded Mandate Reform	A: 350-71 (1/19/95)
H. Res. 44 (1/24/95)	MC	H. Con. Res. 17	Social Security	A: 255-172 (1/25/95)
		H.J. Res. 1	Balanced Budget Amdt	
H. Res. 51 (1/31/95)	O	H.R. 101	Land Transfer, Taos Pueblo Indians	A: voice vote (2/1/95)
H. Res. 52 (1/31/95)	O	H.R. 400	Land Exchange, Arctic Nat'l. Park and Preserve	A: voice vote (2/1/95)
H. Res. 53 (1/31/95)	O	H.R. 440	Land Conveyance, Butte County, Calif	A: voice vote (2/1/95)
H. Res. 55 (2/1/95)	O	H.R. 2	Line Item Veto	A: voice vote (2/2/95)
H. Res. 60 (2/6/95)	O	H.R. 665	Victim Restitution	A: voice vote (2/7/95)
H. Res. 61 (2/6/95)	O	H.R. 666	Exclusionary Rule Reform	A: voice vote (2/7/95)
H. Res. 63 (2/8/95)	MO	H.R. 667	Violent Criminal Incarceration	A: voice vote (2/9/95)
H. Res. 69 (2/9/95)	O	H.R. 668	Criminal Alien Deportation	A: voice vote (2/10/95)
H. Res. 79 (2/10/95)	MO	H.R. 728	Law Enforcement Block Grants	A: voice vote (2/13/95)
H. Res. 83 (2/13/95)	MO	H.R. 7	National Security Revitalization	PQ: 229-100; A: 227-127 (2/15/95)
H. Res. 88 (2/16/95)	MC	H.R. 831	Health Insurance Deductibility	PQ: 230-191; A: 229-188 (2/21/95)
H. Res. 91 (2/21/95)	O	H.R. 830	Paperwork Reduction Act	A: voice vote (2/22/95)
H. Res. 92 (2/21/95)	MC	H.R. 889	Defense Supplemental	A: 282-144 (2/22/95)
H. Res. 93 (2/22/95)	MO	H.R. 450	Regulatory Transition Act	A: 252-175 (2/23/95)
H. Res. 96 (2/24/95)	MO	H.R. 1022	Risk Assessment	A: 253-165 (2/27/95)
H. Res. 100 (2/27/95)	O	H.R. 926	Regulatory Reform and Relief Act	A: voice vote (2/28/95)
H. Res. 101 (2/28/95)	MO	H.R. 925	Private Property Protection Act	A: 271-151 (3/2/95)
H. Res. 103 (3/3/95)	MO	H.R. 1058	Securities Litigation Reform	
H. Res. 104 (3/3/95)	MO	H.R. 988	Attorney Accountability Act	
H. Res. 105 (3/6/95)	MO			A: voice vote (3/6/95)
H. Res. 108 (3/7/95)	Debate	H.R. 956	Product Liability Reform	A: 257-155 (3/7/95)
H. Res. 109 (3/8/95)	MC			A: voice vote (3/8/95)
H. Res. 115 (3/14/95)	MO	H.R. 1159	Making Emergency Supp. Appropriations	PQ: 234-191; A: 247-181 (3/9/95)
H. Res. 116 (3/15/95)	MC	H.J. Res. 73	Term Limits Const. Amdt	A: 242-190 (3/15/95)
H. Res. 117 (3/16/95)	Debate	H.R. 4	Personal Responsibility Act of 1995	A: voice vote (3/28/95)
H. Res. 119 (3/21/95)	MC			A: voice vote (3/21/95)
H. Res. 125 (4/3/95)	O	H.R. 1271	Family Privacy Protection Act	A: 217-211 (3/22/95)
H. Res. 126 (4/3/95)	O	H.R. 660	Older Persons Housing Act	A: 423-1 (4/4/95)
H. Res. 128 (4/4/95)	MC	H.R. 1215	Contract With America Tax Relief Act of 1995	A: voice vote (4/6/95)
H. Res. 130 (4/5/95)	MC	H.R. 483	Medicare Select Expansion	A: 228-204 (4/5/95)
H. Res. 136 (5/1/95)	O	H.R. 655	Hydrogen Future Act of 1995	A: 253-172 (4/6/95)
H. Res. 139 (5/3/95)	O	H.R. 1361	Coast Guard Auth. FY 1996	A: voice vote (5/2/95)
H. Res. 140 (5/9/95)	O	H.R. 961	Clean Water Amendments	A: voice vote (5/9/95)
H. Res. 144 (5/11/95)	O	H.R. 535	Fish Hatchery—Arkansas	A: 414-4 (5/10/95)
H. Res. 145 (5/11/95)	O	H.R. 584	Fish Hatchery—Iowa	A: voice vote (5/15/95)
H. Res. 146 (5/11/95)	O	H.R. 614	Fish Hatchery—Minnesota	A: voice vote (5/15/95)
H. Res. 149 (5/16/95)	MC	H. Con. Res. 67	Budget Resolution FY 1996	A: 252-170; A: 255-168 (5/17/95)
H. Res. 155 (5/22/95)	MO	H.R. 1561	American Overseas Interests Act	A: 233-176 (5/23/95)
H. Res. 164 (6/8/95)	MC	H.R. 1530	Nat. Defense Auth. FY 1996	PQ: 225-191; A: 233-183 (6/13/95)
H. Res. 167 (6/15/95)	O	H.R. 1817	MilCon Appropriations FY 1996	PQ: 223-180; A: 245-155 (6/16/95)
H. Res. 169 (6/19/95)	MC	H.R. 1854	Leg. Branch Approps. FY 1996	PQ: 232-196; A: 236-191 (6/20/95)
H. Res. 170 (6/20/95)	O	H.R. 1868	For. Ops. Approps. FY 1996	PQ: 221-178; A: 217-175 (6/22/95)
H. Res. 171 (6/22/95)	O	H.R. 1905	Energy & Water Approps. FY 1996	A: voice vote (7/12/95)
H. Res. 173 (6/27/95)	C	H.J. Res. 79	Flag Constitutional Amendment	PQ: 258-170; A: 271-152 (6/28/95)
H. Res. 176 (6/28/95)	MC	H.R. 1944	Emer. Supp. Appropriations	PQ: 236-194; A: 234-192 (6/29/95)
H. Res. 185 (7/11/95)	O	H.R. 1977	Interior Approps. FY 1996	PQ: 235-193; D: 192-238 (7/12/95)
H. Res. 187 (7/12/95)	O	H.R. 1977	Interior Approps. FY 1996 #2	PQ: 230-194; A: 229-195 (7/13/95)
H. Res. 188 (7/12/95)	O	H.R. 1976	Agriculture Approps. FY 1996	PQ: 242-185; A: voice vote (7/18/95)

H. Res. No. (Date rept.)	Rule type	Bill No.	Subject	Disposition of rule
H. Res. 190 (7/17/95)	O	H.R. 2020	Treasury/Postal Approps. FY 1996	PQ: 232-192 A: voice vote (7/18/95)
H. Res. 193 (7/19/95)	C	H.J. Res. 96	Disapproval of MFN to China	A: voice vote (7/20/95)
H. Res. 194 (7/19/95)	O	H.R. 2002	Transportation Approps. FY 1996	PQ: 217-202 (7/21/95)
H. Res. 197 (7/21/95)	O	H.R. 70	Exports of Alaskan Crude Oil	A: voice vote (7/24/95)
H. Res. 198 (7/21/95)	O	H.R. 2076	Commerce, State Approps. FY 1996	A: voice vote (7/25/95)
H. Res. 201 (7/25/95)	O	H.R. 2099	VA/HUD Approps. FY 1996	A: 230-189 (7/25/95)
H. Res. 204 (7/28/95)	MC	S. 21	Terminating U.S. Arms Embargo on Bosnia	
H. Res. 205 (7/28/95)	O	H.R. 2126	Defense Approps. FY 1996	A: 409-1 (7/31/95)

Codes: O-open rule; MO-modified open rule; MC-modified closed rule; C-closed rule; A-adoption vote; D-defeated; PQ-previous question vote. Source: Notices of Action Taken, Committee on Rules, 104th Congress.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BEILENSEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the rule before us provides for consideration of what is clearly one of the most significant foreign policy measures that we will be taking up in the foreseeable future—the bill requiring the President and the American participation in the United Nations-imposed arms embargo on the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina could very well mark the beginning of our direct involvement in this tragic conflict.

As the gentleman from Florida has explained, the rule provides for 3 hours of general debate. It also makes in order one amendment in the nature of a substitute to be debatable for 1 hour. Should no substitute be offered, that hour will be available for general debate.

Mr. Speaker, our main concern in fashioning the rule was that enough time be provided so that Members on both sides of the aisle have an adequate opportunity to offer their arguments and to hear the opinions and the arguments of other Members.

We would have preferred 6 hours of debate time. Many of us felt that a full day of debate was necessary for a measure this momentous. We do hope very much that every Member who has a desire to be heard during this important debate is given the opportunity to speak in the 5 total hours of time that are provided under this rule.

Mr. Speaker, we support the rule, although as I have just stated we would have preferred that some more time be available for debate.

Mr. Speaker, it may not be necessary to restate the obvious, but perhaps it would be useful to do so. From the beginning, the policy choices for the United States and our NATO allies have been difficult, and each has been fraught with substantial peril. The alternatives available to us are probably fewer in number and less propitious today than they were 3 or 4 years ago.

From the beginning, our goals have been to end the fighting and the barbarism throughout the former Yugoslavia; to do so, if at all possible, as a contributor to multilateral efforts through the aegis of the United Nations to end the tragedy; to act in concert with and in support of our European allies who in their own way have sought to take the lead in responding to the situation and who have contrib-

uted the bulk of the troops on the ground in Bosnia; and to avoid, if possible, the insertion of U.S. troops on the ground there.

Needless to say, the policies undertaken by ourselves and our allies and the United Nations have not been entirely successful, although it is fair to say that our involvement together has undoubtedly lessened the amount of fighting and the amount of death and dislocation that would otherwise have occurred.

But we have known from the beginning that this was and is a terribly complex and difficult problem to help solve and although each of us has his or her own ideas about what we might have done differently at various times during these past few years, most of us have hesitated to criticize too harshly either Mr. Bush or Mr. Clinton as they who had the awful and final responsibility as President to forge U.S. policy and quite possibly commit U.S. troops grappled with the twin difficulties of responding in an effective way to the problems on the ground while at the same time trying to remain a part of and supportive of the multilateral efforts of which we are a part to contain the conflict.

It is precisely that concern that suggests to many of us that this week is not the time to take up this resolution.

It is extremely important in the long run that we not undertake unilateral action that may leave us with unilateral American responsibility in the area, and especially at a time when, as the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] argued before the Committee on Rules on Friday afternoon, "We have just reached major new decisions with our allies and with the United Nations that will give the United Nations one good last chance to more effectively carry out its mandate in Bosnia. We now have a different strategy and we need time to make it work. This is not a matter of months, but weeks."

As appealing as lifting the embargo is, we all know that the hoped for results of getting adequate additional heavy armaments to the Bosnian Government will take a good many months, and we all know that the withdrawal of U.N. troops that our taking such an action will precipitate is likely itself to require the insertion of U.S. troops on the ground while they withdraw. It would seem that the prudent policy just now would be to give the newly arrived at agreement between the United Nations and NATO to commit to a serious air campaign to halt any further Serb aggression and last

week's U.N. agreement to simplify the chain of command to allow military commanders to make the decisions as to whether and when air strikes should take place an opportunity to take effect. We shall all be back here 1 month from now and should these new policies which have been agreed upon and reached amongst ourselves and our allies and the United Nations not be successful or carried out to our satisfaction, there will be time enough then for us to undertake this unilateral action.

I say this, Mr. Speaker, as one who along with a good many of our colleagues in this body has felt strongly for some time now, in the case of many of us since late 1991 and early 1992, that the Serbs will not be deterred until finally they believe and are made to understand that they will suffer real damage and real pain and real casualties if they continue their aggression.

Every time they believed they would suffer retaliation, they have hesitated, but tragically they have succeeded in calling our bluff time and again.

Our argument now is that we seem to have finally a policy that will in fact inflict the necessary kind of damage in response to their continuing these outrageous assaults upon humanity. It would be foolish of us not to give this policy, which many of us have argued for now for a long time, a chance to work.

It cannot hurt to say once more that every one of us who has taken the time to think seriously about and argue through the various policy alternatives available to us understands that each of them carries with it its own grave risks and that none is certain of success. It thus seems to many of us that the wise and sensible thing to do now is to take no action that might prevent the successful functioning of our newly arrived at policy and worse yet perhaps force us to break with our closest allies in our mutual attempt to solve this problem together and leave us with an unwanted and potentially dangerous unilateral responsibility for undertaking further actions without the involvement of others that may necessarily be required by our unilaterally lifting the arms embargo.

Mr. Speaker, as I mentioned earlier, we support the rule.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GOSS], my distinguished colleague on the Committee on Rules.

(Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend and my colleague the gentleman from Florida [Mr. DIAZ-BALART] for yielding me this time. I hope his district and mine remain safe from Hurricane Erin and all others remain safe from Hurricane Erin bearing down on us.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule and the bill, S. 21. I am most grateful to the leadership of this House—and to Chairman GILMAN—for the prompt work undertaken to ensure that this House has a debate and a vote on the subject of the escalating atrocity that is Bosnia and Herzegovina. No doubt, the gruesome and abhorrent reality of death, destruction, and debasement of human life in Bosnia, presents enormous challenges as does working through the ponderous international machinery now in use.

Although no one believes that resolving this terrible crisis is an easy task, there is at least one clear and obvious step that the United States should be taking, namely lifting the arms embargo and allowing the Government of Bosnia to exercise its right to self-defense. The administration seems to be arguing that it was all wisdom and that Congress should not participate in any resolution of this tragedy—but the administration has long had its chance to do the right thing on its own—and its policies have failed to do the job.

I am proud that this House, following the lead of the other body, will demonstrate that we are not afraid to stand up for what is moral and what is right. We will direct the President to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government, something we should have done some time ago. I am pleased that Chairman SOLOMON and our Rules Committee responded to this urgent need—even at a time when our committee time and time on the floor is at such a premium—and developed a fair rule that allows significant debate, while ensuring an opportunity for the minority to present an alternative of their choice. Support this rule and support S. 21.

□ 1040

Mr. BEILENSEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER] who has been involved personally in this matter.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, let me rise first and say that I do not believe this is an issue of the President's policy; neither President Clinton nor President Bush. Frankly, I think that President Bush should have moved more decisively at the beginning, but let me say that I thought President Bush was right at the time. We both made a mistake.

President Clinton, in 1992, spoke strongly of the strike-and-lift policy that he wanted to see our country pursue, but the issue is what we do today;

What America's policy will be as set by the Congress of the United States.

Mr. Speaker, President John Kennedy, in his first inaugural address said, "To those people in the huts and villages of half of the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help themselves, for whatever period is required, not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right."

Let me repeat that, Mr. Speaker. "Because it is right."

That is what we are about today; doing what is right. Helping the Bosnian people break the bonds of misery. We can do this by voting to allow them the right, the inherent right of a nation to defend themselves as explicitly stated in article 51 of the U.N. Charter.

In that regard, Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this rule and legislation which would lift the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Mr. Speaker, 318 of the Members of this body voted on June 8, just a little short of 2 months ago, to lift the arms embargo. Since that vote, the so-called safe havens, of Srebrenica and Zepa, which were designated safe havens by the United Nations, the mightiest nations on the face of the earth, have been overrun by the Serb forces.

Fighting rages around another safe haven, Bihac, and the shelling of Sarajevo continues. The West's response was to draw the line at Gorazde, allowing Serbian forces to amass at the other safe havens and threaten to overrun these areas as well.

Since that June 8 vote, 24 Bosnian and Croatian Serbs, including Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic and his military chief, General Mladic, have been indicted by the international community for war crimes, including that of genocide. This is not a personal opinion; this is not an opinion of our Government or other governments; this is an opinion of the U.N. tribunal. We are dealing with international felons and war criminals.

This body should not retreat from that overwhelming vote on June 8. Some Members say it was an easy vote for them, but now this measure is real. It is a free-standing piece of legislation. To retreat from the House's overwhelming support to lift the embargo would send yet another signal to the Serbs that the United States has drawn another line in the sand, dared the Serbs to cross it, and then ourselves fallen back to a new position.

It seems to me, Mr. Speaker, that what we are encountering is similar to a scene dating back to the 1930's when yet another dictator sought to carve up a neighboring country in the name of ethnic unity. It occurred in Munich in 1938. It was called, rightly, "appeasement."

At the outset of the crisis in Czechoslovakia, one European leader remarked, "How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging

trenches and tying gas masks here because of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing."

All of us learned the lessons of the neglect and negligence at that time. The result was called a Holocaust and, Mr. Speaker, it tragically is happening today in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Bosnians do not want our soldiers. Prime Minister Silajdzic said in a letter, "Throughout this conflict we have never asked for American or foreign ground troops to fight for us. We do not need them. We have both the manpower and the will to fight for ourselves."

Mr. Speaker, let this body show the Bosnian people that we too have the will to do what is morally and ethically right and allow them to defend themselves.

Mr. Speaker, using another quote, "For two centuries," one of our Presidents said, "America has served the world as an inspiring example of freedom and democracy. For generations, America has led the struggle to preserve and extend the blessings of liberty. And today, in a rapidly changing world, American leadership is indispensable. Americans know that leadership brings burdens and sacrifices. But we also [know] why the hopes of humanity turn to us. We are Americans. We have a unique responsibility to do the hard work of freedom," he said. "And when we do, freedom works."

That was President George Bush in his State of the Union Address in January 1991.

Today, Mr. Speaker, this body has a unique and compelling responsibility to do the hard work of freedom. Let us give the Bosnian people the opportunity to pursue their freedom from their aggressors. I would hope that my colleagues would vote for this rule. Vote for S. 21. It will be a vote for the right of an internationally recognized sovereign Nation to defend itself.

In closing, Mr. Speaker, let me read from a letter to Haris Silajdzic, The democratically elected prime minister of Bosnia. He says this in a letter dated yesterday: "Since before the very first attacks on our population more than 3 years ago, we have been prepared to fight to defend ourselves. Tragically, the arms embargo against our country has ensured that this conflict be a slaughter rather than a war."

"The Arms Embargo," he goes on to say, "must be terminated and a balance of power be effected on the ground. Only then," he says, "will the genocidal spiral end." He closes with this, Mr. Speaker. "On behalf of our people, I appeal to the American Government, the American people, and their elected representatives to untie our hands and to prove, once again, why America is the leader of the democratic world. In the name of morality, lift the arms embargo. Sincerely, Haris Silajdzic, Prime Minister" of the democratic, internationally recognized, sovereign nation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], the chairman of the Committee on International Relations and one of the great leaders of this Congress who continuously proves precisely that it is the American people who are the moral leaders of the world.

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. DIAZ-BALART] and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GOSS] and the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER] for their strong supporting statements on behalf of this measure.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this rule on S. 21 which will allow the House, for the third time in 14 months, to debate the critical issue of terminating the unjust arms embargo that has been imposed, with our Government's support, on the Government and people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The position of the House is clear—we had a vote on this question in early June where an amendment to our State Department and foreign assistance authorization directing the President to terminate the arms embargo was adopted by an impressive, overwhelming 3-to-1 ratio.

However, the measure which we will consider today, S. 21 under this rule, will upon approval, go directly to the President's desk for his approval or his veto. This measure will allow the Congress as a whole to speak clearly, without ambiguity of our distaste, and our revulsion for the maintenance of an unjust, immoral, and entirely misguided arms embargo which has penalized the victims of aggression and prolonged a conflict which the international community has been powerless to bring to an end.

The legislation introduced and adopted in the Senate by Majority Leader DOLE is a responsible measure—it allows the Government of Bosnia to choose between having the U.N. peacekeepers remain or having the embargo terminated by the United States. It avoids the charge that we who support lifting the embargo would precipitate a withdrawal of the United Nations from Bosnia, because it explicitly says that the embargo will be lifted only after the Bosnian Government has formally requested the United Nations to depart. Moreover, it provides flexibility to the President to the degree that the safety of UNPROFOR troops or our own forces that may be involved in assisting a withdrawal.

This rule is a fair one. It provides for a counterproposal to be considered if one is offered by any Members opposing termination of the embargo. Most importantly, this rule provides for an ample allotment of time—3 hours, for our Members to speak out and fully consider this issue. Having been involved with the question of this embargo for 3 years as both ranking member

of the Foreign Affairs Committee during the previous Congress, and as chairman of our International Relations Committee, I have become fully aware of the tremendous level of outrage and frustration which most of our Members share because of the continuing humiliation of the United Nations and our own Government, and the ongoing victimization of the Bosnian people. Today, we will have an opportunity to fully examine this proposal and its implications for the Bosnian people.

Accordingly, I urge our Members to support this rule and bring this urgently required measure to the floor.

Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from Virginia [Mr. MORAN].

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, there have been few situations in modern history that have been as cruel and unjust as this, when people who could have changed it chose not to. The United Nations designated six areas in Bosnia that were to be safe enclaves. In fact, when people came into those enclaves, they were disarmed. We agreed to that.

We are the principal financial contributor to the United Nations. We contribute more than any other country. We have been contributing almost a third of all the money that supports the United Nations. So it was our word, as well as the U.N.'s word, that these people would be safe.

Nine out of ten of them were unarmed. In fact, those who had arms had only small arms that were of no use against heavy artilleries that the Serbs have had in their possession and have used for the last 3 years.

Mr. Speaker, it is a cruel irony, in fact, that the arms embargo was never intended to apply to Bosnia. It was intended to apply to those States within Yugoslavia that had as many heavy arms as they wanted to use; Serbia and Croatia and Slovenia. They all had access to arms, but we knew Bosnia did not, and yet we imposed an arms embargo on Bosnia as well. When it became clear it was only effectively applying to Bosnia, we would not lift it. Now, for 3 years we have stood by as tens of thousands of people have been slaughtered.

We have almost 2 million refugees floating around Europe that have been displaced. About 40,000 women have been raped. That is a large number, but it has been a tactic of this war; to rape women, defile them, to shame the family, to break the spirit of the Bosnian people, partly because they are Moslems, partly because it is a multiethnic secular democracy, and that, of course, is a threat to any dictator like Mr. Milosevic who is a hard-line, old-line Communist.

And so we set up six enclaves. Now, in the last few weeks, we have let those enclaves be overrun. In the process of overrunning them, hundreds of women have been raped, hundreds of people have been viciously tortured, thousands of people have been massacred.

Let me just put a little flesh and blood on what this means, what some of these numbers represent. Mr. Speaker, the following is from the July 31, 1995, edition of Newsweek magazine:

This past week at a crossroads in the mountains outside Srebrenica, Sabaheta Bacirovic saw 500 men on their knees. They were Bosnian Moslem prisoners. Their arms were tied behind their heads and their Serbian captors forced them to march by shuffling along on their knees. The Serbs taunted Mrs. Bacirovic and the women traveling with her. They were all driven out of Srebrenica when the Moslem enclave fell on July 11. "These are your husbands," she recalled them saying. "There is your army. We will kill them all."

Mr. Speaker, they can kill them, because they are unarmed, because we have insisted upon this arms embargo. Mrs. Bacirovic realized that her husband was not among them. He had already been executed. Other women who walked this trail of tears out of Srebrenica saw heaps of dead men, their throats slit, piled up beside the roads; 9 out of 10 of them were unarmed. They were shot at and shelled by the Serbs every step of the way, broken into segments. When the stragglers caught up, they saw piles of corpses with their throats slit.

Mr. Speaker, 9,000 men were killed as a result of the Serb's overtaking this enclave. This death march was the worst massacre in Europe since the Nazi era. Trickery led some of them to their deaths. The Serbs had white tanks that were made to look like U.N. vehicles. They had "U.N." painted on them, and with bullhorns they urged the Bosnian to come out of the mountains and surrender.

One of the Bosnian Moslems said, "We knew it was really the Serbs." Mr. Alija Omerovic watched as some of his companions walked down and tried to surrender and were shot down by the armored car's machine gun.

Some of the victims were mutilated, often with noses and ears cut off. A company commander was found, Enver Alaspahic, lying on a path. This is the company commander. His face had been cut open to the bone in the shape of an Orthodox cross. He begged the scout to kill him. The scout said he could not do it and left him there.

Many of the atrocities have been committed by the black-clad members of the Serbian Volunteer Guard. These are followers of a thug known as Arkan. A woman whose husband and brother were among the missing marchers said she saw Serbs in black bandanas pull a pair of 12-year-old twin boys off a refugee bus. This is a U.N. refugee bus that we finance, we are responsible for. They slit their throats, slit the throats of the two twins, as their mother tried vainly to trade her life for theirs.

□ 1100

Later the mother tied herself to a tree limb and hanged

herself. We saw that on TV. People at the time said they did not know why she had hanged herself. They have now found out. And who would not?

These are the kinds of atrocities that are occurring. While it is awkward and makes us uncomfortable to talk about them, they are real, they are happening today, and we are complicit in their happening unless we act.

General Arkan has a long history. He had eight convictions by Interpol, murders, and yet he was armed by the Serbs in Serbia. He rounded up the worst, most vicious thugs that they could find, sent them into Bosnian villages, told them, "You can go into these homes, you can shoot the men, you can rape the women. I will not go into what they did to the women, but it boggles the imagination that people could be so vicious and inhuman. They threw these families out of their homes, took all the possessions that they could, and went through village after village, ethnically cleansing these villages. That was the policy, and it has worked. It never should have worked at this time in the 20th century, when the United States has the military power, has the moral power to prevent this kind of slaughter, this kind of ethnic genocide. We committed ourselves to do that, not just when we erected the Holocaust Memorial, but when we learned of the slaughter of 6 million Jews because they were Jews, and now we see the slaughter of over 200,000 Moslems because they are Moslems. Most of them are innocent civilians. It never, never should have happened.

Let me just quote the last point that the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER] made. This is a quote from Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, who just today sent us a letter, all of us, addressed specifically to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH] and the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER]. It says:

On behalf of our people, I appeal to the American Government, the American people, and their elected representatives to untie our hands and to prove once again why America is the leader of the democratic world. In the name of morality, lift the arms embargo.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ROTH], a tireless fighter for human rights throughout the world and a member of the Committee on International Relations.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Few, if any, issues are more important and more urgent than the legislation that is addressed in this rule. The purpose of this legislation is to give the Bosnian Moslems one last chance to defend themselves and save their country from the Serb onslaught.

Under this rule, the Senate-passed measure would be brought up for an up-or-down vote. This means that we can send this bill directly to the President tonight. So, for those of us who want

fast action, we can do that by passing this legislation, today.

Mr. Speaker, Bosnia is on the ropes. Its army is being pushed back. Its population is undergoing terrific hardships, death and destruction, as we have been told here this morning during this debate.

The civil war in Bosnia has now entered its fifth year. More than 200,000 people have been killed; 2 million more are refugees, driven from their homes.

The Bosnian Moslems have taken the worst of it even though their army is twice the size of the Bosnian Serbs'. The Bosnian Army has some 150,000 soldiers while the Bosnian Serb forces are about 60,000 strong. Why, then, are the Moslems losing this war to a smaller army?

Certainly, part of the answer is the military leadership on the part of the Bosnian Army. But the Serbs make up for their smaller army with much better equipment. What has caused this difference? It is the embargo which has prevented the Bosnian Army from obtaining the heavy weapons that are essential if the Moslems are to have a chance to turn back the Serbs.

The original purpose of the arms embargo was to stop the fighting, like putting out a fire by cutting off the oxygen. But it has not worked out that way.

In reality, the embargo has shifted the course of the conflict against the Moslems. By maintaining the embargo, we have been a silent partner in the Serbian aggression. The result is that the Serbs now control 70 percent of Bosnia.

The embargo should have ended last year when the House first voted to lift the embargo. It should have ended months ago when the House voted a second time to free Bosnia from its shackles. Now, before it is too late, the House must act and the President must sign this bill into law.

Mr. Speaker, the first step is for the House to adopt this rule, to vote for the rule and for this bill. Let us at least give the Bosnians a fighting chance. This bill will accomplish that goal.

Mr. BEILENSEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. HEFNER].

(Mr. HEFNER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HEFNER. Mr. Speaker, what I would like to do at this time is raise a question to anybody who would wish to answer the question. I have listened very closely to the debate today.

It is not going to be hard to vote to lift the embargo. That is going to be a very popular vote, to vote to lift the embargo, very popular.

Now, the next step is what if the United Nations forces, if the Bosnian Government says, "We want you to leave. We have lifted the embargo, we want you to leave, you have got to get out," we have already committed, the

President has committed and some of the leaders on the Republican side have committed that we would commit 25,000 troops or more to help these people leave the conflict area. The next vote is not going to be that easy, because you are going to have to vote for authorization to authorize us to send 25,000 American troops to that part of the world for a conflict that I do not think that the American people are going to support putting Americans on the ground and in harm's way in this event.

And I would just like to ask why, if you are going to lift this, unilaterally lift the arms embargo, why is it not part of the legislation that you tell the whole picture, that you go through the whole scenario, that you are going to eventually have 25,000 or more American troops committed to the conflict?

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HEFNER. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. I think it is important, No. 1 to concentrate on legislation before us today. I want to be specific with regard to the last section of the bill which reads:

Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as authorizing for deployment of United States forces in the territory of Bosnia for any purpose, including training, support or delivery of military equipment.

Now, that is important to realize that is in this bill. The gentleman brings up other possibilities in the future.

Mr. HEFNER. Reclaiming my time, that is the easy vote. That is the easy vote, that we are not going to have anybody go in with the equipment that we send in. We are not going to have anybody go and show them how to use the equipment. It is easy to make that vote. But once you do this, you are going to have to have some commitment from somebody; if we supply the armaments to them, you cannot just send it in. It is going to take a month or longer. You cannot just send equipment in and say, "Here it is guys." They have no experience. Somebody is going to have to take this responsibility. That is going to be a tough vote to make in this House, to vote to authorize American troops to go in as advisers or as help to get the United Nations forces out. That has not even been talked about in this legislation. It has not even been mentioned.

You can make the votes to unilaterally lift the embargo. You can make the votes to the last part of your bill that says no Americans can be involved in any capacity.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. They are not authorized at this point.

Mr. HEFNER. Then where do you go from there?

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. If the gentleman will yield, the gentleman brings up some possibilities with regard to the future and points to this vote being an easy vote. I do not think it is an easy vote to say that the world community, in fact, has acted immorally for over 3 years. That is not an easy vote.

There is a lot of speculation that we can engage in with regard to the future. But what is true is the world has acted immorally, and we are solving that problem with this vote.

Mr. HEFNER. This is not speculation. It is going to be a fact.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3½ minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. ROHRBACHER], a distinguished member of the Committee on International Relations, who is a genuine freedom fighter for the best causes throughout the world and has been throughout his political career.

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Mr. Speaker, I have been in Washington, DC, since 1980, when I came here with Ronald Reagan as a member of his White House staff, and I can tell you we did not end the cold war by being afraid to act. Every time Ronald Reagan tried to do anything, he was told, "You cannot do this, because there are going to be serious repercussions." We would still be in the middle of the cold war if we took that kind of advice.

The fact is Ronald Reagan stated, and he saw very clearly, that the problems we confronted are not so complex but that they are difficult and we must make difficult decisions if problems are to be solved.

In the Balkans, the fundamentals are clear. What the world is witnessing is, No. 1, a Serbian land grab; No. 2, Serbian aggression; and Serbian genocide, ethnic cleansing of their neighbors. Villages are being destroyed in Croatia and Bosnia.

Are there Croatian and Bosnian tanks in Serbia? Is there Croatian artillery or Bosnian artillery in Serbia? Are there Bosnian or Croatian airplanes in Serbia?

The fundamentals are clear. What we are facing is Serbian aggression and genocide against their neighbors. We must determine, as the Western powers and as the leading Western power, what to do about it, and do not let anybody say there are no non-Serbsians in Serbia. In Kosovo, we are going to find if we let this genocide go on in Bosnia, there are hundreds of thousands of Muslims in Serbia who then will face genocide if we do not face up to this murderous regime right now.

Serbian crimes and culpability are clear. Yet U.S. policy has been an arms embargo on both sides.

Denying arms to an unarmed victim, denying the right to defend oneself is immoral on the face of it. It has encouraged the murder and aggression that we see taking place in the Balkans.

We have heard the answer is basically letting the victims defend themselves. I believe that is the central part of the answer. No. 1, let these people defend themselves by giving them the means to do so. Let us not watch a "Schindler's List" movie 20 or 30 years from now of unarmed civilians being herded, unable to defend themselves, to their slaughter.

Yes, we hear, "Oh, you cannot do anything unless you are willing to put

U.S. ground troops on the ground." That is absolutely ridiculous. That is saying we cannot do anything unless we do everything.

Is it our policy that victims should be kept defenseless? This has encouraged attacks. If we do not believe in putting U.S. ground troops on the ground, what should our policy be? Again, lifting the embargo.

No. 2, we have the airpower, the airpower needed to deter the Serbian aggression and the Serbian genocide. I am not talking about using that airpower against little emplacements in Bosnia. The answer is lift the embargo, bomb Serbia, bomb Serbia. This will not cost innocent civilian lives in Serbia. We can destroy their military capability. We can bomb Serbia. They will get the message without killing any of their innocent civilians. We can destroy their military capacity.

No. 3, we should take Mr. Milosevic into custody and try him for his war crimes. Those things are within our capacity. We need not commit 50,000 U.S. troops on the ground.

We must stand for the moral position. We must stand up for what America is supposed to stand for, freedom and against aggression, or there is no hope in the world; there is no hope for the Bosnian people or anyone else.

□ 1115

Mr. BEILENSEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield the remainder of our time to the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURTHA], the ranking member of the Subcommittee on National Security.

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate what the gentleman from California [Mr. ROHRBACHER] just said about the Reagan administration and the support. Many of us Democrats supported the Reagan administration's foreign policy, and we felt very strongly about it, and there were very few of us. I supported President Bush very strongly when he went into Saudi Arabia and when he defeated the Iraqis in the desert. This policy, though, of lifting the embargo looks like to me we are inviting a defeat, we are inviting a Dien Bien Phu, in the United States. If we lift the embargo, what we are saying to our allies is, "You're going to have to get out because they have said they are going to get out." We have committed ourselves to send in 25,000 American troops on the ground to get to help them out.

Now I was just 2 weeks ago over in Split, in Split, a very inadequate port facility that takes one ship a day, that takes one C-5 at a time. The roads from Split to Sarajevo are very narrow with 10-ton bridges. None of the heavy equipment could get through this very narrow winding road. The military situation in the wintertime is impossible. Air power is not near as effective.

So we are inviting a defeat. We are inviting, we are saying, "All right; we're going to lift the embargo, and the results of that are the French and

British pull out, the United States is going to deploy troops into Bosnia to withdraw and actually face a defeat." So the vote we are casting is actually to defeat the U.S. forces or to defeat the United Nations.

The policy change that has been made is a key factor here. The President has said, well, the dual authority for bombing is gone. We now have military-to-military to be able to use bombing in order to reinforce the people on the ground. That is important. This a key. We no longer are going to be concerned about it; we are no longer going to stop fighting because of hostages. That is obviously an important change in policy. In the United States, we will use massive air power in order to stop the Serb aggression around the enclaves, and negotiation is going forward.

For us to lift the embargo sends exactly the wrong signal. There is no worse signal we could send because the French and the British would immediately withdraw, and I say to the Members of Congress, "This vote is actually participating in voting for the authorization of going to war because it will be essential that we go in to help rescue the French and British. They are on the ground, and we have committed ourselves. The American President has committed our prestige and the power of the United States to help the British and the French withdraw."

And the physical conditions of just getting in; let us talk about just getting into Sarajevo and how long it will take. It took us 40 days to get a light helicopter division into Saudi Arabia with the most modern port facilities, the most modern airport facilities in the world. Here we have inadequate port facilities, with mountainous roads, with impossible terrain, within 40 to 60 days of having all kinds of bad weather.

Now I participated in the fighting in Vietnam. I was wounded twice. I know the advantage of closed air support. I know the advantage of having air support when in a tactical situation. That did not win the war. We had 450,000 American troops on the ground, and that did not win the war.

If we were to withdraw the troops from Bosnia, and try to lift the embargo, and try to force-feed the Bosnian troops—we tried to train the Vietnamese, we tried for years to train the Vietnamese. They do not have the long-term training of officers. It takes 10 years to train a staff sergeant, takes 15 years to train an officer in the American military, 20 years to train a battalion commander, and we are saying in a few weeks we can train the Bosnians to use heavy equipment. We can train them to use individual pieces of equipment, but we cannot train them to use a coordinated attack. We had trouble with our guard units, training them in 60 days, and they were already well trained, and many of them experienced in Vietnam.

So we are asking for a disaster, and I support this rule, but I ask the Members of Congress to think very seriously and to vote against this lifting the embargo because it will be disastrous to American foreign policy.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. DUNCAN). The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. BEILENSON] has now expired.

The gentleman from Florida [Mr. DIAZ-BALART] has 5½ minutes remaining.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. KING].

Mr. KING. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. DIAZ-BALART] for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Speaker, this is an historic moment in the history of the House of Representatives, and it is important to keep our mind and our eye on the key issue, and the key issue is the right to a sovereign nation to defend itself, and it raises the issue of what we are to do in the post-cold war era. Is the United States going to continue to be an accomplice to a policy which deprives victims of the right to defend themselves?

Speakers have raised the issue today, is this going to involve the United States? The fact is the United States is already involved. It is involved in a conspiracy to deny the most basic rights to the people of Bosnia.

And what are we talking about? We are talking about aggression by the Serbs against the Bosnians. We are talking about mass rape against the people of Bosnia. We are talking about ethnic cleansing and genocide. This is "Schindler's List" of the 1990's, and what is the response of the Western World? Our response has been to look the other way, and worse than looking the other way, to put an embargo on those that want to defend themselves.

I was in Bosnia several years ago with the gentlewoman from New York [Ms. MOLINARI], the gentleman from New York [Mr. PAXON], and the gentleman from New York [Mr. ENGEL]. I saw firsthand the atrocities being carried out against the innocent people of Bosnia, and we, as Americans, have a moral obligation to step forward and lift this embargo. There is no moral, or diplomatic, or military justification to continue this unjust embargo upon the people of Bosnia.

Along with the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER] and the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH] last week we met with the Prime Minister of Bosnia. Here is a man; all he is asking for for his people is not for American troops. He is asking for the right to defend himself, the most basic right, and if we do not have the courage today to cast the vote, and, by the way, I disagree that this is an easy vote. There is no easy vote when we are talking about war and peace. This is a very, very serious vote, and, if we have to cast votes in the future, they will be even more serious, but the fact is we

cannot stand idly by while aggression goes unchecked.

The Prime Minister of Bosnia, all he is asking for is the weapons to defend himself, to defend his people. That is a moral right that they have, and we, as signatories to the U.N. Charter, have to agree with that right.

So I urge adoption of the rule and the bill, and I again stress to my colleagues what an historic moment this is to the House of Representatives.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield the remainder of our time to the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON], the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Rules, tireless fighter for human rights and an inspiration for freedom fighters throughout the world.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON] is recognized for 2½ minutes.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me, and I strongly support this fair rule and the bill that it brings to the floor. I commend the gentleman from Florida [Mr. DIAZ-BALART], an outstanding fighter for human rights, along with the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER], and others.

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SOLOMON. I yield to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. WILSON], another great American.

Mr. WILSON. Would the gentleman agree with me that I am certain this amendment is going to pass and pass overwhelmingly, but would the gentleman agree with me that we also should pay some attention to the plight of Croatia, who also is a victim of aggression?

Mr. SOLOMON. Absolutely. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. WILSON] is correct.

My colleagues, let me just say this. As my colleagues know, the idea before us today is to lift the embargo. To those who legitimately argue against this idea, I would just ask them what is the better idea, because continuing the embargo is continuing genocide for helpless Bosnian people, and we cannot be a part of that.

As my colleagues know, American foreign policy under all Presidents, be they Republican or Democrat, has always been to support, and encourage, and, yes, defend democracy around the world against outside military aggression. It is argued that this is not outside military aggression, and we cannot interfere with internal strife, as bad as it may seem.

But what can we do? What we can do is lift the embargo, an embargo that's implementation has been one-sided.

As my colleagues know, we have been giving the former Soviet Union, Russia, U.S. tax dollars. They in turn are giving Russian rubles, Russian dollars, to Serbia. They are giving equipment to Serbia, who in turn are giving it to

the Bosnian Serbs, who are perpetrating this genocide on those poor, helpless people. It is all one way. We are enforcing the sanctions on the official democratic Government of Bosnia, yet on the other side the oil tankers roll down the Danube giving oil to Serbia, which in turn is putting it into the Bosnian Serbs. That is genocide, my colleagues. The answer is to lift this embargo and let the Bosnian people defend themselves.

Someone said they are not going to know how to use this equipment. These people know better than my colleagues and I how to use that equipment. We give them the ability to defend themselves, and the genocide will stop, and we ought to be helping them do that, and I urge support of the rule and the bill that it brings to the floor.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 204 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the Senate bill, S. 21.

□ 1127

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the Senate bill (S. 21) to terminate the United States arms embargo applicable to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Mr. BONILLA in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read the first time.

The text of S. 21 is as follows:

S. 21

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) For the reasons stated in section 520 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236), the Congress has found that continued application of an international arms embargo to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina contravenes that Government's inherent right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and therefore is inconsistent with international law.

(2) The United States has not formally sought multilateral support for terminating the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina through a vote on a United Nations Security Council resolution since the enactment of section 1404 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337).

(3) The United Nations Security Council has not taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the aggression against that country began in April 1992.

(4) The Contact Group, composed of representatives of the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and Germany, has since July 1994 maintained that in the event of continuing rejection by the Bosnian Serbs of the Contact Group's proposal for Bosnia and Herzegovina, a decision in the United Nations Security Council to lift the Bosnian arms embargo as a last resort would be unavoidable.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF SUPPORT.

The Congress supports the efforts of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina—

(1) to defend its people and the territory of the Republic;

(2) to preserve the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the Republic; and

(3) to bring about a peaceful, just, fair, viable, and sustainable settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

SEC. 4. TERMINATION OF ARMS EMBARGO.

(a) TERMINATION.—The President shall terminate the United States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as provided in subsection (b), following—

(1) receipt by the United States Government of a request from the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina for termination of the United States arms embargo and submission by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in exercise of its sovereign rights as a nation, of a request to the United Nations Security Council for the departure of UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina; or

(2) a decision by the United Nations Security Council, or decisions by countries contributing forces to UNPROFOR, to withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(b) IMPLEMENTATION OF TERMINATION.—The President may implement termination of the United States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina pursuant to subsection (a) prior to the date of completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina, but shall, subject to subsection (c), implement termination of the embargo pursuant to that subsection no later than the earlier of—

(1) the date of completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina; or

(2) the date which is 12 weeks after the date of submission by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina of a request to the United Nations Security Council for the departure of UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(c) PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER AUTHORITY.—If the President determines and reports in advance to Congress that the safety, security, and successful completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with subsection (b)(2) requires more time than the period provided for in that subsection, the President may extend the time period available under subsection (b)(2) for implementing termination of the United States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina for a period of up to 30 days. The authority in this subsection may be exercised to extend the time period available under subsection (b)(2) for more than one 30-day period.

(d) PRESIDENTIAL REPORTS.—Within 7 days of the commencement of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and every 14 days thereafter, the President shall report in writing to the President pro

tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives on the status and estimated date of completion of the withdrawal operation. If any such report includes an estimated date of completion of the withdrawal which is later than 12 weeks after commencement of the withdrawal operation, the report shall include the operational reasons which prevent the completion of the withdrawal within 12 weeks of commencement.

(e) INTERNATIONAL POLICY.—If the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina submits a request to the United Nations Security Council for the departure of UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina or if the United Nations Security Council or the countries contributing forces to UNPROFOR decide to withdraw from Bosnia and Herzegovina, as provided in subsection (a), the President (or his representative) shall immediately introduce and support in the United Nations Security Council a resolution to terminate the application of United Nations Security Council resolution 713 to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The United States shall insist on a vote on the resolution by the Security Council. The resolution shall, at a minimum, provide for the termination of the applicability of United Nations Security Council resolution 713 to the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina no later than the completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the event the United Nations Security Council fails to adopt the resolution to terminate the application of United Nations Security Council resolution 713 to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina because of a lack of unanimity of the permanent members, thereby failing to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the United States shall promptly endeavor to bring the issue before the General Assembly for decision as provided for in the Assembly's Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950.

(f) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as authorization for deployment of United States forces in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina for any purpose, including training, support, or delivery of military equipment.

(g) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section—

(1) the term "United States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina" means the application to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina of—

(A) the policy adopted July 10, 1991, and published in the Federal Register of July 19, 1991 (58 FR 33322) under the heading "Suspension of Munitions Export Licenses to Yugoslavia"; and

(B) any similar policy being applied by the United States Government as of the date of completion of withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina, pursuant to which approval is denied for transfers of defense articles and defense services to the former Yugoslavia; and

(2) the term "completion of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina" means the departure from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina of substantially all personnel participating in UNPROFOR and substantially all other personnel assisting in their withdrawal, within a reasonable period of time, without regard to whether the withdrawal was initiated pursuant to a request by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a decision by the United Nations Security Council, or decisions by countries contributing forces to UNPROFOR, but the term does not include such personnel as may remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina pursuant to an agreement between the Government of Bosnia and

Herzegovina and the government of any country providing such personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN] and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] will each be recognized for 1½ hours.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN].

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, as my colleagues know, this year is the 50th anniversary of the United Nations. The President himself went to San Francisco for the celebrations marking the signing of the charter.

Article 51 of that charter gives every member nation the right of self-defense against armed attack.

S. 21, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995—is designed to enable the sovereign State of Bosnia—a member in good standing of the United Nations—to defend itself against armed attack from its immediate neighbor.

It establishes a procedure that resolves the concerns of many who have argued that unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would have disastrous results.

Opponents contend that U.S. termination would Americanize the conflict—first because the U.N. Protection Force—UNPROFOR—would pull out, requiring the President to make good his commitment to provide up to 25,000 American troops to assist in their withdrawal.

Second, it is argued that because the Bosnian Government would seek the heavy weapons they need from the United States, Americans would have to provide the necessary training.

Opponents also have said that long before Bosnia could obtain the weapons and training it needs, the Serbs would launch an all-out attack. The result would be even greater destruction than we have seen so far—with more ethnic cleansing, more rapes, murders, and other atrocities against unarmed civilians.

Some opponents also have argued that by unilaterally lifting the arms embargo, we would put at risk other embargoes that our Nation supports—such as those against Iraq and Iran.

However, the embargoes against Iraq and Iran are designed to punish those nations for aggressive actions—while the arms embargo against Bosnia punishes the victim.

S. 21 contains important conditions that obviate many of those arguments. First, in order for the United States to terminate the arms embargo, the bill requires action by Bosnia, the U.N. Security Council, or countries contributing troops to UNPROFOR.

The Bosnian Government must first call upon the U.N. Security Council to withdraw UNPROFOR, or the Council—or countries contributing to UNPROFOR—such as Britain and France—must decide to withdraw the force.

Second, after the Bosnian Government requests the withdrawal of UNPROFOR the President can wait up to 12 weeks before terminating the arms embargo.

Further, the President can extend the waiting period for up to 30 days if he determines that a safe, secure, and successful withdrawal will require more than 12 weeks. These extensions can be continued until the withdrawal of UNPROFOR has been completed.

Two years ago, on June 29, 1993, the Bosnian Ambassador to the United Nations called upon the security Council to terminate the arms embargo. That request obviously has not been granted.

This legislation links termination of the arms embargo to withdrawal of UNPROFOR, and places the decision to request that withdrawal upon those most directly affected by the consequences of that decision—the Bosnian Government.

If the Bosnian Government calls for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, the United Nations will have no choice but to comply—despite the possibility of greater fighting and the implementation of some very serious commitments that many may prefer not to implement.

S. 21 has nothing to do with Americanizing the war. A request by the Bosnian Government for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR would activate the President's promise to assist in that withdrawal even if S. 21 is defeated.

Mr. Chairman, the policies of our Government have carried us into a political cul-de-sac. Those policies have not been working and they are no longer sustainable.

It is time to end the charade of the past 3 years. Not only has it demeaned and diminished the authority of the United Nations, it has eroded the credibility of our Western allies.

Mr. Chairman, there are times when the hinge of history turns on a decision. The failure of the League of Nations to act against the Italian invasion of Ethiopia—the failure to challenge Hitler when he marched into the Sudetenland. We all know the consequences that flowed from those failures to confront aggression.

Similarly, this is one of those critical decisions.

History will judge our actions—and the judgement of history will be harsh if we do not enable Bosnia to act as a sovereign state and a full-fledged member of the United Nations.

Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to support S. 21.

□ 1130

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I. INTRODUCTION

I rise in opposition to the Dole-Lieberman bill. I know where the votes

are on this issue. Yet I believe it is important to look at the other side of this issue before we vote.

II. STATUS QUO IN BOSNIA IS NOT ACCEPTABLE

We all agree that present policy has not worked. It is clear that we cannot accept the status quo.

The U.N. peacekeeping operation [UNPROFOR] and NATO were unable to fulfill pledges to protect safe areas in Bosnia.

Diplomacy is stalled. The delivery of much humanitarian aid is still blocked.

The killings continue. The number of refugees grow. NATO, the U.N., and U.S. efforts to stop this war have not worked.

In short, there is a growing feeling that UNPROFOR has failed and should leave Bosnia, and that the arms embargo should be lifted to allow the Bosnian Government to defend itself.

Many who support lifting the embargo do so because they believe that the situation in Bosnia cannot get worse, and that lifting the embargo is the only alternative.

I think my colleagues are wrong on both counts: First, the situation in Bosnia can get worse, if we lift the embargo unilaterally; second, there is an alternative to lifting the embargo.

III. A NEW STRATEGY HAS BEEN DEVELOPED

The situation in Bosnia is not the same today as it was on June 8, when the House last voted on lifting the embargo.

We have agreed upon a new and much tougher, more unified strategy with our NATO allies and the UN:

We now have NATO agreement on the policy of a massive air campaign to halt Bosnian Serb aggression.

We have told the Bosnian Serbs that if they attack Gorazde, we will respond with an air campaign of disproportionate force. Today, NATO is meeting to expand that commitment to include the U.N.-declared safe area of the town of Bihać.

We also have U.N. agreement on a simplified chain of command. U.N. military commanders on the ground in Bosnia, together with NATO air commanders, will make the decision on when and where an air campaign takes place. This is the way our military wants it—this is standard military practice.

There will be no more pinprick airstrikes.

There will be expanded military targets.

There will be no more dual-key control.

There will be no more decisions delayed because they must go through New York.

We now have a 10,000 man Rapid Reaction Force to protect UNPROFOR and make it more effective.

British and French troops in the Rapid Reaction Force are in combat fatigues, not blue helmets. They are much more aggressive and independent of the U.N. chain of command. They have suppressed Serb artillery around

Sarajevo. They are prepared to do more in their successful effort to keep the Mt. Igman aid route into Sarajevo open.

Will this new strategy work? We want it to work. We think it is working but we do not know if it will work. We will work in a matter of weeks.

What can this new approach accomplish? The administration's new strategy will not solve all the problems in Bosnia. It will not roll back Serb aggression. It will not end the war in a matter of weeks.

But it will deter more Serb attacks on some of the safe areas, it will give more time to search for a negotiated solution, and it will keep the United States out of the war.

We should give this new, more assertive strategy time to work.

IV. WHAT'S WRONG WITH UNILATERAL LIFT

This new strategy, while imperfect, is far superior to the option we are voting on today, a unilateral lifting of the embargo.

A. Consequences of unilateral lift

Lifting the arms embargo unilaterally will have dire consequences on the ground in Yugoslavia:

UNPROFOR will withdraw, that is a certainty.

For all the complaints about UNPROFOR, it has helped feed over 2 million people for nearly 3 years, including the entire city of Sarajevo—which remains completely dependent on humanitarian assistance.

The U.N. has helped to protect civilians. Casualties were 130,000 in 1992 before UNPROFOR arrived, and declined dramatically to 2,500 in 1994.

Once UNPROFOR leaves, the war will intensify. The killing and human misery will increase; before the Bosnians get heavy arms, the Serbs will step up their attacks; and right in the middle of this escalating conflict, up to 25,000 U.S. troops will be sent to Bosnia to help UNPROFOR withdraw. That is a commitment the United States must fulfill.

Prime Minister Major and President Chirac have made clear that UNPROFOR will leave Bosnia if we lift the arms embargo unilaterally. President Clinton has made clear that United States troops will go into Bosnia to help UNPROFOR leave.

Make no mistake: Lifting the embargo means United States troops on the ground, in Bosnia.

Once United States troops are in Bosnia to help the U.N. withdraw, there will be enormous pressure to stay—to fill the humanitarian vacuum left by UNPROFOR.

Who will feed 2 million Bosnians each day, once UNPROFOR leaves?

Who will protect Bosnian civilians, once a Serb assault begins?

How can U.S. troops leave, under the glare of world attention?

We say now that the mission of U.S. forces will be limited in time and scope. But United States troops could be in Bosnia for a very long time.

Unilateral life means unilateral responsibility. By acting alone in Bosnia, we will Americanize the war.

Lifting the embargo will not change the outcome of this war.

The Bosnians have a better army today, but more armor and artillery is not enough. They need better leadership, training, tactics, command, control, communications, and intelligence. They need airpower. They need a modern army—the U.S. Army—if they are to win this war.

Lifting the embargo will damage U.S. interests at the U.N.

It will undermine the authority of the U.N. Security Council. While other nations must honor multilateral sanctions, the United States is saying it can pick and choose those that apply to us.

If the United States unilaterally lifts the embargo on Bosnia, others may feel free to break existing U.N. sanctions on Iraq and Libya. Russia may feel free to break sanctions on Serbia.

Article 51/self defense issue

It has been argued that the U.N. embargo should be lifted because it violates Bosnia's right to self-defense. We all agree that the Bosnians have a right to self-defense.

On a practical level, the Bosnians are getting weapons from other countries and using those weapons to defend themselves.

But the legal argument—that an international arms embargo violates Bosnia's self-defense rights under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter—is just plain wrong.

Article 51 says that member states' rights to "individual or collective self-defense" must not "affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council" to take "such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

That means that rights of self-defense or collective defense cannot contradict existing U.N. Security Council enforcement actions.

In the judgment of the Security Council, the international arms embargo was the best means to ensure peace and security in the former Yugoslavia. That remains the judgment of the Security Council.

B. Loss of control by the United States

Lifting the embargo unilaterally also mean the United States loses control of its foreign policy.

We complain a lot in this institution about handing over decisions to the U.N. Yet this bill hands over to a foreign government a crucial foreign policy decision that will result directly in the deployment of thousands of U.S. troops in the middle of a war zone.

This bill says that the President shall lift the embargo if the Bosnians ask UNPROFOR to leave. In my view, that's an incentive to the Bosnians to ask UNPROFOR to leave.

Under the terms of this bill we are simply telling the Bosnian Government: You decide. Make a request to

lift the embargo, and we'll do it. No discretion. No judgment. Just do it.

C. Unilateral lift does not confront the hard questions

A vote to lift unilaterally the embargo leaves all the tough questions unanswered: Who will supply the arms? Who will deliver them? Who's going to pay for them? Who will train the Bosnians to use them? Who will protect the Bosnians while they are training?

Proponents of a unilateral lift don't answer these questions. They offer promises without resources—without authorization or appropriation.

One of the mistakes of this war is that the international community has promised more than it delivers. This bill continues that practice—it compounds the felony.

The key problem for United States policy in Bosnia has been the gap between what we say we want to achieve, and the resources we are willing to commit.

But we know who will be called on to provide these resources: The United States.

D. Unilateral lift presents constitutional problems

Voting for a unilateral lifting of the embargo creates serious constitutional problems for American foreign policy. If we adopt this bill we create a profound ambiguity in American policy.

Under the Constitution, the President is the chief architect of American foreign policy. Congress can advise the President on foreign policy, but Congress cannot implement or conduct foreign policy. Congress must declare war, but Congress cannot be the Commander-in-Chief.

This bill infringes on both those Presidential powers:

At a time when the President is moving in one direction—negotiating with our closest allies to strengthen the U.N. mission and trying to end this war—this bill moves in exactly the opposite direction—pulling the plug on the U.N. mission and fanning further war.

At a time when the Commander-in-Chief wants to keep United States troops out of Bosnia, Congress is acting on a measure that will mean United States troops going in.

If the President and Congress move in such opposite directions, it diminishes our stature in the world, it profoundly weakens our leadership, and it damages our system of separation of powers. It will tear U.S. foreign policy apart.

E. Bad timing of unilateral lift

Finally, voting today to life the embargo unilaterally is bad timing. We have simply not given the new strategy time to work.

V. CONCLUSION

I know my colleagues are frustrated about the tragedy in Bosnia. I am frustrated. I am not going to argue that the present policy will lead to a wonderful outcome. It is to late for a wonderful outcome.

I want to say to my colleagues that this is not a free vote today. Maybe the vote in June was free vote, not this one. I think the standard that every Member of this House should apply in voting on this bill is to ask himself or herself, what should the policy of the United States Government be with respect to Bosnia?

Put aside the politics. Put aside all else. Focus on what the policy ought to be, and cast your vote on the basis that your vote will control American policy.

I understand that my colleagues want to do something about the horror of Bosnia. We do not know what else to do, so we vote to lift the embargo.

But what we are proposing to do today will only make a bad situation worse.

I do not believe my colleagues are willing to send United States troops to Bosnia. I do not believe the American people are willing to do so either. That is simply too high a price.

Yet that is the consequence of lifting the embargo, in my view.

What is our alternative? What can we achieve at a price we are willing to pay?

Instead of concentrating on a military solution, we should concentrate on a political solution that brings all parties to the table for face-to-face negotiations—including the Bosnian Serbs.

If we support the administration's new strategy, we will be choosing a course that offers modest but realistic gains:

It reduces the risk of a wider war, and may reduce the killing.

It gives the negotiations another chance.

It will allow us to continue to contain the conflict.

It avoids further damage to NATO, and to the U.N. that would follow a pullout by UNPROFOR.

It will keep humanitarian aid flowing to Bosnia.

It will keep United States troops out of Bosnia.

I urge my colleagues to defeat this bill.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 minutes of my 90 minutes provided for general debate to the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER] and I ask unanimous consent that Mr. HOYER be permitted to yield portions of that time to other Members.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my friend and the chairman of the committee for his generous yielding of time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes and 30 seconds to the very distinguished gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. TORRICELLI] who has been one of the most outspoken leaders on behalf of freedom in the international community.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his leadership on this issue throughout the months.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the resolution. In a perfect world, the strong would defend the weak. In the world in which we live, the weak must sometimes defend themselves.

It is this basic truth of our time that brings us to this judgment today.

The people of Bosnia have made to the world a simple question eloquent in its simplicity, a plea that has been heard many times by many people in different lands.

Mr. Chairman, they seek to survive. They simply seek for their nation to exist. For 4 years the world has answered that plea with resolutions and international forums, negotiations by the world's premier diplomats and peacekeepers from throughout the globe. They were all well-intentioned. Each was brave, and each was intent and each was unsuccessful.

Every nation is grateful to all the diplomats who tried, acknowledges the time, the sacrifice of every soldier who risked their lives. It is to the eternal credit of the British and the French and the Dutch forces who tried to do so much, but we achieve nothing by ignoring the simple truth that they failed.

The evidence mounts with every rape, every murder, each disappearance, the pillage of each new village. The simple truth is that the international forces were always too weak to defend Bosnia. But the embargo was always too strong to permit Bosnia to defend itself.

Serbia, under the provisions of this resolution, will have 12 weeks to consider the implications of United Nations withdrawal or face the wrath of an international community, a community intent on justice on the battlefield that has eluded it at the negotiating table for so many years. It is not a perfect answer, but it is an answer when all other answers have failed.

Our opponents argue that lifting the embargo will Americanize the war. I argue that keeping the embargo will Americanize the genocide.

Our opponents argue that lifting the embargo will have America stand alone; I argue that if America alone will stand for the right of a poor and weak people to defend themselves, then America has never stood in better company.

Our opponents argue that Europe has the right to lead; I argue that Europe has had years to lead. Now it is time for America to lead again.

Mr. Chairman, in these last few months, our children have seen the specter on flickering television screens of the times of our fathers, liberating concentration camps and ending a genocide. Each Member today must ask whether they will exchange that memory for a time in which our children will remember a genocide in our generation and the flickering pictures of Americans not as liberators but standing guard as a defenseless people were

prevented from getting the arms to defend themselves by our own forces.

What the world was unwilling to do for the victims of the Holocaust, what the United Nations has been unwilling to do for Bosnia, we have no right to prevent the people of Bosnia from doing for themselves. There is no human right more fundamental than the right of self-defense. The international community has no greater obligation in this crisis than to distinguish between the victims and the aggressors.

This resolution does both.

Mr. Chairman, in every church and synagogue throughout this land for a generation our people in a single prayer have made a simple pledge: never again. Simply because the institutions of peace have failed, there is no reason to abandon that pledge or that prayer. Keep the promise. Lift the embargo, pass the resolution. Never again.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ROTH], the distinguished chairman of our Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of our committee for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I have to agree today with the speakers who have spoken here before. As I interpret their remarks, they are saying that the issue before us today is really a moral question: "By what right does the United States prevent Bosnia from defending itself?" Every nation, every people has the ultimate right to defend their land, their homes, their families from aggression.

Instead of stopping this war, this embargo has simply shifted the balance toward the Serbs and against the Moslems. It can be argued that by keeping this stranglehold on Bosnia, we have been the silent partners in the Serbs' aggression. Oh, the United States has promised over and over that we would save Bosnia. But 200,000 deaths later and some 2 million refugees later, the United States has done nothing to save Bosnia.

The United Nations has been useless. NATO has been impotent, and we have collaborated with the Western European Powers in the slow strangulation of Bosnia. Why else does a Serb force of only 60,000 conquer a far larger Bosnian army of 150,000?

□ 1200

It is the embargo that has been the crucial difference. Without the heavy machinery of war, tanks, artillery, anti-tank weapons, missiles, and mortars, the Bosnian Army is doomed. For 4 years we have held the Bosnians' arms and hands behind their back while the Serbs beat the Moslems to death. For 4 years we have denied Bosnia the fundamental right of all nations: The right to defend themselves.

Our embargo, I think it can be argued, has been an immoral act. It is

time for us in this 11th hour to rectify this grave error and give Bosnia one last chance to save itself. "Do not do it," the opponents of this bill will say, "it will just widen the war." Mr. Chairman, the course of the war is out of our hands. The Bosnian Serbs have taken the measure of the United Nations and taken the measure of NATO and have dismissed those forces as impotent, as forces that they do not have to contend with, so they are acting with impunity in Bosnia. The Serbs will march until they either conquer Bosnia or until we lift the embargo.

The essential fact is this: The ethnic cleansing will continue unless we lift this embargo. The Serb war crimes will go on until Bosnia is allowed to defend itself. The opponents of this measure will say that we will use air strikes to stop the Serbs. Consider what General Horner, one of our best Air Force generals, said recently about the Balkans. He said, "I would find it very difficult to design a military strategy to be successful."

Air strikes will not stop the Serbs. Consider what happened when one American pilot was shot down. It took us some 5 days to retrieve him. It took a massive rescue effort to get him back. Well, the Serbs have hundreds, perhaps a thousand surface-to-air missiles. How many casualties will we suffer in a vain attempt to rescue Bosnia? I, for one, do not want to tell one American family that their son or daughter died in Bosnia.

Let us do what is right. Now, at long last, let us do what we should have done a long time ago: End this embargo and allow Bosnia to defend itself.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. RICHARDSON].

(Mr. RICHARDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, first let me say the sincerity of those on the other side of the issue is to be commended. There are no easy answers on the Bosnia issue, but lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia makes it America's war. We are taking the wrong step at the wrong time. We are pouring fuel to the fire, and we might cause an explosion.

Let us not make this vote the opening primary vote of the Presidential campaign, either. This is the time when we should rally behind the President, the Commander in Chief, his military advisers, the Joint Chiefs, all of whom do not want to lift the embargo. This morning they made a case to a number of Members of Congress with very strong convictions. Unilaterally lifting the embargo means unilateral responsibility, an Americanization of this war; possibly, yes, another Vietnam situation, as much as we hate to admit it.

Let us also remember what the American people want. Poll after poll

shows the American people do not want to get involved in Bosnia. They do not want to put American troops there. They are leery about getting involved in an air war, even for defensive reasons. They are leery of the United Nations, they are leery of NATO. Let us support the President in his efforts to not Americanize this war.

Worse, Mr. Chairman, if this unilateral lifting passes, it would send a terrible message around the world that the United States is divided; that the President is going in one direction and the Congress is going in a totally different direction. We recognize that the votes are not there. We recognize that perhaps the best we can achieve is 150, 160 votes, so that a veto of the President can be sustained. He will veto this initiative if it passes.

Let us not make matters worse. Bosnia is an enormously difficult situation. No administration is flawless in its execution of policy toward Bosnia, but the fact is there may be no real solution to this problem. There may be killings and more savagery continuing, and little that we can do; but let us not exhaust diplomatic means, diplomacy, one last effort at trying to resolve the problem before we pour enormous fuel to the fire.

What happens if we lift this embargo? UNPROFOR leaves, and guess who has to protect them? American troops. No question about it, it would be our responsibility. What happens to the enclaves? They will be put in jeopardy. Tuzla, Srebrenica, possibly they can be defended, but what about Gorazde? What about Bihac? What about Croat and Serb, engaging in more tanks, thousands of Serbian troops massing at the border, jeopardizing the alliance? What happens to NATO? What will NATO's role be if all of a sudden we say, "We are shifting and we are lifting the embargo, we are going to act unilaterally, we are going to act on our own, we are not going to act jointly"? What about the 25,000 American troops that we are going to put at risk?

What happens if this war spreads to Kosovo, to Romania, to Greece, through the Balkans? What happens to sanctions? Russia is about to end sanctions on the Serbs, their Parliament. What about the sanctions on Iraq and Iran? How can we justifiably say that we will always uphold embargoes and sanctions?

There are no simple or risk-free answers in Bosnia, but unilaterally lifting this embargo has very serious consequences, and the time has come to let the executive branch, those that are on the ground, our diplomats, our military leaders, let them make the decisions without a totally different signal from us here in Congress. We will move on to the next vote and the next issue, but they have to live with it. This is the executive branch's responsibility. Let us rally around the President the way we did on the gulf war, recognizing that our goal here may be 150 votes.

Mr. Chairman, I urge a "no" vote on lifting the embargo.

Mr. Chairman, a unilateral lift of the arms embargo by Congress would undermine efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in Bosnia and could lead to an escalation of the conflict there, including the possible Americanization of the conflict.

There are no simple or risk-free answers in Bosnia. Unilaterally lifting the arms embargo has serious consequences.

Both Britain and France have said they will withdraw their forces from Bosnia if the United States unilaterally lifts the embargo. This will lead to the collapse of the UNPROFOR.

The United States will have to assist in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops, involving thousands of U.S. troops in a difficult mission.

A unilateral lift by the United States drives our European allies out of Bosnia and pulls the United States in.

The United States is working intensively with our allies on concrete measures to strengthen UNPROFOR and enable it to continue to make a significant difference in Bosnia.

UNPROFOR has been critical to an unprecedented humanitarian operation that feeds and helps keep alive over 2 million people in Bosnia. The number of civilian casualties has been a fraction of what they were before UNPROFOR arrived.

UNPROFOR must be strengthened if it is to continue to contribute to peace. The administration is now working to implement the agreement reached last Friday in London to threaten substantial and decisive use of NATO air power if the Bosnian Serbs attack Gorazde and to strengthen protection of Sarajevo using the rapid reaction force.

These actions lay the foundation for stronger measures to protect the other safe areas. Congressional passage of unilateral lift at this delicate moment will undermine those efforts.

It will provide our allies a rationale for doing less, not more—absolving themselves of responsibility in Bosnia, rather than assuming a stronger role in this critical moment.

The House must face the consequences of a U.S. action that forces UNPROFOR departure:

The United States would be part of a costly NATO operation to withdraw UNPROFOR;

There will be an intensification of fighting in Bosnia as it is unlikely the Bosnian Serbs will stand by waiting until the Bosnian Government is armed; under assault, the Bosnian Government will look to the United States for more military support to fill the immediate void.

This could cost up to \$3 billion in arms, require some 25,000 U.S. troops, and immerse the United States in training and logistics operations for the foreseeable future.

Intensified fighting will risk a wider conflict in the Balkans with far-reaching implications for regional peace.

UNPROFOR's withdrawal will set back prospects for a peaceful, negotiated solution.

Unilateral lift means responsibility. It does not show leadership, it shows that the United States cannot get others to follow its frustrated actions.

We should not rush this action for political gain. The nightmare in Bosnia should not worsen in the name of political posturing for the upcoming Presidential elections in this country.

To abandon our NATO allies in their own backyard for political posturing is a dangerous precedent with grave consequences.

The NATO Alliance has stood strong for almost five decades. We should not damage it in a futile attempt to find an easy fix to the Balkan conflict.

While the majority of Americans are opposed to United States ground troops in Bosnia because it is a European conflict, Congress is willing to overlook the concerns of our European allies who have the most to lose in an escalated conflict.

Mr. Chairman, I include for the RECORD a letter from President Clinton to the majority leader, and an article appearing in Newsweek August 7, 1995, also written by the President.

The material referred to follows:

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, July 27, 1995.

Hon. RICHARD A. GEPHARDT,
Democratic Leader,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. LEADER: I am writing to express my strong opposition to Congressional efforts to unilaterally lift the Bosnia arms embargo. While I fully understand the frustration that supporters of unilateral lift feel, I nonetheless am firmly convinced that in passing legislation that would require a unilateral lift Congress would undermine efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in Bosnia and could lead to an escalation of the conflict there, including the possible Americanization of the conflict.

There are no simple or risk-free answers in Bosnia. Unilaterally lifting the arms embargo has serious consequences. Our allies in UNPROFOR have made it clear that a unilateral U.S. action to lift the arms embargo, which would place their troops in greater danger, will result in their early withdrawal from UNPROFOR, leading to its collapse. I believe the United States, as the leader of NATO, would have an obligation under these circumstances to assist in the withdrawal, involving thousands of U.S. troops in a difficult mission. Consequently, at the least, unilateral lift by the U.S. drives our European allies out of Bosnia and pulls the U.S. in, even if for a temporary and defined mission.

I agree that UNPROFOR, in its current mission, has reached a crossroads. We are working intensively with our allies on concrete measures to strengthen UNPROFOR and enable it to continue to make a significant difference in Bosnia, as it has—for all its deficiencies—over the past three years. Let us not forget that UNPROFOR has been critical to an unprecedented humanitarian operation that feeds and helps keep alive over two million people in Bosnia, until recently, the number of civilian casualties has been a fraction of what they were before UNPROFOR arrived; much of central Bosnia is at peace; and the Bosnian-Croat Federation is holding. UNPROFOR has contributed to each of these significant results.

Nonetheless, the Serb assaults in recent days make clear that UNPROFOR must be strengthened if it is to continue to contribute to peace. We should be determined to make every effort to provide, with our allies, for more robust and meaningful UNPROFOR action. We are now working to implement the agreement reached last Friday in London to threaten substantial and decisive use of NATO air power if the Bosnian Serbs attack Gorazde and to strengthen protection of Sarajevo using the Rapid Reaction Force. These actions lay the foundation for stronger measures to protect the other safe areas. Congressional passage of unilateral lift at this delicate moment will undermine those

efforts. It will provide our allies a rationale for doing less, not more. It will provide the pretext for absolving themselves of responsibility in Bosnia, rather than assuming a stronger role at this critical moment.

It is important to face squarely the consequences of a U.S. action that forces UNPROFOR departure. First, we immediately would be part of a costly NATO operation to withdraw UNPROFOR. Second, after that operation is complete, there will be an intensification of the fighting in Bosnia. It is unlikely the Bosnian Serbs would stand by waiting until the Bosnian government is armed by others. Under assault, the Bosnian government will look to the U.S. to provide arms, air support and if that fails, more active military support. At that stage, the U.S. will have broken with our NATO allies as a result of unilateral lift. The U.S. will be asked to fill the void—in military support, humanitarian aid and in response to refugee crises. Third, intensified fighting will risk a wider conflict in the Balkans with far-reaching implications for regional peace. Finally, UNPROFOR's withdrawal will set back prospects for a peaceful, negotiated solution for the foreseeable future.

In short, unilateral lift means unilateral responsibility. We are in this with our allies now. We would be in it by ourselves if we unilaterally lifted the embargo. The NATO Alliance has stood strong for almost five decades. We should not damage it in a futile effort to find an easy fix to the Balkan conflict.

Veto any resolution or bill that may require the United States to lift unilaterally the arms embargo. It will make a bad situation worse. I ask that you not support any Congressional efforts to require a unilateral lift of the Bosnian arms embargo.

Sincerely,

BILL CLINTON.

[From Newsweek, Aug. 7, 1995]

THE RISK OF 'AMERICANIZING' THE WAR
(By President Clinton)

Unilaterally lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia is the wrong step at the wrong time. Let me explain why I believe so strongly that this is the case.

Without question, the current situation in Bosnia is unacceptable. The recent assault by Bosnian Serbs on the Muslim enclaves in Srebrenica and Zepa, and the brutality and atrocities that have accompanied it, are intolerable. The inability of the United Nations mission in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) to protect centers it has declared as "safe areas" undermines the U.N., NATO and Western values in general. UNPROFOR clearly has reached a crossroads. The issue is not whether to act, but how.

There are three basic alternatives. One is to undertake a massive commitment by NATO, including U.S. ground forces, for the purpose of decisively affecting the outcome of the war. From the beginning of my presidency, I have refused to cross that line, and I will continue to do so. I cannot justify committing American ground troops to Bosnia except for the limited purpose of acting within NATO to protect our allies if they withdraw or to help enforce a genuine peace agreement.

The second alternative, born of intense frustration with the current situation and embraced by many in the Congress, is for the United States, by itself, to violate the international arms embargo in order to better enable the Bosnians to fight for themselves. It is powerfully appealing, but it is not that simple. It has real and serious consequences for the United States.

First, our allies have made clear that unilateral U.S. action to lift the arms embargo,

which would place their troops in greater danger, will result in their immediate withdrawal from Bosnia. As the leader of NATO, the United States would have an obligation under those circumstances to assist in that withdrawal, involving thousands of U.S. troops in a difficult mission. Consequently, at the least, the unilateral lift immediately drives our European allies out of Bosnia and pulls America in, even if for a temporary and defined mission.

Second, after that operation is completed, there will be an intensification of the fighting. It is unlikely that the Bosnian Serbs would stand idly by waiting for the Bosnian government to be armed by others. The United States, having broken with our NATO allies as a result of the unilateral lift, will be expected to fill the void—in military support and humanitarian aid. If lifting the embargo leads to more Serbian military gains, would we watch Sarajevo fall, or would we be compelled to act—this time by ourselves?

Third, intensified fighting risks a wider conflict in the Balkans, with far-reaching implications for Europe and the world. We have worked hard to contain the conflict with Bosnia—so far, successfully. If the fighting spreads, the fact that our unilateral action had triggered the escalation would compel us to deal with the consequences.

Finally, the U.N.'s withdrawal will set back prospects for a negotiated peace for the foreseeable future—the only hope for a genuine end to the conflict.

In short, unilateral lift means unilateral American responsibility.

We must recognize that there is no risk-free option in Bosnia. But I believe the wiser course—the path I have been pursuing intensively with our allies over these past days—is to strengthen the U.N.'s ability and willingness to protect Bosnian safe areas against Serb aggression: to enable UNPROFOR to make a real difference in Bosnia as it has, for all its deficiencies, over the past three years. Let us not forget that UNPROFOR has carried out an unprecedented humanitarian operation that feeds and helps keep alive over two million people in Bosnia; that, until recently, the number of civilian casualties has been a fraction of what it was before the U.N. arrived; that much of central Bosnia is at peace; and that where UNPROFOR has agreed to make the commitment to use NATO power, as it did to stop the brutal Serb shelling of Sarajevo in February 1994, it has worked dramatically as long as that threat remained credible.

For UNPROFOR to play this role now, it must become a genuine force for peace in Bosnia once again. Serious steps have been taken over the past several days. The British and French, with our support, are deploying a Reaction Force to open land routes to Sarajevo and strengthen UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its mission. Meeting in London in recent days, our allies, mindful of the risks, agreed to respond to an attack on the remaining eastern enclave of Gorazde with substantial and decisive air power. We are working to extend that commitment to the other safe areas.

To make good that agreement, NATO has fundamentally altered the way in which such air strikes will be conducted, empowering military commanders to respond to a broad range of targets rather than the "pinprick" responses of the past. And U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali last week delegated the authority for the use of air strikes to the military commanders in the field, where it belongs.

NATO air power will not end the fighting in Bosnia, but, at best, it can deter aggression; at least, it will increase its price; and in the process, it will enhance the chances of a diplomatic settlement.

We must make this final effort to strengthen UNPROFOR's ability to save lives in Bosnia and create the conditions for a negotiated peace. Congressional passage of unilateral life legislation at this decisive moment will undermine the effort. It will provide our allies with the rationale for absolving themselves of responsibility in Bosnia. Ultimately, it will Americanize the conflict.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 5 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, exactly 20 years ago today President Gerald Ford and other leaders of the 33 European countries and Canada gathered in Helsinki, Finland, for the solemn signing of the Helsinki Final Act of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the OSCE. In two decades since this historic gathering, the Helsinki Accords have helped guide relations between the participating states from the dark days of the cold war to the dawning of democracy in the countries of East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Mr. Chairman, the commemoration of today's anniversary is overshadowed by the dark ongoing tragedy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, one of the newest members to join the OSCE. It is fitting that the House consider S. 21 legislation to lift the arms embargo in Bosnia today.

At no point over these past 20 years, Mr. Chairman, have the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act been under greater attack than in the ongoing war of aggression and genocide in Bosnia. Over the course of the past 3 years, virtually each and every one of these principles have been violated by the Serb militants in Bosnia and neighboring Croatia, with devastating consequences for the people of these two countries. Tens of thousands of women and girls raped, hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians killed in cold blood, millions driven from their homes through a policy of ethnic cleansing; concentration camps, wanton aggression, and genocide in the heart of Europe 50 years after the victory over Nazi Germany. Promises of never again ring curiously hollow in the face of genocidal practices and policy pursued by those bent on the destruction of the multiethnic state in Bosnia.

The crisis in Bosnia, Mr. Chairman, has unmasked a crisis of leadership at the White House and in the West in general, characterized by confusion, contradiction, and ultimately, acquiescence. While no one wants to be blamed for the bleeding of Bosnia, Mr. Speaker, no one is willing to intervene in order to stop it. For 3 years the international community has pursued a diplomatic process which has consumed considerable time and effort, even as Bosnia and her people have been consumed by armed aggression and genocide.

Left unchecked, Mr. Chairman, this crisis of leadership will only further erode institutions, vital institutions

like the United Nations, NATO, the European Union, and the OSCE, with direct political and economic consequences for the United States.

Mr. Chairman, the international community has stood by as well-armed Serb militants, under the leadership of indicted war criminals Karadzic and Mladic have pursued their genocide policies, bent on the destruction of Bosnia and the creation of a greater Serbia.

At the same time the government of the sovereign, independent, and recognized state of Bosnia has been prevented from attaining the means to defend itself and its people through its continued imposition of an arms embargo which virtually guarantees a victory to the Serb militants. At this point, further negotiations with war criminals like Mladic and the others can only yield results at the further expense of Bosnia. Appeasement by the West has only raised the stakes for a final settlement, even as the Serb militants pursue their aims on the ground.

Herding Moslems and Croats into shrinking numbers of ethnic ghettos is not the answer. If the international community has been unwilling to provide for the collective defense of Bosnia within its internationally recognized borders, on what basis can we be expected to defend even a truncated Bosnia, as recently suggested by Charles Krauthammer in his op-ed?

Let me just quote this: "While the administration goes back and forth, more lives are being lost and the situation grows more desperate by the day." These words are not mine, Mr. Chairman, but an observation made by then candidate Bill Clinton in October 1992, in the early months of a war which has now stretched for over 3 years. For 30 months President Clinton has vacillated as even more lives have been lost and the situation has grown even more desperate on the ground.

The United States has backed a diplomatic process which has led to a dead end. We have to be honest and face that. No amount of tinkering is going to resuscitate the failed U.N. mission in Bosnia. The so-called rapid reaction force agreed to nearly 2 months ago was supposed to be the last great hope for UNPROFOR. So much for rapid reaction, Mr. Chairman. The force has turned into a farce as militant Serb forces moved against the enclaves in Srebrenica and Zepa, two U.N. protected areas, and they have done so with impunity. The fate of another enclave, Bihac, is very much in doubt as Serbs from Croatia have joined their Bosnian Serbian brethren in a military assault which continues, despite the promises to repel Croatian Serbs and to pull back from the area. A spokesman for the U.N. peacekeeping battalion in the Bihac pocket says there were no signs of a general withdrawal, and Serb military tanks and artillery that power the advances were going ahead.

Mr. Chairman, just let me conclude very, very briefly. Prime minister

Silajdzic has said over and over again, "We do not need American troops there, but what we do need is the ability to defend ourselves." That is what they need the ability to do.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of S. 21, legislation passed in the Senate which would lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina upon a request from the Bosnian Government to the United States requesting a lift and a request from Bosnia to the United Nations requesting the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. An actual lift would take place, under this bill, 12 weeks from the date of the request to the United Nations. It also includes a provision extending that time frame in the event that such a withdrawal would require more time to complete.

Mr. Chairman, exactly 20 years ago today President Gerald Ford and the leaders of 33 European countries and Canada gathered in Helsinki, Finland for the solemn signing of the Helsinki Final Act of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]. As a member, and now as Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I have witnessed first hand, the positive impact of the OSCE in helping to shape developments in Europe. In the two decades since this historic gathering, the Helsinki Accords have helped guide relations between the participating states from the dark days of the cold war through the dawning of democracy in the countries of East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Mr. Chairman, the commemoration of today's anniversary is overshadowed by the ongoing tragedy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of the newer members to join the OSCE. It is fitting that the House consider S. 21, legislation to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia today, Mr. Chairman, for at no point over these past 20 years have the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act been under greater attack than in the ongoing war of aggression and genocide in Bosnia. Over the course of the past 3 years, virtually each and every one of these principles has been violated by Serb militants in Bosnia and neighboring Croatia with devastating consequences for the people of these two countries.

Tens of thousands of women and girls raped. Hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians killed in cold blood. Millions driven from their homes through a policy of ethnic cleansing. Wanton aggression and genocide in the heart of Europe 50 years after the victory over Nazi Germany. Promises of never again ringing curiously hollow in the face of genocidal practices and policies pursued by those bent on the destruction of the multiethnic state of Bosnia.

The crisis in Bosnia has unmasked a crisis of leadership in the West characterized by confusion, contradiction, and ultimately acquiescence. While no one wants to be blamed for the bleeding of Bosnia, Mr. Chairman, no one is willing to intervene in order to stop it. For 3 years, the international community has pursued a diplomatic process which has consumed considerable time and effort even as Bosnia and her people have been consumed by armed aggression and genocide. Whenever a new crisis has arisen, the response of the international community has been to convene yet another conference, issue another statement, or adopt a new resolution. So many words, so little action. Pursuit of policies largely intended to preserve the

status quo have led to a dead end. With the passage of time, the policy options in Bosnia have been reduced. In fact, there are no easy options to pursue. This stark reality has only exacerbated the crisis in leadership over Bosnia.

Left unchecked, Mr. Chairman, this crisis of leadership will only further erode vital institutions like the United Nations, NATO, the European Union, and the OSCE with direct political and economic consequences for the United States.

Mr. Chairman, the international community has stood by as well-armed Serb militants, under the leadership of indicted war criminals Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, have pursued their genocidal policies bent on the destruction of Bosnia as a multiethnic state and the creation of a greater Serbia. At the same time, the government of the sovereign, independent, and recognized state of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been prevented from obtaining the means to defend itself and its people through the continued imposition of an arms embargo which has virtually guaranteed victory by the Serbs given their superiority in heavy weapons. The message is clear—might makes right.

There is nothing to suggest that the militant Serbs, who have been allowed to wage their war of aggression and genocide in Bosnia with impunity, will be satisfied with anything less than the complete annihilation of that country. Their appetites whetted, what is to prevent them from moving against Croatia, Macedonia, Kosovo, or others in the region? If the militant Serbs were interested in striking a deal, they would have signed onto the contact group proposal presented over a year ago, accepted by Sarajevo, and repeatedly rejected by Pale.

At this point, further negotiations with war criminals like Karadzic and Mladic or their benefactor in Belgrade, Slobodan Milosevic, can only yield results at the further expense of Bosnia. Appeasement by the West has only raised the stakes for a final settlement even as the militant Serbs pursue their aims on the ground.

Herding Moslems and Croats into a shrinking number of ethnic ghettos is not the answer. If the international community has been unwilling to provide for the collective defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders, on what basis can it be expected to defend even a truncated Bosnia as suggested in a recent opinion piece by Charles Krauthammer.

"While the administration goes back and forth, more lives are being lost and the situation grows more desperate by the day." These words are not mine, Mr. Chairman, but an observation made by then-candidate Bill Clinton in October 1992 in the early months of a war which has now stretched over 3 years. For 30 months now President Bill Clinton has vacillated as even more lives have been lost and the situation has grown even more desperate. The United States has backed a diplomatic process which has led to a dead end. Mr. Chairman, no amount of tinkering is going to resuscitate the failed U.N. mission in Bosnia.

Time and time again the administration has asserted that it was backing the one last chance to sustain the U.N. effort in Bosnia. It was the contact group proposal—that's been gathering dust on the table for over a year as the Bosnian Serbs have continued to wage

their war of aggression and genocide on innocent civilians in so-called safe havens and elsewhere in Bosnia.

The so-called rapid reaction force agreed to nearly 2 months ago was suppose to be the last great hope for UNPROFOR. Well so much for rapid reaction. Mr. Chairman, the force has turned into more of a farce as militant Serb forces moved against the enclaves Srebrenica and Zepa two U.N. protected areas with impunity.

The fate of another enclave, Bihac, is very much in doubt as Serbs from Croatia have joined forces with their Bosnian brethren in a military assault which continues despite promises by rebel Croatian Serbs to pull back from the area. A spokesman for the U.N. peace-keeping battalion in the Bihac pocket said there were no signs of a general withdrawal and Serb artillery and tanks that powered advances almost to the heart of the pocket had not budged. So much for promises.

At the end of last week, President Clinton, referring to NATO plans for aggressive bombing of Serb positions if they move on Gorazde or if other safe havens are imperiled, said, "This is the last chance for UNPROFOR to survive." Well the robust bombing many, including myself, had hoped for has yet to materialize despite the latest attacks on Bihac. A spokesman in Brussels said last Thursday that NATO officials were ready to meet at a moment's notice to discuss plans for Bihac and Sarajevo. Mr. Chairman, attempts to fix UNPROFOR will only consume more precious time as the militant Serbs continue, with impunity, their campaign of aggression and genocide.

Mr. Chairman, time and time again we are told that plans are being worked out and that it will take a couple of more planning sessions before everything is in place. By the time most of this planning has been completed, the plans have been overtaken by events on the ground. And the cycle goes on and on and on.

President Clinton said the other day that he has decided "we're either going to do what we said we're going to do with the U.N. or we're going to do something else." Mr. Chairman, this pretty much sums up the Clinton administration's failed Bosnia policy if it has one to begin with. Faced with the worst humanitarian crisis to strike Europe since the end of World War II, the Clinton administration has vacillated and equivocated time and time again. A crisis of leadership in a country which, until recently, was viewed, with pride, as the leader of the free world.

Mr. Chairman, as the prime sponsor of H.R. 1172, I rise today to urge my colleagues to vote, as they did in overwhelming numbers and on a bipartisan basis on June 8, to lift the illegal, immoral, and inhuman embargo imposed on Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the past, the Congress has sent mixed messages to the administration over policy toward Bosnia. I believe it is imperative that the Congress—House and Senate—speak with a single voice in support of Bosnia's inherent and sovereign right to self-defense. The June 8 House vote of 318 to 99 confirmed that there is growing support on both sides of the aisle for ending this embargo once and for all.

In the 7 weeks since the House vote the situation on the ground in Bosnia has gone from bad to worse. The safe havens of Srebrenica and Zepa have fallen. Militant Serbs continue their savage armed attacks on Bihac. Sarajevo

is subjected to sporadic shelling. These and other developments underscore the urgency of lifting the arms embargo without further delay. Time is of the essence.

While I would have preferred an immediate lifting of the embargo as envisioned in my bill, I am convinced that the Congress reach a consensus on the embargo sooner rather than later. The bill before us represents that consensus.

Mr. Chairman, through inaction the United States and the international community have, in fact, become accomplices to genocide.

I urge my colleagues to heed the message contained in the letter of resignation of the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in the former Yugoslavia, former Polish Prime Minister Mazowiecki, dated July 27, 1995: "We are dealing with the struggle of a state, a member of the United Nations, for its survival and multi-ethnic character, and with the endeavor to protect principles on international order. One cannot speak about the protection of human rights with credibility when one is confronted with the lack of consistency and courage displayed by the international community and its leaders. The reality of the human rights situation today is illustrated by the tragedy of the people of Srebrenica and Zepa."

He continues: "The very stability of international order and the principle of civilization is at stake over the question of Bosnia. I am not convinced that the turning point hoped for will happen and cannot continue to participate in the pretense of the protection of human rights."

Mr. Chairman, it is time to stand by our principles.

Mr. Chairman, the Bosnians have asked us for one thing—the right to defend themselves and their country. Enough is enough. Mr. Chairman, it is time to put an end to the equivocation and vacillation which have characterized United States policy toward Bosnia. I urge my colleagues to uphold Bosnia's fundamental right to self-defense by voting to lift the arms embargo.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. COMBEST], the distinguished chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this resolution. I have consistently opposed the lifting of the arms embargo in Bosnia, and I continue to maintain that consistency. I do not question the motives of those who strongly support this action. I respect their position, and I think it is a way to speak out against the atrocities that are occurring.

However, this is not a free vote. Some people have said that a vote in favor of this resolution would be a condemnation of the administration's failed policy, and I would have to admit that that makes it very tempting, but I think it is much more than that. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that if this policy becomes the law of the land that I am wrong, because if I am not wrong, it is going to mean that there have been Americans that have died in Bosnia.

If the proponents succeed and if the policy that is outlined becomes reality, supporters of this resolution had better be ready to support the engagement of American troops. I think it is important that these questions must be answered: Who provides the arms? How long does it take to put the arms in place? How long does it take to adequately train the Moslems? What happens to the Americans that are training and delivering those arms? Do we expect the Serbs to stand idly by? What do the Russians do about providing arms to the Serbs?

□ 1215

Mr. Chairman, there are too many unanswered questions, even before we consider the possibility of engaging Americans on the soil in Bosnia. All of the questions must be answered and all of the contingencies must be contemplated and the alternatives must be planned.

Mr. Chairman, several years ago, we voted to authorize the use of force and military action in the Persian Gulf, and I did not, as any Member of this body, take that lightly or as an unconcerned bystander. At that time I had a son who wore a marine uniform to work every day and there was a great probability that he would wind up in the gulf, and yet I think the action that was taken that day was right. I supported it. It was right then, and I think it is right now. But I think that today is a substantially different question. Where is the American interest?

Mr. Chairman, I would not vote to send my son to Bosnia, and I will not vote to send yours.

Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.

First of all, Mr. Chairman, I would say that I would not worry about any message we may be sending to the rest of the world, as the previous speaker alluded to. Unfortunately, the administration has confused the rest of the world for so long with threats and promises never carried out, or changed their mind from day-to-day.

Mr. Chairman, in the past I have not supported this resolution. I have not supported the resolution primarily because it was a unilateral effort and I did not think we should be in that kind of position, since we did not have the troops on the ground and other countries did. However, this resolution is different in that this resolution only takes effect as the U.N. forces leave or if the Bosnian Government indicates in writing that they want the U.N. forces out. Therefore, we have a totally different picture.

So I will support this resolution. I do not stand here indicating that it is a great answer to a very serious problem. I know that what we have done in the past has not been effective and has caused millions to flee, other slaughtered. So it is our next best hope. But I will support the resolution since it is not unilateral in that the forces on the ground will already have gone, or they

will be asked to leave by the Bosnian Government.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5½ minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Rhode Island [Mr. REED].

Mr. REED. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this bill.

Today, the House of Representatives considers legislation to lift the arms embargo governing Bosnia. This proposal is a product of months of frustration and outrage as the killing goes on in Bosnia, as we witness scenes of calculated cruelty which we thought had been banished with the defeat of the Nazi tyranny 50 years ago, and as we observe the western powers and the United Nations fitfully grapple with the violence that has engulfed the former Yugoslavia.

But, frustration and outrage, as sincerely and keenly felt as they may be, should not be the rationale or measure of our policies. Rather, we must look to the consequences of our actions; the consequences for ourselves as well as for the people of the former Yugoslavia.

By lifting this embargo, we will guarantee only one thing: The level of violence in the former Yugoslavia will increase. Passage of this proposal will initiate a powerful and compelling dynamic among the combatants. For the Bosnian Serbs, the logic is quite clear; strike as quickly as you can with as much force as you can muster before the Bosnian Government can increase its military capabilities. For the Bosnian Government, the logic is equally clear; do not negotiate, continue to resist, and prepare through local offensives for the time when a reequipped Bosnian Army can mount a general offensive to reclaim territory lost to the Serbs.

By lifting the embargo, we will precipitate the withdrawal of the U.N. mission and terminate the commitment of our European allies to maintain their troops in the former Yugoslavia. Having visited U.N. forces in the former Yugoslavia, I am acutely aware of their organizational shortcomings and, just as importantly, the lack of a clear and consistent policy objective to focus the use of military power. Nevertheless, UNPROFOR, for all its shortcomings, has limited the violence in Bosnia and prevented the expansion of violence into other regions of the former Yugoslavia.

That is the conclusion of Gen. John R. Galvin, former NATO commander, one of the most distinguished military leaders of our generation and now the dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. In testimony before Congress in June, General Galvin stated that a "key aspect for an understanding of the situation in Bosnia is our concept of the value of UNPROFOR. * * * They deserve more credit than we have been willing to give them." He went on to add in regard to UNPROFOR "their multinational troops have given the world

outstanding service. Moreover, any conceivable solution to the conflict will require some kind of international presence. We should keep the U.N. forces in Bosnia and not take action that would confound their efforts."

Lifting the arms embargo will accelerate the departure of UNPROFOR for several reasons. First, intensified fighting will further threaten the very survival of UNPROFOR forces which are scattered throughout the former Yugoslavia and are not organized for sustained and determined combat operations. Second, and arguably most critically, it will give our allies and the United Nations the political justification to cut their losses and withdraw. No longer would they be accused of abandoning their mission. Rather they could point to the unilateral action of the United States in frustrating the strategy of the world community.

And as we consider this measure today, we should be acutely aware that the departure of the United Nations will trigger our announced policy of committing U.S. ground forces to assist in the evacuation of our allies. As such, if this proposal passes, we are taking a step closer to the introduction of American forces into the killing fields of the former Yugoslavia. Ironically then, today's vote may draw us into the battle and not, as some may argue, give us an easy way to remain aloof from the struggle.

Lifting the arms embargo will not provide the Bosnian Government with the timely and decisive edge that it needs to counter the Bosnian Serbs. Individual weapons already are in plentiful supply in Bosnia. What is lacking are crew-served weapons such as artillery and tanks. The simple presence of these weapons is not sufficient for their effective use. Extensive training must be undertaken on many levels. On the technical level, crews must train to obtain basic proficiency. On the tactical level, units must be trained to integrate these weapons into effective combined arms teams. All of this takes time as well as outside expertise.

Without training and external support, these arms are ineffective. Thus, today's vote is more about symbolism than practical and timely assistance to the Bosnian Government.

Although lifting the arms embargo may assuage the sensibilities of the proponents, it will not resolve the conflict in Bosnia. Moreover, the escalation of combat resulting from this policy could spill over into other parts of the former Yugoslavia; particularly if other ethnic groups claim that they should be the beneficiaries of this policy of unrestricted access to the international arms bazaar.

There are no easy solutions to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Lifting the arms embargo is easy, but it will not resolve this crisis. Indeed, there is the very real possibility that it will escalate the fighting, precipitate the withdrawal of international forces, expand the fighting to other regions and draw United States ground forces into the deadly morass of Bosnia.

What should we do? In the words of Gen. John Galvin "stay with peace-keeping * * * recognize that a crisis such as this can be long and difficult * * * hold to our purpose [and] remember that permanent peace can come only if the combatants will it so." I urge rejection of this bill.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. GILMAN was allowed to speak out of order.)

IN MEMORIAM: THOMAS E. "DOC" MORGAN

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of my request is to inform my colleagues of the death of the former distinguished chairman of our House International Relations Committee, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Thomas E. Morgan.

"Doc" Morgan—as he was affectionately known to all of us—died peacefully yesterday afternoon in Fredericktown, PA. He was 88. "Doc" Morgan was first elected to this House in 1944, and retired on January 2, 1977, after 32 years of distinguished service.

He assumed the chairmanship of our House Foreign Affairs Committee, as it was then known, in 1959, and served as our able chairman for 17 years. He was a friend and a mentor to all who knew him.

Funeral services will be held Friday at 2 p.m. at the Methodist Church in Fredericktown. Flowers may be sent in care of the Greenlee Funeral Home, Fredericktown, PA. 15333.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much the chairman of the committee making this announcement for the benefit of Members. It was my privilege, of course, to serve under Chairman Morgan. My recollection is he served as chairman of the committee, then the Committee on Foreign Affairs, longer than any other person has ever done so.

Mr. Chairman, our former colleague practiced medicine throughout his tenure in the Congress. He was very close to his constituents. He served any number of Presidents, I really do not know how many. He was a close confidant and adviser of several. He reflected great credit upon this institution, and all of us appreciate very much the contributions of his remarkable life and extend to his family our deepest sympathy. He was in all respects a most remarkable man.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Indiana for his remarks, and I would like to note that there will be a special order in memory of "Doc" Morgan at a later date.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would take the liberty at this time to thank the gentleman for advising this body of this tragic news.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GEKAS].

Mr. GEKAS. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I come to the decision that has to be made here with of course

the age-old-mixed emotions. In the community which I serve in my home area, there are fellow Americans who have direct blood and emotional ties to the very area which we are considering here today as the focal point of this resolution. I have Americans of Serbian contact, of Slovenian blood, of Croatian allegiance, of Macedonian heritage, of Bosnian Serb, Bosnian Croat extraction.

Mr. Chairman, what am I to do? They have strong feelings about what is happening. No matter what I do or how I vote, I will be perceived by one segment or another as taking sides. I can do nothing less than try to do the best I can in the situation we find ourselves; keeping their ideas and opinions in mind, of course, but then, rising above that and doing the best I can to try to help the American position, the U.S. Government position, in that morass that we find ourselves.

Mr. Chairman, I will support this resolution, because I have answered one question that I posed to myself in this fashion. The question: What good did the placement of the embargo do in 1991? What is the result of the embargo that was forced on these parties in 1991? The answer is easy to come by. Rapes, killings, expansion of the war, attacks, safe haven victims, nonsafe haven victims, war of words, no resolution to the problem, continued bloodshed. We can do no worse than to lift that embargo and begin to help the President form a foreign policy in that region that will help all.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. GIBBONS].

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, let me say that I regret hearing the news about the death of Dr. Morgan. I was privileged to work with him and serve with him here, and he was a man of good common sense, and I feel that if he had been here today, he would be right where Mr. Hamilton is, warning us not to get involved any deeper in their situation.

□ 1230

Let me say everything I have to say is premised upon the fact that I feel terribly sorry for the Bosnians involved in this conflict. It was obvious that we were going to be on their side, despite the religious differences, because we want to keep peace in that area and we want to protect people's rights in that area. Had the Bosnians been winning, we would be here defending the Serbs, but that is not the case.

The resolution is a feel-good, pass-the-buck resolution. It will allow us to go home and say we did something, despite the fact that it may not have been very rational; and we have got an answer for the people who stop us on the street, but it is not the right answer.

Mr. Chairman, I have been through about five of these in my career here in

Congress. Some of them have been not quite this serious, but they are all about the same. Every time there is any injustice done around the world, our good instincts urge us to go out there and get involved in it. But this is not America's war, this is not the United States' war, and we should not get involved in it.

I want to make it very, very clear that if the President calls upon us to send troops, American troops, to this war zone, I will not support it. If we are called upon to appropriate money for the arms or any participation in this war, I will not support it.

Mr. Chairman, anyone who is the least bit familiar with the history of this sad part of the world knows that this conflict has been going on for eons. These poor people who are involved in it now were born into this mess, and I feel terribly sorry for them. But there is no practical way we can help them.

If we repeal the arms embargo unilaterally, as we do here, we will immediately give the Russians the excuse to supply arms to the opposing side. They are far closer to the conflict; they can transport their arms immediately to the areas, and the impact to the combatants is that the Serbs will have a lot more arms and more quickly and be able to do more damage to the Bosnians.

Second, are we going to pay for the arms that the Bosnians purchase? I do not know who else would pay for them; obviously, we are going to have to.

Third, what are we going to do when we Americanize this war? Are we going to then be prevailed upon to send ground forces into Bosnia, send more air forces into Bosnia? What are we going to do if this war expands, as it perhaps will do, as we add more fuel to the fire by supplying arms?

I do not think America is ready for it. We have a humanitarian interest in this area, certainly, but we have no great national interest in this area, and it has been my experience that Americans do not get involved well or stay long where we do not have a great national interest involved.

I hope that Members will take this vote very seriously, will realize that as well intended as they are, that this is just a feel-good, pass-the-buck type of resolution. It will not put an end to this war; it will cause those forces that are there now under the U.N. command to pull out. The pillaging will go on, and before any effective intervention can be made by any side, the war will have come to an even worse conclusion than it may under any other set of circumstances.

Mr. Chairman, this is not a wise resolution. It is humanitarily motivated, but it will cause great suffering for the people who are on the ground there, and it will be something that we must pay a higher and higher price for as we go along.

Vote "no" on this resolution.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. TRAFICANT].

(Mr. TRAFICANT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, we were not elected to Western Union to send messages; we are elected to the Congress of the United States.

I support the bill. Current policy is a failure. Bosnian Moslems are being exterminated. Safe havens do not exist. They are, in fact, shooting galleries. U.N. peacekeepers are being held as human-hostage shields, allowing the aggressors to brutalize the victims.

Mr. Chairman, I ask my colleagues, how can we sit idly by and not even allow those brutalized victims to defend themselves, protect their homes, their wives, and their children?

As far as getting involved in this, do we honestly believe that these Katzenjammer Cops who are over there are going to keep anybody out?

Mr. Chairman, I support this bill, but let me say this: This is in Europe's backyard. Europe has got to respond. We are not the policeman for the world, but all free people should at least help those victims to defend themselves and protect their families. If we cannot do that, then freedom means very little to the Congress of the United States anymore.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. PETERSON].

Mr. PETERSON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, we are looking for a solution. We are looking for the solution to the indiscriminate killing that has occurred in Bosnia over the last several years.

For a moment, I thought lifting the embargo would be a solution. Maybe a few years ago, we would have made a difference. I do not think so now.

Mr. Chairman, my major consideration comes from what happens when we do so. My major consideration is that we immediately place our allies' troops, our allies who have troops in Bosnia on the ground, in deep jeopardy.

U.S. forces would immediately be withdrawn, and that has been well-known. The United States would become responsible for the introduction of troops to assist in that withdrawal. If we agree to assist in supplying arms, then we must assume the responsibility for training the personnel in the use of those arms.

There is a major cost fiscally, a major cost potentially in lives, for this action. I am not convinced we have exercised all the options that we have in the prospect of dealing with this issue.

Mr. Chairman, our strength lies in the use of air power. At the same time, we do not want to take sides. I am convinced that the conflict has a solution only in negotiation and not on the battlefield. I say, freeze in place everything throughout the country on both sides with no military movement anywhere in Bosnia, period.

With air power, we can enforce this proclamation. Whoever, either side, becomes the target in the movement, we will force both sides to the table. We will bring about a negotiated settlement as we try to take away from the military solution and move into a diplomatic solution.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from Florida yield?

Mr. PETERSON of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I agree with the gentleman's conclusion.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1½ minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mrs. MALONEY].

Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the resolution.

It pains me to vote against my President on a foreign policy issue, but I support the lifting of the arms embargo of Bosnia.

Mr. Chairman, we cannot wait even one more day before the United States changes its policy on the Balkans and takes active steps to stop the bloodshed and to halt the slaughter of innocents.

What the world has witnessed in Bosnia is quasi-genocide, mass rape, and the denial of the Bosnian people to defend themselves against aggressive assaults.

The U.N. policy has been a dismal failure.

Safe areas are not safe.

Weapon-free zones are filled with weapons.

No-fly zones are filled with planes.

And whatever humanitarian aid reaches the Bosnians does so at the sufferance of the Serbs.

Lifting the arms embargo will not lead to wider U.S. involvement.

Allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves is the only credible way to bring the fighting to an end.

Without the lift, Serb atrocities will continue and the war will go on.

And if we do not act now, we risk a much broader war involving the entire Balkans region. This tragic outcome would enhance the prospects of wider U.S. involvement.

Therefore, we have both a strategic and a moral obligation to lift the embargo, and to do it right away.

Mr. Chairman, I will never forget what Elie Wiesel said at the dedication of the Holocaust Memorial Museum, just 1 mile from this Chamber.

He turned to the President and said, "Something—anything—must be done to stop the bloodshed. It will not stop unless we stop it."

Stop the slaughter.

Support the amendment.

Lift the embargo.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. KING], a member of the House Committee on International Relations.

Mr. KING. Mr. Chairman, I particularly thank the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN] for the tremendous leadership he has shown on this key

issue, both as chairman of the committee and as a Member of this body.

Mr. Chairman, I think there are certain points that should be made very clear at the outset. First of all, this is not a partisan issue; it is not a Democrat or Republican issue. It is a human issue, a moral issue, and it is an issue behind which all men and women of goodwill must rally to resist the aggression of the Serbs.

Second, there is no moral equivalency in this war. This is not a case of two nations who just happen to be fighting each other, any more than there was any moral equivalency between Nazi Germany and Czechoslovakia. We are talking about the democratically elected government in Bosnia being attacked by the brutal dictatorship in Serbia.

For those Members who say the United States should not get involved, the tragic fact is we are involved and, whether we admit it, we are involved on the side of the Serbs, because we are embargoing the weapons that are going to the victims. As long as we continue to allow that embargo to exist, then we stand with the Serbs.

Mr. Chairman, there are other foreign policy ramifications, apart from the moral issue here. If the aggression is allowed to go undeterred by the Serbs, we are going to provide greater instability in that region. This can be an encouragement to Russia to move on its former republics, when it sees that the Western World stays silent in the face of such aggression.

Also, what kind of a message are we sending to the Moslem world? We have denounced genocide for the past 50 years. We realized that the world stood by and did nothing during World War II and we have said, "Never again will we allow genocide to be carried out." Yet, there is genocide being carried out today against the Moslems and we are doing nothing about it.

Apart from the moral ramifications, what does that do to our foreign policy posture in countries such as Iran, Iraq, Egypt? We can go through all the Moslem, Arab countries and see what that has done to damage our reputation.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I call for strong support of this bill. We have no choice. It is a moral imperative.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. PARKER].

(Mr. PARKER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PARKER. Mr. Chairman, there comes a time in everyone's life when he or she must choose between two very bad choices. For me, this vote today is one of those times. For the last several years I have supported lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia. I have made public statements to that effect and have criticized the foreign policy leadership of the Bush and Clinton administrations on this issue.

But today, I will vote against this resolution. I no longer support lifting

the embargo. Lifting the embargo will not make the slaughter in Bosnia go away. It will not right the wrong choices of the past. Bosnia is a tragedy and a failure for the entire world.

This decision I have arrived at is not so much based on a meticulous, intellectual analysis of foreign policy. It is based on a deep-seated, gut-wrenching feeling that I, as a man, would live to regret a decision to the contrary.

That's not to say that I have not given much thought to the matter and engaged in long and heated debates. I have. But I am absolutely convinced that the situation in Bosnia can get worse, far worse than it already is.

The war can broaden throughout the region. Lifting the embargo now will lead to a withdrawal by the United Nations. The Europeans will wash their hands and when the war escalates into a larger Balkan explosion, the United States will be drawn in.

That is the bottom line for me. I believe that a unilateral lifting of the embargo now—too late in my view—will lead to the use of American troops in the region and I am totally opposed to that course of action. I cannot accept the loss of a single American soldier in this insanity and that is the outcome that I believe I would have to live with if I voted for this resolution.

I do not have the answer for Bosnia nor, it seems, does anyone else. I wish I had the solution to the ongoing genocide and horror of this war's innocent victims. I don't. What I do have is an unyielding determination to fight against including American sons and daughters, and mothers and fathers in this suffering.

But let there be no misunderstanding. I can count votes and I believe this resolution is likely to pass. If it does, and if the promised veto is overridden, I will accept the commitment that we then acquire and will support whatever is necessary to honor that commitment. I believe that commitment will be the use of U.S. Armed Forces. But I, at least, will not regret that I failed to do all in my power to avoid that coming disaster.

□ 1245

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. WOLF], who has been a leader in the issue of lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia.

Mr. WOLF. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

I want to pay tribute to the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN] and the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER] for their leadership on this issue.

Before I speak, I want to say that there are good and decent people on both sides of the issue, and it is a difficult issue, and I am speaking for myself. I thank God, and I know that if the French had not needed us at Yorktown, we may not have been an independent nation. I will tell you, the British ought to thank God for the fact

that Americans went to their rescue in World War II. So we talk about aid and what will make the difference. History has been changed by people assisting other people.

I have visited Bosnia three times. The first time I went there, I was with the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH], who is not here. We were in Vukovar just 2 weeks before Vukovar fell. When we went down in the cellars of Vukovar, the people there said, "America? What will America do? Will America get involved?" We did not get involved. We now see the reports, hundreds were killed; in fact, 204 people were taken out of the Vukovar hospital and killed by the Serbs and put in a mass grave.

So we did not learn much of a lesson. We went on and maintained the embargo.

The second time I went to Bosnia, I visited a Serb-run prisoner-of-war camp. If you cannot see this picture, just go back and remember what "Schindler's List" was like, because this is what "Schindler's List" was like. The Moslem men would go like this, they would walk around, they would not look you in the eye. I went in a place, and I hollered, "I am an American Congressman from America." They lit up like that. You could see they thought maybe finally somebody cares.

Well, nothing more happened, and the embargo continued.

The third time I went, I went to East Mostar, and this young lady, who is probably maybe dead now, had nothing whereby they were being attacked over and over first by the Serbs and then by the Croats. We continued, we continued the arms embargo.

Now, the geopolitical things are being talked about. Let us bring it down to where you and I and all of us are. It says, in the Golden Rule, it says, "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." It does not say, "Do unto others as you would not have them do to you." It says, "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you."

Try to put yourself in this case. I am going to take one narrow slice. When we had the CSCE hearings, they said, the witnesses came and said there had been 20,000-some rapes in a country of less than 5 million people. Let me read you the testimony from that one day, the expert said. He said:

Most of the rapes occurred in detention facilities or in custodial settings. Most of them occurred on a mass basis, not only in terms of the repeated number of rapes against the victim, but also the number of victims.

In other words, the victims were rounded up.

I will give you three examples in the town of Foca. There were three places where this occurred: the partisan hall where the women were brought in and raped and kept, and it was sort of a turning point where people would be brought in and out and raped and brought in and out and raped and brought in and out. In another place

where women were kept for the satisfaction on rotation on a 15-day basis for soldiers coming in from the field, and I can identify with that one, because the people outside at risk, there was a little house there where women, young girls ranging in age from 11 to 17, were kept from 8 to 10 months, 8 to 10 months in this house. They were all daughters of prominent persons in the cities, and they were ultimately ransomed.

I interviewed, he said,

a 14-year-old or a 15-year-old who had been raped repeatedly for 8 to 10 months, consistently by their guards. I have seen an 11-year-old in a fetal position in a psychiatric hospital in Sarajevo having given birth to a child but having completely lost her mind.

As fathers, forget the Congressmen and the Congresswomen, as fathers and as mothers, imagine you had to sit back and watch your wife raped in front of you, imagine that you watched your daughters raped in front of you, imagine that your sister is involved or, if you are woman, imagine that your daughter has been taken away, pulled out of your arms and taken away and is in a house in a village down the street, and you know the soldiers go in there day in and day out and your little daughter is in there.

Talk about the geopolitical things. Forget it. Talk about what you would do if you were a father, and I say, God willing, if you were a father and if you were a mother, you would want the arms to defend yourself. But more important than defending your country, but to defend your mom and your wife or your daughter or your sister. That is what we are talking about.

The Moslems have come to us and said over and over they do not want American troops. Do not hide behind this. There are no American troops involved.

They have told us over and over. The gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER] has been there. They do not want American troops. So we are not voting on American troops.

Second, under the U.N. Charter, they have the right to defend themselves. They have the right to defend themselves. That is all they want to do.

No American troops. We are not voting on American troops. We are voting to lift the arms embargo.

So enough of this Bosnian nation, but so these Moslem fathers and sons and mothers and daughters can defend something that is so important that, if each of us were in that situation, we would want to do.

I strongly urge an "aye" vote to lift the embargo.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Alabama [Mr. CALLAHAN].

(Mr. CALLAHAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, in 1991, most all of us who are speaking here today stood in this very well to talk about whether or not we were going to involve ourselves in the Persian Gulf war, whether or not we were going to send our troops to Kuwait to defend the freedoms this country stands for. The President of the United States called, George Bush, and he urged us to support what the administration was doing. The Vice President, Dan Quayle, called, and Colin Powell called, and Jim Baker called, and we had a tremendous debate, one of the healthiest debates that ever took place on the floor of this House, over one thing, whether or not we were going to go along with our commander in chief of these United States and let him exercise his constitutional prerogative of international affairs.

Today is no different. It was the hardest vote I have made since I have been in the Congress because I had to vote "yes" or "no" as to whether or not to involve people from my own district, placing their lives on the front lines of that encounter. And we won.

Today we have a new commander in chief, Bill Clinton. I did not vote for President Clinton, but he is our commander in chief, and the Constitution very clearly gives the responsibility of foreign affairs to the President of the United States. We have a new Vice President, and we have a new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and all of these people who have been selected by the President to run our international affairs have come to us and pleaded with us to let them handle international policy.

The statements by the previous speaker from Virginia are most compassionate statements. I could not agree with them more. No one in this House, no one, likes the atrocities that are taking place. No one of us will ever tolerate such atrocities, whatever section of the world it is in.

Incidentally, it is taking place in other sections of the world. Why are we not here saying, "Let's bomb, let's do something in Rwanda?" Look at the horrible things that are taking place there, and I do not see a single one of you coming and saying, "Let us do something about Rwanda."

If we in this Congress are going to take over the responsibility of foreign affairs from the administrative branch of government, well, then, let us vote on that. Let's change the Constitution and do that.

Are we going to tell our NATO allies that no longer does the President and the Secretary of State have the authority to enter into agreements with NATO forces? Are we going to say that just because the President thinks it is right and the French Government thinks it is right and the British Government thinks it is right and the Dutch Government thinks it is right, are we going to say we know more about the intricacies of this problem than they?

We ought to leave to the President of the United States his constitutional authority. This question is not over the atrocities.

Certainly, the Bosnian Moslems know that those of us in this Congress, 100 percent of those of us in this Congress, believe that they are being mistreated by, the Serbians, and that this is wrong, and we want to correct that. That is why we are here. That is why we are there.

Are we going to tell our NATO allies, "All right, fellows, you are on your own. We are going to lift the embargo," The Russian *duma* has already passed a resolution saying if the United States votes to lift the embargo for the Moslems, then they are going to lift it for the other side.

The arms embargo is not just on the Bosnian Moslem side. It is for the entire region. We are going to escalate the war, and we have 25,000 allies there that we are going to have to get out of there.

No matter which way you look at it, it is going to have to involve American troops.

Let me say to you today that the issue is not on whether or not the Serbians are mistreating the Bosnians, because every evidence I have seen indicates that they are. But, in my opinion, we ought to recognize that the President and the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NATO and our Ambassador to the United Nations are all pleading with us to let them handle this international affair, to let them work with our allies, hopefully to gain some peaceful solution.

I have conveyed to the President, which all of you should do, the direction that I think he should take. But for us to pass this resolution and for us to tell the world that our President, that our Chief of Staff, that our Secretary of State have no real authority, that the Congress is going to over-ride them, I think we are making a tremendous mistake.

I would like to urge that the resolution be withdrawn, and if not, then I would like to urge you to vote against it.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BARRETT].

Mr. BARRETT of Nebraska. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of S. 21, a bill that would lift the arms embargo that has been imposed on the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the last 4 years.

Unfortunately, the pursuit of peace has been met by turned backs and the guns of cruelty, inhumanity, and butchery. It should be apparent to everyone that neither the Bosnian Serbs nor the Bosnian Moslems are prepared for, or desire peace.

But, we must not fool ourselves, that passing this bill will absolve Congress, and our military, from further action in this troubled region. The President has already committed us to 26,000 U.S.

ground forces to help speed the departure of U.N. peacekeepers. And, while we all may have differing opinions about the President's commitment, it is right and proper that we aid our allies as the our policy changes. We would expect nothing less if our roles were reversed.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support S. 21, and help close the book on a failed arms embargo policy that, has done nothing but continue the suffering of Bosnian Moslems.

□ 1300

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Colorado [Mr. SKAGGS].

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. HASTINGS] for yielding this time to me.

Bosnia is a profound tragedy, a political, a moral, a military, a human tragedy. The brutality and depravity of Serbian aggression not only murders innocent Bosnian civilians, it defies the ability of words to express our outrage and disgust.

A vote to lift the embargo may look like a good way to register the moral outrage that we all feel. But sound national security policy requires a careful examination of the consequences, if we were to lift the embargo—and I do not believe we should.

Specifically, there are at least four unintended consequences that we have to face up to if we take the step of unilaterally lifting the embargo:

First, it would lead to a decision by UNPROFOR to depart Bosnia and so lead to the very dangerous involvement of United States ground troops to extract the international force. Britain and France have already made it clear what they would do. We have an obligation, which we have already acknowledged, to help with the withdrawal that would necessarily put U.S. forces at real risk.

Second and perhaps most problematic, lifting the embargo would almost inevitably lead to an expansion of the conflict. I do not believe Serb nationalists are going to be satisfied merely with territorial gains in Bosnia. And if the conflict spreads to other parts of the former Yugoslavia, then Greece, Turkey, other regional powers are likely to get involved. And if that happens, the entire European security structure that has functioned so well for so many years is really likely to become at risk also.

Third and even more serious is the probability of the Americanization of the conflict. If we are left with the moral responsibility for arming and training the Bosnian Army, having broken policy with our NATO allies, it seems to me very likely that the United States ends up alone trying to fill the void in terms of military support and humanitarian aid.

Finally, our unilateral action could jeopardize cooperative efforts against rogue states now and in the future.

Under the legal constraints of the U.N. Charter, this embargo cannot properly be lifted without the approval of the Security Council. If we violate our legal obligation to adhere to that embargo, we will undermine the credibility of other multilateral embargo efforts in the future, such as that that we want to see maintained against Iraq.

What can we do? Sadly there are not a lot of good alternatives. But we can act, and we should act, to strengthen the U.N.'s ability and willingness to protect the remaining safe areas against Serb aggression. There have been improvements made in the recent weeks to make increased and, I hope, more effective use of air power in the event of any attack against the enclave of Gorazde. And I want to see that extended to other areas that ought to receive strong NATO support as well.

By increasing the price of aggression I believe our power can enhance the chances of diplomatic settlement. But a congressional vote now to go it alone and lift the embargo will provide our allies with a rationale for withdrawal. It will tend to Americanize the conflict at a time when the American people do not have a sense of a significant American interest there. And I am afraid it would ultimately result not in an improvement to this awful, awful situation, but to a further disintegration, further humanitarian calamity, and further outrages at the hands of the Bosnian Serbs.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. PAXON].

Mr. PAXON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the resolution and commend the sponsors for their leadership.

My colleagues, many Members of this House and I know many American citizens have traveled to Israel and to Jerusalem where they have had the chance to visit the Yad Vashem Holocaust Museum, and in that very moving museum there is a specially moving place that is the Children's Memorial. It is a memorial to several million children who died at the hands of the Nazis. When one stands in that room, that dark room, they can hear the voices of those children saying, "Never again. Never again stand by while a modern-day Hitler carries out another genocidal campaign."

For those of us who have heard those voices and for the millions and millions of Americans who have already been to our own Holocaust Museum at the foot of this hill, today is a day of important historical note because, my colleagues, the modern-day Hitlers are at it, and it is not far away and far removed from our lives. It is on CNN every single day and every single night. They are not faceless people. Their names are Milosevic and Karadzic and others who we see on the television who are running the rape

camps and the torture camps and committing the violence that the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. WOLF] just a few minutes ago so graphically described. The genocide is called ethnic cleansing, but it is nothing more, nothing less, than the action of the Serbs designed to wipe from the face of the Earth the Bosnian Moslems.

Now through our arms embargo I am embarrassed to say we have been party to this outrage through two administrations and through several Congresses. We have tied the Bosnians' hands while the Serb aggressors have had free rein to rape, and to brutalize, to tear apart families that will never be joined together again, and to murder innocent men, women, and children whose only crime is that they have a Moslem name.

Two years ago the gentlewoman from New York [Ms. MOLINARI], the gentleman from New York [Mr. KING], the gentleman from New York [Mr. ENGEL], and I went to Bosnia, and they said to us at the time, "Don't send your troops here. We don't want young American men and women fighting our battle." All they asked then, and all they ask today, is to unchain their hands, to give them the weapons to defend their children, and their lives, and their husbands, and their neighbors, and their people. That is a certain way to insure that American troops do not end up there, as I believe they will if we do not take this action today.

As I indicated, I feel very strongly that two administrations have mishandled the Bosnian tragedy. It is not Bill Clinton alone. George Bush was in the White House also. I disagreed with George Bush, as I do with Bill Clinton, but the time for disagreement is over. The time for action is here today. Let us not be here months from now or years from now looking back and saying, "We didn't try, we didn't take this stand." Let us support the resolution.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1½ minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. OBERSTAR], one of the most senior Members of this body.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER] for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, last year I voted against unilateral lifting of the sanctions. I have changed my mind. The administration's best efforts have not been supported by the international community, the killing continues, the balance of power continues to shift to the numerically larger and stronger Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian Moslems do not have the equipment they need to defend themselves, their families, and their land. If the international community, the United Nations and NATO, are not willing to launch sustained, massive air strikes with overwhelming force against the Bosnian Serb Army to deter the aggression, then the allies must in fairness lift the

embargo and allow the Bosnians to defend themselves.

I have no illusions about the consequences. There will be increased security risks for the UNPROFOR peacekeepers. It may be necessary to introduce United States troops directly into Bosnia to help withdraw the peacekeepers. More arms in the country will mean more killing, a widening of the conflict, and prolonging the war. But, in the current circumstances, the war does continue under international auspices, and that is what my conscience cannot condone. If we are not willing to risk American lives in Bosnia—and we should not; if we are not willing or able to seal the arms and economic embargo against the Bosnian Serbs and their "greater Serbia" patrons, then we should remove the shackles from the Bosnian Moslems, who seek only to defend their homeland and their families and pass this resolution.

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. SISISKY].

Mr. SISISKY. A strange dilemma happened this weekend. It seems everywhere I went, I thought they would be, people would be, talking about the appropriation bills that we had last week, but they were not. They were talking about Bosnia. They have watched television. They do not know an awful lot about it. But they do ask the question: What is the American interest there? Why should we be there? I tell them basically that we are there because of the carnage and we do not want to expand on the European continent.

I will be very honest with my colleagues. I was not in favor of the embargo. I think it is wrong. But we have the embargo now, and I am opposed to the unilateral lifting of the embargo.

A lot of people say, "Well, what is the United Nations doing? UNPROFOR is not doing anything." I would remind them that in 1992 there were 130,000 deaths in Bosnia; in 1994, there were 3,000 deaths, as best that we could calculate. Still too many, much too many. There are rapes going on there. There are children being killed. All of us know that.

Yes, I have been to Yad Vashem, and it is easy to bring that up, never again, but America is not turning its back on Bosnia. We have forces in the Adriatic, we have forces in Italy, and we are ready to do what we need to do under the auspices of the United Nations and NATO.

My colleagues, the rapid reaction forces are there now. The Europeans have finally got into the act. But if we unilaterally lift this embargo, I believe that the Europeans will pull out and we will have to have 25,000 troops just to protect the withdrawal. But even more than that, if the Europeans pull out and the United Nations pulls out, there is no food coming in, we lift the embargo, who is going to train them? Who is going to train the command and control and how to use sophisticated arms? American soldiers.

I am not willing to do that yet. I am willing to let the United Nations, and NATO, and the Europeans try their hand now.

All I can say is we are at a crossroads, things may break. Nobody knows what the right answer is. But I can tell my colleagues in my opinion, and I hope I am right, it is wrong to unilaterally lift the embargo, and I would hope that the members would vote against the resolution.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. RAMSTAD].

(Mr. RAMSTAD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

□ 1315

Mr. RAMSTAD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman for yielding me time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of lifting the unjust and unconscionable arms embargo on Bosnia. For too long now the world has heard of countless atrocities from the war in Bosnia: Women systematically raped and tortured, men forcibly separated from their unarmed families and gunned down without being able to defend themselves, all in the name of ethnic cleansing, all during the arms embargo.

Mr. Chairman, let us call a spade a spade. Let us call ethnic cleansing by its real name: Genocide. The key question we must answer today with our vote, each and every one of us here in this body, is this: How much longer can we sit by and force the Bosnian Moslems to defend themselves from genocide with one arm tied behind their backs?

The people of Bosnia, Mr. Chairman, are at a breaking point. This vote today will show them that the United States will not turn its back on genocide. Let us not turn our backs on people who have the right to defend themselves, let us not turn our backs on the Bosnian Moslems. I urge a "yes" vote to lift the arms embargo.

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS], ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, I rise today in opposition to the bill, S. 21, the so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995. I urge my colleagues to resist the temptation that there exists such an easy solution to end the killing and the suffering in that region of the world.

Mr. Chairman, one of my colleagues quoted President Bush's statement that we have a unique opportunity and responsibility to do the hard work of freedom. While I agree with that sentiment, lifting the embargo is the easy work, and I believe the wrong choice. Seeking a successful termination of

the conflict, an end to the violence and a resolution of the underlying dispute is indeed the hard work that should engage our attention.

Mr. Chairman, understand the probable consequences of lifting the embargo. First, we would see an immediate escalation of the fighting as the Bosnian Serb forces seek to win as much territory on the ground before the Bosnian Government forces can be armed and trained to use those arms.

Second, it would take, Mr. Chairman, 6 months to 1 year before the Bosnian Government will be capable of fielding and employing these new weapons. During this period, the Bosnian people will be at an even greater risk of attack and genocidal victimization.

Third, the United States would take a final and unambiguous commitment toward one side of this conflict, with all of the moral implications that arise from making such commitments.

Fourth, we will cause a rupture between ourselves and our NATO allies.

Fifth, we eliminate the moral authority with which the United States presses the case for embargo against Serbia and for other places such as North Korea and Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, understand the possible consequences of lifting the embargo. First, the United States will find itself pulled directly into the conflict because it will be compelled to shoulder the moral responsibility to defend the Bosnian people during the period of transition before the weapons are fielded. Can we simply stand by and allow people to die in the tens of thousands? I believe not.

Second, the war, in this gentleman's opinion, Mr. Chairman, will surely widen, possibly spread into other republics emerging from the former Yugoslavia, possibly sparking conflict between Greece and Turkey, drawing Russia into the conflict on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs or their Belgrade allies.

Mr. Chairman, these would be the awful consequences of taking the easy course in response to the list of horrors that have been offered up on the floor of Congress today. Unless those supporting the lifting of the embargo are prepared to have the United States shoulder the defense responsibilities for civilians in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the period when they would be armed, I would also argue that it would not be the moral choice.

Mr. Chairman, it is not enough to offer a critique to those who would seek, and I would believe in good faith, to end the civilian anguish of offering military equipment to the Bosnian Government through a lifting of the embargo. What other path exists to end these horrors? How do we successfully undertake the hard work on behalf of freedom and morality? Without revisiting the long list of diplomatic mistakes that have occurred since Yugoslavia began to dissolve, let me describe the other path that exists to secure peace to end the genocide and

punish those responsible for international law violations.

First, Mr. Chairman, we should seek an immediate cease-fire and reconfirm to all parties that the primary mission of the U.N. forces in Bosnia are to secure the safety of civilians and not take sides in the conflict.

Second, the U.N. force should be made sizable enough and capable enough to discharge their mission to prevent ethnic cleansing and to ensure that humanitarian relief arises. This will require an urgent re-examination of decisions to intervene in a manner that appears to violate the first rule of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance: Take no sides; make no enemies.

The no fly zone enforcement and one-sided close air support campaigns have, in this gentleman's opinion, violated such a norm, and, thus, compromised the mission and led to attacks on the safe areas.

Third, we should continue to press vigorously for a continuation of the war crimes tribunals to deal with the genocide that has occurred in Bosnia rather than to escalate the violence.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we must recognize that the manner in which the former Yugoslavia dissolved in the first place generated this conflict because it failed to properly manage the conflicting claims for new nationhood. In order to end the war that has resulted from this miscalculation, we must seize upon possibilities that do exist for a realistic resolution of the underlying claims and which would create a viable and defensible Bosnian nation.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to reject the proposed easy work that lifting the embargo represents and thereby avoid its disastrous consequences. Let us do the morally based hard work for freedom and morality. I urge my colleagues to reject the bill before the body at this time, and I thank my colleague for his generosity.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BENTSEN], one of our most valuable Members.

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia and allowing the people of Bosnia to defend themselves against aggression and genocide.

There is an old saying I'm sure we've all heard: "Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me." The United Nations has been shamed more than twice in Bosnia as we've hidden an unworkable policy while the Serbs slaughtered, raped, and tortured more than 200,000 Bosnian people. Today we in the United States can end the shame and begin to lead by lifting the arms embargo.

Those who oppose this legislation argue that lifting the embargo would end the United Nations peacekeeping mission and increase American involvement in the Bosnian war.

But the sad truth is the U.N. mission has failed and unfortunately, the United States is involved in Bosnia, not with troops on the ground, but through our international credibility and our moral authority which are at stake. The best way to preserve that credibility and authority is to show leadership, and the best way to show leadership is by lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia.

We will hear many arguments that we should give other approaches a chance to work. Give the latest ultimatum time to work. Give the United Nations one final chance.

These are the same excuses we have heard time and time again. These excuses have utterly failed to stop Serbian aggression and ethnic cleansing. All they have done is severely eroded our credibility and that of our allies.

So it is time to end the excuses and lift the embargo. The right policy is to allow the Bosnian people to defend themselves against this modern holocaust. There are those who would argue that lifting the embargo will result in unnecessary bloodshed, death, and escalation of hostilities, but if you talk to the Bosnian people they will tell you that the war cannot become any worse.

I recently met with a Bosnian refugee living in Houston. Her name is Jasmina Pasic and she ran a school in the basement of her bombed-out apartment building for 2 years during the siege of Sarajevo. She was finally forced to flee and is now separated from her family.

Jasmina dreams of returning home. "In five years maybe I can see it," she says, "but I don't know if it will be in the war or we will have freedom." Today, I will vote to lift the embargo because I believe it will help Jasmina Pasic and her fellow Bosnians fight back to attain that freedom and defend themselves against this grotesque human tragedy which calls into question the moral compass of the entire world.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. ROHRABACHER], a member of the Committee on International Relations.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this motion to end the embargo against the victims of Serbian aggression.

During this debate it has been very clear by all who have participated that Serbia is clearly the aggressor. They are criminals. They are engaged in criminal activity. The victims are the Croats and Bosnians, and we are talking about what to do about it.

Mr. Chairman, I would submit for the RECORD a letter from Margaret Thatcher, who says, and I quote, "We owe it to the victims at last and at least to have the weapons to defend themselves since we ourselves are not willing to defend them. The arms embargo was always morally wrong."

Mr. Chairman, I would submit this entire letter from Margaret Thatcher to Senator DOLE for the RECORD.

Lifting the arms embargo, Mr. Chairman, means less violence, not more. Let us get that straight. We have been talking about this all day now. What does it mean to lift the arms embargo? There will be less violence in that part of the world if we lift the arms embargo. Like all bullies and all aggressors and all criminals, the Serbs have been more aggressive as a result of the weakness of their victim. If those villagers could have defended themselves against tanks, there would have been fewer attacks made against those villages. The ethnic cleansing would not have taken place had those people, had the victims had the technology, the weapons to defend themselves.

Mr. Chairman, what happened was the criminals have had to pay no price for their crime against the victims. The criminal regime in Serbia has paid no price, and this has been going on for 4 years. Therein lies the solution.

No. 1, let the victims defend themselves. Let them have the weapons to defend themselves. No. 2, make the criminal regime of Mr. Milosevic and Serbia pay the price for the murder, rape and mayhem unleashed by Serbia against its neighbors in Croatia and Bosnia.

Mr. Chairman, how do we make Serbia pay a price and deter aggression? Naysayers claim either we must do everything, send U.S. troops and put them on the ground, or do nothing and just let this go on and on and on, not even lift the embargo so people can defend themselves. All the questions have to be answered before we can even let someone defend themselves.

Think about it, Mr. and Mrs. America. Someone next door is being raped and murdered. A neighbor is being raped and murdered, but you have to answer all the questions before you can help your neighbor, throw your neighbor a gun or a stick to defend his family. No, you don't have to wait to answer all the questions, you know what is right and wrong.

It is time for us to side with the victim and make sure that that victim can defend himself and his family. America is going to be a major force in the world if we have the courage to act and to be bold. That does not mean we have to be reckless and take chances.

In this post-cold-war war world, we will face challenges of evil people. They might not be like the Soviet Union, a massive evil force, but we had the courage to stand against the Soviet Union, and that is why it crumbled. That is why we were able to save the world a holocaust of a world war three because we were bold and we were strong.

At the very least, the Milosevics of the world, this little piggish gangster in Serbia, who is murdering innocent people in his neighboring countries, should know there will be a price to pay. At the very least, a minuscule use of American air power against Serbia, not against Bosnia, no, not in the neighboring countries but in Serbia,

would convince the Milosevic regime to leave their neighbors alone. In fact, the Melosevic regime, just like communism in the Soviet Union, would likely crumble before a minuscule use of American power.

Mr. Chairman, let us be bold. Let us permit those who are victims to stand up and defend themselves, and let us make sure the world knows that America has the courage to lead the world in the post-cold-war era.

The letter previously referred to is as follows:

MARGARET, THE LADY THATCHER,
O.M., P.C., F.R.S., HOUSE OF
LORDS,

London, July 18, 1995.

DEAR SENATOR DOLE: I am writing to express my very strong support for your attempt to have the arms embargo against Bosnia lifted.

I know that you and all members of the United States Senate share my horror at the crimes against humanity now being perpetrated by the Serbs in Bosnia. The U.N. and NATO have failed to enforce the Security Council Resolutions which authorized the use of force to defend the safe havens and to get humanitarian assistance through. The safe havens were never safe; now they are falling to Serb assault. Murder, ethnic cleansing, mass rape, and torture are the legacy of the policy of the last three years to the people of Bosnia. It has failed utterly. We owe it to the victims at last and at least to have the weapons to defend themselves—since we ourselves are not willing to defend them.

The arms embargo was always morally wrong. Significantly, it was imposed on the (then formally intact but fragmenting) former Yugoslavia at that regime's own behest. It was then, quite unjustly and possibly illegally, applied to the successor states. Its effect—and, as regards the Serbs, its intention—was to ensure that the proponents of a Greater Serbia, who inherited the great bulk of the Yugoslav army's equipment, enjoyed overwhelming military superiority in their aggression. It is worth recalling that the democratically elected, multi-faith and multi-ethnic Bosnian Government never asked for a single U.N. soldier to be sent. It did ask for the arms required to defend its own people against a ruthless aggressor. That request was repeatedly denied, in spite of the wishes of the U.S. administration and of most leading American politicians.

There is no point now in listing the failures of military policy which subsequently occurred. Suffice it to say that, instead of succeeding in enforcing the mandates the U.N. Security Council gave them, UNPROFOR became potential and then actual hostages. Airpower was never seriously employed either. The oft repeated arguments against lifting the arms embargo—that if it occurred U.N. troops would be at risk, that the enclaves like Srebrenica would fall, that the Serbs would abandon all restraint—have all now been proved worthless. For all these things have happened and the arms embargo still applies.

Two arguments are, however, still advanced by those who wish to keep the arms embargo in place. Each is demonstrably false.

First, it is said that lifting the arms embargo would prolong the war in Bosnia. This is, of course, a morally repulsive argument; for it implies that all we should care about is a quick end to the conflict without regard to the justice or otherwise of its outcome. But in any case it is based on the false assumption that the Serbs are bound to win.

Over the last year the Bosnian army has grown much stronger and the Bosnian Serbs weaker. The Bosnian army has, with its Croat allies, been winning back crucial territory, while desertion and poor morale are badly affecting the over-extended Serb forces. What the Bosnian government lacks however are the tanks and artillery needed to hold the territory won and force the Serbs to negotiate. This lack of equipment is directly the result of the arms embargo. Because of it the war is being prolonged and the casualties are higher. Lifting the arms embargo would thus shorten not lengthen the war.

Second, it is said that lifting the arms embargo would lead to rifts within the U.N. Security Council and NATO. But are there not rifts already? And are these themselves not the result of pursuing a failed policy involving large risks to outside countries' ground troops, rather than arming and training the victims to repel the aggressor? American leadership is vital to bring order out of the present chaos. No country must be allowed to veto the action required to end the present catastrophe. And if American leadership is truly evident along the lines of the policy which you and your colleagues are advancing I do not believe that any country will actually try to obstruct it.

The West has already waited too long. Time is now terribly short. All those who care about peace and justice for the tragic victims of aggression in the former Yugoslavia now have their eyes fixed on the actions of the U.S. Senate. I hope, trust and pray that your initiative to have the arms embargo against Bosnia lifted succeeds. It will bring new hope to those who are suffering so much.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

MARGARET THATCHER.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. LIVINGSTON], the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations.

(Mr. LIVINGSTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, I think my friend from Indiana for yielding me time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in reluctant opposition to this resolution and to urge its defeat. While in the past I have spoken for and even voted for the lifting of the arms embargo, I have reappraised my position, and I have decided that to do so would be a terrible mistake.

Granted that the current situation is intolerable, and that the approach taken by our allies in Europe by way of the United Nations must change, and must change drastically, this unilateral step by the United States would bear consequences so far removed from reason and common sense, that on proper reflection, it could be one of the worst steps we could take.

Mr. Chairman, I want there to be no mistake in my position. If I thought this resolution would bring peace to Bosnia, if I thought this resolution would allow the Bosnian Moslems to defend themselves and thwart Serbian aggression, if I thought this resolution would bring a measure of social justice to Bosnia I would support it. Unfortunately it does none of these things.

Adoption of this resolution will simply mean the end of the U.N. mission in Bosnia. It will signal to our NATO allies, especially the French and the British troops on the ground that we do not care if they withdraw. It will put those troops at risk. It will put hundreds of thousands of refugees at grave risk, and it would damage the NATO alliance beyond repair.

Moreover, it would most certainly lead to the very commitment of U.S. troops to a European war that the sponsors of the resolution probably wish to avoid.

Why? Because UNPROFOR troops are already on the ground and scattered about Bosnia, many in wholly indefensible enclaves surrounded by Bosnian Serbs.

When they begin to pull out, the Bosnian Serbs will move in to take their place, and the Bosnian Moslems will become entirely vulnerable and defenseless. Will they allow the U.N. to abandon them? I doubt it. So UNPROFOR could very well find its forces exposed to attack by both Serbs and Moslems, with little opportunity to defend their own troops.

Thus, U.S. troops will be called on to help evacuate them, not just with air cover, but with ground support—with lots of American lives.

Mr. Chairman, I remain second to no one in my belief that the Bosnian Moslems should be allowed to defend themselves. But will that happen? Will the United States then sell arms to the Bosnians? Will we put troops in the ground to train them with our weapons? Will the Bosnians have an adequate command and control structure? Will their officer corps be capable of technical and tactical competence? Will they be given intelligence capability?

Will they have a fair chance against the Bosnian Serbs? If so, will the neighboring Serbians stay out of the fight? Will the Russians, the Turks, the Greeks? What if the fight spills into Macedonia, or Kosovo, or Albania? Is this the first step of another world war?

We are reaping the multiple effects of a failed policy. The Vance-Owen plan to force ethnic groups into enclaves or cantons was a total catastrophe. It has left us with pictures of places like Srebrenica and Zepa and Gorazde where Serbian thugs backed by Russian military might are given license to murder, rape, and ethnically cleanse. The President says he is drawing the line on Gorazde. But what does that mean? Will massive U.S. air power do what diplomacy has failed to so save the lives of innocent women and children in Gorazde? I doubt it.

What is the end game for Bosnia? Can the Bosnian Moslems be consolidated into an area where a cease-fire can hold and a military position be staked out to give them some security? That may be the only solution but we can't get there under this resolution, or under the Clinton plan.

Mr. Chairman, again, what is the end game in Bosnia? We are considering this resolution today because men and women of good will on both sides of the aisle and both sides of the Capitol cannot stand the spectacle of the worst foreign policy debacle in the past decade. This resolution represents something, and the status quo is unacceptable. Unfortunately, after the arms begin to flow and after the massive air strikes the President wants, we still don't know the end game. There is none. Only more suffering.

I do not have a good answer for Bosnia, but I do not think this resolution is the answer. I do think it is important to keep our NATO alliance together. I think it is critical to address the refugee problem. I think it is necessary to bring about a cease-fire. I think it is vital we keep a NATO military presence in Bosnia. I do not see those things happening if we pass this resolution today. So I regret I must oppose it in the hope that we can do better later.

And I believe we can, if the Bosnian Moslems can and will centralize in a simple, clearly defined, and cohesive portion of Bosnia which becomes a defensible, predominantly Moslem region.

□ 1330

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. GUNDERSON].

(Mr. GUNDERSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GUNDERSON. Mr. Chairman, we cannot today dictate the moral compass of civilized society, and we cannot today dictate the moral compass of even the United Nations or our NATO allies. But I think today we will determine the limits beyond which the American people can no longer tolerate business as usual in Bosnia.

I call upon my colleagues in this Congress to take a good look at the reality, the stark reality before us. Over 200,000 people have been killed; over 20,000 have been raped, over 4,000 children have been displaced and await some kind of placement; and over 2.75 million people have already been driven from their homes and their personal belongings stolen.

I am reminded of those words of Pastor Martin Niemoller shortly after World War II when he wrote,

First they came for the communists; I was not a communist, so I did not object. Then they came for the Jews; I was not a Jew, so I did not object. Then they came for the trade unionists; I was not a trade unionist, so I did not object. Then they came for the Catholics; I was not a Catholic, so I did not object. Then they came for me, and there was no one left to object.

I am not Bosnian, and I am not Moslem. But, Mr. Chairman, I am appalled by how we have failed to learn the lesson of history and how we stand by to watch the rape, the murder, and the pillage of a people. We say nothing and

we do nothing, and we let history dictate its results.

Ideally I would suggest that the Western world would be moved to simply go in and impose a peace where there is no peace and to impose civilization where there is none. But if we are unwilling to do today what we were willing to do in 1991, then let us at least be willing to let them defend themselves.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON].

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, the German chancellor of the last century, Bismarck, once remarked that the Balkans are not worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier.

I say to you today that the Balkans are not worth the life of one American soldier. We are on the brink, Mr. Chairman, of a major international mistake. To those that would support this resolution, I say you do not know what you do. Oh, how simple it sounds. Level the playing field, let them fight back. But we should look, in the light of history, into the consequences of what lifting this embargo would be.

First and foremost, it would be a death knell for many Bosnian Moslems, because the Serbs will intensify their attack before any training and any additional weapons can reach them.

Second, the UNPROFOR forces will come out. They will leave, and they will ask and receive help by the American forces. Of this I will speak a bit later.

Third, the United States will be asked to fill the void, first to train, then to supply, and when that fails, to fight. Those who look at more recent history see that there is a great parallel to this and our tragedy in Vietnam, and it could be all that all over again.

Fourth, outside forces will enter the conflict. Russia has already stated that should we enter the conflict on one side, they will on behalf of the Serbs. What about the other Moslem countries in the area, the other orthodox countries in the area? We will have the tinderbox once again that started the First World War.

Fifth, it destroys any prospects for a negotiated settlement. We have been trying. As a matter of fact, it seems that the Serbs, of all people, are willing to talk and negotiate, and we find that the Moslems have been less prone to do the negotiating.

Sixth, it will cause a strain with our allies. The United Kingdom and France have soldiers there on the ground. It will cause us a great deal of trouble with them.

Last, it will irreparably harm NATO.

For all of these things and all of these reasons, we should not lift this embargo. Further, it will Americanize the conflict in one of two ways: Either to fill the void of which I spoke, to help with supplies, to train, logistics, and, sadly, to fight; or it will Americanize it

by helping UNPROFOR withdraw, for which our President has already pledged some 25,000.

To withdraw this UNPROFOR force will not be easy. We look at the tunnels, the narrow roads, the dangerous situation in which we find the various UNPROFOR forces today, and our country has pledged 25,000 of a 110,000 force to withdraw them. We will have serious problems in getting that job done.

Heed the remarks of Bismarck. Heed our words today when we speak about not getting involved. This is really a vote as to whether to get America involved in this conflict or not. History tells us that this part of the world has repeated itself and repeated itself by finding the inhabitants at each others' throat for centuries. We will not change that.

The best thing we can hope for is a negotiated settlement. We have been trying. We should give it one last chance, for if we do not, we will find ourselves in an Americanized conflict for which we did not ask. The consequences of lifting this embargo would be disastrous for them and for our country.

Mr. OLVER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. WYNN].

Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Bosnian Self-Defense Act. We ought to pass this resolution. You know, Mr. Chairman, we are not just in the often referred to global marketplace. We are also part of a global community, and in such a community, as with the old playground, leaders have to step up to resist aggression and resist bullies.

It is time that we confront the realities. It is time that we confront the realities. It is not enough to play "what if." "What if" is an excuse for inaction. It is not enough to try to figure out the end game. We do not know the end game. We never will. What we have to do is confront the realities.

The realities are these: People are being slaughtered on one side, the Moslem side; women are being raped on one side, the Moslem side; our so-called safe-havens are being overrun on a daily basis. They have become a cruel joke.

It is time for us to respond. The Moslems deserve an opportunity. They have the right in fact to defend themselves. Through the exercise of this right, we can create consequences for aggression. The reason this war has gone on so long and gone so badly is because there have been no consequences.

□ 1345

The Bosnians have become emboldened. If the Moslems have weaponry to defend themselves, they can create consequences and create pain that will give the Bosnians pause in their aggression.

The great concern seems to be whether we will Americanize this war. I do

not think so. The U.N. forces will ultimately have to come out. Our allies are not going to stay indefinitely and watch their people be used as human shields. So, as the President has indicated, we will have a responsibility as leaders in the global community to help extricate these U.N. forces.

But that need not mean that we will have a complete expansion of the war and a complete Americanization. On the contrary, it will signal Americans to stand up for the victims, to take its true and appropriate place as a world leader and respond to this crisis by enabling people who are the victims of rape and murder to defend themselves.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. DAVIS].

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this resolution. America should be a world leader, not the world waffler and follower that we have been in this crisis. We waited and allowed the U.N. safe havens to operate, but they have failed. We have stood by watching while tens of thousands of innocent Bosnians Moslems have been raped, bombed, and murdered.

The arms embargo is a very noble-sounding phrase, but the arms embargo hurts only one side, the Bosnian Moslems. The Serbs have plenty of firepower and the remnants of the Yugoslavian armed forces. The arms embargo simply means that the Bosnian Moslems will be unable to defend themselves, and the Serbs have plenty of firepower.

Last week I was visited by two members of the Bosnian Parliament. When I asked what this country could do to halt the ongoing atrocities in Bosnia, they replied they do not want U.S. troops. They do not want this country's intervention. They only want us to help the lifting of the arms embargo so they can defend themselves against these atrocities.

That is the least we can do as a world leader. Let us adopt this resolution and end the current failed policies.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Michigan [Mr. KNOLLENBERG].

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Indiana for yielding time to me. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to S. 21. I too have watched the news reports of the worsening situation for the Bosnian people. But unilaterally lifting the arms embargo will not end this conflict. This legislation can only lead to the total collapse of humanitarian efforts in Bosnia and likely will result in an escalation of the fighting.

I remind this body that we do not have troops on the ground—nor should we—and it is our allies in NATO who will pay the price if the United States violates our own embargo. And as you know, our allies have said that if the United States acts unilaterally they will withdraw from UNPROFOR. President Clinton has stated his belief that

the United States is obligated to assist that withdrawal. I do not want to see our troops dragged into this conflict.

Earlier this year this Congress voted to lift the embargo. Why hasn't it been lifted? Because the countries who are there say lifting it would jeopardize their mission of humanitarian relief.

Our allies do not want this lifted. Are you willing to sacrifice the lives of their soldiers over their objections? Or can you say, with any credibility, that lifting this embargo will not affect the U.N. and NATO operations in Bosnia.

No one can say that the United Nations and NATO have been successful in Bosnia. It is to our shame that these organizations have failed to protect so many people. But this action we take today will not rectify past mistakes. And it will not bring peace to this region.

Lifting the embargo will bring more weapons into the region. It will isolate us further from our NATO allies. It will antagonize Russia who already has threatened to aid the Serbs if the embargo is lifted. It will slide us further down the slippery slope we now are precariously balanced on.

Mr. Chairman, this legislation will force the President to act unilaterally to lift the embargo against his will and against the will of our allies. It will make the Bosnian conflict our responsibility, it will severely damage the NATO alliance, and it will make the conflict in Bosnia worse not better. This is the wrong policy at the wrong time. Vote "no."

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE], a distinguished member of our House Committee on International Relations.

(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, there are all kinds of peace. There is the peace of the jail and the peace of the graveyard. You can have peace in Bosnia, kill all the Moslems, and they cannot fight anymore. Next to that, just keep them disarmed while everybody else brims with armaments.

Freedom has to be defended. Genocide, its modern incarnation, ethnic cleansing, must be resisted if we are to retain our membership in the human race. Does the United States have any interest in faraway Balkin Bosnia? I would say yes. The moral imperative is resistance to genocide.

The slaughter in Bosnia has uncovered the inadequacy of the United Nations and NATO, for that matter, to deal with wars of ethnic nationalism, wars of states within states rather than between states. But please remember, Bosnia was recognized formally as a sovereign nation by the United States, by the European community on April 7, 1992, and by the United Nations on May 22, 1992. The U.N. charter guarantees the right of self-defense. So lifting the embargo is merely implementing the elementary

rights of people in sovereign nations, and it ought to prove that aggression is not without cost.

This is not the time or the place to discuss the incredibly complicated problems of peace in the Balkans. I agree with everybody who has pointed out the incredibly difficult, shattering problems that we have trying to adjust borders and peace. It is incredibly difficult. But before we get to that problem, we ought to understand genocide cannot be tolerated. We cannot remain indifferent to it.

In this century there have been three major genocides, not counting Rwanda, Burundi, the Sudan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and all of the ongoing tribal killings that are going on. But the Armenians in 1915, the Jews in World War II in the Holocaust, and the Moslems in Bosnia today, are three genocides. We stand and avert our eyes because we have no interest there.

When the Holocaust Museum was dedicated by the President, he stood there, and I am sure he meant it, he said two words: never again. What did he mean, never again? Never again will the Jews be killed in Germany in 1940? Or does he mean never again will we permit holocausts against ethnic groups because somebody does not agree with their religion or their color or their way of living?

Never again. Let us put some flesh on those words and start by lifting the embargo.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Connecticut [Mrs. KENNELLY], one of the leaders on our side of the aisle.

Mrs. KENNELLY. Mr. Chairman, everyone in this Chamber is moved by the suffering we have seen in Bosnia. Everyone in this Chamber is disturbed by the frightening historical echoes of previous episodes of carnage in Europe. Yet not one person in this Chamber has come up with a completely satisfying answer. Three years ago the United States imposed an arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia. It is evident that the embargo has little or no effect on the Serbian aggressors. Obviously that is for one reason: because they inherited the arms of the former Yugoslavian military. Has this policy worked? It is clear to me that it has not.

For 3 years we have stood by a policy that has permitted the loss of 70 percent of the Bosnian land which has ended in tremendous suffering to get this land. After 3 years, I do not believe this policy, if continued, can accomplish anything further. So what do we do? If we had a clearly preferable solution, one that guaranteed success, I know every Member of this House would support it wholeheartedly. But there is no policy, no clear best course. We only know now what did not and does not work.

Our choice today is to continue down a path that has already resulted in so much suffering or to embark on a new

path. For me the choice is clear. The choice now is in front of us, that we must, we have to look to a different way. We have to take a new course.

I will vote to lift the embargo today. I think it is up to us in this Chamber to try something new to spare those people we are worrying about here today.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WELDON].

(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to support this resolution lifting the embargo. And in coming up with my reasoning in terms of my decision, I sought the support and input of that one person who perhaps is the most well-versed American in terms of what our policy should be. John Jordan is a volunteer firefighter from Rhode Island.

As my good friend, the gentleman from Maryland, [Mr. HOYER], on the other side knows, John Jordan went over to Sarajevo 3 years ago as a volunteer to work with the Sarajevo fire brigade, to establish emergency response service for the people in that country, be they Serbs, Muslims, Croats, whatever they might be. John Jordan has been there every day for the last 3 years.

I called John Jordan on the phone, as I caught him on the way back to Sarajevo today. He said, "Curt, we have to lift the arms embargo."

Two years ago he brought Kenan Slinic over here, a 31-year-old fire chief from Sarajevo who was protecting the lives of the people in Sarajevo. Kenan Slinic met with the Vice President; he met with us at our dinner and spoke to us. He pleaded with us, I have his original notes from his speech, his handwritten notes, he pleaded with us to allow his people to defend themselves 2 years ago. Because he spoke out, when he went back to his homeland, he was shot in the back of the head and killed and his six-year-old child today does not have a father.

Mr. Chairman, this has gone on too long. The policy is not working. We have to create a level playing field.

John Jordan also said to me, "Curt, you have got to provide some support to bring your relief workers out." I agree with that. He said, "We have got to provide support until the arms can reach the appropriate groups inside of the afflicted area." I agree with that.

Mr. Chairman, in the end we have to lift the embargo to give these people a chance, to give them the opportunity to defend themselves.

We have heard story after story about the atrocities occurring in that country. I ask my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to support the resolution in honor of those people who have suffered so much.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. LEWIS].

Mr. LEWIS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I am deeply troubled and anguished by what is happening in Bosnia.

We all share the pain and the suffering. We have seen the horror. Women are raped, children are brutalized, and young men are taken away to an uncertain fate—often death.

These people of Bosnia are part of the family of humankind. When they bleed, we bleed. When they suffer, we suffer. When they are slaughtered and killed, something dies in all of us.

What is happening in this part of the world is an affront to all humanity. We—as the community of nations—cannot, and we must not, stand by in the face of this carnage.

I—like everyone else—have watched in anguish as the United Nations failed to defend the safe areas in Bosnia.

But I know that the British and French have troops in Bosnia. Lifting the embargo is not so simple or clear. We will send troops to help remove the U.N. forces if we lift the arms embargo.

How many of us are prepared to send American troops—our young men and women—to Bosnia to fight in this conflict?

A vote for this resolution is a vote to send American troops into Bosnia. Every member of this body must know this. This vote is not a free vote. This vote has consequences.

The question is not whether to stop the violence. We all want to stop the violence. The question is how to stop the violence. Will unilaterally lifting the embargo bring peace to this region? Or will it spread the conflict and increase the toll of death and destruction?

We must strengthen our resolve to defend innocent men, women, and children. But we cannot act alone.

We must give this fresh plan a chance. The U.N. must allow NATO to defend the safe areas.

Mr. Chairman, we all are frustrated. All of humanity is crying out for a solution to this conflict. This vote is our attempt to act, to do something.

But we must not move this way. We must strengthen our U.N. mission. If it does not work, then later we may have to act on our own.

American willingness to work with the community of nations is at stake. Our allies have troops on the ground—they are in harm's way.

Mr. Chairman, I stand here with a heavy heart—I want to do what is right. I want to end the genocide.

I have thought long and hard about this vote. I have searched my soul and conscience, and I have concluded now is not the time to unilaterally lift the arms embargo. It will not help stop the killing. It will not end the bloodshed.

We must urge the United Nations to stop the violence—to stop the Serbian aggression. We must protect the innocent people of Bosnia. We must protect the safe areas.

Now is not the time to get lost in a sea of despair. With our allies, we have

taken a stand against Serbian aggression. Now we must be strong in that stand. Mr. Chairman, I will oppose this resolution.

□ 1400

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. SAM JOHNSON.

Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, the United Nations and NATO do not work. That is what the problem is. Once again we are facing the same arguments we have heard for over 2 years now, that the United Nations and its military command is serving some purpose to the thousands of people who are dying or suffering every day in Bosnia, some purpose. Most importantly, we will find ourselves again face to face with America's worst kept secret: That is, the utter failure of our administration to define why the United States and our troops should be involved in a U.N. peacekeeping operation in a place where we have no national interest and where there is no peace to keep.

These same mistakes have been made before, and they cost us American lives. It happened 2 years ago in Somalia under U.N. command, with no defined mission and no defined purpose. The so-called humanitarian mission that first brought us to Somalia ended up costing us lives, like that of Sgt. James Joyce, our Army ranger who died on October 3, 1993. His father, Lt. Col. Larry Joyce, who was my constituent, testified before this House as to how dangerous it was for the United States to think that we could solve the world's problems, and how irresponsible of us it was to use our troops as bargaining chips in the international peacekeeping game.

President Clinton is making the same mistake again. He is using United States military troops as a bargaining chip in a game where the United States is not even a player, just like Somalia. How disappointed Larry Joyce must be today. Instead of knowing that his testimony and his son's death is making a difference, he is being forced to sit by and watch this country make the same tragic mistakes again, endangering America's stature, and more importantly, the lives of American soldiers. I urge my colleagues to end the arms embargo and vote in favor of this resolution.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. MEEK].

Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to oppose the effort to unilaterally lift the arms embargo on Bosnia.

Mr. Chairman, there is a horrible tragedy happening in Bosnia. I, along with everyone else, wants that tragedy to come to an end. But Mr. Chairman, lifting the arms embargo will not end the tragedy, it will only force the United States to become an active participant.

Arms, it is argued, will allow the Bosnian Moslems to defend themselves.

But Mr. Chairman, what else will arms shipments do? How about end the U.N. humanitarian mission which helps feed Sarajevo? How about trigger the exit of NATO from the conflict? How about signal the entry of Serbia into the Bosnian war?

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the most important result of lifting the arms embargo will be the entry of the United States into the war. We will be obligated by treaty to help our allies pull out. And we will be obligated by morality to protect the Bosnian Moslems until they can defend themselves. I strongly favor the end of the war in Bosnia, Mr. Chairman, but what price are we willing to pay to lift this embargo?

Mr. Chairman, what is happening in Bosnia is a horrible tragedy. But Mr. Chairman, acting unilaterally to end the arms embargo in Bosnia will only leave the United States holding the bag. Unilaterally. I urge a "no" vote on the bill.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. SALMON], a member of our committee.

Mr. SALMON. Mr. Chairman, there are no easy answers in Bosnia, no quick fixes. But I believe we must lift the embargo—now.

The Bosnians want to defend themselves against rape, murder, and ethnic cleansing. But let's face it: the fundamental right of self-defense is meaningless without the opportunity to procure weapons. The Bosnians deserve the same chance to defend themselves that the people of Afghanistan had in their fight against Soviet terror.

The current policy of the United States is to be an active accomplice in the strangulation of the Bosnian people.

And we are doing great damage to the vitality of NATO and the credibility of the United States. The debacle of Bosnia sends a clear message to the tyrants around the world—the United States can be bullied, and will not even stand up against genocide.

No tyrant will ever negotiate a settlement when he can get everything he wants by force.

If we continue to be paralyzed by weakness, countless American troops may be needed in the future to counter the aggressive actions of tyrants who conclude that America's weakness in Bosnia is the post-gulf-war reality of the United States.

Let us do what is right, and begin the restoration of America's foreign policy. Lift the embargo.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, it gives me a great deal of pleasure to yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR], the minority leader of the House of Representatives and a leader on this floor.

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague, who has been so instrumental and who has shown extraordinary leadership on this issue, for yielding me the time.

Mr. Chairman, there are no easy answers in Bosnia today.

But how many more atrocities do we have to witness.

How many more children do we have to see killed before we act in Bosnia?

Are 200,000 dead Bosnians enough?

Are 16,000 murdered children enough?

Are 2 million homeless refugees enough?

That's what we've let happen the past 3 years.

And today, once again, there are those who say that lifting the arms embargo will involve America in this war. But let's be honest, Mr. Chairman, we're already involved in this war.

By keeping this embargo in place for so long—not only have we denied the Bosnian people the weapons they need to defend themselves—we have helped tilt the balance of the war in favor of Serbian aggression.

Mr. Chairman, there can be no more excuses.

It's time to lift this embargo once and for all.

Over the past 3 years, we have seen two dozen ceasefires come and go.

We have seen the peace process start and stall.

We have watched the Serbs break agreement after agreement.

And the one constant through it all has been the absolute unwillingness of the West to take the steps necessary to do what needs to be done.

The greatest sin, Mr. Chairman, isn't that we simply turned our backs.

The greatest sin in Bosnia is that time and time again, we have raised the hopes of the Bosnian people that the cavalry was on its way. And time and time again, we have not delivered.

Mr. Chairman, the people of Bosnia deserve better than this.

If we are not going to stop the slaughter, if we are not going to defend the people of Bosnia, then we have no right to continue to deny them the right to defend themselves.

By lifting this embargo today, we will extend to Bosnia the right which is guaranteed to every other sovereign nation under the U.N. charter—the simple right to defend themselves.

There are those who say that lifting this embargo will disrupt the peace process.

To them, I say: what peace process?

Just 2 months ago on this floor we heard the same tired arguments.

And in the past 2 months, we have seen nearly 50,000 people driven from their homes.

We have seen innocent women and children herded into trucks.

We've heard stories of young men being hung from trees and thousands of young women being raped.

Fifty years after the world said "never again" we are sitting back and watching mass genocide happen again.

Mr. Chairman, lifting the embargo won't weaken the peace process, it will strengthen it.

The reason peace talks have failed the past 3 years is because the Serbs have no reason to negotiate.

They face no real opposition on the battlefield, so they have no incentive to stay at the negotiating table.

Only when the Serbs are certain that the Bosnians can defend themselves will they realize that further aggression will get them nowhere.

And only then will we have a real chance for peace in Bosnia.

Mr. Chairman, 200 years of American leadership have led up to this moment. And we can't turn our backs any longer.

It's time to help the Bosnian people help themselves.

It's time to lift the arms embargo.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. ROEMER].

(Mr. ROEMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, as medical students learn to become doctors, as they learn about healing, as they learn about hope, as they learn about improving the course of humanity, they learn very, very early about the Hippocratic oath: First do no harm.

Mr. Chairman, it is sad to say at this point neither side of this debate can claim no harm, at this point. Current policy has not been successful. The ethnic cleansing going on is a travesty. There are no good solutions at this point. As war is bloody and chaotic, so, at times, is peace. We may have to settle for a bad peace, a bloody peace, and a messy map, but lifting this embargo threatens even a bad peace or a bloody peace.

What does this resolution do to stop the killing? It will probably increase the killing, sending arms to 1.2 million Moslems fighting against over 9,000,000 Serbs. Will it prevent the war from spreading? Certainly not. It will probably exacerbate that war. Will we have a Christian-Moslem war on our hands? Maybe. Do we do permanent damage to our allies? Probably, yes.

War, as it has been said, is merely an extension of politics, by other means. This resolution is an extension of politics, and although it is well-intended, I think it is responding in a simple way to a very complicated problem. Robert Caplan wrote a book called "Balkan Ghosts," a journey through history. This book traces the origins of this conflict. It goes back beyond 1939 and World War II. It goes back beyond our revolution in 1776, and even centuries beyond the signing of the Magna Carta.

We are not going to solve this war with a resolution to send more arms into a very messy and bloody war. Let us continue to try to work, although it will be difficult, for probably a messy and bloody peace.

□ 1415

Mr. GILCHREST. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.

Mr. Chairman, we are not going to solve this war by doing nothing. Where is the door to hell on the planet right now? The door to hell resides in this

bad peace in Bosnia. What has caused the 200,000 deaths in Bosnia? What has caused the 3 million refugees? What has caused the continuing nightmare of rape and mayhem? What has caused evil to prosper in Bosnia?

Dogma, ignorance, arrogance, apathy, the Nation's community who have had a sense of deliberate deafness to suffering. Are we as a nation becoming a nation of tortured ghosts because we do not know what to do? What has caused this evil to prosper, this door to hell to remain open in Bosnia for good men like us to do nothing? The Bosnians are far better off defending themselves than relying upon platitudes and international bureaucrats.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my good friend, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. TAYLOR].

Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, one of my colleagues, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR], just made the statement that we have somehow led the Bosnian Serbs to believe that the cavalry is on the way. Well, I might feel a little bit better about the outcome of this vote if I knew that the cavalry was going to be led by the likes of the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR], the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER], and some other people who are very anxious to get America involved in a war where we do not belong.

Mr. Chairman, our national interests are not at stake. NATO is not under attack. Yes, people are dying. People are dying all over the world as we speak. I do not think it is America's business to be the world's policeman. People say, if we just lift the embargo, somehow the war will go away. Who is kidding who? That is like pouring gasoline on a fire.

According to Collin Powell when he spoke before the Committee on Armed Services back when he still was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he said there was a 10-year supply of weapons in the former Yugoslavia. You see, Tito was paranoid. He didn't know whether it was a Warsaw Pact or NATO that was going to attack him, so he prepared for either.

Folks, this fight has been going on at least since the 1200's. It has been a blood feud, and to sum up Canadian General McKenzie who was in charge of the general command just a few years ago when he came before the Committee on Armed Services, he summed up his remarks by saying, we have three serial killers. One has killed 15, one has killed 10, and one has killed 5, and he does not see the rationale of jumping in on the side of the one who has only killed 5.

Mr. Chairman, if you lift the embargo, who do we sell to? Are we going to sell to the Serbs? Are we going to sell to the Croatians? No you want to sell to the Moslems. You want to pick sides. When you pick sides, that means you have to train people, and when they invariably lose, that means the decision will have to be made in this

body, do we go rush to the rescue, as Mr. BONIOR said? Not with my kids. Not with kids from south Mississippi, not with kids named Widener and Nickase and Bond who have no reason to die in what was Yugoslavia.

People, we are wasting 8 days on hearings on something that took place over 2 years ago in Waco, TX. You are not even willing to give a half a day's consideration to sending American kids to die in a part of the country most people could not point to on the map. Please, for God's sakes, think about what you are doing before we have hearings 4 years from now wondering what went wrong in Bosnia. Please oppose this resolution.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. FOWLER].

(Mrs. FOWLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of S. 21, legislation to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia.

I have previously supported the embargo, but recent events in Bosnia and improvements in this legislation persuade me that this measure deserves support.

The whole premise of the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia was to allow the United Nations to intervene and prevent hostilities against civilians. Six safe areas were established in Bosnia to shield civilians from Bosnian Serb aggression.

While these populations were subjected to periodic hostilities, they were still safer than if exposed to open warfare and Serbian ethnic cleansing. The United Nations, whether through moral suasion or military force, was supposed to protect these individuals.

But the United Nation's inability to protect Srebrenica and Zepa or prevent the massive human rights violations that followed were nothing but disastrous.

The President's plan for Bosnia is deeply flawed. This bill provides of the withdrawal of U.N. forces from Bosnia prior to the lifting of the embargo and will finally enable the Bosnian Government to defend its citizenry. It deserves our support.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. OLVER], who has been one of the strongest outspoken advocates of bringing peace to this troubled area of the world.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. OLVER].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized for 4 minutes.

(Mr. OLVER was asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. OLVER. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, it is time to do the right thing in Bosnia. From the first

day of this war, Slobodan Milosevic, the President of Serbia and the last Communist dictator in Europe, has orchestrated the actions of the Serb minority in Bosnia. He has armed them, he supplied them with all of the weapons of a modern army, the tanks, the heavy artillery and the missiles, while Bosnia, a U.N. member, has been embargoed.

Three years ago Milosevic told General Mladic, the military commander of the Bosnian Serbs who has recently been indicted by the United Nations as a war criminal, for the deliberate slaughter of civilian populations, for the use of mass rape of women as a tool of terror, for the detainment of killing of male Bosnians between the ages of 16 and 65 in Srebrenica, Milosevic told Mladic to destroy Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia.

Mr. Chairman, we recently saw General Mladic strutting through the streets of Zepa after the U.N. safe haven was overrun with the United Nations doing absolutely nothing. Mladic said he intends to take Bihac, then Gorazde, then Sarajevo by winter, and "eliminate the Bosnian Moslems as a people from the Earth".

The goal from the first day of this war has been the territorial expansion of Serbia by whatever means would eliminate the Bosnian Moslems as a people from this Earth. No amount of wishful thinking about being reasonable or making nice to Milosevic will change that policy. The United Nations had made it absolutely clear, at least to Milosevic, that the United Nations will not stop him, so it is time to allow the Bosnians to defend themselves.

Mr. Chairman, there is something obscene about the adherence to a failed policy long after that failure has been proven again and again and again and again, any many more times again. There is something obscene about the tortured self-righteous defense of an arms embargo on only one side of the Bosnian conflict. The hand-wringers say the Bosnian Government cannot be allowed to defend its people from genocide because it would offend the Serbs.

Mr. Chairman, there is something obscene about declaring that a whole people cannot be allowed the weapons to defend itself against genocide, and there is something monstrously obscene about the cowardice of the international community refusing to protect the safe havens that they themselves established. Srebrenica and Zepa and the others that are to come from the indiscriminate slaughter of males of all ages, the mass rape of women, the bombardment of fleeing civilian refugees, there is something overwhelmingly obscene about genocide in all its forms.

It was obscene, and overwhelmingly so, in the 1930's and 1940's. It led to the near extermination of Jews in Europe and to the death of many more millions of Poles and other Slavic people from Eastern Europe.

Mr. Chairman, yesterday, a coalition of 27 human rights and religious and medical groups called for stepped up United States and international action to stop the slaughter of Bosnian civilians. These are not warlike organizations. The American Nurses Association, the Human Rights Watch, Anti-Defamation League, Refugees International, Physicians for Human Rights, American Arab Antidiscrimination League, the American Jewish Committee, World Vision. Quite the opposite. These are organizations that are devoted to peace and toward a just peace. They know that if Bosnia is not allowed to protect itself and the United Nations refuses to stop the Serb minority from its stated goal of "elimination of the Bosnian Moslems as a people from the Earth," then we will see in full color on CNN and all our other media the ethnic cleansing, the bombardment, the rape, and the slaughter of innocent people and the male populations of Bihac and Gorazde and Sarajevo repeated again.

Mr. Chairman, it is time to allow the Bosnians to obtain the weapons of defense. This war will stop when the Serbs know the world will not tolerate genocide. It is time to do the right thing in Bosnia; it is time to lift the arms embargo.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. BAKER].

Mr. BAKER of California. Mr. Chairman, this is a very healthy debate to have go on here today, but the resolution that we have before us is based on flawed premises. The premise is that there is not enough guns and that one side has more guns than another. It also has the premise that only one side are the bad guys, that this must be a one-way war. Just the other day we read in the newspaper where Croatia attacked an unarmed Serbian town and forced 15,000 people out of the town after shelling that town which was not defended by Serbian troops.

Mr. Chairman, this is not a one-way war. There is no shortage of arms. Yes, the Middle East are, through Croatia, arming the Bosnian Moslems. Yes, Russia is arming the Bosnian Serbs. Yes, even Germany is arming the Croatians in Bosnia. There is not a shortage of arms. There is not a one-side-is-all-bad attitude, and every other side is good. This war has been going on for 500 years since the Turks deposited the Moslems in the middle of this part of Europe. Now we are being asked to get in there and say, give them more arms, let us get involved. This controversy needs a new map.

Mr. Chairman, our State Department backed the recognition of Bosnia. What was wrong with that? Well, the map put little Croatian communities in the middle of Serbian territory, Serbian communities in the middle of Croatian territories, and Moslem territories, they were all mixed. In fact, 30 percent of Sarajevo was communities that were Serbian.

Mr. Chairman, suppose they came to you and said, Washington, DC is going to be under Moslem control, Maryland is going to be Catholic, and all of you in Virginia are going to be Orthodox. People would be forced to move unless they wanted to live under these constraints.

Mr. Chairman, the only way is to force people to the bargaining table. This is no resolution. This is an extension of war. There is no request that the Bosnian Moslems go to the bargaining table. We just ask for more arms.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BAKER of California. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I would point out that in Sarajevo, the populations lived together very peacefully. It was extrinsic forces that changed that.

Mr. BAKER of California. They lived peacefully until we recognized the false state of Bosnia Moslems who then took in people who did not want to live under them and vice versa.

Mr. Chairman, vote "no" on this resolution. Let us do something to restore peace.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. GOODLATTE].

Mr. GOODLATTE. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the lifting of the arms embargo to allow defenseless people in Bosnia to defend themselves. They do not have to fight tanks with rifles.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Indiana calls this a bloody peace that we see in Bosnia—200,000 lives slaughtered is a bloody peace? Mr. Chairman, a bloody peace is no peace.

Patrick Henry, 220 years ago in Virginia said, gentlemen may cry peace, peace when there is no peace in the famous speech that he cited calling for this country to rise up against Great Britain. The people of Bosnia seek a situation in which they should have the right to defend themselves against far worse atrocities, killings, torturing, rapes, imprisonment in internment camps, expulsion from their lands, creation of refugees, of thousands and thousands of people.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. TAYLOR] says that the United States cannot be the world's policeman, and he is right. So why are we participating in policing Bosnia by enforcing an arms embargo that prohibits people from having the opportunity to defend their own lives, their own families?

□ 1430

That is what this is about. This does not involve putting U.S. troops into the situation. It simply involves allowing people to defend themselves.

Mr. Chairman, I urge support for this bill.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield, I commend the

gentleman for his excellent point that he just made. Right.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. HEFNER].

(Mr. HEFNER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HEFNER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to approach this from a little different perspective. As the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURTHA], former chairman of the Armed Services Committee, said this morning when we debated the rule, these are some easy votes if we are looking for some votes that we want to make and we can put a press release out and say "I voted to lift the embargo to let the people defend themselves."

Mr. Chairman, it makes us feel real good, but there are going to be some tough votes that are going to come later if we implement lifting this embargo. What is going to happen is, we are going to lift the embargo and the President is probably going to veto the bill. If we do not override the veto, it goes through and becomes law and then the next step comes.

They are going to ask for some arms; it is going to come for the United States. We are going to be bringing these arms in, and somebody has got to accompany them to teach these people how to use these sophisticated weapons. Both Republicans and Democrats have said, if we need to extract the U.N. forces from this area, that they are willing to put 25,000 American troops on the ground to support extracting these people from this area.

Mr. Chairman, that is where the tough vote is going to come, because many Members have said, we are not going to enter into this unless Congress authorizes putting American troops on the ground in Bosnia. That is what it comes down to; that is when the tough vote comes.

Mr. Chairman, I just wonder where the people that are so eager to lift this embargo, where they are going to be when the argument is on this floor when we are being asked to send 25,000, or more, American troops to Bosnia to help extract the U.N. forces from Bosnia. There will not be a sufficient number of votes to allow that. We are going to find ourselves in an absolutely intolerable situation.

This is a feel-good vote, and I do not know of one single American, I do not know of one Member in this House that does not deplore the actions that are taking place in this part of the world today. But, to me, to do this is absolutely the wrong way to go.

Mr. Chairman, there have been some changes in policy that have been made that are going to put the decisionmaking policy into the military. If it takes strategic bombing and heavy bombing, let us give it a shot. Sooner or later, Members who are advocating lifting this embargo are going to be called on to come to this House floor and called on to make the vote to put American troops on the ground in Bosnia.

Make no mistake about it, Mr. Chairman, this vote today is Americanizing the war in Bosnia. Make no mistake about it. Remember that when the vote comes to put American troops in harm's way in Bosnia where our national interest is not at stake.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York [Ms. MOLINARI], the distinguished vice chairman of our Republican conference and a long-standing member of the Bosnia Task Force.

Ms. MOLINARI. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read a letter sent to a Senator from President Clinton. It states:

If by October 15, the Bosnia Serbs have not accepted the Contact Group's proposal of July 6, it would be my intention within 2 weeks to introduce formally and support a resolution at the U.N. Security Council to terminate the arms embargo. Further, if the Security Council fails to pass such a resolution, it would be my intention to consult with Congress thereafter regarding unilateral lifting of the arms embargo.

This letter was in response to congressional attempts to end the arms embargo. The letter is dated August 10, 1994.

An entire year has gone by since this administration signaled its intentions to get serious, if only we give them a little more time.

So we agreed and we gave them a year: a year more of bombings, a year more of bloodshed, another year of children being viciously taken from their parents, another year of women being raped and men being tortured.

Mr. Chairman, we are all watching.

As if the tragic act of doing nothing in the face of this barbarism is not enough, we have heightened our complicity by insisting that the Bosnians "do nothing" as well:

Fathers forced at knife point to rape their daughters. Do nothing.

Concentration camp victims forced to drink their own urine to stall dehydration. Do nothing.

Mothers forced to watch their babies beheaded in front of them. Do nothing.

Watch as family and friends get blown away. Do nothing.

Here we are today face to face with our failure. No more delays.

The Serbians have not stopped in their quest for blood. The United Nations cannot save a town, a life, or a hope.

Genocide is our problem, and convenient dismissal of catastrophic human tragedy will be on all of our epitaphs just as it was 50 years ago when Neville Chamberlain chose to dismiss Nazi aggression with words that have been ringing in our ears since then:

"How horrible," he said, "How incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing."

His words sound very similar to the speeches we have heard here today.

It was tragic then; it is tragic now. The time has come to end the arms em-

bargo, and I thank the gentleman on both sides of the aisle for their leadership in forcing this tragedy, once and for all, to end. This is our date with destiny.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentlewoman from New York [Ms. MOLINARI] for her leadership and her strong statement.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my friend, the distinguished gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. MENENDEZ].

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, the time has come for us to be resolute, and for us to act.

As the leader of the free world, the United States of America must no longer stand by idly as accomplices to a carefully planned and savagely executed genocide by Serbian war criminals. We must act now to allow the Bosnian people to assert their right to self-determination and their right to self-defense.

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a member of the United Nations. As a U.N. member Bosnia has an inherent and internationally recognized right to defend itself against armed aggression.

Let us not deny the Bosnian people the right to fight their own fight.

The United Nations Protection Force [UNPROFOR] no longer protects anyone. It is no longer a force for the protection of the innocent, but an object for our pity. The U.N. safe havens are no longer safe but sitting targets for more brutality. How much more blood will we allow to stain our hands?

Let us not deny the Bosnian Government the right to protect their defenseless women and children. That is all that we propose here today—nothing more and nothing less.

But this is not only about Bosnia's defense. This is about America's pursuit of her national interests.

International peace and stability is most certainly in America's national interests. The Balkan crisis has threatened the viability and the stability of the international system. Who would have predicted that just a few years after its historic victory in the cold war, the credibility of NATO would be threatened as it is? Well, it need not be that way.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former National Security Adviser to President Carter, could not have put it better when he wrote recently:

The character of the international order is also at stake. A world unable to make the distinction between victims and aggressors, and especially a world unwilling to act on that distinction, is a world in which the United Nations becomes an object of derision—on the part not only of the aggressors but of all free peoples. World peace will be the ultimate casualty in Bosnia.

Let us enter the new millennium with the confidence of victory in the cold war and the Persian Gulf; with the moral authority that distinguishes between the victims and the aggressors—not with the insecurity of inaction in the Balkans. Let us enter a new millennium where world peace is the ultimate victor.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. CUNNINGHAM].

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, last month I was fortunate enough to have dinner with Colin Powell, Dick Cheney, John Sununu and "Cap" Weinberger, and everybody was in agreement the one way to expand the war in this part of the world is to get the major powers involved and also to increase the arms in those areas.

Mr. Chairman, none of us want the atrocities to continue. But if we look at the solution logically, increasing arms into an area is not going to help us to a peaceful solution; it is going to expand it and in my opinion, and many others' opinion, it is going to increase the length of time before we could ever go in and stop it.

Mr. Chairman, if my colleagues would just think logically, by increasing arms is it going to stop the war? No, it is not. It is going to encourage it. More will die on all sides if we put in weapons. And we do not just put in a weapon and ask them to pick it up, especially high-technology weapons. We have to put in those 25,000 U.S. troops. When we do that, we are going to lose a lot of those U.S. troops.

We expanded arms in Vietnam; 55,000 Americans died. That was not a good solution and, Mr. Chairman, I say this is not a solution either.

If we put in those arms, it is going to encourage. Why do my colleagues think that Greece and Russia support the BSA? Because, first, they were allies in World War II and, second, because of the orthodox religion. But if my colleagues will take a look at history, it was the Croatians that fought with Nazi Germany and they ethnically cleansed millions and millions of Serbs. Where were we then?

My idea is not to focus on the atrocities, as the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. TAYLOR] said, but on a solution. Mr. Chairman, putting arms in that area is not focusing on the solution.

I recently attended an event where over 400 allied pilots gave homage to the Serbs for getting them out in World War II. Misinformation damages the solution. For example, the press reported that when Captain O'Grady was picked up, he was shot at by the Serbs. He was not. He was not shot at until he was over Croatia by the Croatians.

Mr. Chairman, that is immaterial. If we focus on who shot who, and who commits the most raids, and we dump arms into that area, Mr. Chairman, we are inviting pain. If we get involved, the things that the Republican Party has stood for, balanced budget amendment and Medicare solutions, if my colleagues want to get us involved, we can kiss it all good-bye. It is gone. It is history.

Mr. Chairman, once the fighting starts over there, try and get out. We could not even get out of Somalia without running with our tail between our legs.

Mr. Chairman, I ask for a "no" vote on this resolution.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. PALLONE].

Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in favor of S. 21, the Bosnia Self-Defense Act. The recent collapse of the two so-called U.N. designated safe areas indicate that the U.N. mission is falling apart. It is clear the United Nations is not capable of protecting the Bosnian Moslems and is denying them the right to adequately protect themselves.

Since its inception, the arms embargo has provided the Serbs who inherited the weapons of the former Yugoslavia with a decisive advantage in this war and the arms advantage as facilitated Serbian terror campaigns which have included ethnic cleansing, systematic mass rape, and executions. What is occurring in Bosnia is a campaign of terror by the Serbs that closely resembles the Nazi atrocities of World War II.

Mr. Chairman, the tide may be turning in the war in Bosnia. There are signs that the Moslems may be able to take back the lands captured by the Serbs and ultimately lift the stranglehold on their capital, Sarajevo.

□ 1445

With a new infusion of arms, the Bosnian Moslems may be able to take the upper hand in the war for the first time. Let us give the Bosnian Moslems a chance in this war by passing this bill.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my good friend, the gentleman from California [Mr. FAZIO].

Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to S. 21, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995.

Mr. Chairman, I know that all of us share a commitment to bring a peaceful end to the tragedy in Bosnia, but we remain divided over one important question. Should we go forward, against the advice of our military commanders and unilaterally lift the embargo prohibiting the export of arms to the Bosnian Government?

The difficulty we face arises out of a complex set of circumstances, principally the lack of any easy, clear-cut alternatives, and the likelihood that such a decision will thrust the United States deeper into a war not of our own making, and permanently damage the NATO alliance.

While we bear a moral obligation and a global responsibility to seek a solution to this crisis, we have sought to strike a delicate balance—retain our commitment to multilateral peacekeeping operations while making every effort to guarantee the safety of the Bosnian people.

Until recent days, we could pursue these two goals in tandem.

But as two UN-declared safe-havens have fallen to Bosnian-Serb troops, we have rightly reexamined our decision

to participate in this world-wide arms embargo, and we have begun to reassess the role of the U.N. peacekeeping force, giving command authority over to NATO.

The U.N. coalition has been less than successful, and conditions in Bosnia have continued to deteriorate.

But as we begin to look at alternative solutions—particularly one dependent on a heavily armed Bosnian military force—we should consider three things:

First, the likelihood that a unilateral decision to rescind the arms embargo will bring an immediate end to current peacekeeping operations. Our United Nations allies—principally Britain and France—have stated that unilateral United States action will compel them to withdraw troops they have placed under United Nations command in Bosnia.

Hundreds of thousands of Bosnians will be immediately and adversely affected if U.N. forces are forced to abandon what has been—largely—a humanitarian mission. Both injured civilians and refugees have come to depend on U.N. troops for humanitarian relief. In addition, humanitarian organizations that rely on U.N. forces to maintain a minimum level of safety and security would find it difficult if not impossible to continue their work.

Second, unilateral termination of the arms embargo will put a severe strain on our relationship with NATO allies and Russia.

While we have an obligation to assert a preeminent moral position on the world stage, we cannot and must not embark on approach that does nothing more than Americanize this conflict and leave us isolated.

Finally, the immediate and indisputable effect of this policy change will be an escalation of terror as Serbian troops advance on previously safe-havens. If arms shipments to Bosnian forces increase—as they are certain to do if we vote to reject the embargo—there is a real possibility that United States ground troops will slowly, but surely, be drawn into this conflict, as technical advisors or direct combatants.

Our engagement is likely to come in two phases. Initially, the United States is obligated to assist in the evacuation of U.N. forces—an operation, that despite its clear purpose, exposes our troops to considerable risk. We will face a second, more considerable risk as the Bosnian military, under heavy assault from Bosnian-Serb troops, look to United States to provide arms, air support, and active military support.

The United States cannot afford to back into this conflict. Driven by public outrage, and without having clearly defined the parameters for our involvement, we run this risk.

The United States should only consider rejecting the arms embargo—as the administration has suggested—as part of a multilateral agreement.

While avoiding irreparable damage to the NATO coalition, we would be in a

position to reassess the U.N.'s role, and, possibly, develop a viable, international solution—one that does not require the United States to assume unilateral responsibility.

While this policy remains an option, the administration is in the midst of negotiations intended to strengthen the U.N.'s hand—a strategy that reflects a more sensible alternative to an outright rejection of the arms embargo. I urge my colleagues to consider this strategy, and reject S. 21.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute 20 seconds to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. LEVIN].

(Mr. LEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I do think we have to consider who shot whom and who is raping whom. In a word, we have to step up to Serbian aggression.

While there is a clear difference of opinion in our Nation let me ask this: Would the Bosnian Serbs prefer this resolution pass or fail, that the arms embargo be lifted or continued? I suggest that they will deem a positive vote today as another indication of determination to stop Serbian aggression.

Any course does carry a risk. Past policies have risked continued aggression and mass murder, and they have paid the consequences. It is time, indeed long overdue, to try a new course. I support this resolution.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LEVIN. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman makes a critically important point. The point the gentleman just made was that the message the Serbs would take from this was that the Congress and America were determined to stop further Serb aggression. I think the gentleman is absolutely correct, which is why I am so strongly in support of a "yes" vote on S. 21.

I thank the gentleman for his statement.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1½ minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. CLEMENT].

Mr. CLEMENT. Mr. Chairman, this debate is about a father's right to protect his family, a brother's right to protect his siblings, and the preservation of a race and a heritage.

We have all seen the horrible scenes of starving men in camps which harkened memories of World War II concentration camps. We know about the rape, robbery, destruction, and mass genocide.

Ethnic cleansing has become commonplace in everyday conversation. Ethnic cleansing: what a sanitary term. Perhaps it is the hope that such a term will make the events in the former Yugoslavia a little more bearable—a little more tidy. But, in reality it is anything but tidy. Ethnic cleansing is the systematic destruction of a people, a culture, real live human beings like you and me.

The United Nations arrived as the knight in shining armor; the defender of the innocent and persecuted. They issued edicts and ground rules and promised to protect and defend the innocent victims.

Well, we are still waiting. This mission has the world's premier military hardware and the best trained soldiers at its disposal, yet time and time again innocent people are tortured, murdered, and abused while U.N. forces sit idle.

The U.N. Secretary-General has reduced UNPROFOR to a role of finger pointing. The U.N. has lost all credibility. Renegades and criminals masquerading as soldiers have managed to hold the world at bay for months.

I understand that this is a delicate situation and that things are easier said than done, but you have to make an effort. You can't win if you don't join the game. Superior force ceases to be a deterrent if there is a demonstrated reluctance to use it. The Serbs have no fear because U.N. reprisals have been too seldom and too restrained.

The U.N. has clearly demonstrated that it is willing to talk the talk but reluctant to walk the walk. Unfortunately, the Bosnians don't have such luxuries.

It is bad enough that the Secretary-General of the U.N. continues to sit on his hands and leave the so-called safe zones vulnerable. But to make matters worse, the Secretary-General continues to keep the Bosnians' hands tied behind their back.

The Bosnians have a right to defend themselves. If the U.N. is not going to defend the Bosnians—and there is no reason to believe they will—then the very least we can do is to lift the arms embargo.

Two safe havens have fallen since our last vote on the House floor and there is no reason to believe that other safe zones will not follow in the near future. How much longer will we wait? How many more people will have to suffer? How many more men and women will be widowed? How many more children will be orphaned?

Lift the arms embargo. Give the Bosnians a fighting chance.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN].

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. EMERSON) having assumed the chair, Mr. BONILLA, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (S. 21) to terminate the United States arms embargo applicable to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had come to no resolution thereon.

PERMISSION TO EXTEND GENERAL DEBATE IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE DURING CONSIDERATION OF S. 21, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA SELF-DEFENSE ACT OF 1995

Ms. MCKINNEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that further general debate on S. 21 be extended by 1 hour equally divided between the chairman and the ranking member of the Committee on International Relations in the Committee of the Whole.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Georgia?

There was no objection.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA SELF-DEFENSE ACT OF 1995

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the House Resolution 204, and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the Senate bill, S. 21.

□ 1455

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the Senate bill (S. 21) to terminate the United States arms embargo applicable to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Mr. BONILLA in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose earlier today, the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN] had 5½ minutes remaining in debate, and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] had 1 minute remaining in debate, pursuant to the House resolution 204 and the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER] had 3½ minutes remaining.

Pursuant to the order of the House of today, the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN] and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] will each be recognized for an additional 30 minutes of general debate.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN].

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER] of the 30 minutes provided to me, for general debate, and I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. HOYER] be allowed to yield portions of that time to other members.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN]?

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, obviously I am not going to object, I do want to thank the chairman of the committee, the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN]. The gentleman from New York is one of the real gentlemen of this House irrespective of party. He is my close