

fighter up, ready to be built. Who around here is going to vote \$25 billion, \$30 billion or \$40 billion just to get another bomber developed? Why spend that kind of money when we have the great B-2?

Mr. DICKS. If the gentleman would yield, I told my friends in the Boeing Co. in the State of Washington that one of my colleagues has suggested a B-3; and they said, "Congressman, what we would do is, we would build a long-range, subsonic aircraft and it would look a heck of a lot like the B-2. It would be stealthy and we would have the ability to put precision-guided munitions on them."

We have got the line open and the costs are down where this thing is affordable in terms of the defense budget, and now, not to do enough of it just does not make sense. I always say to my Democratic friends, many of whom are not happy about some of the budget cuts that are being made, if we cut out the B-2, this money is not going to go to HUD or education or the environment; this money is going to go to something that is less important in the defense arena.

As I said, I look at the entire defense budget, and except for the men and women serving in the service, I cannot think of one weapons system that has anywhere near potential that this weapons system does.

The gentleman has made another important point that General Skantze, who was our former acquisitions person at the Air Force, has made as well, and that is that this plane is the most difficult plane to put together. So we finally figured it out.

Mr. Chairman, I think we should stay with it, and I appreciate my colleagues joining me here on the floor in an impromptu session to talk about one of the most important defense decisions this country will make during our time in Congress.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

DO NOT BE DETERRED: CONTINUE B-2 PRODUCTION

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ENSIGN). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. MCKEON] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MCKEON. Mr. Speaker I do not know exactly what you had talked about before I came in.

Mr. DICKS. Do not be deterred.

Mr. MCKEON. The B-2?

Mr. DICKS. The B-2.

Mr. MCKEON. What do you know? I think it is a very important vote, and it is a lot of money; I think that people need to understand.

I am a businessman. This is my second term in Congress. I came here to make cuts, but I also came here to carry out our constitutional responsibility which is to provide defense for this country. Defense is one of the most important things that we need to

do. It is our responsibility, as the Congress, to look out for that.

Mr. DICKS. If the gentleman would yield on that point, I have served for 17 years on defense appropriations subcommittees since the winter of 1979. We build up until 1985, but since 1985, the defense budget has been reduced by \$100 billion a year. Today's defense budget would be 350; it is 250 now in fiscal year 1995, so we have made a big cut, 37 percent in real terms.

We have a smaller Army, a smaller Navy, a smaller Air Force. Yet, here is a technology, a revolutionary technology that would help us still have an enormously effective and capable military. But we have got to have enough of it so that it can have the sortie rates, in and out, in and out, to do the job. Every expert who has looked at this and said, 20 of these is not enough; we have got to have somewhere between 40 and 60.

It is value. Sometimes we forget when it is right in front of us that some things are more important than other things. Some things can do things that no other system can do. And that is why this is so important.

The B-2 offers us a revolutionary conventional capability that nobody else has in the world. Think about it. If somebody else had the B-2, we would be in deep trouble. We would be very, very concerned about it. We would be probably cheer if they made a decision to cut it off at 20 and only have a very limited capability. We would be saying, "Thank God they made that decision, because if they had 50 or 60 of these, and we did not have a way to counter it." Think if our adversary, Russia, had developed this stealth technology. We would be deeply concerned. I think sometimes we forget things that are so obvious. They are right in front of us and we still do not see it.

It reminds me of the battleship debate where they said that battleships are not vulnerable to air power. Finally, Billy Mitchell flew over one and dropped a bag of flour and everyone had to wake up and say, "Oh, my God. These things are vulnerable." And some day they are going to say the same things about the B-52's, the B-2's and the planes coming off the carriers. They are all vulnerable to these surface-to-air missiles.

Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman would yield briefly, Billy Mitchell did sometimes. He showed that technology had moved on and we had entered the era of air power. But he did not drop a sack of flour; he dropped enough munitions to totally sink and destroy three major ships, including one captured German battleship. He carried out his task with a little more enthusiasm than the people who have invested all their political capital in battleships or warships cared for him to do.

In a way we are doing the same thing here. We are in an era in which we can avoid radar because of the great technology that freedom has brought us in this country and we are about to forgo

that technology for some pretty silly reasons. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. MCKEON. Reclaiming my time, I think you make a good point on the technology. A lot of my friends here in the Congress have asked me, "Well, is there technology out there, or will there be in the next few years, to make it possible to see the B-2 to make it obsolete?"

I was talking to our ex-Secretary of the Air Force about a month ago, before we had the last vote, and he was going over that with us. He said that all during the development phase of the B-2, we had our best minds working to see if they could come up with a way to detect it. So that we, if the other side had it, so that we could defend against it. We have not been able to find that; it is not available.

Mr. DICKS. The gentleman makes a point too. Remember one thing, a plane can be seen. That does not mean you can vector weapons against it. That is the thing that you have to remember about stealth.

People say, "Well, I can see it. It is there on the field." But when you have that thing up in the air at 45,000 feet, and it has got that incredible design which is very hard to see, even when you are just a few miles away from it. But it is the fact that the enemy cannot vector weapons with their radars and the systems that they have to have to take a weapon to the plane. That is why it is so revolutionary. So we do not want anybody to be misled, because you can see it.

DO NOT BE DETERRED: CONTINUE THE B-2

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. DICKS].

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, it is that important fact, and the fact that we have not been able to figure out a way to counter it. This is a game that goes on and on. There is a struggle back and forth.

Again, I want to thank my colleagues for coming over here and joining me in an impromptu discussion of the B-2. We are going to be moving on to this issue as we get to the defense appropriations bill. As I have said, I think this is the most important defense issue that most of us will decide while we are in the House of Representatives.

Mr. Speaker, I am glad that I have good bipartisan support from my colleagues as we try to oppose those who I think in a very shortsighted way are trying to cut off this program and saying that they are going to save money.

I will tell my colleagues this: We are going to save lives and money if we build the B-2. We are going to save money if we do it at the time the line is open. We are going to preserve the

industrial base. The B-2 weapons that are sometimes 40 percent less expensive than the weapon on the B-52's or the B-1's.

But most importantly as the F-117 showed us, we can send pilots into the most difficult areas with surface-to-air missiles that are active and survive and that is what this is really all about: Saving lives of American young people who we send in harm's way.

To me, as the gentleman said a few minutes ago, how we could in good conscience not want to be able to use that in the early days of any war in the future, because we know we will save lives and we know that we can win the war more rapidly? Stealth can go in and out, in and out, in and out, destroy all those targets and help us win the air war more rapidly, which is crucial to almost any scenario that I can think of in the future.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. McKEON].

Mr. McKEON. A couple of weeks ago, Charles Krauthammer had an editorial, I think I got it out of the Washington Times. I do not know what other papers it was in. George Will wrote one in "The Last Word" in the magazine.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to insert these in the RECORD, if I may. If I could just make a comment on Mr. Krauthammer's. He entitled his article, "The B-2 and the 'Cheap Hawks'" and he gave 3 reasons why the B-2 is so important.

First, American is coming home. In 1960, we had 90 bases abroad. We are down now to 17. We cannot station short-hop airplanes around the world. We have to have range.

Second, America will not endure casualties. We do not want to put, as you were saying, our people in harm's way if it can be avoided.

Third, the next war will be a surprise, such as every other war we have entered into, and we need to be ready. And the B-2 meets all three of these requirements. It has long range; it can reach anywhere around the world. If we have it in the three bases that we look at, we can reach any key spot in the world in 10 to 12 hours.

Fourth, Casualties. It has two personnel on board. Does not need a lot of support and backup because of the stealthiness and the amount of weapons that it can carry.

Fifth, If we have an adequate number, we will be prepared and we will have a deterrent.

Mr. Speaker, I include the following articles for the RECORD:

THE B-2 AND THE CHEAP HAWKS

(By Charles Krauthammer)

We hear endless blather about how new and complicated the post-Cold War world is. Hence the endless confusion about what weapons to build, forces to deploy, contingency to anticipate. But there are three simple, glaringly obvious facts about this new era:

(1) America is coming home. The day of the overseas base is over. In 1960, the United States had 90 major Air Force bases over-

seas. Today, we have 17. Decolonization is one reason. Newly emerging countries like the Philippines do not want the kind of Big Brother domination that comes with facilities like Clark Air Base and Subic Bay. The other reason has to do with us: With the Soviets gone, we do not want the huge expense of maintaining a far-flung, global military establishment.

(2) American cannot endure casualties. It is inconceivable that the United States, or any other Western country, could ever again fight a war of attrition like Korea or Vietnam. One reason is the CNN effect. TV brings home the reality of battle with a graphic immediacy unprecedented in human history. The other reason, as strategist Edward Luttwak has pointed out, is demographic: Advanced industrial countries have very small families, and small families are less willing than the large families of the past to risk their only children in combat.

(3) America's next war will be a surprise. Nothing new here. Our last one was too. Who expected Saddam to invade Kuwait? And even after he did, who really expected the United States to send a half-million man expeditionary force to roll him back? Then again, who predicted Pearl Harbor, the invasion of South Korea, the Falklands War?

What kind of weapon, then, is needed by a country that is losing its foreign bases, is allergic to casualties and will have little time to mobilize for tomorrow's unexpected provocation?

Answer: A weapon that can be deployed at very long distances from secure American bases, is invulnerable to enemy counter-attack and is deployable instantly. You would want, in other words, the B-2 stealth bomber.

We have it. Yet, amazingly, Congress may be on the verge of killing it. After more than \$20 billion in development costs—costs irrecoverable whether we build another B-2 or not—the B-2 is facing a series of crucial votes in Congress that could dismantle its assembly lines once and for all.

The B-2 is not a partisan project. Its development was begun under Jimmy Carter. And, as an urgent letter to President Clinton makes clear, it is today supported by seven secretaries of defense representing every administration going back to 1969.

They support it because it is the perfect weapon for the post-Cold War world. It has a range of about 7,000 miles. It can be launched instantly—no need to beg foreign dictators for base rights; no need for weeks of advance warning, mobilization and forward deployment of troops. And because it is invisible to enemy detection, its two pilots are virtually invulnerable.

This is especially important in view of the B-2's very high cost, perhaps three-quarters to a billion dollars a copy. The cost is, of course, what has turned swing Republican votes—the so-called "cheap hawks"—against the B-2.

But the dollar cost of a weapon is too narrow a calculation of its utility. The more important calculation is cost in American lives. The reasons are not sentimental but practical. Weapons cheap in dollars but costly in lives are, in the current and coming environment, literally useless: We will not use them. A country that so values the life of every Capt. O'Grady is a country that cannot keep blindly relying on non-stealthy aircraft over enemy territory.

Stealth planes are not just invulnerable themselves. Because they do not need escort, they spare the lives of the pilots of the fighters and radar suppression planes that ordinarily accompany bombers. Moreover, if the B-2 is killed, we are stuck with our fleet of B-52s of 1950s origin. According to the under-secretary of defense for acquisition, the Clin-

ton administration assumes the United States will rely on B-52s until the year 2030—when they will be 65 years old!

In the Persian Gulf War, the stealthy F-117 fighter flew only 2 percent of the missions but hit 40 percent of the targets. It was, in effect, about 30 times as productive as non-stealthy planes. The F-117, however, has a short range and thus must be deployed from forward bases. The B-2 can take off from home. Moreover, the B-2 carries about eight times the payload of the F-117. Which means that one B-2 can strike, without escort and with impunity, as many targets as vast fleets of conventional aircraft. Factor in these costs, and the B-2 becomes cost-effective even in dollar terms.

The final truth of the post-Cold War world is that someday someone is going to attack some safe haven we fell compelled to defend, or invade a country whose security is important to us, or build an underground nuclear bomb factory that threatens to kill millions of Americans. We are going to want a way to attack instantly, massively and invisibly. We have the weapon to do it, a weapon that no one else has and that no one can stop. Except a "cheap hawk," shortsighted Republican Congress.

[From Newsweek, July 24, 1995]

THE LAST WORD—PRECISION GUESSWORK ABOUT THE B-2—DO AMERICANS NOW FIND THEIR 'MORAL ECONOMY' TOO TAXING TO DEFEND?

(By George F. Will)

We should study war some more. We should because doing so is contrary to the spirit of the age and our national temperament. If peace is to be preserved, that must be done by a few nations of a sort that is disinclined to believe that peace requires preserving. These nations believe that although war once was prevalent, history has ascended to a pacific plateau. The nations that believe this, such as the United States, are, says historian Donald Kagan of Yale, formed by ethics that are commercial, individualistic, libertarian and hedonistic. Kagan concludes his book "On the Origins of War" with a warning: "The United States and its allies, the states with the greatest interest in peace and the greatest power to preserve it, appear to be faltering in their willingness to pay the price in money and the risk of lives. Nothing could be more natural in a liberal republic, yet nothing could be more threatening to the peace they have recently achieved." Hence the high stakes of the debate about the B-2 bomber.

The issue is whether to purchase more than the 20 long-range stealth bombers already in service or being completed. The argument against steady low-level production to bring the B-2 force to 40 is that the B-2 is too expensive, particularly because the mission for which it was designed—penetrating Soviet air defenses to attack mobile or hardened targets—is no longer relevant.

The case for continuing the B-2 program is more complex, but more compelling. It rests on three facts. The B-2 is not as expensive as critics contend. The B-2 economizes other material assets, and economizes lives, too. And given the age of the B-52s (the youngest is 33 years old) and the time and cost required to design another bomber (at least 15 years and scores of billions from design to deployment), the B-2 force is going to be the only U.S. bomber force for many decades. Who wants to wager that in, say, the year 2030 the nation will not need a bomber better than a 70-year-old B-52?

Critics bandy the figure \$1.5 billion for each B-2. Actually, given the research and development already paid for, the life cycle cost of additional B-2s, including 20 years of

spare parts, is about 1.1 billion 1995 dollars. Buying 20 more B-2s would consume only 1 percent of the defense budget and 5 percent of the combat aircraft budget for a few years. And doing so would prevent the irreparable dispersal of the industrial base that has produced the most sophisticated weapon ever, a weapon suited to the changed world.

In 1960 there were 81 major U.S. air bases overseas. Today there are 15. The B-2's long range responds to the dwindling of forward-based U.S. forces. Its high payload and stealthiness (the difficulty of detecting its approach) enable it to do extraordinary damage to an adversary's warmaking capacity, at minimum risk to just two crew members per aircraft. This gives a president a powerful instrument of credible deterrence for an era in which Americans are increasingly reluctant to risk casualties. The importance of a military technology tailored to this political fact is argued by Edward Luttwak in his essay "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare" in *Foreign Affairs*.

Luttwak, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says the end of the Cold War has brought a "new season of war," in which wars are "easily started and then fought without perceptible restraint." A war such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait can menace the material interests of the United States. And a war such as that in the former Yugoslavia can, Luttwak argues, injure the nation's "moral economy" if the nation "remains the attentive yet passive witness of aggression replete with atrocities on the largest scale."

Perhaps Americans find their "moral economy" too taxing to maintain in today's turbulent world. The debacle of American policy regarding Bosnia strongly suggests that is so. If so, America faces a future in which only one thing is certain: it will never again be what it has been, the principal force for good in the world. But if America wants to be intolerant both of evil and of casualties, it needs to arm itself appropriately, as with the B-2.

It is the only aircraft that can on short notice go anywhere on the planet with a single refueling, penetrate the most sophisticated air defenses and deliver high payloads of conventional weapons with devastating precision. Five B-2s can deliver as many weapons as the entire force of F-117s (America's only other stealth aircraft) deployed in Desert Storm. Four U.S.-based B-2s with eight crew members could have achieved by same results as were achieved by the more than 100 aircraft sent against Libya in 1986. Military personnel are not only precious as a matter of morality, they are expensive. True, many targets can be attacked with "stand-off weapons," such as cruise missiles, but such weapons are 20 to 40 times more expensive than direct attack precision weapons. Calculating the real costs of weapons is more complicated than reading restaurant bills.

And as Luttwak argues, cost-effectiveness criteria for weapons often do not factor in the value of casualty avoidance, which is a function of casualty exposure and is often the decisive restraint on political leadership when it is considering whether to project U.S. power. "When judged very expensive, stealth planes are implicitly compared to non-stealth aircraft of equivalent range and payload, not always including the escorts that the latter also require, which increase greatly the number of fliers at risk. Missing from such calculations is any measure of the overall foreign policy value of acquiring a means of casualty-free warfare by unescorted bomber."

Will the nation need a substantial B-2 force? That depends on developments in the world, and on what America wants to be in the world. On a wall at the Jet Propulsion

Laboratory in Pasadena there reportedly use to be a sign: We do precision guesswork. So do the people who must anticipate crises relevant to America's material interests and moral economy, and the means of meeting them. Twenty more B-2s would be a responsible guess.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California [Mr. MCKEON]. He is a very articulate and a very strong supporter of national defense. I also thank the gentleman from Washington [Mr. DICKS] who was really the father of this special order. Thanks to Mr. DICKS for taking this order up.

I think it is important to talk about these things, because a lot of folks have 100 issues on their minds. They do not know what this vote is about until they actually sit down and think about it. And also the gentleman who was here earlier, Mr. LEWIS. Mr. LEWIS does not spend a lot of time talking on the House Floor. He is one of the smartest defense minds in this Congress and he is a real advocate for this program and one of our champions. I am glad he was up here discussing this with Mr. DICKS.

I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. DICKS].

□ 1630

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, I will just say one final thing. One of the other articles General Skantze wrote, one of the big problems has been, ever since the Air Force reorganized and got rid of the Strategic Air Command, there really has not been an advocate for bombers inside the Air Force. They will advocate for the F-22 and the C-17, but nobody stands up for bombers, and I think that is one of the things where the Congress may have to step in. We may have to reconsider that decision and recreate a Strategic Air Command within the Air Force so we have some real attention by the service on this subject. I think we ought to consider that.

RECESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ENSIGN). Pursuant to clause 12, rule I, the Chair declares the House in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

Accordingly (at 4 o'clock and 30 minutes p.m.), the House stood in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

□ 1802

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the House was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. ENSIGN) at 6 o'clock and 2 minutes p.m.

DEPARTMENTS OF VETERANS AFFAIRS AND HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, AND INDEPENDENT AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1996

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 201 and rule

XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, H.R. 2099.

□ 1803

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.R. 2099) making appropriations for the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and for sundry independent agencies, boards, commissions, corporations, and offices for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1996, and for other purposes, with Mr. COMBEST in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose earlier today, title V was open for amendment at any point.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. ENSIGN

Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. ENSIGN: Page 87, after line 25, insert the following:

SEC. 519. The amount otherwise provided in title I of this Act for "DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS—VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION—MEDICAL CARE", the amount otherwise provided in title III of this Act for "NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION—HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT", and the amount otherwise provided in title III of this Act for "NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION—RESEARCH AND RELATED ACTIVITIES" are, respectively, increased to a total of \$16,961,000,000, reduced by \$89,500,000, and reduced by \$235,000,000.

Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent for a time limitation of 15 minutes total split equally between the two sides on the Ensign amendment and all amendments thereto.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California.

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Nevada [Mr. ENSIGN] will be recognized for 7½ minutes, and a Member opposed will be recognized for 7½ minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Nevada [Mr. ENSIGN].

Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I offer my amendment to ensure that we keep the promises made to our veterans. The Ensign amendment is about the contract with those who have served our Nation honorably without fundamentally altering the priorities set forth in the bill before us today.

First, I want to commend the chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. LEWIS, for making tough choices. In most instances, the VA/HUD subcommittee has accommodated or exceeded the President's requested funding levels in veterans programs such as compensation and pensions, readjustment benefits, and extended care facility grants.