

Yes, Mr. Speaker, we—the forces of freedom—did win the Korean war and we're winning the peace, too, with our policy of peace through strength on the peninsula.

Near the apex of the Korean War Memorial, across from the American flag, is the inscription "Freedom Is Not Free". That simple, four word phrase is so very meaningful.

Clearly, from looking around the memorial and reflecting on the sacrifices it represents, we can appreciate this phrase in the political-military context. But, the phrase "Freedom Is Not Free" has another everyday meaning, too.

Let me tell you a true story about a little boy named JAY KIM. The year was 1950 and Seoul, the capital of Korea, had been overrun and occupied by the Communists. Life was dangerous and miserable.

Because my family was educated, we were branded "enemies of the people". Most of our possessions were confiscated and my father was forced to go into hiding.

Others, like my adopted brother, were hunted down, lined up against the wall and executed.

They made the younger boys, including me, watch. I was so scared but I'll never forget the way he looked at me and gave me a brave, little smile, and then they shot him.

I was left to care for my mother—always wondering would the next bullet be for us?

Then came the liberation of Seoul. In retreat, the Communists tried to destroy everything. They lit our houses on fire and threatened to kill anyone who tried to extinguish the flames. We took the risk and tried to save what little we had.

As I was rushing back and forth carrying things from the burning house, I heard people shouting that the Marines were coming. I was so overjoyed I dropped everything and ran into the street, despite the gunfire.

There were tears in my eyes and I screaming with excitement that these brave soldiers had come to save our lives.

One of the marines—he seemed so big—smiled and gave me some spearmint chewing gum. Communist sniper fire rang out and the marine sheltered me from the danger. I can still smell his sweat and feel the press of his hand keeping me down out of the line of fire.

With the sniper neutralized, the marine smiled and moved on to save some other poor little soul like me. I watched him until he left my sight—this angel in a marine uniform who had come to deliver me from the hell we were in.

I knew from that very day, that I wanted to be an American. America represented so much hope, opportunity, freedom, and goodness.

Who else but Americans would come thousands of miles from their homes and risk their lives to save some nameless little boy like me?

After serving in the Korean Army, I was one of the lucky 1 in 1,000 to be able to come to the United States. I had very little money and spoke no English.

But, I had determination. Spirit was the one thing the Communists could not take away from us and I was not going to miss the incredible opportunities America presented.

I worked hard—very hard. A day only has 24 hours, but mine seemed to have 30. I went to college and worked at the same time. My wife, who joined me a year after I came to California, did the same and we started a family. I was a janitor, cleaned up after a supermarket butcher, and washed dishes. I took any job I could find to feed my family.

I didn't know about any Government assistance programs then.

And, even if I had, I wouldn't be qualified for such Government subsidy program anyway. Times were tough, but they were nothing like the war. I knew that in America hard work would pay off. It did—and it still does today. Hard work always pays in America. Through hard work and determination I came from the ashes of Seoul to the United States Congress. Only in America can this happen.

But, as the inscription on the memorial reminds us, "Freedom is Not Free." Earlier today in this very Chamber, I listened to a lot of heated debate about the role of the Federal Government in housing. A few weeks ago it was welfare.

Big government, mandating all kinds of expensive one-size-fits-all programs reduces freedom of opportunity. It makes the American dream subject to Government regulations and bureaucratic delays.

Rather than depend on the Government, people must be responsible for their own lives. Those who work hard and take advantage of the opportunities in this country will succeed.

Rather than look for a free ride, they should be working hard to restore their pride.

Freedom from want, freedom from poverty, and freedom from illiteracy cannot be achieved through endless, free Government handouts. I know from personal experience that it is tough being poor. I hated being poor.

But, instead of blaming someone else and demanding more Government handouts, I worked hard, determined to achieve success.

Yes, I had some lousy jobs I did not like. The hours were long and the pay was poor. But, I labored hard and got an education and started my own business. I was able to buy a nice house and pay back my country by serving the public in Congress.

I did not ask for a free handout to achieve this. I only asked for the freedom to pursue the great opportunities this country provides. The rest was up to me.

That's what the American spirit is all about. That's what is reflected, so very clearly by the Korean War Memo-

rial. Unselfish sacrifice, teamwork, pride, and courage. Mr. Speaker, I strongly urge all of my colleagues and the American public to take the time to visit this new memorial. It is a most moving and rewarding experience.

It reminds us of why America truly is the greatest country on Earth. I'm so proud I'm American.

□ 1545

SIEZE THE OPPORTUNITY: CONTINUE B-2 BOMBER PRODUCTION

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. FOX of Pennsylvania). Under the Speaker's announced policy of May 12, 1995, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. DICKS] is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the minority leader.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, tonight I rise to address my colleagues and the American people on what I consider to be the most important defense decision that will be made by this Congress in this decade. This summer, the Congress will case a deciding vote on one of our most critical issues facing the future of our Nation's defense capability. What is at stake is nothing less than the future of the Nation's only bomber industrial base and our ability to not only fight and win two major regional conflicts, as our current war fighting plans require, call for, but to deter such conflicts from arising in the first place.

During the time of diminished resources and diminished threats, we are confronting the temptation to abandon efforts at maintaining our technological superiority. In the case of the B-2 Stealth bomber, seven former defense secretaries have issued a strong warning that such a move would risk one of the key factors that will allow us to meet future defense requirements. This is a warning that the President and Congress should not ignore, in my judgment.

I have long been convinced, as have many in Congress, that the wise move at this time would be to harness the giant technological advances represented by the B-2's design and its capabilities in order to meet the new and difficult conventional power projection requirements. The wisdom lies not only in retaining the newest and least vulnerable of all the weapons we have already paid for, but also in the economic reality of defense downsizing.

When you have fewer and fewer weapons and forces, there must be an even greater premium on technological superiority. Herein lies the essential reasoning for last year's congressionally led effort to build at least an additional 20 Stealth bombers, a force consistent with recommendations of several comprehensive defense studies, one done by Rand in Los Angeles, and on bomber requirements and with the recommendations of the seven Defense Secretaries made to President Clinton in January.

Simply put, 20 B-2's do not represent enough bomber capability to meet our

Nation's future needs, even when supplemented by B-52's and B-1's. In conventional war, time plays the central role in guiding choices and measuring success. The significance of this maxim is magnified by the single most intriguing "what if" question of the Persian Gulf war: What if Saddam Hussein had not stopped at the Kuwaiti border and quickly proceeded into Saudi Arabia and elsewhere at a time when the United States and Allied forces in the region were minimal? Though we remember clearly the great victory of 500,000 allied troops over Saddam's Republican Guard, we should remember that we had nearly 6 months with which to ship troops and materiel into the gulf.

If Saddam's military advance had been immediate through Kuwait into Saudi Arabia, there is no doubt the cost both in terms of dollars expended and lives lost would have been much more severe on all of the allied nations, including the United States, in order to expel him. We cannot base our military capabilities on the assumption that we will have a long period to build up forces and unimpeded access to in-theater basing.

We were very fortunate in the gulf that the Saudi Arabian people had airbases, had port facilities. But if that had not been the case, we would have been faced with a much more daunting challenge.

If the B-2 currently in production could have been deployed to the Persian Gulf, as Saddam Hussein was threatening to invade Kuwait, I believe the Iraqi dictator would have had a much more difficult decision to make before crossing the border into Kuwait. With a fully equipped fleet of Stealth bombers, the President could have launched a strike force of B-52's from either Whiteman Air Force Base or Diego Garcia, and with one aerial refueling they could have engaged Saddam's prized Republican Guard.

In a Rand study, a simulation was conducted utilizing B-2's against one of Saddam's advancing armored divisions, consisting of approximately 750 combat vehicles.

□ 1600

The B-2's, armed with sensor-fused weapons known as skeet conventional munitions; they are currently in production and now coming into the inventory; managed to destroy 46 percent of those 750 combat vehicles, not only halting the armored division's advance, but inflicting so much damage that the division could not be reconstituted, and the people at Rand, I asked them had there ever been any other combination of conventional weapons that could stop a mobile division in the field, and their answer was, "Congressman, there is no other combination of conventional weapons that could have stopped a moving division."

Extending the Persian Gulf scenario, which is clearly the type of conflict most representative of our national se-

curity challenges in the years ahead, we should look at how we would repel the invading Iraqi forces if Saddam had not given us a 5-month head start. We know the advantage of Stealth fighters, the F-117's with smart weapons, gave us when the allied attack actually began, but without the long-range Stealth-bomber capability in the early August days of the Iraqi advance, what assets would we have used?

The answer is an expensive one, and this is the one that this administration is proposing to the Congress and one that I think is very, very foolish. With the existing fleet of bombers, primarily B-52's that are now as old as their pilots' fathers, expensive standoff weapons would have been used capable only of hitting a fixed target rather than being able to engage moving divisions. Each of these cruise missiles would have cost 1.2 million, and usually an airplane would carry somewhere between 12 and 16 of them, and the cost of the conventional munitions such as the ones that would be on the B-2, which could penetrate against fixed targets, are about \$20,000, and the cost of the skeet munitions, which I mentioned earlier, are about one-fourth the cost of a load of these expensive standoff cruise missiles, and remember that those skeet munitions, these are little pucklike weapons with a parachute. They come down over the battlefield, hit the tanks, the Bradleys, all the vehicles as they come into the country. Those would cost about a fourth versus the load of cruise missiles, but of course the cruise missiles do not have any capability against a mobile target, and the two most important things were the advancing division and actually the movement of Scud missiles. We were unable to detect those Scud missiles during the gulf war, and find them and destroy them. The B-2, or the Block 30 upgrade, would give us a new capability with better intelligence to find those Scud missiles, and if those Scud missiles had had chemical, or biological, or nuclear weapons, the outcome of the war in the gulf could have been vastly different.

Now where B-2's are stealthy, survivable, and able to operate autonomously, nonstealth-bomber aircraft require significant protection including air escorts, fighters, and electronic jammers, and that is why I put this chart down here to show you the value of stealth.

On the far side is a package of airplanes. I think it is about 76 aircraft that would use nothing but dumb bombs. Then you have a package of airplanes using precision weapons, and then you got to the stealthy F-117's, and the major difference is that these nonstealthy aircraft were unable to go into the most heavily defended areas. They were forced to come back out, as General Horner has testified, and then, before we had gained total air superiority in the gulf, we used the F-117's, and eight of them were able to be used to go in and knock out these surface-

to-air missiles and do it in a very timely way, and what happened also was that our pilots in these stealthy airplanes survived. They were not shot down even though they were going in against the most heavily defended areas.

And the comparison is, and here they have two B-2's because the Air Force never sends just one airplane, it always has two, but one B-2 is equivalent to these airplanes and to all of these stealthy aircraft—I mean nonstealthy aircraft in terms of their capability to attack these targets, and remember the standard package on the far right. All those 76 planes were turned back. They could not get the job done. So stealth worked, we saved money, because we were able to use less-expensive weapons. They did not use the standoff weapons, and we were able to have all of our pilots survive. That is the value of this revolutionary technology.

Now the saving comes not only in dollars, but in lives, and both, as I mentioned, are significant. In dollars we reduce the cost of weapons alone in the gulf scenario from approximately \$2.24 billion per day for the expensive standoff weapons to about \$300 million per day by utilizing the radar-evading capabilities of the stealth, and 1 week's savings during such a conflict could pay for nearly 20 additional B-2's. Even more important is the lifesaving ability of utilizing a much smaller attacking force of aircraft that can operate undetected in hostile airspace. The B-2 can provide us with conventional deterrence, but if deterrence fails, it can help us win wars more quickly and with fewer losses.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to my distinguished colleague, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Procurement of the Committee on National Security, and one of the real experts on defense and national security matters in the House. I yield to the gentleman from San Diego.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for that tribute, and let me just say that he has been a real expert in the area of national security as one of the leaders in the Committee on Appropriations in the Defense Subcommittee, and he made a really important point, Mr. DICKS, and that is the point that you can deter wars by having lots of air power early in the war, and all of the studies, even the studies in which conclusions were drawn adverse to B-2's by the political elements in the administration, said that bombers can stop armor, and that means that when Saddam Hussein or others who have a desire to take territory that does not belong to them fire up their tanks and put them in third gear, the only way you can stop that armor quickly is with heavy bomber attacks. You cannot sail that carrier task force into that place where you can make those short, 200- or 150-mile sorties off the carrier deck. You cannot airlift and sealift all your troops over

in a very short period of time. The one thing you know you can do without permission from anybody in the world is take your bombers off from the United States of America, maybe relay them at the Deigo Garcia, or maybe, if you have another friendly airstrip around the world, and we have fewer of them now than we had a few years ago, you could take those bombers, and you can stop that armor attack, and having the ability to do that is a very, very important thing.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, we have never had that kind of capability before because the B-52's and the B-1's only drop dumb bombs. They do not have the capability to drop smart conventional weapons.

Now we hope to do that someday in the future on the B-1. I support that.

Also, the gentleman, another important point to think about here is if that division is moving, it is going to have air defense capabilities. Russian air defenses have proliferated all over the world, and so, if you came in with the B-52, or the B-1's, or any other nonstealthy airplane, they would be shot down.

Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman would continue to yield, the gentleman has really made the key point for those who appreciate stealth. We developed stealth because we lost 2,200 aircraft in Vietnam. We discovered that Russian-made SAM missiles were so effective that they could be taken to any Third World nation, at that point Vietnam, along with a short training course, and in a short period of time surface-to-air missiles could be effectively operating against the best conventional aircraft that we had.

Now that lesson was driven home to us a few weeks ago in Bosnia when our F-16 pilot strayed over an area that had an old Russian SAM missile that we overlooked, and that SAM missile went up and got that F-16 at over 20,000 feet. We decided to develop stealth because we were losing pilots at an enormous rate, our pilots are important to us, our aircraft are important to us, and, you know, probably the development of radar is considered to be probably the most important military invention of this century. Will the ability to evade radar—to be invisible to radar is probably the second most important military invention of this century, and we are threatening to throw away that enormous discovery if we stop the B-2 line.

Mr. DICKS. And the gentleman is so correct. Think about our history in World War II. If the Germans had had a stealthy bomber force, they would have potentially defeated England. I mean it was the fact that those planes were not stealthy and radar was able to detect them that allowed during the Battle of London, you know, for their fighters in those days and their air defense system to function. I mean a stealthy airplane in those days could have been devastating to the effort in World War II.

And also one other thing about this. We went through this whole thing about the vulnerability of battleships, and, what was it, Billy Mitchell finally flew over and dropped down a bag of flour on the battleship, and all of a sudden the battleship admirals had to admit that they were vulnerable to air attack. It is the same mind set here. These nonstealthy airplanes are vulnerable to being shot down, and that means, as you suggested with Captain O'Grady, that we are going to lose those lives, and that is why the revolution of stealth is so important. You can go into those heavily defended targets, knock out the surface-air-missiles, gain air superiority, and then you can use your nonstealthy equipment.

Mr. HUNTER. OK, the gentleman has hit a very important point to every American, and that is called bring the crews back, bring your aircrews back. If you take that group of 75 aircraft, conventional aircraft, that are required to do the same job at the same 16 named points as one B-2 can hit, can cover, and two B-2's if you want to do it redundantly, that flotilla of conventional aircraft carriers about 147 crewmen.

Mr. DICKS. That is right.

Mr. HUNTER. So you have 147 crewmen at risk to hit the same targets where, if you use one B-2, you have two crewmen at risk, and, if you use two B-2's, you have four crewmen at risk, and the second point the gentleman made is really, really important when you went back to World War II.

You know we were developing a nuclear weapon. Well, Adolf Hitler was developing a nuclear weapon, and we beat him to the punch, and they were very close to having their heavy-water experiments successfully converted at the time when we really closed in on the Third Reich. Similarly, the Nazis were building jet engines, and they were developing jet aircraft. The last aircraft, I believe it was the last one, that Chuck Yeager shot down with a propeller-driven aircraft was a German Jet. But we had a President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and I say this as a Republican. He was a Democrat President who every time his inventors and his scientists came to him and said, "Mr. President, we have something that will make this country stronger militarily," he would say, "Do it, because the lives and safety of our people depend on it. Don't ever reject technology. You can't turn the clock back because the other guy is not turning the clock back."

If we reject this stealth technology that would bring back our pilots alive, this will be the first time in this century where we as Congress have told our pilots and their families, "You know we could have protected you. We could have kept you safe from that SAM missile, but we didn't do it because we thought it was too expensive."

Mr. DICKS. It is because we cannot make any decisions about roles and

missions, and it is not just this administration that has failed to be able to sort things out. The Bush administration with Cheney and Powell failed, as have Perry and Shalikashvili failed, to address the value of this and make room for this in the defense budget. In my judgment it is a disgrace to our country that, if we say that we are going to use B-52's after the year 2000 that are going to be 50 to 60 years old, have a huge radar cross-section, and they are going to get shot down. I mean I do not know how we explain to these kids that we are going to go put them in harm's way when we have got a better way to go, and it is not that expensive.

And the other thing that just bothers me so much in this whole thing is that the B-1B's, and I supported them, I did not like them at first, I thought the B-2's were better, but the B-1B's cannot penetrate either without being shot down because they are not stealthy, so we are going to wind up with a bomber force after the year 2000 where we have the B-52's that cannot penetrate, the B-1B's that cannot penetrate, and we are only going to have 20 stealth bombers, and the gentleman knows so well all the respected studies have said, Rand has said, Jasper, Welsh, and Colin Powell told me at the White House a few months ago that he recommended 50 to Cheney, that what we need to have a capable bomber force for future challenges is somewhere between 40 and 60 bombers, and the gentleman has been in the Congress for many years and has risen to a point of major authority. Can you ever remember in modern history seven Secretaries of Defense writing a President and saying, "Please don't stop this program?" I mean, if that is not a repudiation of the Defense Department and its inability to sort our priorities, I do not know what is.

□ 1615

Mr. DICKS. Those seven Secretaries of Defense, including Harold Brown, whom the current Secretary of Defense worked for, they have said that this is such an important issue that we should continue the production of this and get enough of it now.

The other problem with this, if we do not do it now, and come back to it in 5 years, it will cost 6 to 10 billion just to reopen the line. We will have wasted all the money we have invested in this and then we will not get any airplanes. Now we can get them for 15.3 for another 20 airplanes. To not do it at this juncture is, I think, the most serious mistake we will have made in the two decades I have been involved in defense policy on Capitol Hill.

Mr. HUNTER. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKS. I yield to my distinguished friend.

Mr. HUNTER. The gentleman has made a great point. Seven former Secretaries of Defense wrote this President in a very, very serious vein and

said do not stop this program. The President has decided to ignore them. Recently, Dick Cheney sent out a second letter that was distributed to Members of the House, and I think all of us, you and I especially, who are good friends of Dick and remember being with him, and it was a joy to serve with him on the House floor, remember his wisdom in many, many areas of defense. He is strongly for this bomber.

One reason he is for it is Dick Cheney was a realist. He was a man who did not say a lot. I can remember him making very few speeches on the House floor, but one thing he said stuck in my mind. He said, "There will be another war, and we cannot control that. We can control whether we are prepared for it or not."

When the gentleman said, How can we make such a dumb mistake as to cut down our bomber force down to such a low level? I will tell the gentleman how it came about that we came up with this dumb idea, and now that General Lowe is a civilian and not controlled by President Clinton, he says it every day, and he wrote a letter to us even while he was in the uniform saying you would take enormous risks. We had an administration looking at this little bitty bomber force, smaller than it has ever been in our modern history and saying, How can we stretch this thing between two wars?

America has to be ready for two wars because if we get engaged in the Middle East, we cannot presume that our adversaries in North Korea, for example, are not going to jump in the fray knowing that we are occupied and tied up in one place. We have to be prepared to handle two wars at the same time, and the Clinton administration was faced with this. How do you stretch this small bomber force between two wars?

I understand some staff guy came up and said, I tell you what we will do, and it was probably a guy with no military experience, and he said, we will just swing the bombers back and forth between the wars.

Now, you ask General Lowe, what if you swing the bombers out of one war theater, let us say Korea to go to the Middle East, because you desperately need them in the Middle East, and your adversary, who sees them going and leaving decides to mount a heavy armor attack. I asked General Lowe what would happen. He said, "You could take big casualties." Big casualties mean American men and women, soft bodies, coming home in body bags.

There may be a time in our history when somebody looks back to say, who made this crazy idea that you could swing bomber forces back and forth between wars with no problems, and they will point to some staff guy who stood up at a meeting with the way to save money, and who probably had no military experience. I know no uniformed people who will say that that is a smart idea.

Mr. DICKS. The other problem is, those bombers, those B-52's, which we will have 66 of, and the 90-plus B-1B's, they cannot go into those heavily defended targets because they will get shot down. They have extraordinarily limited capability.

The other problem we have is that today, off of our aircraft carriers, we do not have a stealthy airplane. That means that those attack aircraft, the F-18's, have only a limited capability to go to the deep targets early in a war situation. Now we are reduced to only having 50 F-117's, and, literally, only 16 of the 21 B-2's would ever be available at any one time. Then we are going to chop off our stealth capability. Now, that is the biggest mistake that has been made, and I want to just even the score up here, that decision was made during the previous administration, and, as Cheney has pointed out, it was a political reality that Chairman Aspin at that time kind of put forward.

It was a political reality. We did the best we could in the circumstances. Now, however, with a new Congress, and a Congress that is putting more money into defense, we have an opportunity to take some of that additional money and invest it in keeping alive this stealth technology.

This is enormous value. We are buying something that will save American lives. We are buying something that will get the job done. If we had 60 bombers of these B-2's, and put 20 at Diego Garcia, 20 at Guam, and 20 at Whiteman Air Force Base, and loaded them up with smart conventional submunitions, like the centrifuge weapon where we had this division killing capability, I think you would deter North Korea, Iran, and Iraq.

Think about this. If Saddam had known, and if we had demonstrated that we had this capability and Saddam had known it, and let us say he might have been deterred, first of all, but let us say he was not and he came in, and we flew the B-2's in over that moving division, and, with those smart submunitions, destroyed that division. Do you know what it cost us to go out there and fight that war and move all that equipment from Europe and America out there? That cost \$10 billion just to get the equipment out there, and then we had to spend \$60 billion with our allies to win the war.

We have in our own potential the capability of possessing something that could have stopped it from happening in the first place so that not one single American life would have been lost. None of our kids would have come home with these chemical diseases and other problems that they have had because we had something that we could have used that would have gotten the job done.

In my whole career in Congress, I have never been more disappointed in any decision. It is a shame. It is an absolute shame that this is on the verge of happening. I just hope that the gentleman from California, and I and our

colleagues, when they search out the truth here, will listen to the seven former Secretaries of Defense, listen to General Horner, who conducted the air war in the gulf, who said if he had had the B-2 he would have used it, because in the first couple days of the war, the F-117's flew 2.5 percent of the sorties but knocked out 32 percent of the targets.

Stealth works and it makes it possible for our kids to survive. And we proved it. It is proven.

Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman would yield on that point, and I think it is important that our colleagues understand this, that when you go in, as we did in Desert Storm, and you have that package of conventional aircraft there, one of the first packages that we sent in to cover a number of targets in Desert Storm was a package of some 38 aircraft.

Now, we sent in 38 aircraft, and I think half of the aircraft, four of the aircraft that actually dropped the bombs on the enemy targets, were A-6 aircraft, and the other four aircraft were British Tornados. So you had four bomb dropping aircraft. Then, to accompany all those aircraft and support them, you had 30 support aircraft. The 30 support aircraft did all kinds of stuff.

Some of the support aircraft had to jam enemy radar so they could not put SAM's on them. There were other support aircraft to suppress the SAM's themselves, to destroy surface to air missile sites. Then we had other aircraft there to engage enemy aircraft, so that if the enemy painted you with their radar and sent up interceptors, you could hold off the interceptors.

We had to send out 38 planes just to get 8 planes that would actually drop bombs on the target. Now, when you send in your stealth aircraft, you do not send any of these support aircraft in with them. In fact, if you sent in a support aircraft with them that was conventional, that did not have stealth, the enemy aircraft would paint the escort plane.

We found out that we actually knocked out targets on a 36-to-1 ratio, stealth aircraft over conventional aircraft. And I would tell the gentleman that Mr. KASICH admits that, who is a good friend of both of ours and is a proponent of this amendment to kill B-2. He says, Do not worry about that, because we have all those conventional aircraft, so we can send in the groups of 38 and 40 and 50. I have news for our friend. We have cut down the Air Force now in the last 3 years from 24 air wing equivalents to 13. We have cut the conventional Air Force almost in half.

When Mr. KASICH reaches out for all those support aircraft, all those EA-6B's and all those A-6 aircraft, and all the tankers and all the other aircraft that he says we can afford to risk, they have been sent to the bone yard. We will have to go out to Arizona, pull them out of the bone yard, fire them up

or get them back from military sales because they are gone.

Mr. DICKS. The gentleman is so correct.

I want to talk to my colleague a little bit about the money involved in this. Before my good friend got here I mentioned the fact that there is a great difference in the cost of the weapons. The administration says we will use standoff weapons, cruise missiles. Those standoff cruise missiles cost \$1.2 million per missile. The cost of the bombs on the B-2—they are JDAMS, as the weapon of choice—cost \$20,000. So 20 times 16 is, what, \$320,000. That is one-fourth the cost of one missile.

There is an enormous difference because they can fly in over the targets and drop those 16 bombs. Now, the cost of the centrifuge weapon—and I will explain this, too. This is a new revolutionary conventional submunition. A B-2 would carry 36 of these bombs. Each bomb has 40 bomblets. So you are talking about 1,400 little bomblets from each plane. They are like a skeet and on the top of it you have a little parachute and you come in over the moving division. This thing will cover like 2,100 yards by 9 miles deep, and a moving division, you fly in and drop these things down. It hits the tanks and the vehicles and according to the Rand study it will knock out 46 percent of the mechanized vehicles.

So it is a much less expensive weapon than what we will have to use. The ones coming off the B-52 and the B-1's can only go to a fixed target. They have no capability against a mobile division moving in the field. The B-2 gives you the ability to attack the mobile division coming in and also to go into the heavily defended areas with 16 2,000-pound bombs.

Remember the gulf war the first day. It was the F-15 Eagle or the F-117 that dropped one of those 2,000-pound bombs right down the elevator shaft of the opposing air commander's building. This is a revolution that is going on out here.

I know what my friend and colleague and I are worried about is that here America will turn its back on the technology that gives it the advantage for the future and we are not going to buy enough of it when the line is open out in California to have a credible bomber force for the future. We can save money during this. We can use the B-2's and use much less expensive weapons than the standoff cruise missiles that are much more expensive and not nearly as effective. I would yield to my colleague if he wants to comment on that.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for making that point, because you have made the precise point about one of the biggest threats that we have, and that is in the post-cold-war world discovering one day that somebody like a Saddam Hussein has fired up his armor forces, his tanks, and is moving

across an international line. It is very, very difficult to stop him quickly.

Now, Saddam Hussein, as Colin Powell said, was a character right out of central casting. He let us build up other forces to the point where we overwhelmed him. But the thing that you want to do—

Mr. DICKS. Which had to be one of the dumbest military moves in the history of warfare.

Mr. HUNTER. Absolutely. We built up this massive force, but what you want to do to really save casualties and to deter that enemy from really crossing that international line is to get air power in and stop the armor, destroy the tanks.

This munitions and submunitions that my friend Mr. DICKS has described is the way our technicians and our scientists have figured out to stop heavy armor advances without having to throw a lot of American boys, a lot of soft bodies and infantry divisions out there in harm's way.

□ 1630

American air power is a way to save lives. This is a real breakthrough in American air power.

If the gentleman will continue to yield, I think of one other example. When we hit Mr. Qadhafi in Libya after he had assassinated Americans, and we had proof of that, and we struck him in Tripoli, we decided we were going to do that partly with naval projection, and we moved a lot of naval ships into the Gulf of Sidra, right outside the Gulf of Sidra.

Mr. DICKS. Two carrier battle groups.

Mr. HUNTER. Which cost us about \$6 billion in capital investment. Then when we flew those F-111's, those conventional aircraft, out of Great Britain, first there was a big political debate over whether they should even let us fly out of Great Britain because they were afraid of Libya. Finally, Maggie Thatcher, God bless her, let them fly out.

Then France told us we could not fly the aircraft over France so we had to go around the perimeter of France, and we lose one of those aircraft. Probably one reason we lost it was just simple fatigue on the part of the pilots, because they had to do all these silly things because of international politics.

If we had flown one B-2 aircraft out of the United States, we could have done the same job as that entire carrier battle group that had a \$6 billion capital investment.

I am for carrier battle groups and I am for force projection in a number of ways. But the point is that one thing we can always rely on its being able to fly out of airfields in the United States, and if you have got a bomber that will make it all the way and hit the target, you have quick reaction time, and that means deterrence.

American mothers and fathers who do not want their youngsters to have

to go out there and be part of an infantry division that stops a frontal assault believe in deterrence. Americans believe in deterrence. That is why the American people have always believed in the nuclear deterrent. That is why they have always allowed us to build these pretty ugly looking machines, because they did not want to have to fight the war. If you have enough B-2's, you will not have to fight some wars.

Mr. DICKS. On that point, what it says to me is that we are in a very different world in the post-cold-war era. We face terrorists, we face people like Qadhafi. We have situations like North Korea, Iran, Iraq where there is peril out there that has already been demonstrated. We have also seen that sometimes, even with our nuclear deterrent, because people do not think we will use it, that someone like Saddam invades.

But the revolution here in technology, with precision-guided munitions and these smart submunitions and a bomber with long range and stealth, means that we now have a conventional capability that if deterrence fails we can destroy that man's divisions, and he has got to take that into account because he knows we could use that capability unlike nuclear weapons where the American people do not want to use them unless the survival of the country is at stake. I think it is this compact kind of weapon that we need for the future.

As the gentleman and I both know, we have gone through a major reduction in defense spending. People forget that in 1985, if we took today's dollars, we were spending about \$350 billion on defense. We have cut it down to \$250 billion. The gentleman is an expert on procurement. We have reduced the procurement budget from \$135 billion down to \$40 billion. Yes, the Republican Congress is putting a little bit of money back into defense, and that helps.

Mr. HUNTER. God bless them.

Mr. DICKS. And I support that aspect of it, especially because we need a little bit more money in there for procurement. But we have already reduced defense spending by 37 percent. We need to have a technological advantage in order to be able to prevail in the future with a much smaller force. What the B-2 allows us to do is keep America secure for the future, because even though we have got a smaller Army, a smaller Navy, a smaller Air Force, we still would have a highly credible force.

Another point is, we are going to have fewer air bases abroad. That is why having a bomber that can go one-third of the way around the world with one aerial refueling is really a revolutionary capability.

I had a hearing the other day with Brent Scowcroft. I said, "Tell me about the 3 days before the war started."

He said, "NORM, people always say we are going to have actionable warning time. Well, there was not any actionable warning time because the intelligence community was telling us that

Saddam was preparing to invade, but all the leaders in the gulf were saying he would not do it, so we did not do anything. We did not take any steps."

For this administration, for the Cominsky study to say that there is going to be 14 days of actionable warning time so we can move 800 tactical aircraft to the gulf in order to stop the guy from coming in is laughable. It is a joke.

When in the history of this country have we had 14 days of actionable warning time? We certainly did not have it at Pearl Harbor, we certainly did not have it in the Korean war, and we certainly did not have it in the war in the gulf.

What this country needs is the ability within a matter of hours to interdict an invading division, whether it is in Korea or in the gulf or anywhere else, and stop it with long-range bombers that are stealthy and survivable, that will get the job done. This is a revolutionary potential.

To stop it prematurely, to not get enough, there is not one study that says 20 of these bombers is enough. Every study that has been done says you need somewhere between 40 and 60 so you can get the sortie rates up, so you can use the whole potential of them. Then you can have a smaller bomber force, get rid of some of the older planes to take care of life cycle costs, and there are many ways we can finance it.

The gentleman from California is an old pro up here. You have been on the Hill as long as I have. I went back to our staff on the defense appropriations subcommittee and I said, "How much do we cut out of that budget every year in low-priority items?"

For the last 2 years, even when the budgets are down, with a \$250 billion budget being sent up here, the professional staff of the Committee on Appropriations with the chairman and the ranking member have cut out \$3.5 billion a year, in just things you do not need to do, that are not important, low priority, and can be put to the side. All we are asking in order to keep this thing going, to keep this line open, is about \$2 billion a year in Air Force procurement.

Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman will yield, that is roughly 5 percent of the procurement budget. We spend between \$20 and \$30 billion a year just for professional shoppers in the Department of Defense.

Mr. DICKS. It is a joke that we have reduced procurement from \$145 billion down to \$40 billion and we still have as many people over there as we have had in the past. I commend the gentleman for his initiative to try and reduce the number of those people, because that saving can also help us pay for the B-2.

But remember something: I think, and can the gentleman think, I do not think there is one thing in this budget in procurement that I can think of that has more defense potential capability

for this country than the B-2. So how can anyone say, "We cannot afford it"? But we are going to buy a bunch of other things that are not real important, that are not stealthy, that cannot get the job done, but we are going to buy them because we have already made up our budgetary mind to say, "We have this much for the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and we can't make any hard decisions on roles and missions and we can't face the reality." It reminds me of those old admirals in the Navy who were defending the battleships. They just did not get it. This is the future. Stealth technology is the future. We are about to end this line in California and it will go down as the greatest mistake in the history of this country from a military perspective. It ranks with not being prepared for World War II.

Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman will yield further, the gentleman asked me what type of decision this would be if we decided to cut the B-2 bomber and eliminate it. I think that if we decide with this great technology, this ability to evade radar, having this technology in hand and giving it away, stopping it and terminating it, would be just as dumb as if in 1941 when we looked at our defense budget, we looked at all the things we were doing in 1941 and 1942 and we made a determination to stop spending money on radar.

Radar was the greatest military invention of this century, the invention of the atomic bomb notwithstanding. The ability to evade that radar, to evade losing 2,200 pilots like we did in Vietnam, or 2,200 planes shot down, to evade having to watch your pilots being paraded by our adversaries on international television, to be able to bring your aircraft back so they can run another sortie, to give that away is just as dumb as if in 1941 some staff guy had said, "Hey, I've got a great way to save money with the 1941 defense budget. Let's stop spending money on radar. It is one of those whiz bang things, and I think we need to have more horses in the cavalry."

Mr. DICKS. "We'll do it with stand-off capabilities."

The gentleman has asked me and I wanted to put up this chart. This is a chart that shows the letter that was written by seven former Secretaries of Defense, including Harold Brown, who is the father of stealth technology, and let me read it to my colleague.

Mr. HUNTER. Do not forget Dick Cheney, the guy who won Desert Storm.

Mr. DICKS. Right. Let me read this letter. I think the American people need to know what the President received on January 4. I want to tell the names here: Mel Laird, Jim Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld, Harold Brown, Caspar Weinberger, Frank Carlucci, and Dick Cheney.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We are writing you to express our concern about the impending termination of the B-2 bomber production line. After spending over \$20 billion to de-

velop this revolutionary aircraft, current plans call for closing out the program with a purchase of only twenty bombers. We believe this plan does not adequately consider the challenges to U.S. security that may arise in the next century, and the central role that the B-2 may play in meeting those challenges.

At present the nation's long-range bomber force consists primarily of two aircraft: the B-52 and the B-1. The 95 B-52's are all over thirty years old, and their ability to penetrate modern air defenses is very doubtful. The 96 B-1's were procured as an interim bomber until B-2's were available.

Even after all twenty B-2's are delivered, the inventory of long-range bombers will total barely 200 aircraft. This is not enough to meet future requirements, particularly in view of the attrition that would occur in a conflict and the eventual need to retire the B-52's. As the number of forward-deployed aircraft carriers declines and the U.S. gradually withdraws from its overseas bases, it will become increasingly difficult to use tactical aircraft in bombing missions. It therefore is essential that steps be taken now to preserve an adequate long-range bomber force.

The B-2 was originally conceived to be the nation's next generation bomber, and it remains the most cost-effective means of rapidly projecting force over great distances. Its range will enable it to reach any point on earth within hours after launch while being deployed at only three secure bases around the world. Its payload and array of munitions will permit it to destroy numerous time-sensitive targets in a single sortie. And perhaps most importantly, its low-observable characteristics will allow it to reach intended targets without fear of interception.

The logic of continuing low-rate production of the B-2 thus is both fiscal and operational. It is already apparent that the end of the Cold War was neither the end of history nor the end of danger. We hope it also will not be the end of the B-2. We urge you to consider the purchase of more such aircraft while the option still exists.

Mr. HUNTER. Could the gentleman recite the names of the people once again who signed that letter?

Mr. DICKS. I will be glad to do it. Melvin Laird, former member of the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations; Jim Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, head of the CIA; Donald Rumsfeld; Harold Brown; Caspar Weinberger; Frank Carlucci, and our good friend and former colleague Dick Cheney who was involved in the decision with Les Aspin to go to 20. He has now written us a letter saying he only did it because the political realities of the time were such. But he signed this letter that we need to keep this low-rate production.

There is a major industrial base problem. I come from the State of Washington. The great Boeing Co. is in my State.

I went to them and I said, "Tell me, if the Congress kills this, and we have to do it again, how long do you think it would take us to build a B-3?"

They said, "It would take 15 years, from start to finish."

I said, "How would it differ from the B-2?"

They said, "It wouldn't differ from the B-2. We would have basically built

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the same airplane. We build a plane that has long-range, enormous carrying capability and is stealthy and would look a lot like the B-2."

Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman will yield further, let us explain that for a minute.

People need to know that in the old days, when we built these conventional bombers, they were not a lot different from the domestic aircraft that we build, so we could go to the gentleman, who is one of the greatest representatives that area has ever had in Washington, my colleague, and go to his hometown and talk to the Boeing management and Boeing workers, we could have gone back in the 1950's and the 1960's and said, "We need a new bomber line and can you change your jigs and your tooling a little bit and build us a bomber," and they say, "Yeah, we can do it," because the conventional bombers were not that much different from conventional aircraft, the type you use for commercial airlines.

□ 1645

If you have got a picture of that B-2 bomber, everybody knows it looks like a bat. It is very, very different from anything. I have got a poster that has got it on this side, if the gentleman would put that up for us. I have a poster right here.

The B-2 looks different and is different from any conventional aircraft by a very, very wide margin. So the suppliers, if you look at that bat-shaped aircraft and all the different composites and components and things that allow it to evade radar, you do not want your commercial aircraft to evade radar, you want them to use radar because you want your flight control people to know where that plane is at all times. So it is a totally unique, different aircraft.

We did not do what we did in the 1940s and 1950s and 1960s and go to our domestic aircraft companies and tell them to reconfigure their domestic production line a little bit, just like Rosie the Riveter did in World War II, and make a bunch of war planes. We have a very unique set of suppliers that make the thousands and thousands of various components that comprise a B-2 bomber.

If we close down that line, those people and a lot of them are small businesses, are going to go off and do other things. And if we get on the phone and call them up 10 years from now and say, It looks like we made a mistake; we need more B-2's, it is going to be enormously expensive to get that line started up again.

Mr. DICKS. General Skantze, who was one of our best procurement people in the history of the Air Force wrote me a letter, a very strong statement saying:

There are no bomber engineering design teams left at Rockwell or Boeing. Nor can you assemble them overnight, nor do they

come up with a sophisticated design in less than 2 or 3 years at best. Building Boeing 747's is no more like building B-2's than building Cadillacs is like building M1A2's.

Ask the Boeing people who build the After Center Section and the Outboard (Wing) Sections of the B-2. The Aft Center Section of the B-2 begins manufacturing and parts fabrication; assembly of bulkheads, skins, panels, and beams. Then it goes into sub assembly of spars, carry through assembly, keel beams, upper panels and ribs. Most of this work involves careful layups of special composite materials. The final assembly goes through clean, seal, paint, installation, test, and preparation for shipment.

Most of this is very sophisticated composite work and assembly with tolerance of thousandths of an inch. The process takes 37.5 months. When this assembly comes together with the Outboard Section, the Intermediate Sections, and the Forward Center Section at the B-2 final assembly at Palmdale, California, the buildup goes through an excruciatingly accurate mating process to ensure the careful laser-measured joining preserves the aircraft outer mold line, which is fundamental to the very low radar signature.

The resulting total flow time from the B-2 from lead time to rollout is currently 6 years.

Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman will yield, I want to say to the gentleman he has made a tremendous presentation for B-2, and I hope that all Members of the House, whether they are here or in their offices, have been watching this.

I have two colleagues that have a colloquy to do. They are two strong B-2 supporters, so I am going to break off my comments at this time. I want to thank the distinguished gentleman from Washington, who is a conservative Democrat who stands for a strong national defense and he has done a great service in trying to keep American air power alive. We appreciate you.

Mr. DICKS. I want to say one final thing. This is a bipartisan effort and the support for the B-2 has always been bipartisan. I just hope that the people who are watching C-SPAN all over this country will let their Members know and then tell them what they think about this.

This is not just some pork barrel project. This is the future security of our country. I enjoy working with the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER], because I know he too cares about the future of our country; he too has seen too many body bags come home and know we have a way to prevent that, to save American lives, and to have a less expensive program. Because we can have fewer people in the military if we have this technological superiority and we can save money for the taxpayers; we can save American lives in future conflicts, and we can, I hope, some day have a conventional deterrent in the B-2 that will prevent a future war. Then everyone will recognize why we fought so hard to try and save this capability.

Mr. Speaker, I submit the following:

The PRESIDENT,
The White House, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We are writing you to express our concerns about the impending termination of the B-2 bomber production line. After spending over \$20 billion to develop this revolutionary aircraft, current plans call for closing out the program with a purchase of only twenty bombers. We believe this plan does not adequately consider the challenges to U.S. security that arise in the next century, and the central role that the B-2 may play in meeting those challenges.

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MELVIN LAIRD.
JAMES SCHLESINGER.
DONALD RUMSFELD.
HAROLD BROWN.
CASPAR WEINBERGER.
FRANK CARLUCCI.
DICK CHENEY.

REPORT ON RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF S. 21, TERMINATING THE UNITED STATES ARMS EMBARGO ON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Mr. DIAZ-BALART, from the Committee on Rules, submitted a privileged (Rept. No. 104-213), on the resolution (H. Res. 204) providing for consideration of the bill (S. 21) to terminate the United States arms embargo applicable to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.