

□ 1223

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair advises Members that there has been a problem with one of the voting machines, so the Members are asked to please confirm their vote with the screen and in the voting machine.

□ 1225

Messrs. MOORHEAD, DORNAN, and BUYER changed their vote from "aye" to "no."

Messrs. SABO, CLAYBURN, and DAVIS changed their vote from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment to the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, on roll-call No. 349, I was unavoidably detained. Had I been present, I would have voted "no."

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH].

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a 5-minute vote.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 240, noes 181, not voting 13, as follows:

[Roll No. 350]

AYES—240

Allard	Clinger	Ganske
Archer	Coble	Gekas
Army	Coburn	Geren
Bachus	Collins (GA)	Gillmor
Baker (CA)	Combest	Goodlatte
Baker (LA)	Condit	Goodling
Ballenger	Cooley	Goss
Barcia	Costello	Graham
Barr	Cox	Gutknecht
Barrett (NE)	Cramer	Hall (OH)
Bartlett	Crane	Hall (TX)
Barton	Crapo	Hancock
Bateman	Creameans	Hastert
Bereuter	Cunningham	Hastings (WA)
Bevill	Danner	Hayes
Bilirakis	de la Garza	Hayworth
Bliley	Deal	Hefley
Blute	DeLay	Heineman
Boehner	Diaz-Balart	Hergert
Bonilla	Dickey	Hilleary
Bonior	Doolittle	Hoekstra
Bono	Dornan	Hoke
Borski	Doyle	Holden
Brewster	Dreier	Hostettler
Browder	Duncan	Hunter
Brownback	Dunn	Hutchinson
Bryant (TN)	Ehlers	Hytche
Bunn	Emerson	Inglis
Bunning	English	Istook
Burr	Ensign	Jacobs
Burton	Everett	Johnson, Sam
Buyer	Ewing	Jones
Callahan	Fields (TX)	Kanjorski
Camp	Flanagan	Kaptur
Canady	Foley	Kasich
Chabot	Forbes	Killdee
Chambliss	Fowler	Kim
Chenoweth	Fox	King
Christensen	Frisa	Kingston
Chrysler	Funderburk	Knollenberg
Clement	Galleghy	LaFalce

LaHood	Norwood	Smith (MI)
Largent	Nussle	Smith (NJ)
Latham	Oberstar	Smith (TX)
LaTourette	Obey	Smith (WA)
Laughlin	Ortiz	Solomon
Lewis (CA)	Orton	Souder
Lewis (KY)	Oxley	Spence
Lightfoot	Packard	Stearns
Linder	Parker	Stenholm
Lipinski	Paxon	Stockman
Livingston	Peterson (MN)	Stump
LoBiondo	Petri	Stupak
Longley	Pombo	Talent
Lucas	Portman	Tanner
Manton	Poshard	Tate
Manzullo	Quillen	Tauzin
Mascara	Quinn	Taylor (MS)
McColum	Radanovich	Taylor (NC)
McCrery	Rahall	Tejeda
McHugh	Regula	Thornberry
McInnis	Riggs	Thornton
McIntosh	Roberts	Tiahrt
McKeon	Roemer	Tucker
McNulty	Rohrabacher	Volkmer
Metcalfe	Ros-Lehtinen	Vucanovich
Mica	Roth	Waldholtz
Miller (FL)	Royce	Walker
Moakley	Salmon	Walsh
Molinari	Sanford	Wamp
Mollohan	Saxton	Watts (OK)
Montgomery	Scarborough	Weldon (FL)
Moorhead	Schaefer	Weldon (PA)
Murtha	Seastrand	Weller
Myers	Sensenbrenner	Whitfield
Myrick	Shadegg	Wicker
Neal	Shaw	Wolf
Nethercutt	Shuster	Young (AK)
Neumann	Skeen	Young (FL)
Ney	Skelton	Zeliff

Wilson	Wyden	Zimmer
Wise	Wynn	
Woolsey	Yates	

NOT VOTING—13

Calvert	Johnston	Meyers
Cubin	Klecza	Peterson (FL)
Fazio	Klink	Rogers
Franks (NJ)	McDade	
Hansen	McDermott	

□ 1235

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Calvert for, with Mr. Johnston of Florida against.

Mrs. Cubin for, with Mr. McDermott against.

Mr. DAVIS and Mr. THOMAS changed their vote from "aye" to "no."

So the amendment was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, on roll-call No. 350, I was unavoidably detained. Had I been present, I would have voted "aye."

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee will rise informally in order that the House may receive a message.

NOES—181

Abercrombie	Furse	Moran
Ackerman	Gejdenson	Morella
Andrews	Gephardt	Nadler
Baesler	Gibbons	Olver
Baldacci	Gilchrest	Owens
Barrett (WI)	Gilman	Pallone
Bass	Gonzalez	Pastor
Becerra	Gordon	Payne (NJ)
Beilenson	Green	Payne (VA)
Bentsen	Greenwood	Pelosi
Berman	Gunderson	Pickett
Bilbray	Gutierrez	Pomeroy
Bishop	Hamilton	Porter
Boehlert	Harman	Pryce
Boucher	Hastings (FL)	Ramstad
Brown (CA)	Hefner	Rangel
Brown (FL)	Hilliard	Reed
Brown (OH)	Hinche	Reynolds
Bryant (TX)	Hobson	Richardson
Cardin	Horn	Rivers
Castle	Houghton	Rose
Chapman	Hoyer	Roukema
Clay	Jackson-Lee	Roybal-Allard
Clayton	Jefferson	Rush
Clyburn	Johnson (CT)	Sabo
Coleman	Johnson (SD)	Sanders
Collins (IL)	Johnson, E.B.	Sawyer
Collins (MI)	Kelly	Schiff
Conyers	Kennedy (MA)	Schroeder
Coyne	Kennedy (RI)	Schumer
Davis	Kennelly	Scott
DeFazio	Klug	Serrano
DeLauro	Kolbe	Shays
Dellums	Lantos	Sisisky
Deutsch	Lazio	Skaggs
Dicks	Leach	Slaughter
Dingell	Levin	Spratt
Dixon	Lewis (GA)	Stark
Doggett	Lincoln	Stokes
Dooley	Lofgren	Studds
Durbin	Lowey	Thomas
Edwards	Luther	Thompson
Ehrlich	Maloney	Thurman
Engel	Markey	Torkildsen
Eshoo	Martinez	Torres
Evans	Martini	Torricelli
Farr	Matsui	Towns
Fattah	McCarthy	Traficant
Fawell	McHale	Upton
Fields (LA)	McKinney	Velazquez
Filner	Meehan	Vento
Flake	Meek	Visclosky
Foglietta	Menendez	Ward
Ford	Mfume	Waters
Frank (MA)	Miller (CA)	Watt (NC)
Franks (CT)	Mineta	Waxman
Frelinghuysen	Minge	White
Frost	Mink	Williams

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LAHOOD) assumed the Chair.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair will receive a message.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message in writing from the President of the United States was communicated to the House by Mr. Edwin Thomas, one of his secretaries.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Committee will resume its sitting.

AMERICAN OVERSEAS INTERESTS ACT OF 1995

The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments?

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MS. MCKINNEY

Ms. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment numbered 16 offered by Ms. MCKINNEY: After chapter 5 of title XXXI of the bill, insert the following new chapter (and redesignate the subsequent chapter accordingly and make other appropriate conforming amendments):

CHAPTER 6—ARMS TRANSFERS CODE OF CONDUCT

SEC. 3174. SHORT TITLE.

This chapter may be cited as the "Code of Conduct on Arms Transfer Act of 1995".

SEC. 3175. FINDINGS.

The Congress finds the following:

- (1) Approximately 40,000,000 people, over 75 percent civilians, died as a result of civil and international wars fought with conventional weapons during the 45 years of the cold war, demonstrating that conventional weapons can in fact be weapons of mass destruction.
- (2) Conflict has actually increased in the post cold war era, with 34 major wars in progress during 1993.

(3) War is both a human tragedy and an ongoing economic disaster affecting the entire world, including the United States and its economy, because it decimates both local investment and potential export markets.

(4) International trade in conventional weapons increases the risk and impact of war in an already over-militarized world, creating far more costs than benefits for the United States economy through increased United States defense and foreign assistance spending and reduced demand for United States civilian exports.

(5) The newly established United Nations Register of Conventional Arms can be an effective first step in support of limitations on the supply of conventional weapons to developing countries and compliance with its reporting requirements by a foreign government can be an integral tool in determining the worthiness of such government for the receipt of United States military assistance and arms transfers.

(6) It is in the national security and economic interests of the United States to reduce dramatically the \$1,038,000,000,000 that all countries spend on armed forces every year, \$242,000,000,000 of which is spent by developing countries, an amount equivalent to 4 times the total bilateral and multilateral foreign assistance such countries receive every year.

(7) According to the Congressional Research Service, the United States supplies more conventional weapons to developing countries than all other countries combined, averaging \$14,956,000,000 a year in agreements to supply such weapons to developing countries since the end of the cold war, compared to \$7,300,000,000 a year in such agreements prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

(8) In recent years the vast majority of United States arms transfers to developing countries are to countries with an undemocratic form of government whose citizens, according to the Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices do not have the ability to peaceably change their form of government.

(9) Although a goal of United States foreign policy should be to work with foreign governments and international organizations to reduce militarization and dictatorship and therefore prevent conflicts before they arise, during 4 recent deployments of United States Armed Forces—to the Republic of Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and Haiti—such Armed Forces faced conventional weapons that had been provided or financed by the United States to undemocratic governments.

(10) The proliferation of conventional arms and conflicts around the globe are multilateral problems, and the fact that the United States has emerged as the world's primary seller of conventional weapons, combined with the world leadership role of the United States, signifies that the United States is in a position to seek multilateral restraints on the competition for the transfers of conventional weapons.

(11) The Congress has the constitutional responsibility to participate with the executive branch in decisions to provide military assistance and arms transfers to a foreign government, and in the formulation of a policy designed to reduce dramatically the level of international militarization.

(12) A decision to provide military assistance and arms transfers to a government that is undemocratic, does not adequately protect human rights, is currently engaged in acts of armed aggression, or is not fully participating in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, should require a higher level of scrutiny than does a decision to provide such assistance and arms transfers to a government to which these conditions do not apply.

#### SEC. 3176. PURPOSE.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide clear policy guidelines and congressional responsibility for determining the eligibility of foreign governments to be considered for United States military assistance and arms transfers.

#### SEC. 3177. PROHIBITION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS TRANSFERS TO CERTAIN FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.

(a) PROHIBITION.—Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), beginning on and after October 1, 1996, United States military assistance and arms transfers may not be provided to a foreign government for a fiscal year unless the President certifies to the Congress for that fiscal year that such government meets the following requirements:

(1) PROMOTES DEMOCRACY.—Such government—

(A) was chosen by and permits free and fair elections;

(B) promotes civilian control of the military and security forces and has civilian institutions controlling the policy, operation, and spending of all new enforcement and security institutions, as well as the armed forces;

(C) promotes the rule of law, equality before the law, and respect for individual and minority rights, including freedom to speak, publish, associate, and organize; and

(D) promotes the strengthening of political, legislative, and civil institutions of democracy, as well as autonomous institutions to monitor the conduct of public officials and to combat corruption.

(2) RESPECTS HUMAN RIGHTS.—Such government—

(A) does not engage in gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including—

- (i) extra judicial or arbitrary executions;
- (ii) disappearances;
- (iii) torture or severe mistreatment;
- (iv) prolonged arbitrary imprisonment;
- (v) systematic official discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, national origin, or political affiliation; and
- (vi) grave breaches of international laws of war or equivalent violations of the laws of war in internal conflicts;

(B) vigorously investigates, disciplines, and prosecutes those responsible for gross violations of internationally recognized human rights;

(C) permits access on a regular basis to political prisoners by international humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross;

(D) promotes the independence of the judiciary and other official bodies that oversee the protection of human rights;

(E) does not impede the free functioning of domestic and international human rights organizations; and

(F) provides access on a regular basis to humanitarian organizations in situations of conflict or famine.

(3) NOT ENGAGED IN CERTAIN ACTS OF ARMED AGGRESSION.—Such government is not currently engaged in the acts of armed aggression in violation of international law.

(4) FULL PARTICIPATION IN U.N. REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS.—Such government is fully participating in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

(b) REQUIREMENT FOR CONTINUING COMPLIANCE.—Any certification with respect to a foreign government for a fiscal year under subsection (a) shall cease to be effective for that fiscal year if the President certifies to the Congress that such government has not continued to comply with the requirements contained in paragraphs (1) through (4) of such subsection.

(c) EXEMPTIONS.—The prohibition contained in subsection (a) shall not apply with

respect to a foreign government for a fiscal year if—

(1)(A) the President submits a request for an exemption to the Congress containing a determination that it is in the national security interest of the United States to provide military assistance and arms transfer to such government; and

(B) the Congress enacts a law approving such exemption request (including a law containing an approval of such a request); or

(2) the President determines that an emergency exists under which it is vital to the interest of the United States to provide military assistance and arms transfer to such government.

(d) NOTIFICATIONS TO CONGRESS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall submit to the Congress initial certifications under subsection (a) and requests for exemptions under subsection (c)(1) in conjunction with the submission of the annual request for enactment of authorizations and appropriations for foreign assistance programs for a fiscal year and shall, where appropriate, submit additional or amended certifications and requests for exemptions at any time thereafter in the fiscal year.

(2) DETERMINATION WITH RESPECT TO EMERGENCY SITUATIONS.—The President shall submit to the Congress at the earliest possible date reports containing determinations with respect to emergencies under subsection (c)(2). Each such report shall contain a description of—

(A) the nature of the emergency;

(B) the type of military assistance and arms transfers provided to the foreign government; and

(C) the cost to the United States of such assistance and arms transfers.

#### SEC. 3178. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.

It is the sense of the Congress that the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate should hold hearings on—

(1) controversial certifications submitted under section 3177(a).

(2) all requests for exemptions submitted under section 3177(c)(1); and

(3) all determinations with respect to emergencies under section 3177(c)(2).

#### SEC. 3179. UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS TRANSFERS DEFINED.

For purposes of this chapter, the terms "United States military assistance and arms transfers" and "military assistance and arms transfers" means—

(1) assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to military assistance), including the transfer of excess defense articles under section 516 of that Act;

(2) assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to international military education and training); or

(3) the transfer of defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services under the Arms Export Control Act (excluding any transfer or other assistance under section 23 of such Act), including defense articles and defense services licensed or approved for export under section 38 of that Act.

Ms. MCKINNEY (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Georgia?

There was no objection.

(Ms. MCKINNEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Ms. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, today, I will offer the Code of Conduct amendment to H.R. 1561. My amendment seeks to give Congress—for the first time in two decades—a role in U.S. arms export policy.

As the law is currently written, Mr. Chairman, it is nearly impossible for Congress to stop an arms sale. Not since 1986 has a floor vote been taken on an arms sale, nor has a sale proposed by the administration formally been disapproved by Congress.

In addition to the lack of congressional oversight in arms sales, the economic cost to the American taxpayer is more than \$7 billion a year just to support the arms export bureaucracy.

U.S. weapons are being used in 90 percent of today's most significant regional and ethnic conflicts. The weapons and technology that devastated the Iraqi Army only a few years ago, are now available to nations that are undemocratic, violate human rights, and are governed by dictators.

In 1993, the U.S. Government cornered a colossal 70 percent of the global arms sales market, and in 1994 U.S. foreign military arms sales were a whopping \$12.9 billion.

America's arms sales have skyrocketed since the end of the cold war. As this first chart shows, Mr. Chairman, U.S. arms transfers from 1990 to 1993 averaged \$21.7 billion a year, whereas, from 1986 to 1989, arms transfers only averaged \$10.6 billion. It is amazing and shameful that as America solidifies its post-cold war leadership and encourages global democracy, the U.S. Government sold \$83.1 billion in foreign military sales to dictators with no congressional review.

Despite this enormous dominance of the international arms market and the "Boomerang Effect" against U.S. Armed Forces—only a few Members of Congress have worked to restrain this dangerous trade.

Additionally, America spends billions of tax dollars to finance exports to tyrants—highlighted by the second chart—while cutting billions from key domestic programs like veterans benefits, Social Security, and student loans.

Mr. Chairman, the Code of Conduct amendment would not prohibit arms transfers to any country. Rather it would establish a higher standard of scrutiny for countries receiving U.S. weapons and more congressional oversight of arms sales. The Code of Conduct makes sure that we look before we leap by providing four guiding principles for U.S. arms transfers.

History demonstrates that as a result of Siad Barre's Somalia, Cedras' Haiti, and Saddam Hussein's Iraq, our soldiers have paid the price for selling U.S. materiel to dictators.

The code would require that both the President and Congress agree that providing assistance to a certain country is in the best interest of the United States. The code also gives the President flexibility. He can request a 1-year

waiver for countries not meeting the code's standards, or in cases where vital U.S. interests are in jeopardy, use an emergency authority.

The code is endorsed by 275 organizations from Amnesty International to the YWCA and is supported by the European Parliament. Arms sales to unstable governments must end, and the Code of Conduct will be the first step in that direction.

There are 102 Members of Congress who support the guiding principles of the code—democracy, respect for human rights, and nonaggression. I urge all of you to cast your vote in favor of the Code of Conduct. Let's ensure that America's leadership is positively reflected in our arms export policy. Vote for the Code of Conduct.

[From World Policy Institute, May 1995]

U.S. WEAPONS AT WAR: U.S. ARMS DELIVERIES TO REGIONS OF CONFLICT

(By William D. Hartung)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

From Richard Nixon to Bill Clinton, it has been an article of faith for executive branch policy makers that U.S. weapons exports are only made to responsible allies who use these systems for legitimate defense purpose. This report puts that thesis to the test by documenting U.S. weapons deliveries to 50 current ethnic and territorial conflicts.

Contrary to the conventional wisdom in Washington, official U.S. government data on arms transfers provides overwhelming circumstantial evidence that U.S.-supplied weaponry is at the center of many of today's most dangerous and intractable conflicts:

In the past ten years, parties to 45 current conflicts have taken delivery of over \$42 billion worth of U.S. weaponry;

Of the significant ethnic and territorial conflicts going on during 1993-94, 90% (45 out of 50) of them involved one or more parties that had received some U.S. weaponry or military technology in the period leading up to the conflict;

In more than half of current conflicts (26 out of 50), the United States has been a significant arms supplier, accounting for at least 5% of the weapons delivered to one party to the dispute over a five year period;

In more than one-third of all current conflicts (18 out of 50), the United States has been a major supplier to one party to the dispute, accounting for over 25% of all weapons imported by that participant in the most recent five year period;

Despite the popular perception that it is U.S. policy to cease deliveries of weapons once a conflict is under way, as of the end of 1993 (the latest year for which full statistics are available) the United States was shipping military goods and services to more than half (26 out of 50) of the areas where there were wars being fought;

In a number of volatile areas the United States has been the primary supplier to governments that are involved in ongoing conflicts. In Turkey (76%), Spain (85%), Israel (99%), Morocco (26%), Egypt (61%), Chad (27%), Somalia (44%), Liberia (40%), Kenya (25%), Pakistan (44%), the Philippines (93%), Indonesia (38%), Guatemala (86%), Haiti (25%), Columbia (28%), Brazil (35%), and Mexico (77%), the United States has been the primary supplier of imported weaponry in the most recent five year period for which full data is available.

Turkey's use of U.S.-supplied fighter aircraft, helicopters, tanks and armored personnel carriers in its recent invasion of Northern Iraq highlights the dangers of a policy of

uncritical assistance to allies engaged in ethnic or territorial disputes, as does the employment of U.S.-supplied equipment on both sides of the 1995 Peru-Ecuador border war.

Since the end of the Cold War, the continuing U.S. policy of promoting weapons exports as a key element of U.S. security strategy and economic policy has accelerated the incidence of the "boomerang effect": the transfer of U.S. weaponry to forces that end up doing battle against U.S. troops. The last four times the United States sent troops into combat in significant numbers—in Panama, Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti—they faced adversaries that had received U.S.-origin arms, training, or military production technology in the period leading up to the conflict. This is a clear sign that something is awry in U.S. arms transfer decision making processes.

Last but not least, covert U.S. arms sales have come back to haunt U.S. citizens by inadvertently strengthening terrorist organizations. Two of the men convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing received weapons training in Afghanistan under the direction of fundamentalist Islamic forces that were armed and trained by the CIA. The suspects in the recent murders of several U.S. embassy employees in Karachi, Pakistan are also suspected of having ties to the CIA's Afghan arms pipeline. David Whipple, the former head of counterterrorism at the CIA, has indicated that these are not isolated cases: "some of the people who are actual or potential terrorists in this country are former guerrilla fighters in Afghanistan." And an Algerian official has described the existence of a "floating army" of Islamic fundamentalist fighters who were trained with CIA assistance in Afghanistan and are now engaged in organized attempt to overthrow the governments of Algeria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, among others.

As President Clinton tries to mobilize world public opinion against Iran, in part for its alleged role in supporting terrorism in the Middle East, it would behoove him to get his own house in order by clamping down on the CIA's covert weapons trafficking operations, which all too often end up hurting innocent people, including U.S. citizens. The recent revelations that a Guatemalan colonel on the CIA payroll is implicated in the murders of Michael DeVine, an American who ran a farm in Guatemala, and Efraim Bamaca Velazquez, a Guatemalan rebel leader who was married to American lawyer and activist Jennifer Harbury, is just the latest example of a covert arms trading culture that is out of control.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The report makes the following specific recommendations for promoting greater accountability in arms transfer decision making (for the full text of the recommendations, see section IV, below):

*Recommendation 1: Pass the arms transfer Code of Conduct bill*

In February of 1995, Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR) and Representative Cynthia McKinney (D-GA) reintroduced legislation calling for the establishment of a Code of Conduct for U.S. weapons transfers. Under the code, governments that engage in aggression against their neighbors, violate the human rights of their own citizens, come to power through undemocratic means, or refuse to participate in international agreements like the United Nations arms register would not be eligible to receive weaponry from the United States. If the President wanted to make an exception for a specific country on national security grounds, he would have to ask Congress to pass a bill providing an exemption for that nation.

The benefits of the Code of Conduct would be twofold. First, it would place considerations about the character of a given arms recipient and how that nation might use U.S. weaponry up front in the arms transfer decision making process, preventing sales to unstable regimes in the process. Second, even in cases where the President sought an exemption, members of Congress would be forced to go on the record for or against, providing a measure of public accountability that rarely occurs under current law.

*Recommendation 2: Provide more detailed reporting on U.S. transfers of arms and military technology, and press for other nations to do the same*

Up until the Reagan Administration, the State Department issued an annual report under Section 657 of the Foreign Assistance Act that listed most significant items of military equipment delivered from the United States to any foreign country in the prior fiscal year, ranging from rifles and bullets on up to advanced combat aircraft. The section 657 report should be reinstated as an annual publication, to provide a tool for keeping track of potential abuses of U.S.-supplied weaponry.

A full accounting of U.S. arms transfer policy must also include regular, detailed reporting on U.S. transfers of so-called "dual use" equipment—items such as advanced machine tools and computers, measuring instruments, or unarmed light helicopters and aircraft. If Congress and the public had been aware of the particulars of the nearly \$1.5 billion in dual use export licenses that the Commerce Department granted to companies seeking to sell equipment to Iraq during 1985 through 1990, some of the more dangerous items on the list might not have been approved for sale.

*Recommendation 3: The Pentagon and the intelligence community should publish regular reports on the use of U.S.-supplied weaponry in ongoing conflicts*

All too often, U.S. weapons are supplied on a "fire 'em and forget 'em" basis: the decision to sell is made based on short-term political, strategic, or economic considerations, with little thought given to how these arms might be used a few years down the road. In an attempt to prevent this "boomerang effect" from repeating itself in the future, Representative Cynthia McKinney sponsored a successful amendment to the Fiscal Year 1995 Department of Defense Authorization bill requiring the Pentagon to report annually on how proposed arms transfers might create "increased capabilities" on the part of potential adversaries, and how they might "pose an increased threat" to U.S. forces in some future conflict.

As a further step in the right direction, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency should be required to file annual reports on how U.S.-supplied weaponry is being put to use in current conflicts, either by the original recipients, or as the result of unauthorized transfers to third parties. These reports could serve as a running record of the consequences of past U.S. weapons trading activities, and they would hopefully inject a note of caution into congressional debates over new proposed transfers.

*Recommendation 4: Outlaw covert weapons shipments*

From Iran/contra to the arming of Iraq to the ongoing proliferation of weapons originally intended for Afghan rebel movements, covert weapons trafficking have been at the center of a series of unmitigated foreign policy fiascos. As part of the effort to restructure the CIA to better meet the realities of the post-Cold War world, covert arms sales by the CIA and other government departments should be strictly outlawed.

*Recommendation 5: The Clinton Administration (or its successor) should vigorously pursue a policy of multilateral arms transfer restraint designed to limit sales of conventional weaponry to regions of conflict or repressive regimes*

Contrary to the findings of the Clinton Administration's new conventional arms transfer policy, Presidential Directive 41, limiting the spread of weaponry to regions of conflict should be the paramount priority governing U.S. arms transfer decisions in the post-Cold War era. Economic and defense industrial base concerns should take a back seat to efforts to construct a multilateral arms export control regime that can serve both as a tool for preventing conflicts, and for limiting their duration and severity once they break out. At a time when the United States controls 72% of new arms sales agreements with the developing world, U.S. leadership remains an essential prerequisite for implementing any meaningful multilateral arrangement for limiting the flow of conventional armaments.

#### I. Introduction: U.S. Arms Transfers—Promoting Stability or Fueling Conflict?

"[T]here is almost no case since World War II in which arms provided by the United States have been used by the country receiving them for purposes of aggression."—Richard Nixon, "The Real War," 1980.

"[T]here is almost no instance of a country which is primarily dependent upon U.S. weapons using those weapons in an offensive manner."—Joel Johnson, Aerospace Industries Association, February 1994.

"[T]here is strong evidence that countries relying on American weaponry have not started wars with their neighbors . . . To cite the most egregious example, Iraq . . . purchased its weapons primarily from Russia and France."—Ethan Kapstein, "Foreign Affairs," May/June 1994.

"Given the complexities of arms transfer decisions and the multiple U.S. interests involved . . . decisions will continue to be made on a case-by-case basis. These case-by-case reviews will . . . draw the appropriate balance between legitimate arms sales to support the national security of our friends and allies, and the need for multilateral restraint against the transfer of arms that would enhance the military capabilities of hostile states or that would undermine stability."—Fact Sheet on Clinton Administration, Arms Sales Policy Directive, February 17, 1995.

The Arms Export Control Act states that U.S. military equipment and services shall be provided to other nations only for purposes of internal security, "legitimate self-defense," participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations, or involvement in operations consistent with the U.N. Charter.[1] Based in part on this legislative requirement and in part on their ingrained assumptions regarding U.S. weapons sales, several generations of executive branch officials, policymakers, and independent analysts have taken it as an article of faith that U.S.-supplied weapons are primarily used for defensive purposes.

Now that the United States controls nearly three-quarters of all weapons exports to the developing world, the question of whether or not U.S. weapons are used aggressively is of more than merely academic interest.[2]

As of early 1994, there were 50 significant ethnic and territorial conflicts under way in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America.[3] By the end of 1993, the number of ongoing wars involving more than one thousand battle-related deaths reached 34, marking the first increase in this grim statistic since the end of the Cold War.[4] By early 1995, progress towards peace in South

Africa, the Middle East, and Northern Ireland had been offset by the escalation of conflicts in North Africa (Algeria) and Russia (Chechnya), and the outbreak of a border war between Peru and Ecuador.[5]

With the exception of Russia, China, and a few other nations that produce a wide array of weapons systems for their own use, the majority of participants in today's armed conflicts depend upon imported weaponry.[6] The conventional wisdom among U.S. policy-makers is that the weapons that are actually used in the majority of the world's conflicts are supplied by other, less "responsible" suppliers. To the extent that U.S. officials raise questions about arms supplies to regions of conflict, the usual targets of criticism are either Russia or China, which have historically been more willing to supply arms and military technology to "rogue" states like Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Iran.[7] In addition, some observers make pointed references to France's allegedly amoral, mercantile approach to arms sales.[8] In contrast, it has been argued that U.S. arms sales are grounded in carefully considered decisions to bolster the security of trustworthy allies in critical regions.

The notion that the United States is only arming the "good guys" has a long history. In his book "The Real War," Richard Nixon, the architect of the current U.S. role as the world's leading weapons trafficking nation, argued that U.S.-supplied weapons have rarely been used in a belligerent manner, but that "Soviet arms are the ones that are constantly used to break the peace." [9] Nixon's blanket claim ignored a series of aggressive actions by major U.S. arms clients during the Nixon/Ford administrations, including Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, Indonesia's invasion of East Timor, Morocco's occupation of the Western Sahara, and General Augusto Pinochet's reign of terror in the wake of his 1973 coup d'etat in Chile.[10]

The Reagan Administration presided over one of the most revealing incidents in the history of U.S. policy towards aggressive uses of U.S. military equipment when it responded to Israel's June 1981 bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor. Initially, U.S. weapons deliveries to Israel were suspended until the State Department could determine whether the bombing, which utilized U.S.-supplied F-15 and F-16 aircraft, violated Israel's pledge to use U.S. systems for defensive purposes. After a ten week review, Secretary of State Alexander Haig decided to resume arms shipments to Israel, arguing that "I think one in a subjective way can argue to eternity as to whether or not a military action may be defensive or offensive in character." Rather than making a specific case that Israel's bombing of Osirak was justified as a defensive act, Haig seemed to be saying, in Alice-in-Wonderland style, that a defensive use of a weaponry is whatever the U.S. government and its allies say it is.[11] Turkey's 1995 invasion of Northern Iraq, which has been justified by Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller on the grounds that Turkish forces are in "hot pursuit" of Kurdish terrorists, raises similar questions about what constitutes a genuinely defensive deployment of U.S.-supplied weaponry (for further discussion of Turkey's use of U.S. weapons against its Kurdish population, see section II, below).

This "see-no-evil" approach to U.S. weapons trading has survived into the 1990s. The last four times the United States has sent troops into combat they have faced adversaries that received U.S. arms or military technology in the period leading up to the conflict, yet the Clinton Administration's arms transfer policy review stubbornly refused to take into account the very real possibility that U.S.-supplied weapons may be used for purposes contrary to U.S. interests. As if to

underscore the business-as-usual tone of the Clinton approach, an official involved in the policy review has indicated that under the Administration's new guidelines, not a single one of the hundreds of major U.S. arms sales of the past fifteen years would have been rejected.<sup>[12]</sup> The administration's decidedly upbeat perspective on arms sales was summed up early on by Lt. General Teddy Allen, the former Director of the Pentagon's Defense Security Assistance Agency, during testimony to Congress in June 1993: "Many friends and allies depend on U.S. defense equipment, services, and training to deter, and when necessary, defeat, armed aggression."<sup>[13]</sup> When it finally released the results of its arms export policy review in February of 1995, the Clinton Administration described the five key goals of its policy as follows:

(1) To ensure that our military forces can continue to enjoy technological advantages over potential adversaries;

(2) To help allies and friends deter or defend themselves against aggression, while promoting interoperability with U.S. forces when combined operations are required;

(3) To promote regional stability in areas critical to U.S. interests, while preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems;

(4) to promote peaceful conflict resolution and arms control, human rights democratization and other U.S. foreign policy objectives;

(5) to enhance the ability of the U.S. defense industrial base to meet U.S. defense requirements and maintain long-term military technological superiority at lower costs. [14].

The idea of controlling the spread of U.S. weaponry to ensure that U.S. exports do not sustain ongoing wars, fuel regional arms races, or strengthen potential U.S. adversaries is only obliquely hinted at in the Clinton administration's priority list; the underlying assumption is that U.S. weapons transfers go to potential "coalition partners" to be used for strictly defensive purposes. Despite recent evidence to the contrary, the possibility that today's partner could be tomorrow's adversary doesn't seem to enter into the administration's thinking.

To further underscore how small a role the potential risks of U.S. weapons exports will play in executive branch decisionmaking, Clinton Administration officials have indicated that the contribution of a given transfer to the defense industrial base will now be an explicit factor in deciding whether to go ahead with the sale. This could mean that the fact that a deal might extend Lockheed's production run for the F-16 fighter or sustain General Dynamics' assembly line for the M-1 tank will carry greater weight than whether these weapons are being provided to unstable regimes. [15].

Not surprisingly, the claim that U.S.-supplied arms are only used defensively has also been made repeatedly by executives and lobbyists in the defense industry. For example, Don Fuqua, president of the Aerospace Industries Association, made the following claim in a November 1994 article entitled "Merchants of Peace": "during more than half a century, no American soldier ever faced any significant American military equipment used by a hostile power."<sup>[16]</sup> This industry argument has been echoed in academic circles as well, most notably in an article by Ethan Kapstein of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard which appeared in the May/June 1994 issue of Foreign Affairs:

"... there is strong evidence that countries relying on American weaponry have not started wars with their neighbors. Contrast that record with the one compiled by countries that have purchased their weapons from Russia, Western Europe, or Third World

suppliers. To cite the most egregious example, Iraq, which attacked Iran in 1980 before turning on Kuwait a decade later, had purchased its weapons primarily from Russia and France.

"Why American arms should be used primarily for defensive purposes is an interesting question. The most likely reason is that countries reliant on the United States fear being cut off and forced to look elsewhere if they misbehave."<sup>[17]</sup>

The question of whether U.S. weapons transfers are as overwhelmingly constructive and stabilizing as this version of the conventional wisdom claims they are deserves closer scrutiny. As the next section will demonstrate, the sheer volume of U.S. arms shipments to areas of conflict calls into question the notion that these transfers have exerted a uniformly positive or predictable influence on local, regional, and international security.

II. U.S. Weapons at War

A comparison of the Pentagon's own data on deliveries of weapons through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Commercial Sales (CS) programs over the past decade with a list of 50 significant wars that were under way during 1993-94 indicates that U.S. weapons exports have played a major role in fueling the ethnic and territorial conflicts that have become one of the most difficult security challenges of the post-Cold War era [18]:

In the past ten years, parties to 45 current conflicts have taken delivery of over \$42 billion worth of U.S. weaponry;

Of the significant ethnic and territorial conflicts going on during 1993-94, 90% (45 out of 50) of them involved one or more parties that had received some U.S. weaponry or military technology in the period leading up to the conflict;

In more than half of current conflicts (26 out of 50), the United States has been a significant arms supplier, accounting for at least 5% of the weapons delivered to one party to the dispute over a five year period;

In more than one-third of all current conflicts (18 out of 50), the United States has been a major supplier to one party to the dispute, accounting for over 25% of all weapons imported by that participant in the most recent five year period;

Despite the popular perception that it is U.S. policy to cease deliveries of weapons once a conflict is under way, as of the end of 1993 (the latest year for which full statistics are available) the United States was shipping military goods and services to more than half (26 out of 50) of the areas where there were wars being fought.

The data outlined above demonstrate that contrary to the assertions of key policymakers, academic analysts, and industry lobbyists, the United States is sustaining the warfighting capabilities of a substantial number of the parties to the world's current conflicts. In a number of volatile areas the United States has been the primary supplier to governments that are involved in either internal or regional conflicts. In cases where the United States has supplied a majority of a client government's imported weaponry over an extended period of time, it is likely that some U.S. systems will be utilized in future conflicts involving these nations (see Table I, below)

Among the most serious conflicts in which the United States has been the primary weapons supplier are Turkey, Morocco, Somalia, Liberia, Kenya, Zaire, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Haiti, Guatemala, Colombia and Mexico. Official U.S. weapons deliveries to Haiti, Guatemala, Liberia, and Zaire were cut off as of the early 1990s, but U.S. deliveries to conflict zones in Turkey,

Morocco, Somalia and Kenya have actually increased over the past few years. In the case of Somalia, the increase is explained by the fact that a new government has been installed as a result of a UN peacekeeping mission in that nation. But continuing U.S. deliveries to Morocco, Turkey, and Kenya have no such rationale: in these cases, U.S. arms are shoring up regimes that have been intransigent in their pursuit of military solutions to sensitive ethnic and territorial disputes. Last but not least, in both Haiti and Guatemala, legislative attempts to terminate U.S. military assistance were subverted by the implementation of covert aid programs that were actually larger than the overt programs that were eliminated by Congress (see sections II and III for further discussion).

TABLE I—AREAS OF CONFLICT IN WHICH THE U.S. HAS BEEN A PRIMARY WEAPONS SUPPLIER

Region (and recipient)	Percent of total arms imports received from the United States	
	1987-91	1991-93 <sup>1</sup>
Southern Europe:		
Spain .....	85	86
Turkey .....	76	80
Middle East/North Africa:		
Israel .....	99	91
Morocco .....	26	76
Egypt .....	61	89
Sub-Saharan Africa:		
Chad .....	27	25
Somalia .....	44	100
Liberia .....	40	20
Kenya .....	25	100
Zaire .....	17	0
Asia:		
Pakistan .....	44	3
Philippines .....	93	75
Indonesia .....	38	33
Latin America:		
Guatemala .....	86	30
Haiti .....	>25	20
Colombia .....	28	19
Brazil .....	35	40
Mexico .....	77	64

<sup>1</sup>The overlap in years covered by the two columns (1987-1991 and 1991-1993) is a function of the way the data is reported in the two most recent editions of the "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers" report. For a brief description of the nature of the conflicts in each of these nations, see Appendix A, Table I, below.

<sup>2</sup>The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) reported no arms transfers to Haiti or Liberia from any source during 1991-1993; this does not necessarily mean that there were no transfers of any kind—it is likely that there was some black market trading in light weaponry that was not detected by the intelligence sources that serve as the basis for ACDA's data.

<sup>3</sup>It has recently been revealed that the Central Intelligence Agency continued to make millions of dollars in payments to Guatemalan military and intelligence officials after U.S. military aid was officially cut off in 1991; it has yet to be determined whether some of this money was used to import weaponry.

Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers", 1991-92 and 1993-94 editions, Table III.

While data on the total volume of U.S. weapons supplies to areas of conflict is readily available, specific information on how U.S. weaponry is being put to use in today's wars is harder to come by. This is in part because neither the media nor the armed forces have made it their business to identify the specific types of weaponry utilized in a given conflict or to document the origins of these armaments. Even if gathering such data was a priority, the reality of warfare, particularly multi-sided civil conflicts involving light weaponry, would make it difficult to obtain comprehensive information. Nonetheless, accounts in the mainstream and specialty press have uncovered a number of recent examples of how U.S.-supplied weaponry is being put to use on the battlefield, and a number of arms control and human rights researchers have recently begun a concerted effort to gather more information on the patterns of deliveries of light weaponry to ethnic conflicts. The following examples are illustrative of the ways in which U.S. weapons are being utilized in current conflicts: a more comprehensive accounting would require more open reporting of the nature of U.S. weapons transfers to these areas.

Turkey: Turkey received over \$6.3 billion worth of military equipment and services from the United States between F.Y. 1984 and F.Y. 1993.[19] The United States supplied 76% of all weapons imported by the Turkish government between 1987 and 1991, a figure which increased to 80% for the period from 1991 to 1993. The majority of U.S. weapons supplies to Turkey have been paid for by U.S. taxpayers as part of an extensive military aid program that has provided over \$5 billion in assistance from F.Y. 1986 through F.Y. 1995.[20] Turkey has also received large deliveries of U.S. weaponry for free or at minimal cost as part of the NATO "cascading" program, which involves redistributing surplus weapons rendered redundant by the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE).[21] Last but not least, a number of U.S. weapons systems are produced in Turkey under coproduction and licensing agreements with U.S. firms, including Lockheed's F-16 fighter plane and the FMC Corporation's M-113 armored personnel carrier.[22]

There have been reports in the international and Turkish press indicating that U.S.-supplied weaponry has been used extensively by the Turkish government in its war on the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) in southeastern Turkey. A wide range of U.S. systems, including F-16, F-4, F5, and F-104 fighter aircraft, Cobra and Black Hawk helicopters, cluster bombs, and M-60 tanks and M-113 armored personnel carriers have been used in the conflict, which has claimed over 15,000 lives since 1984.[23] The Clinton Administration and other supporters of the Turkish government have argued that the PKK is a terrorist organization, not a legitimate political movement. However, regardless of their views on the PKK, most independent observers agree that the politico-military strategy of the Turkish government—strafing and depopulating entire villages in the southeast—entails unnecessary suffering and repeated violations of the human rights of civilian noncombatants. Human Rights Watch has reported that as of October 1994, the Turkish government has depopulated as many as 1,400 villages and hamlets and displaced several hundred thousand people in its prosecution of the war against the PKK.[24] Major encounters involving U.S.-supplied weaponry have included May 1993 bombing raids in the Karliova valley that utilized F-4 fighter planes and Cobra helicopters to kill 44 Kurdish fighters and a January 1994 incursion into Iraq to bombard PKK camps with cluster bombs, 500- and 2000-pound bombs dropped from F-16 and F-4 aircraft.

The Turkish government's March 1995 invasion of Northern Iraq marks the latest chapter in its quest for a military solution to the Kurdish question. A Turkish government spokesperson proudly described the cross-border raid by 35,000 troops as "the biggest military operation in the history of the Turkish Republic." [25] Ironically, the Turkish attack targeted the same sector of Iraq in which the United States had been enforcing a "no fly zone" as part of the United Nations-backed Operation Provide Comfort, an effort designed to protect Iraqi Kurds in the area from Saddam Hussein's regime. Because the United States is far and away Turkey's largest supplier of weapons and military aid, Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller cleared the operation with President Clinton by telephone before sending her military forces into Iraq. White House spokesperson Mike McCurry reported that the President accepted Ciller's explanation that the raids were strictly aimed at PKK "terrorist bases" in Northern Iraq, and that Clinton expressed "understanding for Turkey's need to deal decisively" with the rebel group.[26]

In a move that may prompt debate for some time to come, President Clinton and the Pentagon also ordered U.S. military personnel in Northern Iraq to "stand down" from enforcing the no fly zone against Turkey aircraft for the duration of Turkey's intervention. When a reporter asked Pentagon spokesperson Dennis Boxx whether the Pentagon was "uncomfortable" over the fact that a U.S. ally was "beating up on . . . the same people we've been trying to protect from Iraq for a number of years," Boxx argued that Turkey was taking great care to focus its attacks on PKK terrorist strongholds. When he was asked where U.S. enforcement of the no fly zone would be rendered inoperative for the duration of the Turkish intervention in Northern Iraq, Boxx implied that it would, noting that "it's simply better not to put these people at risk [U.S. military personnel involved in Operation Provide Comfort] until this has been resolved." The chilling implication of Boxx's remark is that the Pentagon actually feared that if U.S. forces had tried to enforce the no fly zone against the Turkish military, Turkish forces would have engaged in an air war against U.S. troops, using U.S.-supplied aircraft. It was almost as if the Pentagon spokesman was acknowledging that Turkey had intimidated the U.S. into allowing its Iraqi incursion to go forward unhindered.[27]

As has been the case in its major anti-Kurdish operations of the recent past, Turkey's offensive in Northern Iraq has relied heavily on U.S.-supplied equipment. Reports in the European press have indicated that Turkey's air war against the PKK (and against a number of Kurdish settlements and refugee camps) in Northern Iraq has been conducted almost entirely with U.S.-designed fighter planes such as the McDonnell Douglas F-4, the Lockheed F-104, and the Lockheed Martin F-16. Other U.S.-supplied aircraft such as the Textron-Bell Cobra helicopter gunship and the United Technologies/Sikorsky Black Hawk troop transport have also been used in support of Turkey's move into Iraq.[28]

U.S. support of the Turkish intervention is based on the assumption that it is a carefully crafted defensive operation aimed at wiping out PKK bases in Iraq, with little or no negative impact on Kurdish civilians. But press reports from the area have raised serious doubts regarding Turkey's claim that it has been mounting a "surgical strike" against terrorists. Turkey's ongoing war against the PKK, both in Northern Iraq and Southeastern Turkey, is looking increasingly like it may become that nation's Vietnam: a draining, divisive, and ultimately unsuccessful effort to defeat a nationalist movement by military means. An April 2nd news analysis piece by John Pomfret of the Washington Post—appropriately entitled "Turkey's Hunt for the Kurds: the Making of a Quagmire?"—captured the dilemma faced by Turkish troops in Northern Iraq as they attempted to sort out Kurdish PKK militants from Kurdish civilians (both Turkish and Iraqi) in the area:

... by embracing a military answer to what it considers a terrorist question, Turkey risks bogging its army down in a vicious cycle of incursion and withdrawal, followed by guerilla counterattacks and more incursions again. Such a cycle, Western officials have said, would only empty government coffers overtaxed by an ailing economy and a similar counterinsurgency operation within Turkey." [29]

A western relief worker underscored the futility of Turkey's military strategy when he told Pomfret "you can't wipe out a terrorist operation that operates on two continents by attacking the mountains. It's like killing a fly with a sledgehammer." Turkish

soldiers reported a conundrum similar to that faced U.S. forces in Vietnam—an inability to distinguish friend from foe. One soldier told the Post "we have a big problem because we don't know who is a villager and who the PKK is . . . we can't do a thing." [30]

Unfortunately, contrary to the soldier's report, Turkish troops did plenty of things in Northern Iraq, including a number of documented cases of killings and displacement of Kurdish civilians. There is no way of knowing at this point whether these were isolated incidents or part of a larger pattern of abuse, because at a number of key stages in the conflict Turkish military commanders limited access to the combat zones on the part of both journalists and relief workers.[31] At the end of March, during the second week of the Turkish invasion, residents of the Iraqi village of Beshile reported that their village had been bombed and burned to the ground by Turkish forces. Fevzi Rashid, a 43 year old farmer who witnessed the Turkish attack, described it to a reporter from Reuters news service as follows:

"First the planes bombed our village. Then soldiers came some days later and burned our houses. Yesterday they came again and fired at the village with rockets and mortars." [32]

Turkey's claim to be targeting only PKK terrorists has been further undercut by assertions by the Iraqi National Congress, the Iraqi Kurdish organization that controls most of the territory impacted by the Turkish invasion, that on the very first day of the invasion "Turkish soldiers . . . arrested hundreds of refugees as suspected followers of the Kurdish Workers' Party." [33]

Although the Clinton Administration firmly held to its position that the Turkish invasion would be limited in duration and narrow in focus, one expected withdrawal date—Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller's April 19th visit to Washington—came and went with no final timetable for withdrawal in sight. A partial pullback of Turkish troops in late April of 1995 still left at least 10,000 Turkish troops inside Iraq, and there is some dispute even now as to whether all Turkish troops have cleared out of the area (see discussion below). In contrast to the policy of Germany, which has cut off all weapons shipments to Turkey in response to the Iraqi incursion, the Clinton Administration's position on the Kurdish question appears to be "Turkey right or wrong." [34] The U.S. arms industry has officially weighed in on the side of the Turkish government's tactics as well, in the form of a comment by Joel Johnson, chief lobbyist for the Aerospace Industries Association, to the effect that Turkey's military plan was no different from what other global and regional powers have done in similar circumstances:

"It must be acknowledged that the Turks have not invented Rolling Thunder. We used B-52s to solve a guerrilla problem [in Vietnam]. The Russians used very large weapons platforms [in Afghanistan]. And the Israelis get irritated on a reasonably consistent basis and use F-16s in Southern Lebanon. One wishes that it didn't happen. Sitting in the comfort of one's office, one might tell all four countries they're wrong. It's a lot easier to say that here than when you're there and it's your military guys who are getting chewed up." [35]

Setting aside for a moment the obvious moral issues raised by massive bombing raids as a tool of modern warfare, it must be pointed out that Johnson's statement glosses over a key strategic point: in two of the three examples he cites, Vietnam and Afghanistan, the "Rolling Thunder" tactic was employed by great powers that were ultimately defeated militarily and politically by

smaller, better motivated nationalist forces. Even staunch allies of the current Turkish regime might find reason to advise Prime Minister Ciller to abandon her country's current military strategy vis-a-vis Kurdish separatist forces.

In response to a growing international outcry against the Turkish government's tactics in its war against the PKK, the Clinton Administration has repeatedly urged Turkey to stop its indiscriminate approach of bombing and depopulating entire villages. Congress has gone beyond rhetoric by withholding 10% of Turkey's U.S. military aid for F.Y. 1995 pending a report on abuses against civilians by the Turkish military. In December 1994, Human Rights Watch published a report entitled "U.S. Cluster Bombs for Turkey?" which called for a reversal of a plan to provide advanced U.S.-built CBU-87 cluster bombs to Turkey on the grounds that the weapons might be used against civilians. As a result of the pressure generated by the report, the cluster bomb sale has been shelved for the moment.[36]

Despite these efforts to restrict the flow of U.S. arms to Turkey's war against the PKK, the United States remains Turkey's number one weapons supplier, and Turkey's inhumane warfighting tactics continue. As of the first week of May, 1995, Turkish officials claimed to have removed all of their troops from Northern Iraq, but Prime Minister Ciller has stated in no uncertain terms that she retains the right to invade the area again if Turkey detects further PKK activities there.[37] So far, moves to curb Turkey's use of imported weaponry have had no discernible impact on Ciller's approach to the Kurdish problem: she told members of her governing coalition in early April that "we have one thing to say to those who threaten us about using their arms when they should be standing by us—we will use our right to defend ourselves under any circumstances. You can keep your weapons." [38] Maybe it's time for President Clinton to take Prime Minister Ciller up on her offer.

Afghanistan: Beginning during the late 1970s under the Carter Administration and accelerating during the 1980s under the Reagan Administration, the United States supplied rebel factions in Afghanistan with an estimated \$2 billion in covert military assistance.[39] This effort has been widely cited as one of the great success stories of the Reagan Doctrine of arming anticommunist rebels, and there is no question that U.S. weapons supplies contributed to the ability of Afghan guerrilla fighters to drive Soviet forces out of their country. Unfortunately, the longer term consequences of U.S. arms supplies to Afghan forces have been far more problematic. Since Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan in February 1989, U.S. weapons have helped to sustain a vicious civil war amongst competing rebel organizations inside Afghanistan. In addition, systems supplied to the Afghan factions for purposes of fighting off Soviet forces are now being resold on the international market, turning up in conflicts where they were never intended to be used.

As Ted Galen Carpenter of the Cato Institute has noted, "[e]ven before they ousted the Soviet-backed government from power in April 1992 feuding mujahadin guerrilla units spent almost as much time battling each other as they did fighting the communists." Far from setting the stage for a period of peaceful reconstruction and reconciliation, the fighting inside Afghanistan actually intensified after the Soviet-supported regime was overthrown—2,000 people were killed in one three-week period in August of 1992, and by the spring of 1994 600,000 people had been displaced from the capital city of Kabul. Much of the equipment used on each side of

the Afghan civil war comes from stocks supplied to the various rebel factions by the CIA during the 1980s. [40]

The violence sparked by U.S. weapons and training to the Afghan rebel movements extends far beyond Afghanistan. An Algerian government official has described the existence of a "floating army" of Islamic fundamentalist fighters who received weapons and training in Afghanistan starting in the 1980s, and are now mounting terrorist attacks on U.S.-backed governments in Algeria, Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. [41] This international network of armed Islamic fundamentalists that the CIA helped to create has struck in the United States as well: two of the men convicted in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center had received weapons and explosives training from CIA-backed rebels in Afghanistan prior to their attack in New York. And these two men may not be the only examples of U.S. covert aid backfiring. According to David Whipple, the former head of counterterrorism at the CIA, "some of the people who are actual or potential terrorists in this country are former guerrilla fighters in Afghanistan." And it now appears that the suspects in the recent murders of several U.S. embassy employees in Karachi, Pakistan are also suspected of having ties to the CIA's Afghan weapons pipeline.[42]

One of the most dangerous lingering side effects of the CIA's Afghan weapons trafficking has been the proliferation of U.S.-built Stinger missiles. The Stinger, a shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile that can be used to shoot down anything from a fighter plane to a civilian airliner, has been described by Senator Dennis DeConcini as "the ultimate terrorist weapon." [43] Afghan rebel commanders have been putting their U.S.-supplied Stingers up for sale to the highest bidder in the international arms bazaar, and there have been reports that some of the weapons have now turned up in such unlikely places as Iran, Libya, Qatar, and North Korea. [44] The CIA was so disturbed by these reports that they put up \$65 million for a Stinger "buyback" plan; so far the program has only succeeded in driving up the price that Afghan forces can get for the missiles to two to three times their original price, while recovering very few of the missiles. [45]

The shortsighted attitudes of U.S. policymakers involved in creating the Afghan weapons pipeline were summarized by Edward Juchniewicz, the CIA's associate director for covert operations during the Reagan Administration:

"The Iranians have already captured or otherwise obtained some Stingers and continue to accumulate them. I can understand why people are exercised. I wouldn't want one to hit the airplane I'm on . . . [but] one makes the assumption when one goes to battle that one's equipment will be captured by the enemy. So unfortunately, we lost some Stingers, and now our enemy has one of our best weapons." [46]

What Juchniewicz fails to acknowledge is that the Stingers that were transferred to Iran were not captured by an enemy in battle; they were provided to Iran by Afghan rebel forces that had been considered friends of the United States.

While the spread of U.S.-supplied Stinger missiles poses an ongoing threat because of their possible role in augmenting the capabilities of terrorist organizations, the tens of thousands of tons of light weaponry that the CIA funneled to Afghan factions through its contacts in Pakistani intelligence services may pose an even more serious risk to the stability of South Asia. Analysts of the Afghan conflict have reported that during the 1980s the United States purchased literally

hundreds of thousands of combat rifles from such diverse sources as China, Turkey, Egypt, and Israel and passed them on to Afghan rebel groups.[47] However, as British researcher Chris Smith has noted, many of these weapons were siphoned off along the way, because the Afghan pipeline was "extremely badly organized and poorly thought out," to the point that it "leaked profusely and virtually ruptured." As a result, the Northwest Frontier area of Pakistan is dotted with a series of open air weapons marts that are doing a brisk business reselling weapons that were originally intended to go to Afghan rebel forces. Pakistani intelligence officials have been running guns to Islamic fundamentalist forces in the India province of Kashmir, increasing the level of violence of that conflict and undermining efforts to encourage India and Pakistan to come to a diplomatic resolution of the Kashmir issue. Sikh militants fighting in the Punjab region of India have large quantities of Chinese Type 56 assault rifles of the kind that were supplied in large numbers by the CIA to the Afghan war, indicating a likely spillover of the Afghan pipeline into this conflict as well. U.S.-supplied weapons have also been utilized by Islamic fundamentalist fighters engaged in a civil war against Russian-backed government in the former Soviet republic of Tajikistan.[48]

In reviewing the evidence of the spread of U.S.-supplied guns and ammunition that was originally intended for the Afghan war, Human Rights Watch has observed that "[t]he single most important factor in the introduction of small arms and light weapons into South Asia was the effort by the U.S. and Pakistan to arm the Afghan mujahidin resistance." [49]

Indonesia: Governed by one of the world's longest enduring military rulers, General Suharto, Indonesia also has one of the worst human rights records of any major U.S. weapons client. There is direct evidence that some of these human rights violations have been carried out using U.S.-supplied equipment.

In addition to restrictions on freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and labor rights within Indonesia, the Indonesian government has sustained an illegal military occupation of neighboring East Timor for nearly 20 years. In November of 1991, two U.S. journalists, Allan Nairn and Amy Goodman, witnessed a massacre carried out by Indonesian troops in the Timorese capital of Dili. The troops, armed with U.S.-supplied M-16 rifles, opened fire on a memorial mass and procession in honor of a young Timorese man who had been murdered by the Indonesian army for attempting to speak out about human rights abuses in East Timor.[50] Human rights abuses by Indonesian forces have continued up to the present, both in East Timor and within Indonesia; a recent summary of Indonesia's record of Human Rights Watch described "a pattern of abuse . . . characterized by military intervention in virtually all aspects of Indonesian public life and by the arbitrary exercise of authority by President Soeharto." [51]

The massacre in Dili and subsequent actions of the Indonesian military have sparked calls by the public and the Congress for a cutoff of U.S. military assistance, training and sales to the Indonesian government, but so far these demands have only been partially met. In October of 1992 Congress cut off U.S. assistance to Indonesia under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. In 1994, the Clinton administration announced that it would stop permitting arms sales or export licenses to Indonesia for deals involving small arms or crowd control equipment.[52]

Despite these steps, there continues to be a significant flow of U.S. weapons to Indonesia, adding to the more than \$583 million in U.S. weapons deliveries to that nation from F.Y. 1984 through F.Y. 1993. In 1993, the last year for which full data is available, U.S. deliveries to Indonesia through the Pentagon's Foreign Military sales program and commercial sales licensed by the State Department topped \$34 million. And the most recent statistics from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency demonstrate that for a five year period ending in 1991, the U.S. supplied 38% of all weapons imported by the Indonesian government; for the period from 1991 to 1993, the U.S. share of Indonesia's weapons imports dropped slightly, to 33%. As this report was going to press, Defense News reported that the Clinton Administration was seriously considering giving clearance for a multi-billion dollar sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Indonesia; the article reported some ambivalence within the administration, noting that "White House officials . . . realize they must tiptoe around congressional sensitivity over killings and arbitrary arrests in the former East Timor." [53]

Other examples: In addition to these specific examples of the utilization of U.S.-supplied weapons in active areas of conflict, there is strong circumstantial evidence to indicate that U.S. systems have either already been used or may yet come into play in a host of other wars. The mere fact that U.S. weapons have been delivered to 45 of the 50 current localities that are in the midst of significant conflicts in one strong indication that U.S. weapons are involved in many of today's wars.

Moving from statistical evidence to actual cases, a few recent examples should suffice to demonstrate the myriad ways in which U.S. weaponry may be used in ethnic and territorial conflicts.

Guatemala has been on the front pages of American newspapers in recent months because of revelations that CIA-financed Guatemalan military officers were involved in the murders of Efraim Bamaca Velazquez (a Guatemalan rebel leader who was the husband of Jennifer Harbury, an American lawyer and anti-war activist), and Michael DeVine, an American citizen who owned a farm in Guatemala before he was killed in 1990. Ironically, it took the deaths of an American and the husband of an American citizen to focus widespread media attention on the routine use of U.S. arms to promote murder and torture in Guatemala. As R. Jeffrey Smith and Dana Priest noted in a Washington Post piece that ran after the revelations of CIA complicity in these two deaths, "while U.S. public attention was distracted by civil wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua, the CIA and U.S. military trained and equipped anti-communist military forces widely believed to have killed more than 100,000 peasants during a decades-long simmering insurgency, according to U.S. intelligence, military, and diplomatic officials." Once the Cold War aura of anti-communist "legitimacy" is removed from these activities, an objective view of the behavior of U.S.-backed Guatemalan forces reveals that they have been engaged in a campaign of systematic terror against their own people for over three decades. [54]

As if the obscene spectacle of U.S. government funds supporting the murder of a U.S. citizen were not evidence enough that U.S. arms policies towards Guatemala have gone seriously awry, subsequent revelations about the CIA's role in Guatemala raise even more troubling questions.

From 1986 through 1991, the United States accounted for 86 percent of all weaponry imported by the Guatemalan military. In response to ongoing human rights abuses in

Guatemala in general and the murder of Michael DeVine in particular, U.S. military assistance to Guatemala was officially suspended by the Bush Administration in 1990. As far as the public, the media, most members of Congress, the Secretary of State, and even the U.S. ambassador to Guatemala were concerned, this cutoff of military aid meant that the U.S. government's role in arming and financing the Guatemalan military had been brought to an end. This reasonable assumption turned out to be dead wrong.

In the wake of the revelations about the Guatemalan military's role in the murders of Michael DeVine and Efraim Velazquez, Tim Weiner of the New York Times revealed that from the moment official U.S. aid to Guatemala was suspended in 1990, the CIA immediately initiated a multi-million dollar program of payments to key Guatemalan military and intelligence officials. The payments, which were allegedly aimed at "maintaining good relations" with Guatemalan security officials, totaled \$5 to \$7 million per year, more than twice the level of the public U.S. military aid that was terminated by the Bush Administration. Among the recipients of CIA funds was Col. Alpirez, the principal suspect in the murders of Michael DeVine and Efraim Velazquez. [55]

In addition to the secret CIA payments, investigative journalist Allan Nairn has uncovered documentation of 144 separate sales of rifles and pistols to Guatemala from U.S. sources, all of which occurred after the 1990 aid cutoff. [56]

As the Clinton Administration and the Congress proceed with separate investigations of the Guatemalan arms scandal, they will have to consider new, tougher safeguards over the CIA's role in the covert arming and financing of foreign military and intelligence services. Otherwise, there will be no guarantee that the will of the President, the Congress, or the public will be respected in future arms sales relationships. The CIA's conduct in Guatemala brings to mind a remark made by former New Hampshire Senator Warren Rudman with respect to another covert arms trafficking scheme run amok, Iran/contra: "If you carry this to its logical extreme, you don't have a democracy any more." [57]

When Mexico moved to put down the rebel uprising in the southern state of Chiapas in early 1994, they initially used some of the nearly three dozen helicopters that the United States had supplied to the Mexican Attorney General's office for use in anti-narcotics activities. Under questioning from Congress, Assistant Secretary of State Alexander Watson acknowledged that "USG-supplied helicopters were being used in Chiapas," but argued that their use was acceptable because "[s]enior officials assured our Embassy that the helicopters were used in a logistical, noncombat role." [58] Since a "logistical" function for the U.S.-supplied helicopters could include the militarily essential task of transporting troops and equipment to the front, the assertion regarding a "noncombat role" is misleading at best.

In March of 1994, the San Antonio Express-News reported that the Mexican government was "quietly importing millions of dollars worth of riot control vehicles across the Texas border, apparently in preparation for any civil unrest after the late-summer presidential election." The systems imported from the United States included the 17-ton Cobra riot control vehicle, equipped with water cannon and dye guns that can be used to "mark" troublesome demonstrators for later identification by the police; and the 12-ton Textron armored water cannon, which can spray with an impact of 120 pounds at a range of up to 50 feet. Pro-democracy activists in Mexico roundly condemned the sale.

Apparently, the vehicles have yet to be utilized to put down any major demonstrations, but given the continued political turbulence in Mexico they may yet be used for that purpose. [59]

In February of 1995, Newsday reporter Ray Sanchez reported that U.S.-supplied Black Hawk helicopters were being used to ferry troops to Chiapas in the Mexican government's abortive attempt to round up the top leadership of the Zapatista movement. There is a strong possibility that U.S. weaponry will be used again if there is further civil strife in Mexico: the Mexican government has taken delivery of over \$300 million worth of U.S. weaponry over the past decade, and U.S. deliveries accounted for over three-quarters of Mexican weapons imports in the most recent five year period for which information is available. [60]

The Bush Administration's initiative to utilize military assistance to help Andean nations fight the "war on drugs" has led to a number of documented instances of the use (and abuse) of U.S.-supplied weaponry in conflicts having little or nothing to do with the problem of drug interdiction. As the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) noted in its 1991 report "Clear and Present Dangers; The U.S. Military and the War on Drugs in the Andes", under the impetus of the Bush policy "the Andean region has supplanted Central America as the main locus of U.S. military activity in the hemisphere." In the first three years of the 1990s, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia were slated to receive more U.S. military assistance than all of Central America combined, with the rationale of providing equipment and training that could be used to fight drug trafficking in those countries. Despite rhetoric about shifting its emphasis toward reducing demand for drugs in the United States, the Clinton Administration has carried on the Bush policy of providing substantial amounts of military assistance to Andean, Central American, and Caribbean nations for use in anti-narcotics efforts. [61]

In Colombia, Black Hawk helicopters and Textron/Cessna A-37 counterinsurgency aircraft that were supplied as part of the Bush Administration's September 1989 emergency antidrug aid package to that nation were used just a few months later in a series of bombing raids against the village of Llana Fria that resulted in the displacement of 1,400 peasants. The Colombian military claimed that the raids were aimed at leftist guerrilla forces—clearly not a purpose that was covered in the original rationale for the emergency U.S. weapons shipments. To make matters worse, a report by the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) indicated that "witnesses claim that the attacks were not aimed at guerrilla camps, as the military said, but at civilian settlements." In a statement that proved to be prophetic, WOLA Executive Director Alexander Wilde warned in a June 1990 congressional hearing that funneling U.S. aid to the Colombian armed forces under the guise of fighting drugs would just "further fuel the crisis of human rights abuse [in Colombia] . . . and undermine political stability, by strengthening the Colombian armed forces." Five years and hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. military aid later, Colombia has made little progress in stemming the flow of cocaine from its territory to the United States; in fact, in March of 1995 the Clinton Administration stopped just short of cutting off all U.S. aid to Colombia as punishment for the current government's lackluster efforts to bring members of the drug cartels to justice. [62]

When tensions between Ecuador and Peru erupted into a full-scale border war in January of 1995, it marked the latest case in



which the United States has provided substantial amounts of weaponry to both sides of a conflict.

Ecuador received over \$111 million in U.S. Military equipment between F.Y. 1984 and F.Y. 1993. U.S. shipments accounted for more than 33% of all Ecuadorean weapons imports in the most recent five year period, and 50% of all such shipments from 1991 through 1993. In the five years following the announcement of the Bush Administration's Andean antidrug initiative, Ecuador has received \$21 million in security assistance from the United States, including military grants and training, giveaways of excess U.S. Defense equipment, and balance of payments assistance under the Economic Support Fund program (ESF).<sup>[63]</sup> A passage on the aid program for Ecuador in the 1993 edition of the joint Pentagon/State Department Congressional Presentation on Security Assistance provided an ironic foreshadowing of precisely how the U.S. Weaponry provided to that nation for the fight against drugs would prove useful in its 1995 jungle border war with Peru:

"The proposed FY 93 FMF [Foreign Military Financing] program will provide vehicles, aircraft spare parts, and communications equipment to improve military mobility in remote regions. It will also provide weapons and ammunition."<sup>[64]</sup>

This increased mobility apparently proved useful to Ecuadorean forces during the early weeks of the war, as they seized a decidedly remote border zone in the Amazon jungle.

When Peru counterattacked to win back the captured territory, its armed forces were also well equipped with U.S. Weaponry. Although U.S. Military aid to Peru has been an on again, off again affair in recent years due to questions raised by Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori's imposition of martial law, the United States still managed to ship \$136 million worth of military equipment to Peru between F.Y. 1984 and F.Y. 1993. In all, U.S. sources supplied 6% of Peru's total arms imports between F.Y. 1987 and F.Y. 1991, increasing slightly to 8.5% between 1991 and 1993. Protestations over Fujimori's record notwithstanding, the United States supplied over \$293 million in security assistance to Peru between F.Y. 1990 and F.Y. 1994, mostly in the form of cash payments under the Economic Support Fund (ESF) program.<sup>[65]</sup> A presentation to Congress on the F.Y. 1992 aid proposals for Peru provides a capsule summary of the kinds of assistance and training that the United States has attempted to provide to the Peruvian government and armed forces in the period leading up to the 1995 border war with Ecuador:

"The proposed FY 1992 FMF [Foreign Military Financing] program will provide individual troop equipment, small arms and heavy weapons and ammunition, communications equipment, vehicles, river patrol boats and spare parts for previously-provided aircraft and helicopters. ESF [Economic Support Funds] will provide balance of payments support and fund alternative development activities in coca-growing areas and judicial reform activities. IMET [International Military Education and Training] will provide professional military education, technical, management, and special police antinarcotics training, and training to improve military and police human rights practices."<sup>[66]</sup>

Important elements of this ambitious aid program were sidetracked in April of 1992 when President Fujimori imposed martial law, but previous U.S. weapons and training (not to mention hundreds of millions of dollars in aid provided under the Economic Support Fund program) left a substantial mark on the shape and size of the Peruvian armed forces. In a February 1995 briefing for foreign

correspondents at the presidential palace in Lima, Fujimori noted that one of the Peruvian aircraft that was shot down in the air war with Ecuador was an A-37 attack plane, a U.S. counterinsurgency aircraft that is manufactured by the Cessna division of Textron and nicknamed the "Dragonfly."<sup>[67]</sup>

In Asia, the fastest growing arms market in the world, U.S. weapons are playing a central part in a critical conflict as well.

The government of the Philippines has been waging counterinsurgency campaigns against the New People's Army (NPA) and several other indigenous guerrilla movements for over two decades. The United States has taken sides in this civil war by supplying the Philippine government with over \$619 million worth of U.S. weaponry over the past decade. The U.S. supplied 93% of the Philippine government's arms imports from 1987 through 1991, dropping to 75% for the period from 1991 through 1993.<sup>[68]</sup>

While there has been no detailed accounting of the role of U.S. weapons and training in the civil war in the Philippines, it is clear that at least some of the equipment being supplied by the United States has direct applications to counterinsurgency, and that the United States government has gone to some effort to obscure this fact. For example, when the United States made its first report to the United Nations arms register in 1993, it indicated a delivery of nine "combat aircraft" to the Philippines, with no further description. When the Philippines reported on its weapons imports for that same year, they indicated receipt of 19 (not nine) combat aircraft, and they identified the planes as Rockwell OV-10A Broncos, an aircraft designed specifically for counterinsurgency missions.<sup>[69]</sup> In early April, the International Herald Tribune reported that Philippine forces had used U.S. supplied Broncos to conduct bombing raids against Muslim guerrilla forces near the city of Zamboanga.<sup>[70]</sup>

The war in Afghanistan is not the only instance of U.S. covert weapons assistance being misused long after the original purpose of that assistance has passed. In Angola, where the U.S. provided approximately \$250 million in covert weapons shipments to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement between 1986 and 1991, U.S.-supplied systems were utilized extensively in UNITA's efforts to shoot its way into power and overturn the results of U.N.-sponsored elections. A November 1994 report by Human Rights Watch notes that "U.S.-made 106mm recoilless rifles mounted on four-wheel-drive vehicles have been particularly popular with UNITA." The report also recounts Angolan government assertions that they have captured U.S.-made antitank missiles, mortars, and grenade launchers from UNITA forces. As in Afghanistan, UNITA forces in Angola also received Stinger anti-aircraft missiles from the United States during the 1980s, although the Bush Administration apparently got the Stingers back from UNITA by swapping them for "less sensitive lethal equipment."<sup>[71]</sup> As of early 1995, it appeared that UNITA was finally prepared to put down its arms as part of a United Nations sponsored demobilization plan; but the question remains whether the Angolan civil war could have been ended years sooner with considerably less loss of life if the United States and other major arms suppliers hadn't provided hundreds of millions of dollars worth of armaments to both sides in that twenty year conflict.

Last but not least, when a civil war erupted in Yemen at the end of 1994, reporting focused on Soviet-origin weaponry utilized by the government of Yemen, along with the possibility that some of it had been maintained with the assistance of Iraqi advisors. Less attention was paid to the fact that the

Yemeni government also had access to 11 F-5E fighters, 50M60A1 tanks, and 70 M113 armored personnel carriers that it had inherited from the government of North Yemen (a former U.S. ally) when North and South Yemen merged. Despite reports that the U.S. government withheld spare parts for U.S. systems during the conflict, at least four of the F5-Es and an unknown number of the U.S.-supplied tanks and armored personnel carriers were utilized in the conflict.<sup>[72]</sup>

### III. Strengthening Potential Adversaries: The Boomerang Effect

One of the most striking features of U.S. arms sales policy since the end of the Cold War has been the regularity with which U.S.-supplied weapons have ended up in the hands of U.S. adversaries. The last four times the United States has sent troops into conflict in substantial numbers—in Panama, Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti—they faced forces on the other side that had received U.S. weapons, training or military technology in the period leading up to the outbreak of hostilities. While representatives of arms exporting companies have argued that this "leakage" of U.S. weaponry to potential adversaries has been minimal (see section II, above), the statistical evidence tells a different story.

Panama: When President Bush ordered U.S. troops into Panama in December of 1989 to capture Panamanian President Manuel Noriega and bring him back to the United States to face trial on charges of drug trafficking and money laundering, they faced a Panamanian defense force that had been to a considerable extent made in the U.S.A. Panama received \$33.5 million in U.S. weaponry under the FMS and commercial sales programs during the 1980s, and the U.S. accounted for 44% of Panama's weapons imports in the five years leading up to the invasion. Equally important, a large part of the Panamanian officer corps had been trained by the United States military: from 1950 through 1987, 6,695 Panamanian military personnel received training under the Pentagon's International Military Education and Training program (IMET), at a cost of \$8.3 million.<sup>73</sup> Although U.S. troops encountered minimal resistance in their effort to capture Noriega, the Panama invasion was the first incident in a disturbing pattern that has characterized every major U.S. military intervention since the end of the Cold War: U.S. forces going into battle against forces that have been armed or trained by their own government.

Iraq: Despite recent efforts by the defense industry and the Clinton Administration to argue that the United States did not arm Iraq in the period leading up to the 1991 Gulf War, there is ample documentation demonstrating that the Reagan and Bush administrations supplied critical military technologies that were put directly to use in the construction of the Iraqi war machine. There is also strong evidence indicating that the executive branch's failure to crack down on illegal weapons traffickers or keep track of third party transfers of U.S. weaponry allowed a substantial flow of U.S.-origin military equipment and military components to make their way to Iraq.<sup>74</sup>

The differences in perception regarding the degree to which the United States government helped to arm Iraq center around the fact that the most significant U.S. contributions to the Iraqi military complex were not through direct transfers of guns, tanks, helicopters, or other finished weapons systems, but rather through supplies of so-called "dual use" technologies. This misunderstanding was at the heart of the misleading press coverage of the Justice Department's investigation of the BNL affair, a scandal involving provision of U.S.-guaranteed loans to

Iraq by the Atlanta branch of Italy's state-run Banca Nazionale del Lavoro. For example, a headline in the New York Times announced that "Inquiry Finds No U.S. Involvement in the Iraqi Arms Buildup," and the Washington Post reported that the Justice Department's lead investigator, John Hogan, had asserted that "Washington appears to have authorized the sale to Saddam only of some communications gear and a single pistol." In fact, the Justice investigators made it clear in their summary of findings that their mandate was not to assess the extent to which U.S. exports may have contributed to Iraq's military production capabilities but rather to "determine whether chargeable crimes could be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." The report went on to note that "[b]ecause our inquiry was limited in that way, this report is not intended either to criticize or to approve of any policy decisions." [75]

To craft a policy for the future that avoids "another Iraq," it is necessary to undertake precisely the task that the Justice Department's investigators viewed as outside their purview: a critical analysis of the policy-making process regarding transfers of militarily useful equipment to the Baghdad regime during the period from 1985 through 1990. As for the types of equipment that were approved for sale to Iraq, the Justice Department report acknowledges that hundreds of dual use items with applications to military production were approved for export to Iraq in the five years prior to the Gulf conflict of 1990-91. The Iraq issue was never about pistols—it has always been about the transfer of weapons production technology.

The first step in understanding the United States contribution to the Iraqi military buildup prior to the 1991 Gulf War is to look at the concept of dual use technologies. Dual use items include everything from unarmed light aircraft or helicopters that can be adapted to military uses, to instruments of torture like thumbscrews, to equipment like computers, machine tools, and measuring devices that can be applied to the production and testing of civilian or military products. Between 1985 and 1990, the U.S. Department of Commerce granted licenses for more than \$1.5 billion in dual use exports to Iraq, more than \$500 million of which was delivered before the outbreak of the Gulf War in August of 1990. [76] Under pressure from Congress and the public, in March 1991 the Commerce Department released a list of the dual use licenses it granted for exports to Iraq in the five years leading up to the conflict. Even a casual perusal of the list makes it evident that many of these items were put directly to work in Iraq's military research and production network. In addition to items that were licensed for export to obvious military end users like the Iraqi Air Force or the Iraqi Atomic Energy Agency, the list included numerous licenses for equipment that was being sent to Saad 16, a military production complex south of Baghdad that is known, among other things, as the center for Iraq's research and production work on ballistic missiles. [77] Congressional investigators later learned that even this list, which revealed significant U.S. contributions to Iraq's defense industrial base, was incomplete and misleading; at least 68 entries had been changed to obscure their military applications. [78]

While the Commerce Department's licensing process provided the most direct channel for U.S. assistance to Iraq's military buildup, there were also significant transfers of U.S. military technology and knowhow through indirect channels. When Chilean arms dealer Carlos Cardoen decided to sell Iraq \$400 million worth of cluster bombs along with the technology for Iraq to build

its own cluster bomb factory, he apparently did so with the acquiescence of several agencies of the U.S. government. According to Nasser Beydoun, a Lebanese-born arms dealer who worked as Cardoen's U.S. representative, the CIA was aware of the deal but "looked the other way" because Cardoen and his associates had been helpful in a covert CIA plan to provide missile technology to South Africa. In addition, investigators for ABC News discovered that in 1986 the U.S. Patent Office had improperly granted Cardoen a patent for his own version of a U.S. cluster bomb design, at a time when Chile was ineligible to receive cluster bombs from the United States. [79] Howard Teicher, who served on Ronald Reagan's National Security Council from 1982 to 1987, has made even more explicit charges of U.S. involvement in Cardoen's scheme to ship cluster bomb technology to Iraq. In a recent sworn statement filed in federal court in Miami, Teicher asserts that under the direction of William Casey, the CIA "authorized, approved, and assisted" Cardoen's effort to give cluster bombs to Iraq, because Casey believed that the weapons would be "the perfect force multiplier" for Iraq to fight off Iran's strategy of sending "human waves" of attackers against Iraqi positions during the Iran/Iraq war. [80] Whether due to oversight or wilful negligence, U.S. government agencies helped smooth the way for Cardoen's transfer of U.S.-origin cluster bomb know-how to Iraq.

Another major source of weapons for Iraq was Canadian-born artillery specialist (and naturalized U.S. citizen) Gerald V. Bull. During the 1970s Bull ran his firm, the Space Research Corporation, on a 10,000 acre site on the Vermont/Canadian border. It was here that he developed the technology for the G-5 155mm howitzer, a state-of-the-art artillery piece notable for its extensive range. Bull received considerable help at key stages in his career from various agencies of the U.S. government. Before he set up his U.S.-based company, he was granted U.S. citizenship under a rare special act of Congress sponsored by Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-AZ). During the period when Bull was perfecting his howitzer design, Space Research benefited from millions of dollars worth of contracts from the U.S. Army. According to former CIA Angola station chief John Stockwell, in the mid-1970s Bull was assisted by the CIA in setting up a lucrative deal with to supply howitzers, artillery shells, and howitzer production technology to South Africa for use in its war against the government of Angola. When this deal was uncovered, Bull was prosecuted for violations of U.S. arms export laws and served four and one-half months in the U.S. federal prison at Allenwood, Pennsylvania. However, the Customs Service investigator who made the case against Bull has argued that the Justice Department let Bull off relatively easily because his illegal acts were linked to a CIA covert operation.

After Bull was released from prison in 1980, he set up shop in Belgium, marketing his howitzer technology to a customer list that included both China and Iraq. Because Bull was a U.S. citizen and his howitzer technology was developed in the United States, he was required under U.S. law to receive clearance from the State Department's Office of Munitions Control in order to market this system internationally; despite his prior conviction for violating U.S. export laws, the State Department readily granted Bull clearance to sell his guns on the world market. Iraq ended up purchasing Bull-designed G-5 howitzers from both South Africa and Austria. In the case of the Austrian sales, U.S. officials were aware that the guns were being sold to both Iran and Iraq, by lodged protests with the Austrian government only

with respect to the sales to Iran. Bull's most ambitious project, helping Iraq to build a "supergun" that would allegedly have been capable of launching a projectile from Baghdad to Tel Aviv, was cut short when he was assassinated in March of 1990. [81]

One final example of U.S. government complicity in the arming of Saddam Hussein is the case of Sarkis Soghanalian, who for years worked as an arms dealer for Iraq out of offices based at the Miami airport. Among the deals that Soghanalian worked on from his U.S. base were a successful scheme to send 26 Hughes MD-50 helicopters to Iraq and a failed deal to procure Romanian uniforms for Iraqi military forces. Soghanalian has maintained publicly that his arms deals with Iraq were not challenged during the 1980s because key U.S. government agencies were "in on the deal," a claim that is lent some credence by the fact that he operated so openly as an arms procurement agent for Saddam Hussein without any interference from U.S. intelligence or law enforcement agencies. He was finally convicted on charges of illegally selling helicopters to Iraq in the fall of 1991, long after his services as one of Saddam Hussein's most valued arms brokers had been rendered irrelevant by Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War. [82]

When he learned of the details of U.S. government acquiescence in Gerald Bull's various illegal arms transactions at the height of the Gulf conflict, Rep. Howard Wolpe (D-MI) reacted angrily, with a statement that could just as easily been applied to the whole executive branch approach to private arms dealers and producers like Cardoen, Bull, and Soghanalian:

"The bottom line here is that because we have been so lax in our enforcement of American laws we are now finding American-made technology in the hands of the Iraqi forces that are pointing their cannons at American soldiers. That's outrageous." [83]

Somalia: The U.S. arms supply relationship with Somalia presents a textbook case of what can go wrong when short-term political interests outrank long-term strategic considerations in U.S. arms transfer decisionmaking. From the end of the Carter Administration in 1979 through beginning of the Bush Administration in 1989, the regime of Maj. Gen. Mohammed Siad Barre received roughly \$1 billion in U.S. military and economic aid, including \$154 million in weapons deliveries under the foreign military sales and commercial sales programs. U.S. arms deliveries accounted for 31% of Somalia's arms imports from 1985 to 1989, making the United States Somalia's top weapons supplier during the period leading up to the overthrow of the Barre regime and the outbreak of clan warfare in Somalia. [84]

The rationale for U.S. arms aid to Somalia was pure Cold War geopolitics. The Carter Administration decided that Somali ports and airfields would be useful as stepping stones for a potential military intervention in the Middle East by the new U.S. Rapid Deployment Force (since renamed and reorganized as the Central Command). The Carter and Reagan Administrations justified this new arms relationship with Somalia (which was a Soviet arms client during the 1970s) as a straight quid pro quo: U.S. arms were swapped for access to Somalia military facilities such as the port of Berbera. An added argument for supplying the Somalia regime was the fact the Somalia's larger neighbor, Ethiopia, had recently fallen out of the U.S. orbit and allied itself with the Soviet Union. A run through the executive branch's justifications to Congress from the 1980s for shipping weaponry to Somalia provides a virtual catalog of wishful thinking regarding how U.S. arms supplies might somehow turn

around what was obviously a rapidly deteriorating security situation. Time and again, despite mounting human rights abuses and an emerging civil war, Pentagon and State Department officials justified the arms flow to Siad Barre's regime on the grounds that it would "foster stability." [85] the most unintentionally ironic statement of the U.S. policy of ignoring instability in Somalia and pressing ahead with military-related assistance was offered by the Bush Administration in a 1991 presentation to Congress:

"Prior to the civil war, ended by a January 1991 coup, we urged the Siad Barre government to improve human rights, undertake real political reform and promote national reconciliation. \* \* \* Despite the adverse impact of the civil war and the coup of U.S.-Somali relations, our interests in the region remain the same. The new Somali government has expressed an interest in resuming bilateral relations, and may be willing to undertake several democratic reforms which we support". [86]

This analysis was offered in support of offering U.S. military training to the new Somali government. A new round of fighting within Somalia ensured shortly thereafter, and a year and one-half later President Bush sent U.S. troops to Somalia as part of a United Nations force charged with imposing some semblance of order upon rival armed factions that were threatening the delivery of humanitarian relief to a beleaguered and malnourished Somali populace. From 1991 to 1993, the United States has supplied 100% of all new weaponry imported by Somalia's governing coalition.

When Siad Barre was overthrown in January of 1991, much of the weaponry that the United States had so diligently supplied to his government during the 1980s fell into the hands of the rival factions that carried on the civil war that served as the rationale for the dispatch of U.S. troops to that nation in December of 1992. Despite the usual assertions that U.S. weapons deliveries to Somalia were largely "defensive" or "nonlethal" equipment, the U.S. provided significant quantities of small arms, including 4,800 M-16 rifles, 84 106mm recoilless rifles, two dozen machine guns, 75 81mm mortars, and an unspecified quantity of land mines. Larger weaponry included 24 M-113 armored personnel carriers, 18 155mm towed howitzers, and 448 TOW anti-tank missiles. The smaller items on this list, including the M-16s, machine guns, recoilless rifles, and land mines, were precisely the kinds of weaponry that were utilized by the forces of the warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed and other Somali factions in their fighting with U.S. and United Nations troops posted to Somalia. While the U.S. was far from the only supplier to add to the atmosphere of armed chaos that took hold of Somali society, U.S. weapons delivered during the 1980s played a significant role, first in supporting the regime of Siad Barre in its campaign of terror against his own population, and then in supporting the warfighting capabilities of the Somali factions involved in the civil war that carried on after Barre was overthrown. [87]

Haiti: When President Clinton decided to dispatch U.S. troops to Haiti in late 1994 to clear the way for the restoration to power of Haiti's elected leader, Jean Bertrand Aristide, most of the media attention was focused on the last minute shuttle diplomacy carried out by former President Jimmy Carter retired Gen. Colin Powell, and Senator San Nunn. There was very little discussion of the historic U.S. role in arming and training the Haitian military and intelligence forces that United States troops were sent to keep in check. From F.Y. 1984 to F.Y. 1993, the United States delivered \$2.6 million worth of weaponry to Haiti under the FMS

and commercial sales programs. This seemingly modest amount was significant by the standards of Haiti, which maintains 7,000 personnel in its armed forces and spends on average only about \$50 million per year on its military budget. Of equal importance, during the past ten years the United States has trained 164 members of the Haitian officer corps. In addition, from 1986 through 1991, U.S. intelligence agencies were secretly arming and training key military and intelligence officials in Haiti at a cost of up to \$1 million per year, allegedly for the purpose of assisting in the interdiction of illegal narcotics. Taking into account these secret weapons shipments, total U.S. arms deliveries to Haiti during the period from 1987 through 1991 exceeded 25% of total Haitian arms imports. Key U.S.-designed equipment in the Haitian military's inventory include six Cadillac Gage V-150 Commando armored personnel carriers (a vehicle specially tailored for "riot control"), two Cessna 337 aircraft armed with rockets, and a variety of naval equipment and small arms. [88]

While the Haitian mission proceeded remarkably smoothly, with minimal U.S. casualties, the question remains whether past U.S. supplies of arms, training, and intelligence resources to a series of military-dominated regimes in Haiti may have unnecessarily complicated Haiti's transition to democracy, calling forth an intervention that might have been prevented if sounder arms transfer decisions had been made by the United States during the 1970s and 1980s.

#### IV. Taking Control: Reforming the Arms Transfer Decisionmaking Process

Contrary to recent claims of the Clinton Administration and other key participants in the arms export debate, U.S. weapons are decidedly not limited to responsible suppliers who are using them strictly for legitimate defensive purposes. When 90% of the world's ongoing conflicts involve parties that have received U.S. weaponry; when the last four major U.S. troop deployments have been against adversaries that received arms, training, or military technology from the United States; and when U.S. weapons are utilized to kill innocent civilians and abuse human rights in Indonesia, Turkey, Angola, and Guatemala, something is clearly wrong with the arms transfer decisionmaking process. This section makes specific recommendations for promoting greater accountability in arms transfer decisions, in the hopes of preventing a repetition of the disastrous arms deals that have been documented in this report.

#### *Recommendation 1: Pass the arms transfer Code of Conduct bill*

In February of 1995, Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR) and Representative Cynthia McKinney (D-GA) reintroduced legislation calling for the establishment of a Code of Conduct for U.S. weapons transfers (bill number H.R. 772 in the House and bill number S. 326 in the Senate). Under the Code, governments that engage in aggression against their neighbors, violate the human rights of their own citizens, come to power through undemocratic means, or refuse to participate in the United Nations arms register would not be eligible to receive weaponry from the United States. If the President wanted to make an exception for a specific country on national security grounds, he would have to ask Congress to pass a bill providing an exemption for that nation.

The benefits of the Code of Conduct would be twofold. First, it would place considerations and the character of a given arms receipt and how that nation might use U.S. weaponry up front in the arms transfer decisionmaking process, preventing sales to unstable regimes in the process. Second,

even in cases where the President sought an exemption, members of Congress would be forced to go on the record for or against, providing a measure of public accountability that rarely occurs that rarely occurs under current law.

Under current procedures, if a major arms sale does not involve the provision of U.S. assistance, Congress can choose whether or not to vote on the deal; failure to vote signals acquiescence in the sale. Of the 50 to 100 major arms sales notified to Congress each year, the vast majority of them are not subjected to a vote, scrutinized in hearings, or debated on the floor of the Congress. And in the more than twenty years since Congress first acquired the power to vote down arms sales, it has never successfully done so. There have been a few "close calls" such as the 1981 Saudi AWACS sale. There have also been a few cases where the executive branch has withdrawn a deal or reduced it in size to avoid a battle with the Congress, such as the 1986 decision by the Reagan Administration to forgo additional sales of F-15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia (a decision which was reversed by the Bush Administration when it offered the Saudis 72 F-15s in 1992). But on the whole, the current system has allowed tens of billions of dollars in arms sales to be made every year with very little in the way of congressional scrutiny or public input. The Code of Conduct bill would correct this deficiency by stimulating the kind of vigorous public debate that should be a fundamental requirement for making decisions on transfers of weaponry that can have dangerous and unforeseen consequences for United States and international security. [89]

#### *Recommendation 2: Provide more detailed reporting on U.S. transfers of arms and military technology, and press for other nations to do the same.*

Although the United States generally discloses more information on sales of arms and military technology than any other major weapons supplying nation, there are still a number of significant gaps in reporting that to make it difficult (and in some cases impossible) to assess the potential impacts of U.S. transfers to a given regime.

At the high end of the trade, prospective sales of fighter planes, tanks, and advanced attack helicopters, and other sophisticated systems are routinely reported to the Congress for its approval or disapproval. However, this information is not always made readily available to the public in a timely fashion. During the 1970s, the unclassified portions of all major proposed arms sales were routinely reprinted in the Congressional Record, thereby allowing interested members of the public to inform themselves about prospective weapons exports and make their voices heard to the Congress when it would still make a difference (Congress currently has thirty calendar days to disapprove or acquiesce in a given sale). This practice was discontinued in the early 1980s, allegedly because of Pentagon concerns that releasing this data would reveal too much information about the "order of battle" of U.S. weapons clients. In the interests of stimulating an informed debate, Congress should return to the practice of printing the details of all major arms sales proposals in the Congressional Record. [90]

At the mid-to-low end of the trade, there is no longer any regular U.S. government reporting on the trade in small arms or "light weaponry"—the rifles, mortars, light vehicles, land mines, and ammunition that are frequently the weapons of choice in today's ethnic conflicts and civil wars. This was not always the case. Up through fiscal year 1980, the State Department issued an annual report under Section 657 of the Foreign Assistance Act that listed every item of military

equipment delivered from the United States to any foreign country in the prior fiscal year, ranging from rifles and bullets on up to advanced combat aircraft. The report was discontinued during the Reagan Administration, but the information upon which it was based is still regularly collected by the Pentagon's Defense Security Assistance Agency and the State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls. The section 657 report should be reinstated as an annual publication, to provide a tool for keeping track of potential abuses of U.S.-supplied weaponry by undemocratic regimes or nations at war with their neighbors. The report should be widely disseminated in the Congress, the media, and among interested members of the general public.[91]

Finally, a full accounting of U.S. arms transfer policy must include regular, detailed reporting on U.S. transfers of so-called "dual use" equipment—items such as advanced machine tools and computers, measuring instruments, or unarmed light helicopters and aircraft. These items can either be adapted for military use, or, more importantly, utilized to build advanced weapons systems. If Congress and the public had been aware of the particulars of the nearly \$1.5 billion in dual use export licenses that the Commerce Department granted to companies seeking to sell equipment to Iraq during 1985 through 1990, some of the more dangerous items on the list might not have been approved for sale. In keeping with the findings of a 1991 Congressional review of U.S. export procedures in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, legislation should be passed requiring the Commerce Department to make public the details of its dual use licensing decisions, including the type of equipment and company involved, the value of the proposed sale, and the institution within the recipient country slated to receive that equipment.[92]

If these steps toward greater transparency regarding U.S. transfer of weapons and militarily useful technology are implemented, the United States will be in a much stronger position to press for increased reporting by other major suppliers.

The United Nations arms register currently excludes reporting on important categories such as small arms and dual use technologies. The Clinton Administration should press to have small arms added to the UN arms register, so that the weapons of choice in today's ongoing wars are covered by this important international monitoring mechanism. For dual use items, in addition to pressing for consultation on sale of major items in the context of developing a successor regime to the Cold War-era Coordination Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom), the administration should press for some form of international, public reporting system on dual use sales. This might take the form of an annual report by the members of a Cocom successor regime detailing major dual use licenses granted during the previous year, or a voluntary reporting mechanism that could run in parallel to the United Nations arms register.

*Recommendation 3: The Pentagon and the intelligence community should publish regular reports on the use of U.S.-supplied weaponry in ongoing conflicts*

All too often, U.S. weapons are supplied on a "fire 'em and forget 'em" basis: the decision to sell is made basis on short-term political, strategic, or economic considerations, with little thought given to how these arms might be used a few years down the road. The classic cases of this syndrome are the "runaway weapons" that U.S.-backed Afghan rebel forces have been putting up for sale on the world market during the 1990s and U.S. arms supplies that fell into the

hands of eventual U.S. adversaries in Panama, Iraq, Somalia and Haiti (see sections III and IV, above). In an attempt to prevent this "boomerang effect" from repeating itself in the future, Representative Cynthia McKinney sponsored a successful amendment to the Fiscal Year 1995 Department of Defense Authorization bill requiring the Pentagon to report annually on how proposed arms transfers might create "increased capabilities" on the part of potential adversaries, and how they might "pose an increased threat" to U.S. forces in some future conflict. The amendment also requires the Pentagon to "present alternative strategies for regional security based on mutual reductions in the size, spending, and capabilities of forces and among agreements among arms supplying nations to join the United States in reducing or halting military cooperation activities." [93] Representative McKinney's amendment represents an important first step toward shifting the terms of the debate over U.S. arms transfers toward consideration of the long-term dangers of unrestrained weapons trading rather than the apparent short-term political and economic payoffs of a given arms deal.

As a further step in the right direction, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency should be required to file annual reports on how U.S.-supplied weaponry is being put to use in current conflicts, either by the original recipients, or as the result of unauthorized transfers to third parties. These reports could serve as a running record of the consequences of past U.S. weapons trading activities, and they would hopefully inject a note of caution into Congressional debates over new proposed transfers. The institution of this reporting mechanism would mark a sharp break from past practice, which indicates that in some instances the intelligence community hasn't even been keeping close tabs on its own covert weapons shipments, much less reporting them to the Congress or the public. For example, the Justice Department's final report of its investigation of the U.S. role in arming Iraq contained the following troubling description of the CIA's handling of information on its arms sales activities: "Is one instance, it took the CIA two months to identify the intended recipient of weapons shipped at the CIA's request." [94]

*Recommendation 4: Outlaw covert weapons shipments*

From Iran/contra to the arming of Iraq to the ongoing proliferation of weapons originally intended for Afghan rebel movements, covert weapons trafficking has been the driving force behind a series of unmitigated foreign policy fiascoes.

Whatever rationale there may have been for covert weapons trading during the Cold War, it is no longer a viable policy instrument in today's unpredictable international security environment. The cases of covert weapons trading gone awry that have been documented in this report—Afghanistan, Iran/contra, Iraq, Guatemala, and Haiti—provide ample indication that secret wheeling and dealing in weapons does more harm than good, both by subverting the democratic conduct of U.S. foreign policy and by damaging U.S. credibility and standing in the international community. As part of his restructuring of the CIA, President Clinton should shut down its covert operations directorate and press for legislation outlawing all forms of secret weapons trading by any U.S. government agency.[95]

*Recommendation 5: The Clinton Administration (or its successor) should vigorously pursue a policy of multilateral arms transfer restraint designed to limit sales of conventional weaponry to regions of conflict or repressive regimes*

Contrary to the findings of the Clinton Administration's new conventional arms transfer policy, Presidential Directive 41, limiting the spread of weaponry to regions of conflict should be the paramount priority governing U.S. arms transfer decisions in the post-Cold War era. Economic and defense industrial base concerns should take a back seat to efforts to construct a multilateral arms export control regime that can serve as a tool for preventing conflicts, and for limiting their duration and severity once they break out. At a time when the United States controls 72% of new arms sales agreements with the developing world, U.S. leadership remains an essential prerequisite for any meaningful multilateral arrangement for limiting the flow of conventional armaments.[96]

#### FOOTNOTES

1. On this point see Lora Lumpe, "Arms and No Influence," *Arms Sales Monitor*, No. 27, Washington, DC, Federation of American Scientists, November 30, 1994; and Dr. Louis J. Samuelson, editor, *The Management of Security Assistance* (Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio: April 1991), p. 51.

2. Richard F. Grimmett, *Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1986-1993*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 1994).

3. The list of fifty conflicts was compiled by the author, drawing upon the following sources: Ted Robert Gurr, "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 38, No. 3, September 1994, pp. 347-377; Peter Wallensteen and Karen Axell, "Mayor Armed Conflicts," in *SIPRI Yearbook 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 81-95; and David Binder and Barbara Crossette, "As Ethnic Wars Multiply, U.S. Strives for a Policy," *New York Times*, February 7, 1993. The list utilized in this study includes all "major conflicts," defined by SIPRI as "prolonged combat between military forces of two or more governments, or of one government and an organized armed group, and incurring the battle-related deaths of at least 1,000 people during the entire conflict. This study also covers all but a handful of the smallest wars covered in Gurr's list of "Serious and Emerging Ethnopolitical Conflicts in 1993-94." Gurr's list uses a more inclusive standard, namely deaths incurred "directly through fighting or massacres or indirectly through starvation, disease, and displacement, from the beginning of its current phase through mid-1993."

4. Wallensteen and Axell, op. cit., p. 80.

5. Because the Peru-Ecuador border war erupted in January of 1995, it is not covered in the statistical appendix, but it is discussed in the text (see section II, below).

6. Outside of the major producers in the developed world—the United States, Russia, Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom—there are only a handful of nations that can be considered self-sufficient (or nearly so) in armaments production. If one considers only smaller, less sophisticated systems such as rifles, mortars, and light military vehicles, the number of countries with significant indigenous production capabilities increases to perhaps two to three dozen. But even in these cases it is clear that arms imports have a substantial impact on the levels at which violent conflicts can be sustained. Unfortunately, trade in small arms (also referred to as "light weapons" by some analysts) is the least well documented aspect of the international arms trade, even though it probably accounts for the bulk of the weapons systems that are actually utilized in current ethnic conflicts. For two recent accounts of the state of the small arms trade, see Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and Laura Reed, editors, *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons* (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995); and Swadesh Rana, *Small Arms and Intrastate Conflicts* (New York: United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, February 1995). In addition, the Arms Project at Human Rights Watch has done pathbreaking case studies on the trade in small arms that have been used in massacres and systematic human rights violations, most notably Arming Rwanda: *The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan*

War (New York: Human Rights Watch Arms Project, January 1994).

7. This narrow emphasis on preventing transfers to "rogue states" is at the heart of the Clinton Administration's approach to arms sales, as embodied in Presidential Directive 41, which was released in February of 1994; in addition, the Clinton foreign policy team has maintained the Bush Administration double standard of denouncing Russia and China for particular weapons deals they have entered into the Middle East and Asia at the same time that the United States dominates the overall arms market in each of these regions. For a critical analysis of the "rogue state" strategy, see Michael T. Klare, *Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New Foreign Policy* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).

8. It is a commonplace in discussions with representatives of U.S. industry and arms sales policymakers in Washington to hear the refrain that "the French will sell to anybody," or words to that effect. While criticism of French arms transfer policy is certainly justified by France's recent record of providing arms that were used in devastating wars such as the 1991 Gulf conflict and the slaughter in Rwanda, Paris is hardly the only world power that needs to reexamine its weapons export practices.

9. Richard M. Nixon, *The Real War* (New York: Random House, 1980), p. 197.

10. On aggression by U.S. arms clients during the Nixon era see William D. Hartung, *And Weapons for All* (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 25-26.

11. Steven R. Weisman, "Reagan Lifts Ban on Sending Israel 16 Jet War Planes," *New York Times*, August 18, 1981; and Lee Lescaze, "Reagan Lifts Ban on Delivery of 16 Jets to Israel," *Washington Post*, August 18, 1981.

12. On this point see Chapter 13, "Clinton Policy: Arms Control or Business As Usual?" in William D. Hartung, *And Weapons for All* (New York: HarperCollins, paperback edition, 1995).

13. Statement of Lt. Gen. Teddy G. Allen, Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans, and Environment of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, June 16, 1993.

14. Wording of the administration's policy goals is taken verbatim from "Fact Sheet: Conventional Arms Transfer Policy," White House Press Office, Washington, DC, February 17, 1995.

15. *Ibid.* See also Thomas E. Ricks, "Arms Sales to Take Into Account Effect on Industry," *The Wall Street Journal*, November 16, 1994.

16. Don Fuqua, President, Aerospace Industries Association, "Merchants of Peace," *Aerospace Industries Association Newsletter*, Volume 7, Number 5, November 1994, p. 3.

17. Ethan Kapstein, "America's Arms Trade Monopoly," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 3, May/June 1994, p. 18.

18. See appendix A, Table I for details on U.S. transfers to fifty current conflicts. Data used for this analysis is drawn from two principal sources: U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance Agency, *Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1993* (Washington, DC: DSAA, 1994), tables 2 and 6; and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1991-92* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1994), Table III. For further details on sources, see the footnotes to Table I in Appendix A, below.

19. See Appendix A, Table I.

20. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, *U.S. Cluster Bombs for Turkey?* (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 1994), p. 9.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 11; see also British American Security Information Council, *Fueling Balkan Fires: The West's Arming of Greece and Turkey*, Project on the Arms Trade Report 93.3, (Washington, DC: BASIC, 1993), and British American Security Information Council, "US-German Arms Exports and Greece at a Record High," May 20, 1994.

22. For an overview of Turkey's military industrialization drive and the role of U.S. and other foreign firms in helping to sustain it through coproduction and licensing deals, see Gulay Gunluk-Senesen, "An Overview of the Arms Industry Modernization Program in Turkey," in *SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 521-532.

23. For the best review of the evidence on the Turkish armed forces use of U.S.-supplied systems against the PKK, see *U.S. Cluster Bombs for Turkey?*, op. cit., pp. 4-6.

24. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, *Turkey: Forced Displacement of Ethnic Kurds from Southeastern Turkey* (Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, October 1994), p. 4.

25. "Turkey Unleashes a Massive Raid on Kurdish Bases in Turkey," *International Herald Tribune*, March 21, 1995.

26. *Ibid.*

27. Department of Defense News Briefing by Dennis Boxx, March 21, 1995, official DoD transcript.

28. "Turkey Unleashes," op. cit., note 25; "Turkish Army Readies Final Assault on Kurd Pockets," *International Herald Tribune*, March 25-26, 1995; and John Barham, "Turkish Army Invades Iraq to Strike at Turkish Bases," *Financial Times* (London), March 21, 1995.

29. John Pomfret, "Turkey's Hunt for the Kurds: The Making of a Quagmire?," *Washington Post*, April 2, 1995.

30. *Ibid.*

31. "UN Evacuates Kurds from Path of Turkey's Offensive," *International Herald Tribune*, March 27, 1995; "Turkey Plays Down Criticism of Assault," *International Herald Tribune*, March 29, 1995; and Pomfret, "Turkey's Hunt," op. cit.

32. Suna Erdem, "Iraqi Kurds Say Turkey Torched Their Town," *Washington Post*, March 30, 1995.

33. "Turkey Unleashes," op. cit.

34. "Germany Withholds Materiel Over Drive on Kurds," *International Herald Tribune*, March 30, 1995.

35. David Morrison, "Turkish War Concern for America," *National Journal*, April 15, 1995.

36. U.S. Cluster Bombs for Turkey, op. cit., pp. 9-10; and Thomas W. Lippman, "Rights Group Seeks to Block Proposed Cluster-Bomb Sale to Turkey," *Washington Post*, December 28, 1995.

37. "Turkish Aid Says Troops Have Left Iraq," *New York Times*, May 5, 1995. The article actually cites conflicting reports from two different Turkish officials—Turkish Defense Minister Mehmet Golhan is quoted as saying "We have no one there . . . We have withdrawn them all and we only have security measures on the border." However, the article goes on to indicate that "Deputy Prime Minister Hikmet Cetin said . . . that a few troops still remain in Northern Iraq, but he did not give details."

38. John Pomfret, "Turkish Premier Assails Kurdish Attack's Critics," *Washington Post*, April 5, 1995.

39. Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: U.S. Policy Options," *Congressional Research Service Issue Brief*, November 29, 1993, p. 15.

40. Ted Galen Carpenter, "The Consequences of Afghanistan," *World Policy Journal*, Vol. XI, No. 1, Spring 1994, p. 77.

41. Jim Hoagland, "No More Frankensteins," *Washington Post*, July 13, 1993.

42. Tim Weiner, "U.S. Will Try to Buy Antiaircraft Missiles Back From Afghans," *New York Times*, July 24, 1993; on the ties of the World Trade Center suspects to Afghan weapons training camps, see Caryle Murphy, "U.S. Policies Trouble Egypt," *Washington Post*, August 1, 1993 and Tim Weiner, "Blowback from the Afghan Battlefield," *New York Times Magazine*, March 13, 1994.

43. William D. Hartung, "Proliferation's Profiteers," *CEO/International Strategies*, February/March 1993.

44. Molly Moore, "Missile Buyback Stumbles," *Washington Post*, March 7, 1994; and Tim Weiner, "U.S. Will Try to Buy Back Antiaircraft Missiles from Afghans," op. cit.

45. David Rogers, "U.S. to Buy Back Some of Missiles Held by Afghans," *Wall Street Journal*, January 15, 1993.

46. Weiner, "U.S. Will Try to Buy Back . . ." op. cit.

47. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, *India: Arms and Abuses in Indian Punjab and Kashmir*, (Washington: Human Rights Watch, September 1994), pp. 5-11.

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49. Human Rights Watch, *India: Arms and Abuses*, op. cit., p. 5.

50. Matthew Jardine, "Weapons for Genocide in East Timor," *San Francisco Examiner*, May 31, 1993; and Allan Nairn, "A Narrow Escape from East Timor," *USA Today*, 11/21/91.

51. Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights Watch World Report 1995* (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 1994), p. 157.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 162; and Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights Watch World Report 1993* (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 1992), pp. 177-178.

53. For the sources of the statistics cited in this paragraph, see appendix, Table I; for the quote on the potential sale of F-16s to Indonesia see "F-16 Sale to Indonesia Gains Wider Support," *Defense News*, May 1-7, 1995.

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55. Tim Weiner, "Guatemalan Agent of CIA Tied to Killing of American," *New York Times*, March 23, 1995; Tim Weiner, "CIA's Workaday Cloak," *New York Times*, April 5, 1995; and Tim Weiner, "Retracting Words, White House Halts CIA Money to Guatemala," *New York Times*, April 5, 1995.

56. Alan Nairn, "CIA Death Squad," *The Nation*, April 17, 1995.

57. The Warren Rudman quote is cited in Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, *Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the 1980s* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1988), p. 19.

58. "Mexico: The Uprising in Chiapas and Democratization in Mexico," Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, February 2, 1994 (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1994), p. 103.

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60. Ray Sanchez, "Mexican Army Maneuvers In—Crackdown Overshadows Elections," *New York Newsday*, February 13, 1995; see also Appendix Table I.

61. *Washington Office on Latin America, Clear and Present Dangers: The U.S. Military and the War on Drugs in the Andes*, (Washington, DC: WOLA, October 1991), p. 1.

62. Testimony of Alexander Wilde, Executive Director, *Washington Office on Latin America*, to the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, June 6, 1990; Daniel Williams, "Colombia Remains Ally in Drug Fight," *Washington Post*, March 2, 1995; and "No Hail to Colombia," (unsigned editorial), *Washington Post*, March 6, 1995.

63. Data on U.S. aid and arms transfers to Ecuador is from U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance Agency, *Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1993* (Washington, DC: DSAA, 1994); and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1991-92* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1994), Table III.

64. U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, *Congressional Presentation on Security Assistance, F.Y. 1993*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State/Department of Defense, 1992), p. 156.

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66. U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, *Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance, F.Y. 1992* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State/Department of Defense, 1991), p. 252.

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68. See appendix Table I.

69. *United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: Report of the Secretary General* (New York: United Nations General Assembly, October 11, 1993), pages 83 and 111.

70. "Philippine Planes Bomb Guerrillas," *International Herald Tribune*, April 21, 1995.

71. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, *Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 Elections* (New York: Human Rights Watch, November 1994), p. 47.

72. Philip Finnegan, "Yemen's Iraqi Use Irks U.S.," *Defense News*, December 5-11, 1994.

73. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance Agency, *Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Foreign Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1990* (Washington, DC: DSAA, 1991); and United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1990* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1991), Table III.

74. See statements by Joel Johnson and Don Fuqua of the Aerospace Industries Association (referenced in footnotes 16 and 17, above).

75. John M. Hogan, *BNL Task Force Final Report—Report to the Attorney General*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, October 21, 1994—released to the public in January of 1995); Neil Lewis, "Inquiry Finds No U.S. Involvement in the Iraqi Buildup," *New York Times*, January 24, 1995; and Serge F. Kovaleski and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Justice Department Find No BNL Conspiracy," *Washington Post*, January 24, 1995.

76. Michael Wines, "U.S. Tells of Prewar Technology Sales to Iraq Worth \$500 Million," *New York Times*, March 12, 1991.

77. U.S. Department of Commerce, "Fact Sheet on Export Licensing for Iraq," with attached computer printout, March 1991.

78. Statement of Henry Gonzalez, Chairman, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, at Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, on the Issue of Appointing a Special Counsel on Matters Relating to Iraq, June 2, 1992, p. 7; and *Congressional Record*, March 16, 1992, pp. H1274-H1282.

79. Andy Pasztor, "Investigators Say Chilean Dealer Smuggled U.S. Weapons to Iraq," *Wall Street Journal*, November 20, 1991; ABC News Nightline, show 2609, transcript, May 23, 1991; Kenneth Timmerman, *The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq*, (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), pp. 167-170 and 250; and ABC News 20/20, "Made in the U.S.A.," February 1, 1991.

80. Dean Baquet, "U.S. Supplied Arms to Iraq, Ex-Aide Says," *New York Times*, February 5, 1995.

81. For a capsule history of Gerald Bull's arms trafficking activities and his relationships with various U.S. government agencies, see William D. Hartung, *And Weapons for All* (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 195-197 and 235-236.

82. Hartung, op. cit., pp. 189-90 and 236-237.

83. "The Man Who Made the Supergun," *Frontline* transcript, (Boston, MA: WGBH-TV, February 12, 1991).

84. William D. Hartung, "Somalia and the Cycle of Arms Sales," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 22, 1993; U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1990*, op. cit.; and Richard F. Grimmett, "Somalia: Arms Deliveries," *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, October 28, 1993.

85. U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, *Congressional Presentation on security*

assistance programs, op. cit., editions for F.Y. 1980 through 1992.

86. *Congressional Presentation*, op. cit., F.Y. 1992 edition, p. 273.

87. See Appendix A, Table 1; and Grimmett, "Somalia: Arms Deliveries," op. cit.

88. See Appendix Table I; Tim Weiner, Stephen Engelberg, and Howard French, "CIA Formed Haitian Unit Later Tied to Narcotics Trade," *New York Times*, November 14, 1993; and Jane's Defense Weekly *Global Update: Flashpoints and Conflicts*, August 1994, pp. 21-24.

89. For a brief history of Congressional procedures for reviewing arms sales, see Chapter 3, "Congress Steps In," in William D. Hartung, *And Weapons for All*, op. cit. pp. 45-62; and Richard Grimmett, *Executive-Legislative Consultation on U.S. Arms Sales* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1982).

90. As of the early 1980s, it was still possible to construct a list of major U.S. arms sales proposals by tracking the announcements of new letters of offer that were reprinted in the *Congressional Record*; for an example of an analysis conducted using this data, see William D. Hartung, "Weapons for the World Update—1982," *New York Council on Economic Priorities*, 1982, it is still possible to track major U.S. arms sales through a combination of Pentagon press releases and notices in the industry press, but this method can result in time lags that limit the ability of the public to learn about major sales proposals and make their views known to Congress before the 30 day period within which Congress can vote down a sale has passed. For current efforts to track major arms sales, see the "Deals in the Works" section in Lora Lumpe, ed., *Arms Sales Monitor* (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, published 8 to 10 times per year); and Sarah Walkling, *ACA Register of U.S., U.S. Arms Transfers*, (Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, February 1995).

91. The idea of reinstating the section 657 reports has been put forward in recent years by a number of

non-governmental organizations, including Human Rights Watch, the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), and the Project on Demilitarization and Democracy. See Natalie J. Goldring and Otfried Nassauer, "Available Sources and Data: The Trade in Light Weapons," paper prepared for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences Conference, "International Trade in Light Weapons," February 24-25, 1994; and Stephen D. Goose and Frank Smyth, "Arming Genocide in Rwanda," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, no. 5, September/October 1994, pp. 86-96.

92. *Strengthening the Export Licensing System: First Report by the Committee on Government Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 40-53.

93. Lora Lumpe, editor, *Arms Sales Monitor*, No. 27, (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, November 30, 1994), p. 9.

94. John M. Hogan, "Addendum to the BNL Task Force—Final Report," (Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice, 1995), p. 3.

95. Caleb Rossiter of the Project on Demilitarization and Democracy suggested prohibiting covert arms supplies and training in his February 22, 1994 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, noting that "[C]overt aid programs corrupt the recipient precisely because they are covert and have no leverage . . . If we are to engage in aiding foreign forces, we should do so openly." A summary of Rossiter's testimony appears in Lora Lumpe, editor, *Arms Sales Monitor*, No. 24, (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, March 15, 1994), pp. 4-5.

96. See White House Press Office, "Fact Sheet: Conventional Arms Sales Policy," and "Fact Sheet—Criteria for Decisionmaking on U.S. Arms Exports," February 17, 1995; and Richard Grimmett, *Conventional Arms Sales to the Third World*, F.Y. 1986-F.Y. 1993, op. cit.

APPENDIX A: U.S. ARMS DELIVERIES TO AREAS OF CONFLICT, 1984-1993

Region/Conflict (Major conflicts in bold) <sup>1</sup>	U.S. deliveries, 1984-1993 (\$ millions) <sup>2</sup>	Last year U.S. Arms delivered <sup>3</sup>	Percent of imports provided by U.S. 1987-91/1991-93 <sup>4</sup>	Other suppliers <sup>5</sup>
<b>Europe:</b>				
1. <b>Former Yugoslavia</b> (Conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia/Herzegovina) .....	\$163.4 .....	1991	13/0	Russia, Germany, Slovakia, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia.
2. Spain (Govt. vs. Basque Separatists) .....	4,003.6 .....	6 1993	85/86	France.
3. <b>United Kingdom</b> (British forces and protestant paramilitary groups vs. IRA) .....	6,318.5 .....	1993	100/95	
4. <b>Russia</b> <sup>7</sup> (Conflicts in Chechnya and North Ossetia) .....	None .....			NA
5. Moldova (Conflicts in Dniester region) .....	None .....			NA
6. <b>Georgia</b> (Conflicts in Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia) .....	None .....			NA
7. <b>Turkey</b> (Govt. vs. Kurdish separatists) .....	6,302.8 .....	1993	76/80	Germany.
<b>Middle East/North Africa:</b>				
8. <b>Azerbaijan</b> (Conflict with Armenia over Nagorno/Karabakh) .....	None .....			NA.
9. <b>Iraq</b> (Conflicts with Kurdish groups in the North and Shiite Muslim groups in the South) .....	4.4 <sup>8</sup> .....	1989	<1/0 (See <sup>8</sup> )	Former Soviet Union, China, France.
10. <b>Israel</b> (Vs. Palestine intifada through mid-1993 and vs. Hamas) .....	9,544.1 .....	1993	99/91	
11. <b>Algeria</b> (Govt. vs. Islamic militants) .....	105.2 .....	1993	1/0	Former Soviet Union, Egypt, China.
12. Morocco (Moroccan govt. vs. Western Sahara independence movement; UN referendum to be held) .....	404.0 .....	1993	26/76	France, other West European suppliers.
13. Egypt (Govt. vs. Islamic militants) .....	7,227.9 .....	1993	61/89	France.
14. <b>Sudan</b> (Govt. vs. Sudanese People's Liberation Army) .....	155.6 .....	1989	9/0	China, Middle Eastern suppliers, Italy.
15. Yemen (Civil war, North vs. South) .....	50.6 .....	1991	1/0 <sup>9</sup>	Former Soviet Union, China.
16. <b>Iran</b> (Govt. vs. Kurdish separatists, Mujahaddin guerillas) .....	Covert sales, value undisclosed <sup>10</sup> .....	NA	NA/0	Russia, China, European suppliers.
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa:</b>				
17. Mauritania (Govt. vs. black minority) .....	1.5 .....	1992	<1/0	Former Soviet Union.
18. Mali (Govt. vs. Tuareg ethnic group) .....	2 .....	1993	<1/0	Former Soviet Union, Middle Eastern sources.
19. Chad (Ongoing civil war between Anakaza and Bideyet ethnic groups) .....	50.3 .....	1993	27/25	France.
20. <b>Somalia</b> (Multi-sided clan warfare) .....	109.3 .....	1991	44/100	Italy.
21. Senegal (Govt. vs. Diola tribe) .....	13.6 .....	1993	11/100	France, other European suppliers.
22. <b>Liberia</b> (Govt. & West African peacekeeping forces vs. rebels led by Col. Charles Taylor) .....	33.4 .....	1990	40/0	Former Warsaw Pact, Middle Eastern sources.
23. Togo (Govt. vs. opposition forces, including members of Ewe tribe) .....	1.9 .....	1993	<1/0	Latin American sources.
24. Nigeria (Military-dominated govt. vs. pro-democracy forces; Hausa vs. Yoruba ethnic conflict) .....	82.4 .....	1993	9/2	Italy, Czechoslovakia, Former Soviet Union, France.
25. Uganda (Govt. vs. rebels based in Northern Uganda) .....	10.6 .....	1993	5/100	Former Soviet Union, Italy.
26. <b>Rwanda</b> (Hutu-dominated govt. vs. Tutsi minority; govt. overthrown by Rwandan Patriotic Front in 1994) .....	1.4 .....	1993	<5/0	China, France, Egypt, Uganda, South Africa.
27. Burundi (Ethnic conflicts between Hutu & Tutsi ethnic groups) .....	6 .....	1993	<1/0	Former Soviet Union.
28. Kenya (Ethnic conflicts in Rift Valley region sparked by supporters of President Moi) .....	100.2 .....	1993	25/100	U.K., France.
29. Zaire (Multiple rebellions vs. regime of President Mobutu) .....	55.9 .....	11 1990	17/0	China, France.
30. <b>Angola</b> (Govt. vs. UNITA rebels) .....	250-300 .....	NA	NA/0	Former Soviet Union (to Angolan govt.).
31. <b>South Africa</b> (Govt. & Inkatha Party supporters vs. ANC, through mid-1993; radical white ultra-nationalists vs. ANC govt.) .....	8.3 <sup>13</sup> .....	1988	NA/NA	See <sup>13</sup> .
<b>Asia:</b>				
32. <b>Tajikistan</b> (Govt. vs. Islamic opposition) .....	Rebels have rec'd U.S. weapons that were originally supplied to Afghan rebels by the CIA <sup>14</sup> .....	NA	NA/0	NA.
33. <b>Afghanistan</b> (Civil war among competing ethnic factions) .....	\$2B in covert military assistance provided by U.S. to Afghan rebel factions, 1980-1991. .....	1991	NA/0	Former Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia (financier).
34. Pakistan (Govt. vs. secessionist movements in Sindh and NW Frontier Province; conflict with India over Kashmir) .....	1,801.7 .....	1993	44/3	China.
35. <b>India</b> (Govt. vs. secessionist forces in Kashmir; govt. vs. Sikh militants in Punjab; govt. vs. secessionists in Assam; Hindu-Muslim conflict in state of Uttar Pradesh) .....	316.6 .....	1993	1/0	Russia, U.K., West European suppliers.
36. Bhutan (Govt. vs. ethnic Nepalese rebels) .....	0.2 .....	1992	<1/0	NA.
37. <b>Sri Lanka</b> (Govt. vs. Tamil insurgents; Sinhalese militants) .....	8.6 .....	1993	7/0	China.
38. <b>Bangladesh</b> (Govt. vs. Chittagong Hill People's Coordination Association) .....	16.7 .....	1993	4/5	Former Soviet Union, China.
39. <b>Myanmar (Burma)</b> (Govt. vs. Karen separatists, Islamic opposition) .....	6.2 .....	1989	1/0	China.
40. China (Govt. vs. Tibetan independence movement; govt. vs. Muslim secessionists in Xinjiang province) .....	423.9 <sup>15</sup> .....	1993	8/1	Russia.

APPENDIX A: U.S. ARMS DELIVERIES TO AREAS OF CONFLICT, 1984–1993—Continued

Region/Conflict (Major conflicts in bold) <sup>1</sup>	U.S. deliveries, 1984–1993 (\$ millions) <sup>2</sup>	Last year U.S. Arms delivered <sup>3</sup>	Percent of imports provided by U.S. 1987–91/1991–93 <sup>4</sup>	Other suppliers <sup>5</sup>
41. <b>Philippines</b> (Govt. vs. New People's Army)	619.3	1993	93/75	Italy.
42. <b>Cambodia</b> (Govt. vs. Khmer Rouge)	Covert assistance to rebel factions during 1980's; reports of U.S.-supplied Thai army transferring weaponry to Khmer Rouge <sup>16</sup> .	NA	NA/0	Former Soviet Union, China.
43. <b>Indonesia</b> (Govt. vs. independence forces in East Timor; govt. vs. separatist movement in Northern Sumatra)	583.3	1993	38/33	Germany, Netherlands, U.K., other European suppliers.
44. Papua New Guinea (Govt. independence movement on Bougainville island)	None			Former Soviet Union.
<b>Latin America:</b>				
45. <b>Guatemala</b> (Govt. vs. Guatemala National Revolutionary Unity)	35.8	<sup>17</sup> 1993	86/0	Israel.
46. Haiti (Govt. and paramilitary forces vs. democracy movement, through mid-1994; new govt. and UN forces vs. paramilitary groups 1994 on)	2.6 <sup>18</sup>	1992	<sup>19</sup> >25/0	Latin American sources.
47. <b>Colombia</b> (Govt. vs. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia; govt. vs. National Liberation Army)	647	1993	28/19	Brazil.
48. <b>Peru</b> (Govt. vs. Shining Path guerrillas; govt. vs. Tupac Amaru revolutionary movement)	136	<sup>21</sup> 1993	6/8	France, Former Soviet Union.
49. Brazil (Govt. vs. indigenous peoples of Amazon region)	528.8	1993	35/40	Germany, France.
50. Mexico (Govt. vs. rebel movement in Chiapas)	301.2	1993	77/64	

<sup>1</sup> This table reviews U.S. arms transfers to a list of fifty significant ethnic and territorial conflicts that were under way during 1993 or 1994. The informed reader will note that some of the conflicts listed here have since been resolved and/or reduced in intensity (for example, in South Africa and Angola), while other, new conflicts are not covered (such as the January/February 1995 Peru-Ecuador border war). For an explanation of how the list of conflicts was arrived at and the sources used in making that determination, see footnote 2 in the text, above. Countries listed in bold print represent major conflicts that have resulted in 1,000 or more battle-related deaths since the outbreak of the war.

<sup>2</sup> Unless otherwise noted, figures in this column are based on U.S. deliveries under the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and the commercial arms sales program (which involves items on the U.S. Munitions List and requires a license from the State Department); the source of the data is U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance Agency, "Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1993" (Washington, DC: DSAA, 1994). One of the main limitations of this data source (a limitation common to all other major compilations of data on the arms trade) is that it does not include covert arms sales or sales to non-government recipients such as militias, guerrilla movements, and rebel organizations that are major players in the majority of today's ethnic and civil conflicts.

<sup>3</sup> The figures on the last year U.S. arms were delivered is based on data on deliveries under the FMS and commercial sales programs in "Foreign Military Sales . . . Facts," op. cit. In many cases commercial arms sales are allowed to continue even after the U.S. government has cut off military aid and/or sales under the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales programs.

<sup>4</sup> Data on the percentage of a nation's imports provided by the United States is drawn from United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers," 1991–92 and 1993–94 editions (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1994 and 1995), Table III. The column on % of deliveries provided by the U.S. is divided into two time segments (1987–91 and 1991–93) separated by a slash. The one year overlap (1991) is covered in both series) is a function of ACDA reports the data in its 1991–92 and 1993–94 reports. The ACDA data are not directly comparable to the data on deliveries listed in column 2, because they cover a different range of equipment. The Pentagon's delivery figures include items considered to be weapons by virtue of their inclusion on the U.S. Munitions List. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) report uses a broader definition that includes "weapons of war, parts thereof, ammunition, support equipment and other commodities designed for military use . . . Dual use equipment, which can have application in both military and civilian sectors, is included when its primary mission is identified as military." Dual use equipment is by definition "not" included in the Pentagon's figures on deliveries under the FMS and CS programs. The time lag between the currency of the data on U.S. deliveries listed in column 2 and the ACDA data on the U.S. proportion of deliveries to each of the governments involved is a function of the slower schedule for the release of the ACDA data, which is no doubt in part a function of the greater difficulty of compiling information on arms deliveries and purchases by every nation in the world. As noted in note 2, above, the percentages listed here represent the proportion of weapons imported by the governments involved in each conflict that came from U.S. sources; there are no comparably reliable figures on supplies to non-state actors such as rebel movements and private militias. Listings of 0% are marked with an asterisk to denote the fact that according to ACDA's figures the country in question received no arms imports from any governmental source during the period covered—this does not mean that there were no weapons deliveries at all, but rather that there are no known deliveries by the government (i.e., weapons may have flowed through covert or private channels).

<sup>5</sup> Unless otherwise noted, identifications of other major suppliers are drawn from two sources: U.S. ACDA, "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers," Table III, op. cit., and Ian Anthony, Paul Claesson, Elisabeth Skons, and Siemon T. Wezeman, "Arms Production and Arms Trade," in "SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament" (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), Table 10B.3. Countries listed as other suppliers provided approximately 10% or more of a recipient government's imported weaponry in the most recent multi-year period covered by one or both of these sources. Since the periods covered begin before the breakup of the Soviet Union, all transfers involving constituent states of the former Soviet Union are identified as "former Soviet Union." In the case of ongoing arms transfer relationships, Russia is by far the most active arms exporting nation amongst the former Soviet Republics, although its total deliveries in recent years have been only a fraction of the levels achieved by the Soviet Union during the 1970s and 1980s.

<sup>6</sup> Since the main data source for this table only goes up through 1993, an indication that the last U.S. delivery was in 1993 does "not" mean that U.S. arms shipments have been halted, but rather that as of the end of 1993 the nation in question was an active, ongoing weapons client of the United States.

<sup>7</sup> Human rights monitors have reported war-related deaths in Russia's intervention in Chechnya at levels as high as 20,000 to 25,000; although some observers have argued that these figures are an overstatement, there seems to be no question that this qualifies as a major conflict (based on a standard of 1,000 or more battle-related deaths).

<sup>8</sup> This figure for U.S. arms deliveries to Iraq does not include the \$500 million in dual use items shipped to Iraq from the United States between 1985 and 1990, nor does it encompass covert shipments or sales of U.S. equipment via third parties. For a summary of these U.S. contributions to the Iraqi war machine, see the discussion of Iraq in section IV of the text, above.

<sup>9</sup> U.S. arms supplies to North Yemen from as early as 1978–79 made their way into the government arsenal of the combined state of Yemen formed by the merger of North and South Yemen; these shipments are not reflected in this table. For further discussion of this point, see section III, above.

<sup>10</sup> According to the final report of Iran/Contra special prosecutor Lawrence Walsh, the Oliver North/Richard Secord "enterprise" that ran the Iran/Contra arms operations for the Reagan Administration took in over \$47 million and delivered substantial quantities of military equipment to Iran, including over 1,000 TOW anti-tank missiles; on this point, see Lawrence E. Walsh, "Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, Volume I: Investigations and Prosecutions" (Washington, DC: Office of the Independent Counsel, August 4, 1993). In addition, according to a 1986 report in "Aviation Week and Space Technology," (Paul Mann and James K. Gordon, "Iran Secures Operational Gains from U.S.-backed Military Aid," "AW&ST," November 17, 1986), a Reagan Administration official involved in Middle East affairs asserted that "at U.S. instigation Iranians bought critical radar and landing gear components that at times . . . enabled Iran to double the number of sorties flown by its McDonnell Douglas F-4 aircraft against Iraq."

<sup>11</sup> For many years Zaire served as a conduit for U.S. covert arms supplies to rebel forces fighting against the Angolan government. It is not known precisely how much of this U.S. assistance may have been siphoned off to bolster the military forces of the Mobutu regime in Zaire. For a discussion of the role of Zaire in the Angolan arms pipeline, see Lucy Mathiak, "Light Weapons and Internal Conflict in Angola," in Boutwell, Klare, and Reed, editors, "Lethal Commerce," op. cit., pp. 89–90.

<sup>12</sup> The range of values cited for U.S. covert arms shipments to Angola in the 1980s is based on Human Rights Watch Arms Project, "Angola: Trade and Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 Elections," op. cit., p. 47 (for the \$250 million estimate); and Mathiak, op. cit., p. 89 (for the \$300 million estimate).

<sup>13</sup> This figure does include only officially sanctioned exports licensed by the U.S. government. There is considerable anecdotal evidence to indicate that a number of U.S.-based firms made shipments of weaponry and weapons components to South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s in violation of the United Nations arms embargo on the apartheid regime.

<sup>14</sup> On this point see Katzman, op. cit., "Afghanistan: U.S. Policy Options," note 28 in the text.

<sup>15</sup> U.S. arms deliveries to China were suspended by the Bush Administration in response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, but the Clinton Administration has been flirting with the idea of reopening military exports to China, beginning with dual use items.

<sup>16</sup> There have been recent reports to indicate that the flow of weapons to the Khmer Rouge from Thailand and China has been cut off, starting some time in 1994 (cite new Human Rights Watch report).

<sup>17</sup> Although U.S. military aid and commercial arms sales to Guatemala were cut off in December of 1990 because of the Guatemalan government's record of human rights abuses, modest commercial deliveries continued through 1993, as did military-related aid under the "international narcotics control" segment of U.S. security assistance. See "Human Rights Watch World Report 1993," op. cit., p. 117–118.

<sup>18</sup> Deliveries to Haiti listed here exclude \$500,000 to \$1 million per year in covert military aid supplied to Haitian military and intelligence forces between 1986 and 1991.

<sup>19</sup> This figure takes into account the provision of \$3 to \$6 million in military-related assistance justified as anti-narcotics aid (see note 18).

Dear Code of Conduct Supporter:

I would like to thank those who voted for the "Code of Conduct" during the markup of HR 1561 on May 11. The close vote (18-17) and the 101 cosponsors demonstrate the commitment and support for the "Code." It is one of the most important reforms of the arms export process in two decades.

I will be offering the "Code" as a floor amendment to HR 1561 on May 24. I urge your support as we move this legislation forward.

Let's end the "Boomerang Effect" on our armed forces and take a serious step toward underscoring America's leadership role in the new world order and ending our role as the world's number one gun dealer.

We must live up to our claim to protect human rights, foster democracies and promote peace and stability. The arms sales of today are the "Boomerangs" of tomorrow. Vote for the "Code of Conduct" Amendment and end our role as the client for tyrants!

Sincerely,

CYNTHIA MCKINNEY,  
Member of Congress.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, May 23, 1995]

IT'S TIME THE U.S. STOPPED "BOOMERANG" ARMS SALES—AN AMENDMENT TO FOREIGN AID BILL WOULD BAN WEAPONS FOR DICTATORS

(By Cynthia McKinney and Caleb Rossiter)

A defining moment in post-cold-war foreign policy will come today when the House of Representatives takes up the "Code of Conduct" amendment to the foreign aid bill. The Code of Conduct would ban US arms sales to dictators, human rights abusers, and governments not participating in the United Nations arms trade register.

On May 11, the code was narrowly defeated in the House International Relations Committee by an 18-to-17 vote after a heated debate. The vote on the House floor will be the first time in 19 years that Congress debates which countries should be permitted to receive our weaponry.

The code's surprisingly strong showing came despite the opposition of the Aerospace Industries Association, which represents arms-exporters whose political-action committees gave \$7.5 million to candidates in the

last election cycle. The Clinton administration also weighed in heavily against the amendment, with Assistant Secretary of State Wendy Sherman appearing before the committee and distributing a letter "firmly opposing" passage of the code while supporting its principles.

Congress is getting involved in arms restraint for the simple reason that successive administrations have failed to show leadership. In 1993, the administration approved a record \$12.9 billion in arms sales to developing countries, three times the sales to all other countries combined. More than 90 percent of those weapons went to dictators. Then in February, 1995, the president issued a directive that, for the first time, makes corporations' financial health a factor in arms sales decisions.

As the Pentagon buys less, arms-makers pressure the government to keep production lines open by approving strategically questionable sales abroad. In fact, arms sales to developing countries have doubled since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

The arms industry claims that the increase in sales saves jobs. As defense industry profits and CEO salaries rise, however, layoffs of

line workers have increased almost in direct relation. Even worse for the American economy, one-third of all sales are paid for by the taxpayer through foreign aid. "Offset" agreements that help purchasing countries co-produce weapons and sell commercial products in America displace as many workers as the arms sales save.

Hence, we are giving bullies bigger sticks, even though in the past they have used them against their own people and the United States. We have already seen this "boomerang effect" from past sales to armed forces that oppressed their citizens. In the last four overseas US engagements—Panama, Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti—our troops faced the very weapons we sold to those dictators who were once our friends. In Somalia, we spent \$2 billion and two dozen American lives trying to clean up the mess that flowed from our \$200 million in arms sales.

Who among today's favored customers are tomorrow's Somalias and Iraqs?

If the House passes the Code of Conduct, maybe we will not have to find out. Until then, arms transfer policy will be business as usual—big business as usual.

*Cynthia McKinney (D) of Georgia is the primary House sponsor of the McKinney/Hatfield Code of Conduct Bill. Caleb Rossiter is the former deputy director of the Congressional Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus.*

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, DC, May 10, 1995.

DEAR COLLEAGUE: During the full International Relations Committee mark-up of the foreign aid authorization, my colleague on the Committee, Cynthia McKinney, will be offering as an amendment her "Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers" bill (H.R. 772). I urge your support for this important reform of the arms sales process.

The amendment establishes a Code of Conduct for recipients of U.S. military exports and training. The President would decide which countries meet the specific language of the four criteria: promotes democracy, protects human rights, not engaged in aggression, and participates in the U.N. arms trade register. Countries not meeting the criteria would require a waiver agreed to by both the President and Congress.

At present, the decision on whether a country should be eligible to receive U.S. weapons is made by the executive branch alone. The Code of Conduct is really a congressional responsibility act that restores the balance that existed in the original Arms Export Control Act before a Supreme Court decision on an unrelated case invalidated its review procedures.

Arms transfers to undemocratic countries have been the Achilles heel of U.S. foreign policy. Many times we have spent scarce foreign aid cleaning up after conflicts fueled by our own arms transfers; many times we have seen our own troops face weapons we sold to once-friendly dictators. This bill creates a presumption against such transfers while providing a channel for a joint decision to approve them if national security requires.

I have attached for your review a description of the bill, which includes answers to questions about it. Thank you for your consideration of the McKinney amendment.

Sincerely,

HOWARD L. BERMAN,  
Member of Congress.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, USA,  
Washington, DC, May 10, 1995.

Dear Member of the House International Relations Committee:

As a member of both the House International Relations Committee (HIRC) and

the Congressional Human Rights Caucus you are in a strategic position to help stem the flow of U.S. weapons to countries who violate the human rights of its citizens. The "Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers Act" sponsored by Representative Cynthia McKinney (D-GA), will be presented to the HIRC as an amendment to "Division C" of the Foreign Aid Reorganization bill (H.R. 1561) as early as tomorrow. I urge you to vote in favor of this provision.

As an ally in exposing and stemming human rights violations, you recognize the importance of governments accepting accountability. Under this legislation, recipients of U.S. weapons and security assistance would have to vigorously investigate, discipline, and prosecute those responsible for violations, as well as take other positive measures to combat gross violation of internationally recognized rights.

The Code of Conduct would require the President to make an annual certification of countries eligible to receive U.S. weapons. Arms would be prevented from going to countries that are undemocratic, violators of human rights, engaged in armed aggression, not full participants in the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms. If a country does not meet the criteria, transfers can still be made if it is found to be in the interest of U.S. national security.

Amnesty International continues to investigate countries known to have committed human rights violations and their receipt of U.S. security assistance. The Code of Conduct offers another avenue to make violators of human rights accountable for their actions. We urge your support on this important legislation.

Sincerely,

JAMES O'DEA,  
Director, Washington Office.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
Washington, DC, May 9, 1995.

Dear International Relations Committee member:

As you may be aware, our colleague, Rep. Cynthia McKinney, will offer an amendment to attach the Code of Conduct for international arms sales to the Foreign Aid bill later this week. It is my hope that you will join Rep. McKinney, myself, and almost 100 of our colleagues in supporting this timely and reasonable legislation.

Often times, international terrorists acquire U.S.-supplied weapons through pro-American dictators, aggressors, and human rights abusers. A prime example of this was the supplying of Afghan rebels through Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the arms we supplied to the Shah of Iran eventually ended up in the hands of Khomeini and his global terror network. We must stop the boomerang effect which ends up placing U.S. troops, and even U.S. civilians, at the risk of being attacked by our own weapons.

The guiding principle of the Code is that U.S. arms should not be provided to countries that are undemocratic, violate human rights, or are engaged in acts of aggression. However, the United States currently provides 73 percent of all arms to the third world, many of which have not yet held a free and fair election or do not adhere to internationally accepted standards of human rights.

Congress owes it to the American people to play a stronger role in reaching decisions over the transfer and sale of weapons to rogue nations. While the Code is not a ban on arms sales, it will increase congressional oversight and public scrutiny of arms sales.

Once again, I urge you to support Rep. McKinney's Code of Conduct amendment in the International Relations Committee.

Sincerely,

ELIOT L. ENGEL,  
Member of Congress.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND WORLD PEACE,  
Washington, DC, May 10, 1995.

Hon. BENJAMIN A. GILMAN,  
Chairman, International Relations Committee,  
Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN GILMAN: I write to express our concerns about H.R. 1561. I enclose a letter, which the U.S. Catholic Conference has co-signed, which opposes proposals to cut drastically development assistance and U.N. peacekeeping, and questions the wisdom of restructuring that could weaken development and human rights programs.

The enclosed letter does not address our strong support for continued U.S. funding for overseas assistance and protection for refugees, the main provisions for which are contained in a separate State Department Authorization Bill, H.R. 1564. It is our understanding that the International Relations Committee plans to vote on consolidated H.R. 1561, which incorporates these other provisions, rather than allowing them to be considered separately. We regret this decision as it leaves us in the uncomfortable position of opposing a consolidated bill that, in our view, is still fundamentally flawed but which contains provisions we would wholeheartedly endorse were they to be considered on their own merits.

In addition to these concerns, I would like to raise two additional matters related to this legislation. First, I encourage you to support the Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers, an amendment that will be offered to H.R. 1561. In his recent encyclical, *The Gospel of Life*, Pope John Paul II condemned the arms trade as "scandalous." That weapons of war are bought and sold almost as if they were simply another commodity like appliances or industrial machinery is a serious moral disorder in today's world. The predominant role of our country in sustaining and even promoting the arms trade, sometimes for economic reasons, is a moral challenge for our nation. The foreign aid cuts in H.R. 1561 are another example of our country's increasing reluctance to share its economic resources in support of sustainable economic development, while we remain the dominant supplier of weapons to the developing world.

The Code of Conduct is important for two reasons. It imposes appropriate conditions for arms transfers: respect for democracy and human rights, non-aggression, and participation in the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms. And it would bring greater openness and public accountability to decisions to transfer arms by forcing these decisions to be more openly debated in Congress. The Code could thereby improve prospects that the United States would more strictly enforce and strengthen controls on arms transfers and would reduce substantially its role in this deadly trade.

Third, we are concerned about proposals to absorb the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) into the State Department. While we do not normally comment on matters of government reorganization, we are concerned that placing ACDA within the State Department will reduce the prominence of critical arms control and disarmament issues at a time when they are already receiving less attention than they have in the past. There is an urgent need to implement existing arms control agreements, to move toward deeper reductions in



nuclear weapons, to stem nuclear proliferation, and to control conventional weapons, such as landmines. Maintaining ACDA's independent voice in foreign policy making is more likely to ensure that this important arms control agenda receives the attention it needs.

Thank you for considering these various concerns about the legislation currently before the International Relations Committee.

Sincerely,

DREW CHRISTIANSEN,  
*Director, Office of International Justice & Peace.*

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
*Washington, DC, May 8, 1995.*

Dear House International Relations Committee Member: The "Code of Conduct Arms Transfer Act," restricts arms exports to countries that are undemocratic, do not abide by basic international human rights standard, and are engaged in acts of armed aggression.

Today—given the new world order—it is in the best interest of the United States to encourage the development of stable, democratic, and economically viable allies that respect the fundamental human rights of its citizens.

While there are current restrictions on exports of U.S. arms to countries that demonstrate a "gross and consistent" pattern of human rights abuses, these restrictions are seldom enforced. In fiscal year 1994, the State Departments' annual "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices," showed that the U.S. sold weapons to at least four nations that had significant human rights abuses. These four nations purchased \$6.2 billion in arms—nearly half of the total \$12.9 billion sold. Additionally, \$2 billion in U.S. grant money or subsidized U.S. loans to these nations was used to purchase arms.

It is time for Congress to become more proactive in protecting international human rights. We need to end arms exports to those nations that fail to respect the dignity and fundamental well-being of their citizens.

Your vote on May 11 for the Code of Conduct is a vote for the protection of basic human rights.

Sincerely yours,

DONALD M. PAYNE,  
*Member of Congress.*

PROJECT ON DEMILITARIZATION AND  
DEMOCRACY

*Washington, DC, May 5, 1995.*

THE MCKINNEY-HATFIELD CODE OF CONDUCT ON ARMS TRADE: RESTORING THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN THE ARMS TRANSFER PROCESS

This is the first major reform of the arms export process in two decades. Prior to enactment of the Arms Export Control Act in 1976, there were virtually no restrictions on the executive branch's arms transfers. Congress, led by Sen. Hubert Humphrey, enacted the Arms Export Control Act in response to record transfers of arms by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The Shah of Iran and President Marcos of the Philippines were among the leading recipients. Today's record U.S. transfers to undemocratic and unstable governments similarly threaten our interests in democracy and development abroad.

The Arms Export Control Act originally gave Congress a major role in reviewing proposed arms transfers, but the Supreme Court's decision in the unrelated "Chadha" case in 1983 eliminated that role. The AECA gave each House of Congress the ability to block a proposed transfer by passing a resolution. The Supreme Court ruled such "one-house vetoes" unconstitutional, declaring that Congress can only change policy by en-

acting laws, not by taking such partial steps as passing one-house resolutions. As a result, for the past 12 years, Congress could only block a sale by passing a resolution in both Houses and enacting it over a presidential veto, all within 30 days. In terms of time alone, this is nearly impossible. Congress has never enacted such a resolution, and rarely even takes up a resolution opposing an arms transfer, because there is no meaningful chance to succeed.

The Code of Conduct legislation would restore Congress to its earlier role as an equal partner in arms transfer decisions, by requiring congressional approval for sales to countries not meeting the Code's standards. Under the Code legislation, the President would certify countries for eligibility each year. The President could request a one-year waiver for a country not meeting the Code's standards (for democracy, human rights, aggression, and the U.N. arms trade register). Both Houses of Congress would have to approve the waiver, either by enacting a foreign aid bill containing the waivers, or by enacting a separate law. The Congressional Research Service has studied the Code of Conduct process, and declared it constitutional.

CALEB ROSSITER,  
*Director.*

MAY 9, 1995.

DEAR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE: The undersigned arms control, development, religious, human rights and veterans organizations are writing to voice support for the "Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers" bill sponsored by Representative Cynthia McKinney (D-GA) and close to 100 other members. A full committee vote on the Code, as an amendment to the Foreign Aid bill, is expected this week. We urge you to vote in favor of this provision.

The Code of Conduct would require the President to make an annual certification of which countries are eligible, under four criteria, to receive U.S. weapons. To be eligible to receive U.S. weaponry a country cannot: grossly abuse human rights; deny democratic rights; or attack a neighbor or its own people. Also, countries must participate in the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms to be eligible. By creating these criteria weapons will be kept from countries that are bad risks and, it is hoped, the Code will induce undemocratic and aggressor nations to improve their current practices.

This bill is neither a ban nor a moratorium on arms sales. If, for national security reasons, the President wants to sell weapons to countries that are not certified, a majority of Congress must vote to approve the arms transfer. Under the current system, Congress can only vote to stop an arms sale. Under the Code of Conduct Congress can, after careful scrutiny, determine which countries are vital to U.S. security interests and should therefore be eligible to receive arms. The Code also underscores Congress' Constitutional power to regulate trade with foreign nations.

History has shown that sometimes American weapons last longer than U.S. friendships with foreign governments. In Panama, Somalia and Haiti, U.S. troops faced forces that has been equipped with American weapons. The Code of Conduct is an attempt to reduce the likelihood that the men and women of the armed forces will be affected by this "boomerang effect" of the arms trade. Only by closely examining the circumstances surrounding a pending arms sale can Congress hope to minimize the chance of an American soldier being injured by an American weapon.

Furthermore, in a time of tough budgetary decisions, continuing to spend billions of dollars each year in foreign aid to support arms transfers flies in the face of budget cutting measures. Reducing arms transfers would be a prudent way to cut federal spending while contributing to our national defense by keeping advanced weapons out of the hands of future potential adversaries.

As the world's leading arms supplier, the U.S. must demonstrate restraint and international leadership regarding weapons sales to undemocratic nations. The Code of Conduct provides the President and Congress an opportunity to take the first step to reduce the potential for conflict and to prevent harm being done to lives and livelihoods. We urge you to contact Representative McKinney's office to be listed as a co-sponsor of the Code and to vote in favor of this amendment when it comes before the full committee later this week.

Sincerely,

John Isaacs, President, Council For a Livable World; Howard Hallman, Director, Methodists United for Peace With Justice; Peter J. Davies, U.S. Representative, Saferworld; Steve Goose, Program Director-Arms Project, Human Rights Watch; Deborah Walden, Director of Policy and Programs, Women's Action For New Directions; Edith Villastrigo, National Legislative Director, Women Strike for Peace; Tim McElwee, Director, Church of the Brethren; John B. Anderson, President, World Federalist Association; Robin Caiola, Co-Director, 20/20 Vision; James Matlack, Director-Washington Office, American Friends Service Committee; Lora Lumpe, Director-Arms Sales Monitoring Project, Federation of American Scientists; Joe Volk, Executive Secretary, Friends Committee on National Legislation; Caleb Rossiter, Director, Project on Demilitarization and Democracy; Monica Green, Executive Director, Peace Action; Mark B. Brown, Acting Director-Lutheran Office for Governmental Affairs, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America; Vice Admiral John Shanahan, Director, Center for Defense Information; Maurice Paprin, President, Fund for New Priorities in America; Darryl Fagin, Legislative Director, Americans for Democratic Action; Jerry Genesio, Chairman/Executive Director, Veterans for Peace; Greg Bischak, Executive Director, National Commission for Economic Conversion and Disarmament.

MAY 8, 1995.

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,  
*House of Representatives, Washington, DC.*

DEAR MEMBER: The officers, directors and members of Veterans for Peace urge you to support passage of the McKinney-Hatfield Code of Conduct on Arms Trade (H.R. 772). We understand the bill may be offered as an amendment to the Foreign Aid Authorization bill later this week.

Veterans for Peace (VFP) is a national membership organization of U.S. military veterans, including decorated veterans of both World Wars, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and many other conflicts and skirmishes. Our members include retired officers and enlisted men, some of whom served twenty or more years. Many are graduates of military academies, a number are former POWs. One, a pilot during the Vietnam War, languished in the Hanoi Hilton for eight years. Two are recipients of the Congressional Medal of Honor, dozens received Silver and Bronze Stars for valor, and hundreds were awarded the Purple Heart for combat

wounds. The work of VFP is primarily educational: to raise awareness of the great costs of preparing for war and of war itself in comparison to the alternatives of international behavior.

The Code of Conduct legislation should have universal support, if for no other reason than the increasing phenomenon of U.S.-made arms returning to threaten our own U.S. forces. There are other reasons to support the bill. For example, it would substantially help:

Keep arms from dictators and countries using weapons in aggression against neighbors or even their own people;

Restore needed Congressional power and responsibility in the area of arms trade and control;

Protect the U.S. jobs currently being destroyed by the application of so-called "offset" agreements, by which defense contractors promote foreign goods in order to secure arms sales.

Thank you for your consideration of these important issues, and, hopefully, for your support of H.R. 772.

Sincerely yours,

JERRY GENESIO  
Chairman and Executive Director  
(USMC/1956-62).

CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION,  
May 8, 1995.

THE MCKINNEY-HATFIELD CODE OF CONDUCT ON ARMS TRADE: ENSURING THE SAFETY OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES

The Clinton Administration's recent arms sales policy states that the impact on defense jobs must be taken into account when exports are considered. One wishes that the same consideration was extended to the impact on the lives and wellbeing of American service personnel. The current laissez-faire status quo in the international arms trade, where increasingly any conventional weapons sale is deemed permissible as long as it purports to make a profit for its manufacturer, is creating a self-generated danger—the possibility that our service men and women will someday be fighting nations or groups who obtained U.S. weapons and technology.

Many of our former current and arms customers—Panama, Iran, Iraq, Israel, numerous Arab countries, Taiwan, South Korea, Pakistan, and India are in highly volatile parts of the world or have undemocratic governments. Thus our arms and technology sales potentially create—as in the Gulf—the very threat our own forces may someday confront. Furthermore, the threat we are building by our arms sales also justified the continued inflated military spending for even newer equipment to counter the items we have sold others.

Even the Pentagon now officially acknowledges that it faces the prospect of American weapons being used against U.S. military personnel. In the latest Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress Secretary William Perry writes, "In general, threats encountered in MRCs [Major Regional Conflicts] would be standing armies of foreign powers, armed with mixes of old and modern weapons systems. . . Thus, U.S. forces must be prepared to face a wide variety of systems, including some previously produced in the United States." [author's emphasis, p. 170]

A comparison of the Pentagon's own data on deliveries of weapons through the U.S. FMS and commercial sales programs over the past decade with a list of fifty significant wars that were under way during 1993-94 indicates that U.S. weapons exports have played a major role in fueling the ethnic and territorial conflicts that have become the

primary post-war security challenge as indicated by the Pentagon's own Bottom-Up Review and National Military Strategy. These are the same types of conflicts U.S. forces are most likely to be deployed to in the future.

Parties to 45 current conflicts have taken delivery of over \$42 billion worth of US weapons in the past decade.

Out of the fifty significant ethnic and territorial conflicts going on during 1993-94, 90% (45 out of 50) of them involved one or more parties that had received some US weapons or military technology in the period leading up to the conflict.

In more than half of the fifty current conflicts (26 out of the 50), the United States has been a significant arms supplier, accounting for at least 5% of the weapons delivered to one party to the dispute over a five year period.

Areas where U.S. weapons are most likely to be utilized in current or future conflicts include southern Europe; the Middle East and North Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa; Southwest and Southeast Asia; and Central and Latin America.

This data raises serious questions about the claim that US weapons are only used for defensive purposes. As a weapons supplier to fully 90% of the areas where wars are now going on and a major supplier to more than one-third of these areas, it is clear that the US is bolstering the warfighting capabilities of a substantial number of the parties to the world's current conflicts. It does not take a stroke of genius to realize that these capabilities can just as easily be used against U.S. soldiers, sailors, and airmen. It is a sad irony that the current U.S. arms trade policy confirms the words of cartoonist Walt Kelly's character Pogo when he said, "We have met the enemy and he is us."

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
Washington, DC, May 8, 1995.

DEAR COLLEAGUE: The House International Relations Committee will mark up HR 1561, the Foreign Aid and Reorganization Bill this week. I will offer HR 772, the Code of Conduct Arms Transfer Act as an amendment to Title 31 of Division C. The "Code" now has 99 cosponsors in the House and would provide guidelines for arms exports—prohibiting transfers to governments that are undemocratic, violate human rights, or are engaged in acts of armed aggression.

The "Code" would not ban all arms sales. Sales and transfers would continue in the national interest of the United States and to those nations which meet the "Code's criteria." Today's exports could be tomorrow's nightmare for American forces. In the last four US deployments—Panama, Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti—American troops faced armies strengthened by US materiel and technology. In 1993, of the 14.8 billion in US arms sales, 90 percent were purchased by nations that do not meet the Code's guidelines.

Americans throughout the nation support the "Code"—with more than 227 citizen's organizations endorsing its principles and 96 percent of Americans demanding an end to arms sales to dictators.

Let's stop the "Boomerang effect." Vote for the "Code of Conduct on May 11!"

Please contact Robin Sanders at 51605 with questions or concerns.

Sincerely,

CYNTHIA MCKINNEY,  
Member of Congress.

FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON  
NATIONAL LEGISLATION,  
May 10, 1995.

House International Relations Committee,  
U.S. House of Representatives Washington, DC  
DEAR REPRESENTATIVE: Does the United States need a Code of Conduct on Arms Trade? Who answers Yes to that question?

Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation; Amnesty International; Human Rights Watch; Lutheran Office for Governmental Affairs; Maryknoll Justice & Peace Office; Federation of American Scientists; Bread for the World; Committee for National Security.

Institute for Food & Development (Food First); United Methodist Church, General Board of Church & Society, Peace with Justice Program; American Baptist Churches, USA; Center for Defense Information; Physicians for Social Responsibility.

More than 250 other national and regional organizations have endorsed the principles for a Code of Conduct on Arms trade.

Humanitarian aid, human rights, arms control, economic development, women's religious, and veterans' agendas, all would benefit from a Code of Conduct on Arms Trade. That is why the Code is popular with a growing grassroots movement for nonproliferation of conventional weapons.

The Friends Committee on National Legislation urges you to vote for the Code of Conduct on Arms Trade when the House International Relations Committee considers the amendment by Representative McKinney on the Foreign Aid Authorization bill.

Sincerely,

JOE VOLK.

BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY  
INFORMATION COUNCIL.

To: Members of the House International Relations Committee.

From: Bronwyn Brady and Susannah Dyer, BASIC.

Re: Arms Transfer Amendment to Foreign Aid Bill.

Date: 10 May 1995.

It has come to our attention that the Committee is scheduled to vote on the Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers as an amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill. Your consideration of this legislation coincides with a parallel initiative being pursued in the European Union.

Congress now has the opportunity to join its partners in the European Union as they seek to implement similar controls. According to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Europe and the United States together sell over 90% of the world's weapons. Focusing narrowly on maintaining market share, no country has been willing to take unilateral steps toward control, fearing it will lose export markets to competitors. Therefore, it is vital that as the world's leading suppliers, the EU and the United States work together to implement restraint. Cooperation will prevent either US or European companies from undercutting one another in pursuit of sales.

Tomorrow in Brussels, the European Code of Conduct will be launched, calling on the EU to adopt stricter controls on weapons exports. This Code builds on the eight existing criteria on arms exports already agreed by member states in 1991-92. These criteria stress that weapons exports should take into consideration: the purchasing country's human rights record; the internal and regional stability of recipient states; and the effects of weapons purchases on the recipient country's economy.

A number of members of the European Parliament have declared their support for this initiative, highlighting the need for a coherent and controlled approach to European weapons exports, and encouraging the Parliament to press for the Code. In addition,

the proposed Code has already been endorsed by almost 50 NGOs across Europe, including Save the Children and Medico International. In the lead-up to the review of the Maastricht Treaty in 1996, it is critical that an effective EU arms export control regime be an integral part of an EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.

In addition to the US and European Code of Conduct Initiatives, similar measures have also been pursued in other international fora. In November 1994, a proposal was tabled at the United Nations, calling for a Code of Conduct for international conventional arms transfers with a view to promoting restraint. These efforts will continue in both working groups and the General Assembly. In addition, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) agreed a series of "Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers" in December 1993, requiring member states to consider human rights, and reiterating "their strong belief that excessive and destabilizing arms build-ups pose a threat to national, regional, and international peace and security". It is clear that there is growing international consensus regarding the urgent need to restrain the international weapons trade.

In its position as the world's leading exporter of weaponry, the United States has a special responsibility to provide a global leadership in the area of restraint. Passage of the Code will encourage the United States to work in concert with its allies to control the spread of weapons to rogue regimes and regions of conflict. This will prevent scenarios such as the one which unfolded in the Gulf War, where US troops faced weapons supplied to Iraq by both the United States and its European allies.

As your European counterparts begin developing a harmonized EU arms export policy, we urge you to support the Code of Conduct amendment and demonstrate US leadership in promoting unified international restraint of the global weapons trade. Please feel free to contact our office in London or Washington for further details on the European initiatives described above.

UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST  
ASSOCIATION OF CONGREGATIONS,

Washington, May 10, 1995.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE: Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations, strongly supports the Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers bill introduced by Rep. Cynthia McKinney and Senator Mark Hatfield that would place restrictions on the sale and transfer of conventional weapons by the United States to dictators.

We think that the present U.S. arms sales policy which permits the sale of arms to governments which abuse internationally recognized human rights; engage in aggression against their own people or other nations; and do not participate in international efforts to control arms is not in our national interest, fuels regional and local conflicts and aids and abets undemocratic governments.

The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA) gave Congress the power to review proposed U.S. arms exports using a human rights standard. Unfortunately, the AECA has not stopped a single arms transfer since it became law. The Supreme Court in 1983 found the Congressional mechanism whereby either House could block such sales to be unconstitutional. The McKinney-Hatfield Code of Conduct bill would return to Congress a mechanism for participating in the decision making process on U.S. arms transfers.

We respectfully urge you to support the McKinney measure when it comes before the Committee. The Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers has gained more support among

the Unitarian Universalist grassroots than any other legislation we have worked on.

The time has come for charting a new U.S. arms sales policy that puts our country on the high ground and sets an example for the international community to match.

Sincerely,

ROBERT Z. ALPERN,  
Director.

Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

(Ms. WOOLSEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the code of conduct amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Georgia, and I would like to commend her for her tireless work on this important issue.

As written, our current arms transfer policy is reckless and dangerous. Over the past decade, we have sent weapons to countries who have turned around and used them against our sons and daughters in the Armed Forces. We have provided ammunition for governments who oppress their people and commit acts of aggression against the international community. U.S. arms transfer policy must be more responsible.

In the debate over military spending and foreign policy, we continue to hear that "the cold war is over, but the world is still a dangerous place." Mr. Chairman, our current arms transfer policy is making the world an even more dangerous place. I thought we fought the cold war in order to make the world safe for democracy and human rights, not dangerous for U.S. soldiers and innocent citizens worldwide.

Opponents of this measure argue that the United States should not restrict itself to selling arms only to countries who promote democracy and protect human rights. They suggest that we should be allowed to sell weapons to countries which may not fit these categories, but who are friendly to the United States.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the House, Manuel Noriega used to be friendly. Iraq used to be friendly. Why do we refuse to learn that even the Devil can be friendly if he wants to make a deal?

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the McKinney amendment and reject the current reckless arms transfer policy.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Ms. WOOLSEY. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to add my support for what the gentlewoman said for the McKinney amendment. This is a restrained and sensible set of guidelines which reinvolve the Congress in the way that it used to be in the process of arms transfers before the Supreme Court decision knocked that process out and made us essentially irrelevant.

This provides waiver authority. There may be times when a country

that is bad on human rights or a country that is not democratic should get some of our assistance for other, larger kinds of considerations.

□ 1245

There is waiver authority here. Come to Congress, let us go through that process. I think it is a sensible, restrained approach to try and deal with the causes of regional instability in so much of the world and the fueling of an arms race.

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to express my support for the amendment offered by my colleague, the gentlewoman from Georgia, [Ms. MCKINNEY].

This amendment establishes a code of conduct for recipients of U.S. military exports and training. It gives the President the authority to decide which countries meet the four responsible criteria: promote democracy, protect human rights, not engaged in acts of aggression, and participants in the U.N. arms trade register. Those countries which do not meet the criteria would require a waiver agreed to by both the President and the Congress.

As we apply conditions on our military aid to other countries, so should we apply conditions to our weapons exports. It is outrageous that in our last four overseas United States engagements—Panama, Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti—our troops were threatened by weaponry that we sold to various dictators who were once our friends, and later our enemies.

As the only superpower in the world, it is imperative that the United States set the standard for responsible leadership. Congresswoman MCKINNEY's amendment would ensure our moral leadership by prohibiting the sale of arms to those countries that are undemocratic, violate human rights, or are engaged in acts of armed aggression.

Arms transfers to undemocratic countries which past administrations have courted for a variety of reasons, have often come to haunt us. We have spent precious human and financial resources cleaning up after conflicts which were fueled by our own arms transfers. Our own children have been endangered by the very same weaponry that we sold because of short-term foreign policy interests. This legislation will protect our children in the future by creating a presumption against such transfers, but does establish a thorough, responsible review process for those sales that are in our best interest.

Mr. Chairman, I ask the Members to support the McKinney amendment.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I find myself in a kind of an uncomfortable position because I do not particularly like some of the ways that the President has conducted

foreign policy, and I did not particularly like the invasion of Haiti or the way he conducted our operations in Somalia and lost a bunch of American lives, but here is one case where I do agree with the President. The President has to have some leverage and be able to conduct foreign policy, and many times his ability to negotiate with countries that are buying U.S. arms is one way that he can get the job done.

So the President of the United States, Mr. Clinton, is against this particular amendment. In this particular case, I concur with him because I think it hamstringing him in one respect, as far as his ability to conduct foreign policy is concerned.

But, in addition to that, there is another economic issue that needs to be taken into consideration. If anybody believes that a country that wants to buy weaponry is going to not buy it simply because they cannot buy them from the United States, they are just barking up the wrong tree. France sells weapons, Great Britain sells weapons, a number of countries sell sophisticated weaponry. If they do not buy them from the United States of America, then certainly they are going to buy them from some place else.

It will have an adverse economic impact on many segments of our society. If you go out to California and take a look at the aircraft industry, it is in a depressed state. It is starting to come out of it now because of the commercial sales. The fact of the matter is if you put these kinds of constraints on the sales of these kinds of materials, you are going to have an impact on industry in this country, and there are going to be a lot of people lose their jobs and those jobs will go overseas to manufacturers of this equipment in foreign countries.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the sentiments that the gentleman from Indiana is showing in terms building up our own economic base here at home. It is a legitimate concern.

This amendment does not say that we cannot sell arms to Third World countries, nor does it say we cannot sell arms to other countries throughout the world. All it says is that when there are human rights abuses, when there are gross inequities in terms of how the country that is trying to purchase arms treats its neighbors, is overly aggressive in those issues, in terms of spending far too much money on its own arms industry rather than looking out after its own people, that the United States ought to take those issues into account.

It gives the President the flexibility of overruling these on a national security basis, and in any given year. So I think it does provide the kind of flexibility that is necessary to address the

concerns the gentleman from Indiana has articulated, but it does put us into the immoral position that we are currently in where we are actual selling arms to our neighbors that end up using those arms, or to our friends that end up using those arms against us when we get into conflict.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I thank the gentleman for his contribution. I disagree simply because the President of the United States has the ability right now to put pressure on those countries by not allowing arms sales to them. As a matter of act, the President has exercised that authority already in a number of countries. If you followed what has been going on in the past several years, you will find there are a number of countries that even purchased equipment from the United States and the President has not allowed those purchases to go forward.

So he does have some latitude. It is a Democrat President. He is asking for this authority to be maintained. Whether it is a Republican or Democrat, I would support it.

The fact of the matter is there is an inconsistency as far as our foreign policy is concerned. There are many pieces of legislation which I have sponsored, regarding human rights abuses in India, for instance, that have not passed this House because the minority now, then the majority, would not support them.

So I find it kind of interesting that here is the President of the United States wanting to protect his ability to conduct foreign policy and, because of human rights issues, his party is trying to stop it, while at other times in our history when we were fighting for human rights abuses to be removed on other pieces of legislation, we could not get that support.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. If the gentleman would yield further, maybe this kind of legislation would actually improve and get the kind of result that you were looking for in terms of your amendment with regard to Pakistan.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Not Pakistan. India.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. With regard to India in times past. The fact of the matter is, if we had a uniform policy instead of the hodgepodge policy that we have today, I think we would get the moral leadership of the rest of the world to support us, as we have seen today in the European Parliament, which is taking up legislation very similar to this.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I appreciate the gentleman's contribution. In a perfect world we might have a consistent foreign policy worldwide. But as the gentleman well knows, we do not have a perfect world; we have an inconsistency in foreign policy. That is why the President, whether Republican or Democrat, has to have latitude in conducting that foreign policy that includes the ability to stop arms sales or allow those arms sales to go forward.

I am very sympathetic to the human rights abuses issue being raised here.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. BURTON of Indiana was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I am very sympathetic to the human rights issue being raised here. This is a very, very complex world. It is a dangerous world. Even though the so-called cold war is over, we still have to have a foreign policy that will allow us to be able to deal with friends to make sure that they have the ability to defend themselves.

I might add one more time, if we do not sell them these weapons, we will make sure that they will buy them someplace else. Let us allow that the President of the United States will be able to make these determinations where necessary and at the same time protect American jobs by not letting them go overseas.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. If the gentleman will yield further, the fact is that I have worked very closely with Members of the Republican side in the Committee on Banking and Financial Services to structure amendments that are very similar to this dealing with funding for the World Bank and the IMF, which have received bipartisan support. The question is whether or not Members of this body want to provide this authority in the Presidency or whether or not we want to establish this as a national policy for this country.

We have gotten bipartisan support for such a policy in times past, and I would hope we would gain support on the Republican side for this well-thought-through amendment that the gentlewoman from Georgia [Ms. MCKINNEY] is offering.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON] has again expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. BURTON of Indiana was allowed to proceed for 30 additional seconds.)

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I thank the gentleman for his contribution.

Let me just end up by saying that we have asked time and time again that there be a stronger voice by the Congress in the conducting of foreign policy, and the Administration has found that they do not want that to be accomplished. They wanted to keep that power in the executive branch, and I understand that. And we have not been successful in making those changes.

In this particular case, I think the President's arguments are well founded, and I, as a Republican, find myself once again in a difficult position, but I am supporting the President in this particular case.

Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. MEEK of Florida. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. MILLER of California. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.

I rise in strong support of this amendment. I think it is very important that we consider it. I would hope we would pass it.

The gentleman is right. It is not a perfect world, but we have got to strive to make it a better world.

Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the amendment offered by my colleague, the gentlewoman from Georgia [Ms. MCKINNEY].

The United States has long been an arms merchant to the world, Mr. Chairman, but this amendment is not about the quantity of arms sales. This amendment is about who we sell arms to and who makes these decisions.

At the present time, except in rare circumstances, the executive branch alone decides what countries are eligible to receive weapons. This process has resulted in arms transfers to undemocratic countries that use our arms to maintain their own control and to oppress their own people, and in recent United States military operations overseas, in Panama, Iraq, and Somalia, our troops had to fight against hostiles armed with the very weapons we previously sold to them.

We sold \$200 million in weapons to Somalia. We spent \$2 billion fighting soldiers armed with these weapons, many times at the destruction of the U.S. soldiers and citizens.

This amendment brings Congress into the arms sales process without tying the hands of the President. This amendment sets reasonable criteria that have to be met before arms can be transferred, including promoting democracy, protecting human rights, participating in the U.N. arms trade register, and refraining from aggression. A waiver is provided for countries that do not meet this criteria if the national security requires.

Mr. Chairman, the McKinney amendment is a very sound amendment. It is reasonable and responsible reform. It restores the balance of power in arms sales between the legislative and the executive branches. It helps secure responsible decisions in this important policy area.

Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentlewoman from Georgia [Ms. MCKINNEY] for bringing forth this wonderful amendment, and I strongly urge its passage.

Mr. FATTAH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. MEEK of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. FATTAH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.

Let me commend the sponsor of the code of conduct amendment, and let me try to be as brief as possible, Mr. Chairman.

I rise in support of this amendment. I think that we cannot divorce American ideals from American foreign pol-

icy, and in the area of arms sales, I do not think we would want our contribution and our legacy to the world to be that we have sold arms to everyone and allowed for the continuation of the practice of war as almost a permanent vocation in this world.

So I would hope that we would support the McKinney amendment and the companion effort in the Senate because I think it moves us in the right direction, and even though it may be a debatable matter in some people's minds, I think that for all of us, if we want to be on the right side of history on this issue, that we should, in the final analysis, find ourselves voting favorably for the McKinney amendment.

Mr. SALMON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment is offered in good faith. But it is slightly misnamed. This amendment is not about human rights, and this amendment is not about foreign policy. This amendment instead is about a philosophical difference that exists within the Congress.

Some in this body simply believe that all arms sales to our allies are wrong in all cases. They believe that helping our allies defend themselves and helping them defend our vital interests amounts to exporting violence.

□ 1300

I disagree. Often selling arms to our allies may mean we do not have to send U.S. troops, and that makes sense for Americans.

Moreover, responsible arms sales have for many years played an important role in our Nation's foreign policy.

Obviously, opponents of arms sales to our allies could not hope to enact a complete ban on the practice, so they have come up with this lesser amendment.

But we should not artificially restrict our arms sales to our allies, or hold them hostage to interpretations of vague definitions contained in this amendment.

I welcome continued debate on whether we should ban all arms sales to other nations. But this back door effort at beginning such a ban today, should be defeated.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. MICA].

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman and my colleague, I just want to make a couple of points and rise in opposition to the amendment that has been offered here this afternoon.

First of all, this does address the human rights violation question, and none of us favor any type of human rights violations anywhere in the world or by any of our allies, but the matter of fact is that this amendment is not a realistic amendment, and it is not a needed amendment. I say to my colleagues: First of all, if you want to look at human rights violations, just refer to—and I invite all my colleagues to do this, and other folks that are lis-

tening—read the Amnesty International human rights violation reports. You find actually one of the countries that is cited is the United States. Not only is the United States cited, but you also have Israel, Egypt, Turkey, and, if this amendment passed, I think you really would jeopardize the status of peace efforts in the Middle East if this was properly applied according to the language in the amendment, and again I think it serves no purpose. We must work against human rights violations wherever they occur, and human rights violations are not condoned by this Congress.

Let me also point out that a major flaw in this amendment is the President already has the authority. Maybe the other side of the aisle or the sponsor does not trust the President of the United States, but in fact under current law the President of the United States is required to even notify Congress before there is an arms sale in the appropriate committee of Congress.

So first of all, it is not a realistic amendment, and it is not an amendment that recognizes that there are human rights violations, whether it is in the United States or with our allies that are sometime recipients of these arms; and, second, the amendment has no purpose because the President really already has the authority, and the Congress is, in fact, notified when there are these arms sales pending. So it is not a needed amendment, and it is not a useful amendment, and I urge its defeat.

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in favor of this amendment authored by the gentlewoman from Georgia [Ms. MCKINNEY].

This amendment is about the new world order. The United States has emerged as the undisputed political, economic, and military leader of the world.

With the end of the cold war, the old ways of doing international business—especially military business—are no longer adequate. This is a time to re-evaluate. It is a time for America to live up to the promise of its creed—across our borders as well as within them.

This Nation must not support dictators. It must stand strongly against human rights abuses. We have the capacity—through diplomatic pressure, business opportunity, and military arms relationships—to make the world safer for its citizens. The United States should exercise that power. This, Mr. Chairman, is what the McKinney amendment is all about.

We only need to look at the recent past to find examples of good intentions gone bad in the U.S. arms sales.

Many people have heard about the recent, gross violations of human rights in Turkey. Turkey happens to be one of the largest recipients of United States military aid. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Lawrence Korb testified yesterday that Turkey's rulers

have used United States-supplied F-16's, Black Hawk helicopters and M-60 tanks against its own Kurdish population.

The United States also militarily supplies human rights abusers in Indonesia and Malaysia. Unfortunately, we are considering more aid to the Government of Indonesia—despite widely reported human rights abuses by the Indonesian military against East Timor.

In the not quite so recent past, this country felt forced to stop a military exercise by Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein. We had a major war—risking the lives of thousands of soldiers—against Iraq, a country which had always been a human rights abuser, and which had been the recipient of U.S. aid, including military aid.

Too many times in this country's history, we have been short-sighted policy in our arms export policy. Too many times, short-term military alliances have led to long-term human rights disasters, or worse.

The McKinney amendment does not preclude military assistance to any country. If the President and Congress agree that an arms sale is in the national security interest, that sale would be allowed.

However, the McKinney amendment would establish basic, humane, and appropriate standards for the conduct of U.S. military export policy. These standards are common sense standards such as requiring our military exports to go to countries which hold free and fair elections; such as being sure our sales go to countries which do not engage in gross violations of human rights, and making sure that our arms exports do not go to countries which engage in illegal acts of armed aggression.

If there was ever a time when this country could justify working with human rights abusers to further some longer-term strategic objective, that time is surely past. This country, without any serious military threat to our security, now must face its responsibility, and act as the world's moral leader. The McKinney amendment would apply a moral test to U.S. foreign policy.

Let us assert our role as a moral leader in the world. Support the McKinney amendment.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the McKinney amendment. I agree with some of her concerns, but not the solutions embodied in the amendment.

Certainly, Mr. Chairman, during the cold war the two superpowers did transfer billions of dollars of weapons to the developing world every year as a part of their strategic competition. With the dissolution of the former So-

viet Union and excess conventional military equipment flooding global markets, I believe it is essential to find a way to stop the spiral of militarization. An overarmed developing world not only has a terrible human cost, it is also contrary to American interests in fostering democracy, building political stability, and enhancing growing global economy, and I think those are some of the gentlewoman's concerns, and I certainly agree with them.

In my mind the solution to the problem of militarization in arms transfer must be a multilateral one. It would do us, nor the developing world, any good if we reduce exports only to find the gap filled by other suppliers. Yet it is also clear that multi-lateral solutions require U.S. leadership both by the President and by the Congress.

Congress has already begun to address the need for arms restraint, enacting several measures which I support, including, No. 1, encouraging the President to establish a multilateral arms restraint regime; No. 2, imposing a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land mines and calling on the administration to negotiate a worldwide ban on their deployment; and, No. 3, calling on the administration to oppose multilateral lending to countries who refuse to reduce military spending in concert with their neighbors.

That brings me to the amendment at hand.

Mr. Chairman, I am in strong agreement with the sentiments, as I said, which were expressed in the amendment which express the view that we should not sell arms to countries that are democratic, that do not respect human rights, and that do not promote peace and stability. Where I have problems with this amendment is that it mandates, at least as I read it, that human rights, democracy, and participation of the U.N. arms registry of conventional arms be the only criteria that should govern our arms transfers. To say that these criteria should be paramount in evaluating a particular transfer is, I think, going too far. This is too restrictive in my view. Arms transfers serve important foreign policy and national security objectives. That can contribute to regional stability and help deter aggression. They can even foster interoperability should U.S. Assistance ever be required as in the Desert Storm operation.

Human rights and the democratic make up of recipient governments ought to be among the criteria in making a final decision on a proposed transfer. In some cases they may be the primary criterion, but not in all cases. The President must be able to weigh all relevant criteria to reach sensible, sound decisions on the merit of each proposed transfer.

Moreover, the amendment would require the President to certify annually those nations that qualify for arms transfer according to these criteria. Transfer to other countries could only

be made if the President certifies to Congress that such a transfer is in the national security interests of the United States and the Congress enacts a law approving such an exception or if the President determines that an emergency exists under which it is vital to the interests of the United States to provide the transfer. If the President cannot meet this very high standard, quote, that an emergency exists, end of quote, then this amendment would force the Congress to enact a resolution of approval for arms sale. This, of course, turns the current system of congressional review of arms transfer on its head, a system that I, for one, do not think to be broken.

Now, I do believe the author of this amendment has made a very serious effort to modify the language to address concerns of limiting Presidential flexibility by inserting new language under which countries could receive arms if they were violating the criteria in the bill if the President determines that an emergency exists, so there is that flexibility for the President. I would only point out this is a very high standard and one that I think cannot be met, at least not in very many instances. The President's room to maneuver is largely circumscribed, so in my view the modification does not fix one of the fundamental flaws of the amendment.

I want to correct the conclusion here that I think supporters of the amendment may be making. The Congress, contrary to what the supporters—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. BEREUTER was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. BEREUTER. The Congress, contrary to what the supporters of the amendment are seeming to be saying, currently has a very important role in determining which sales are made. In many ways, tangible or not so tangible, the Congress influences the sales about which the administration ends up notifying the Hill. There is an elaborate consultation procedure which we will not find in the formal statutory law whereby the administration vets possible sales with the appropriate committees. Members and staff briefings are convened on proposed sales that are controversial, and, contrary to what some may think, the administration backs off and drops proposed sales, not just this administration, but that has been the trend and the practice.

So, it is incorrect, I think, to argue that we have no role under the current process. The administration and the Congress are in constant dialogue about arms transfers which are conducted in accordance with the Arms Export Control Act. The Congress significantly influences arms transfers in direct and practical ways through the years beginning with consultation on the Javits report. Critics of arms transfer point to the fact that Congress

has never enacted a resolution of disapproval on arms sales. That is not a correct measure. In fact, congressional passage of such a resolution would represent a breakdown of the existing process, not a measure of its success. The fact that we have not passed a resolution then is evidence that in fact the consultation process is working.

□ 1315

Now, I have gone on at length here because I think this is a serious amendment with much merit. But the author of this amendment is committed to the issue, and I commend her. But for the reasons I stated, I cannot support it in its current form, and I would urge a "no" vote for all of my colleagues.

Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge a "no" vote.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, will wonders never cease, where my colleague from Georgia and I are standing together on an issue in this body?

Let me note that the cold war is over. I would not have supported this amendment if it had been 10 years ago. I believe that now is the time for us as a Nation to seriously consider what our policies are around the world in a different light than what we did 10 years ago during the cold war.

This amendment puts Congress squarely in the decisionmaking process. My good friend, the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER], just suggested there is a process that is taking place right now, but it is just not codified. It is not set down solid in legislation.

Well, I believe that now that the cold war is over we can afford to take this decisionmaking process about what kind of countries that we will be dealing with, especially arming to the teeth, what kind of countries we will be selling our sophisticated weaponry to, is a decision in which the Congress can play a legitimate and verifiable role, and that we can be held accountable to our own people for the moral basis of the decisions that are being made by our Government in this area.

When the cold war was on, we left these decisions up to the President of the United States, and I supported that, because we were up against an enemy that wanted to destroy our country. I was, as many of you know, a member of President Reagan's staff for 7 years. I felt it appropriate that the President had the right to counter Soviet moves that were aimed at putting us in a vulnerable situation to a military threat, without necessarily having to come to Congress and have the issue debated on for weeks.

We are not in that situation today. In fact, during the cold war, human rights were secondary in many of the cases in our dealings with foreign countries. In many cases, if we were not dealing with such a hostile and horrible enemy as the communists, we should have

been ashamed of ourselves in dealing with the tyrants we were dealing with. But just like in the Second World War when we allied ourselves with Stalin, we allied ourselves in the cold war against the communists with some unsavory characters.

That is no longer the case. The cold war is over, and today human rights should play a more important role in our decisionmaking process than it did when we were under attack. If a country is crucial to our national security, even besides the fact we are not in the cold war, this amendment provides us the ability to say well, you may not be up to our democratic standards, and indeed we want you to be more democratic and respect human rights, but we will put you on an exception list. You are acceptable because you are crucial to the national security interests of the United States.

I would imagine we might debate countries like Saudi Arabia, who I believe is crucial to the security of the United States, and other kingdoms where people in those countries are more inclined toward having a kingdom than a democracy. That would be a legitimate decision we could make. I have no doubt this Congress is capable of working with the President to determine which nondemocratic countries are crucial to our national security.

This gives the President in fact leverage even in those countries to secure more human rights for their people, when now the President cannot just say well, the Congress is forcing me and thus have a dialog with these countries.

Now, I may, as I say, disagree with the proponents of this amendment on many issues in terms of what countries we are dealing with, but the principle is sound. Let me say this in terms of the practicality. When Ronald Reagan became President of the United States, we decided we were no longer going to be just anti-Communist and support anti-Communist regimes. I believe that was the turning point in the cold war.

When Ronald Reagan made human rights and democracy the issue against the Communists, when he turned away from just supporting dictators who are anti-Communist but instead went to the people of then the Soviet Union and other countries under Communist domination and said we in the West do believe in democracy and we are willing to support those people who are struggling for freedom, and we established the National Endowment for Democracy, that is when the cold war turned around.

In the long run, that proved the downfall of communism. It was the practical thing to do. In the short run, it gave us some problems, because there were some anti-Communist dictatorships which basically were on our side. This too will be practical if we have guts enough to stand for our principles.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. ROHRABACHER] has expired.

(On request of Mr. BURTON of Indiana and by unanimous consent, Mr. ROHRABACHER was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman made one salient point in his comments. He said during the Reagan administration, in which he served, that the felt the President should have this latitude, because of the critical time problems that the President should not have to mess around with Congress for 3 or 4 weeks when he might have to make a quick decision.

What makes the gentleman think that will not happen at some point in the future with some future President?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, the cold war is over. The fact is that today we should not be operating under the same rules as when our country was targeted by a very powerful enemy that meant to destroy us. We now can afford to bring the moral questions into play, and we should, the human rights questions, the democracy questions. This is what America can stand for, and if we do, we will have the allegiance of young people around the world, rather than the fear of those young people of their own regimes that might be armed by our people. That is the way America should be. That is the strength. Abraham Lincoln said, "Right makes might."

Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the gentlewoman from Georgia's amendment to H.R. 1561, the McKinney Arms Code of Conduct. The Arms Code of Conduct is a rational approach. It implements a coherent and comprehensive arms control policy. This legislation would prohibit U.S. military assistance and arms transfers to foreign governments, unless the President certifies that the foreign government adheres to a national code of conduct.

In order to be eligible for military assistance, the gentlewoman's amendment specifically requires that the foreign government head be elected through a fair and free elections process; that the country respect human rights and not be engaged in any aggression which violates international law; and must fully participate in the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms.

The United States is the sole superpower in the world and the world's undisputed leader in arms exports. Today, U.S. firms dominate more than 70 percent of the international arms sale market, up from 57 percent in 1991. According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's 1993-94 report, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, the United States sold \$10.3

billion in arms exports worldwide, compared to our closest competitor, which is Great Britain, which racked up \$4.3 billion in sales. In 1994 alone, the U.S. taxpayer paid more to subsidize weapons sales than we paid for the Federal elementary and secondary education programs.

Ninety percent of the significant ethnic and territorial conflicts in the world in the last 2 years involve one or more parties which had received some type of U.S. weaponry or military technology in a period leading up to the conflict. Additionally, in the war with Iraq there were countless documented and verified instances where U.S. troops faced the enemy who was armed with U.S. based technology and weaponry.

Mr. Chairman, as the world's leading exporter of weaponry, the United States has an implicit responsibility to provide global leadership on this issue by formulating a policy of restraint. While the world's arms market is a lucrative venture, no country has been willing to take up unilateral steps toward control, fearing loss of exports to market competitors. Therefore, it is vital as the world's leading supplier, that the United States take responsibility for initiating a comprehensive and a rational approach to controlling arms sales, which will prevent repeat scenarios, such as those that occurred in Iraq where United States forces faced weapons supplied by the United States.

I urge my colleagues to support the adoption of the McKinney Arms Code of Conduct amendment. This amendment is supported by 103 cosponsors, Democrats and Republicans alike, including the chair of the Senate Committee on Appropriations. Approving this legislation will be one of the most significant steps this body takes to enhance our national foreign policy.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. WYNN].

Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I also rise in support of the McKinney amendment. I think it is a very responsible amendment. I comment her for introducing it. Quite simply, it seems to me in the absence of the cold war we have lost our way in terms of foreign policy. Foreign policy is supposed to advance our interests, our long-term interests, in the global community. To do this, however, we cannot be passive. We have to have some standards and objectives to pursue.

It seems to me our objective ought to be encouraging diplomatic solutions around the world and discouraging warfare and the use of weapons around the world. The McKinney amendment represents sound policy advancing our foreign policy interests, because it sets a specific criteria on which we can evaluate arms sales. Democracy, adherence to human rights, the absence of aggression, and participation in the

U.N. Registry of Conventional Arms, all give us a sound basis on which to evaluate who we ought to be selling arms to. It is correct policy because it gives us leverage. It enables us to leverage those people who are buying our arms in the direction that we wish them to go.

It is also good policy because it imposes moral values. People throw that around. We ought to have moral values in U.S. policy. Well, opposing human rights violations, promoting democracy, and opposing aggression represents the best of moral values.

I am not naive. There are certainly circumstances that are exigent that will require changes in this policy. The bill addresses that. It has a national security exception which the President can utilize. It also has an emergency waiver which the President can utilize. But it seems to me we have got to quit being passive and reactionary and understand what advancing our interests really means. I urge adoption of the McKinney amendment.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, today I rise in support of the code of conduct amendment that is offered by my friend and colleague, the gentlewoman from Georgia [Ms. MCKINNEY]. The code of conduct will be the first major reform of U.S. arms transfer policy in almost two decades.

The code of conduct highlights guiding principles on human rights and democracy which I believe are important to America's leadership role in the post-cold-war era. This amendment would help stem the flow of U.S. weapons to countries that violate human rights of its citizenry and fail to respect international human rights standards. The code of conduct offers an avenue for America to make violators of human rights accountable for their actions if they wish to continue to receive U.S. arms sales.

Mr. Chairman, two-thirds of all the foreign military sales went to countries described by the State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices as human rights violators, with undemocratic governments. The code of conduct is supported by some 275 national organizations who believe that human rights should play a key role in our arms export policy.

Mr. Chairman, I will never forget some years back when I made a trip to Croatia when it was under siege. The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. WOLF] and I got into a place by the name of Vukovar. Vukovar was surrounded by Serb artillery and tanks. We went there to try to bear witness to peace and to try to encourage the people there. We followed it up with meetings with President Milosevic and others. But I remember looking at shell casings and bomb casings that littered the streets, dozens of bomb casings, and they were U.S. made.

Now, some people can say "Oh, big deal. That doesn't really matter. We

sell it to them and how they use it is their business." But it greatly distressed me to know that people, innocent civilians, were being destroyed by the dropping of these 500-pound bombs. I remember bringing that issue to the attention of our National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft. He surely agreed. He said, "Yeah, we sold those bombs, and other kinds of military hardware to the former Yugoslavia," which had a disgusting human rights record.

Now, I think we need to be more serious about who we are willing to sell arms to. This code of conduct may not be perfect. It may be liable to additional change as it makes its way through conference, should it pass. There are reasonable objections by reasonable people about what ought to be a part of this, whether or not the national security exemption is the best and most properly drawn way of proceeding. But I think it makes a clear statement that it will not be business as usual. Arms sales ought to be conditioned and human rights ought to matter.

Unfortunately, we have had hearings in the Committee on Human Rights, the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights which I chair, two human rights hearings. Amnesty International came forward and told us in this administration, the Clinton administration, human rights is an island, disconnected from policy considerations.

□ 1330

We have seen it in a myriad of other issues like the most-favored-nation status for China and other kinds of human rights considerations. There is a disconnect. This tries to, at least in the selling of arms, which kill people, we try to make sure, the gentlewoman from Georgia [Ms. MCKINNEY] tries to make sure that, if we are going to sell arms, that human rights is a significant factor.

I thank the gentlewoman for offering the amendment.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

I rise to offer my strong support of the amendment offered by my colleague and good friend the gentlewoman from Georgia, [Ms. MCKINNEY].

Mr. Chairman, I recall one of the fundamental concerns raised by one of our great Presidents in our time—the late President Dwight Eisenhower. Before leaving the White House and in one of his speeches—President Eisenhower warned our nation of the everincreasing power and influence of the industrial military interests in our country.

Now don't get me wrong—I want our military industry complex to produce weapons and military equipment that meet our national security interest too—but the question is how much and to whom should we sell these weapons?

Mr. Chairman, everyone here in this Chamber knows that our Nation is the



largest producer and exporter of military equipment and weapons of war. It is time that our national leaders need to be more sensitive about exporting and selling of weapons of war to kill and maim other human beings.

Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentlewoman for introducing this amendment, and I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I include for the RECORD the following article:

[From the Washington Post, May 24, 1995]

ARMS SALES 'CONDUCT CODE' OPPOSED—  
STATE DEPARTMENT SAYS PROPOSAL COULD  
IMPINGE ON POLICY AND FRIENDLY NATIONS

(By R. Jeffrey Smith)

The Clinton administration declared yesterday that it opposes a "code of conduct" drafted by some members of Congress to block U.S. arms sales to countries that commit human rights abuses or are not democratic.

At a Senate hearing, Undersecretary of State Lynn E. Davis criticized the proposed code on grounds that its rigid criteria for arms sales would impinge on the administration's authority to decide foreign policy and could force a cutoff of military aid to friendly nations in regions important to U.S. interests.

The code, which is scheduled to come up for a vote on the House floor today, was crafted by Sen. Mark O. Hatfield (R-Ore.) and Rep. Cynthia McKinney (D-Ga.) to stanch estimated annual sales or gifts of billions of dollars worth of U.S. arms to countries that the sponsors claim are not upholding important U.S. values. At the hearing, Hatfield particularly criticized recent U.S. arms sales to Malaysia, Indonesia and Turkey, which he said had each engaged in recent human rights abuses.

The proposed code states that U.S. military assistance and arms transfers should be provided only to nations with governments chosen by free elections that protect basic freedoms and are not engaged in "gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."

It also bars aid to nations engaged in illegal acts of armed aggression and to nations that do not register their arms transactions with the United Nations. The president could waive these restrictions for any country, but only with congressional approval.

The code has collected 102 sponsors in the House, but last week it missed gaining the International Relations Committee's endorsement by a one-vote margin. Hatfield has vowed to try to attach it to a foreign aid or defense appropriations bill this year.

Davis told a Senate Appropriations subcommittee that while the administration supports the "principles" expressed by the code, it "simply cannot agree to this weighting of criteria" for deciding on individual arms sales.

Instead, she said, the administration prefers its own policy of selling arms based on "national security," as spelled out in flexible language approved by President Clinton in February.

Under this policy, Davis said, no single criterion such as respect for human rights "takes precedence over another." Arms transfers can be made to nondemocratic nations if they promote regional stability or help prop up failing U.S. defense companies that produce key military technologies.

Although McKinney has charged that 90 percent of the \$12.9 billion in U.S. arms sales approved last year went to countries that Washington classifies as nondemocratic, Davis said the "vast majority [went

to] . . . allies, major coalition partners, and European neutrals."

Davis confirmed that the administration is considering offering F-16 jet fighters to Indonesia, despite recent evidence of fresh abuses by Indonesian military forces in East Timor.

Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck, who appeared with Davis, said "we are paying close attention to Indonesia's human rights situation and will take this into consideration" in deciding on such sales.

With regard to Turkey, he said "we are, as you know, gravely concerned about the use of [U.S.-made] military material, particularly cluster bombs" during Turkey's military assaults on Kurds in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq.

But Shattuck did not say whether the use of these arms would affect future sales to Turkey, which he described as "a crucial NATO ally."

Lawrence J. Korb, an assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration who is now at the Brookings Institution, testified later that Turkey's use of F-16s, Black Hawk helicopters and M-60 tanks against the Kurds indicated that many U.S. arms transferred overseas "are used not against the foreign enemies of the U.S., but against the indigenous populations."

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON].

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I will not take the whole 5 minutes. I would just like to put some facts on the table.

Right now under the Export Control Act, the Congress of the United States can stop sales. In the past when the President, any President, has started to go ahead with arms sales and he found opposition was rising under the Export Control Act that was passed by the Congress of the United States, they have pulled in their horns and they have renegotiated those sales deals with these foreign countries. So we already have the authority in law to do what is being talked about today. The only difference is we are turning the process around. That hamstringing the President of the United States in his conducting of foreign policy. That is a mistake.

Ten years ago, the United States controlled only 15 percent of the arms sales. My colleagues who spoke on the other side are absolutely right; we do control a large part of arms sales today, but that is because the Soviet Union has disintegrated. Ten years ago, they controlled 50 percent of the arms sales worldwide, and they sold to countries like Iraq, Iran, and Libya. We are not selling to those pariah countries, but they did.

Now that they have fallen apart, our percentage of the market has gone up, but we are still below, way below, where we were 10 years ago. So while our percentage is higher, our actual sales are lower. So the bottom line is this. Simply put, we have the control in the Congress to stop any arms sales that we want to under the Export Control Act. We do not need this legislation.

Second, we should not hamstring the President of the United States in his conducting of foreign policy. And third, the economic concerns that I talked about awhile ago are real, because there are other countries who will sell this equipment to foreign governments if we do not. Along with those sales will go American jobs.

I think those points should be considered by my colleagues. We have the authority to deal with this problem already. We do not need this amendment. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Georgia. I can tell you that in the course of my service in Congress, too often we have seen instances where we have taken the scarce resources of the United States, bought military weaponry, sent it to corners of the world and then find not too much later that it has been turned either on our country or on our allies.

These so-called boomerang sales are addressed directly by the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Georgia. I think her amendment is a step in the right direction. I rise in strong support.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentlewoman from Georgia.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to correct for the record some misstatements and misrepresentations that have been made about this amendment.

First of all, this amendment does not ban arms sales to any country. Second, if there is a problem with this amendment in terms of human rights, it is not that this amendment will fail because it does not address human rights well enough; it will fail for other reasons.

Let me just begin to say what some of those reasons are.

One is that we are spending millions of dollars to quell regional strife that we, in turn, are the fomenters of. First of all, we are fomenting murder and rampage around the world by fueling conflict, by arming potential adversaries, that is the boomerang effect that my colleague just spoke about, by promoting territorial expansion and crossborder aggression and also by facilitating terrorism and repression. And, in fact, as we learned recently, the CIA funded Jihad school over in Afghanistan trained two of the suspects in the World Trade Center bombing.

Second, we are violating our own law. The law states that it shall be the policy of the United States to exert leadership in the world community to bring about an arrangement for reducing the international trade in implements of war. We are violating our own policy.

And then finally, why is that the case? It is the case because in the Washington Post story by Jeffrey

Smith in today's newspaper, it says that the present administration takes the tack that arms transfers can be made to nondemocratic nations if they help to prop up failing U.S. defense companies.

So the bottom line, once again, is the amount of money that is being spent in failing U.S. defense industries.

Finally, I would just like to compliment and thank those people who have worked so hard on behalf of this amendment. They are the over 200 grassroots organizations that have gone around the country in support of this amendment, the strong support of our colleagues who have spoken here this afternoon and who have cosponsored this amendment, and finally the strong staff work of Robin Sanders who put it all together.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman. I want to echo her comments. It is a false economy for us to believe that we are encouraging exports and creating American jobs by these arms transfers and in questionable situations, because, as the gentlewoman alludes to, many times we find in the future even greater expenditures are necessary because of this so-called boomerang effect. We send guns to the wrong people. They turn on us. They shoot at us and they shoot at our friends.

What the gentlewoman is trying to do is to minimize that possibility. She has the strong support of so many organizations, including the U.S. Catholic Conference and others, and I hope my colleagues will take her amendment very seriously and join me in supporting it.

Ms. FURSE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Arms Trade Code of Conduct.

The House International Relations Committee nearly passed this historic piece of legislation in its markup last week, where it failed by a margin of just 18 to 17. A Gallup Poll released in February found that only 15 percent of those queried supported our Government selling military equipment to other countries.

The European Union and the United States together sell 90 percent of the world's weapons. No country has been willing to take unilateral steps toward control, fearing it will lose export markets to competitors. Therefore, it is vital that as the world's leading suppliers, the European Union, and the United States work together to implement restraint.

Fortunately, the European Parliament has started that process already. In January of this year, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling on the European Union to immediately implement a coherent and comprehensive arms export control policy at the Union level. A measure similar to this amendment before us today is being considered by the European Union at this time.

As the world's leading exporter of weaponry, the United States has a special responsibility to provide global leadership in the area of restraint.

As to the issue of jobs in the United States, we must weigh the limited economic benefits of expanding arms exports against the larger costs to the economy as a whole. Arms exports do nothing to address the fundamental

problems of lagging U.S. competitiveness in nonmilitary industries. Furthermore, arms exports undermine peaceful conflict resolution upon which world trade, economic growth, and long-term job creation are based.

Administration policy states that the impact on defense jobs must be taken into account when exports are considered. Well, Mr. Chairman, I wish we would extend the same consideration to the impact on the lives and well-being of American service personnel. Our laissez-faire approach to arms sales creates a self-generated danger—the possibility that our service men and women will someday be fighting nations or groups who obtained U.S. weapons and technology.

Even the Pentagon now officially acknowledges that it faces the prospect of American weapons being used against U.S. military personnel. In his latest Annual Report to the President and Congress, Secretary of Defense Perry writes that "threats encountered in major regional conflicts would be standing armies of foreign powers, armed with mixes of old and modern weapons systems. \* \* \* Thus, U.S. forces must be prepared to face a wide variety of systems, including some previously produced in the United States."

With its current policy, the United States is bolstering the warfighting capabilities of a substantial number of those fighting today's conflicts. It does not take a stroke of genius to realize that these capabilities can just as easily be used against U.S. soldiers, sailors, and airmen.

It is a sad irony that the current U.S. arms trade policy confirms the words of cartoonist Walt Kelly's character, Pogo, when he said, "We have met the enemy and it is us."

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of the Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers and commend my colleague from Georgia, Representative CYNTHIA MCKINNEY, for bringing this important legislation to the floor today.

Since 1990, the United States has been the top-selling merchant in the international arms bazaar. We have dominated the global arms market by sending billions and billions of dollars worth of all types of weaponry to some of the world's worst human rights abusers and most corrupt and repressive regimes. Sophisticated combat weapons exported from the United States, such as armored personnel carriers, antitank missiles, and specialized rifles, have found their way into the hands of notorious international troublemakers and fueled conflicts raging throughout the world.

Placing short-term economic interests above crucial security concerns and fundamental human rights principles has serious consequences, both for our stature as a world leader and for the safety of U.S. military personnel engaged around the world. By cashing in on profits from arms sales abroad without closely scrutinizing potential customers according to criteria like the ones outlined by Representative MCKINNEY, we risk incurring substantial security and human costs. During the Gulf war and in Somalia, for example, the safety of many of our men and women in the Armed Forces was threatened by weaponry sold by our own Government. Moreover, skyrocketing arms sales have contributed to regional arms races, which in turn force us to increase spending to deal with greater threats to our national security.

As we continue to adjust to the realities of the post-cold-war world, we need to revise our

philosophies concerning foreign military sales. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many of the principles which guided our arms export policies in the past no longer are relevant. The provisions of the Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers will establish a sensible, much-needed framework for making decisions about what we send abroad and to whom. The United States should take a leadership role in forging new policies and encouraging new thinking in this area.

Being the world's No. 1 weapons supplier is a very dubious distinction. As we approach the start of the 21st century, we should re-evaluate the priorities which have placed us in this category and look to the Code of Conduct as a model.

Again, I would like to thank Representative MCKINNEY for all her hard work on behalf of this important issue. I strongly support this initiative and urge my colleagues to vote for the McKinney amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Georgia [Ms. MCKINNEY].

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Ms. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 157, noes 262, not voting 15, as follows:

[Roll No. 351]

AYES—157

Abercrombie	Gutierrez	Owens
Ackerman	Hall (OH)	Pallone
Barrett (WI)	Hastings (FL)	Pastor
Becerra	Hefner	Payne (NJ)
Beilenson	Hilliard	Pelosi
Berman	Hinchev	Peterson (MN)
Bishop	Horn	Pomeroy
Boehlert	Houghton	Porter
Bonior	Hoyer	Poshard
Borski	Jackson-Lee	Rahall
Boucher	Jacobs	Rangel
Brown (CA)	Johnson (SD)	Reed
Brown (OH)	Johnston	Reynolds
Bryant (TX)	Kanjorski	Richardson
Cardin	Kaptur	Rivers
Clay	Kasich	Rohrabacher
Clayton	Kennedy (MA)	Rose
Clement	Kennedy (RI)	Roybal-Allard
Clyburn	Kildee	Rush
Coleman	Lantos	Sabo
Collins (IL)	Leach	Sanders
Collins (MI)	Levin	Sawyer
Condit	Lewis (GA)	Schiff
Conyers	Lincoln	Schroeder
Costello	Lipinski	Scott
Coyne	LoBiondo	Serrano
Danner	Lowey	Skaggs
DeFazio	Luther	Slaughter
Dellums	Maloney	Smith (NJ)
Diaz-Balart	Manton	Stark
Dixon	Markey	Stokes
Doggett	Martinez	Studds
Dooley	McCarthy	Stupak
Dornan	McDermott	Tanner
Durbin	McHale	Thompson
Ehlers	McKinney	Torres
Engel	Meehan	Torricelli
Eshoo	Meek	Towns
Evans	Menendez	Traficant
Farr	Mfume	Tucker
Fattah	Miller (CA)	Velazquez
Fields (LA)	Mineta	Vento
Filner	Minge	Volkmer
Flake	Mink	Ward
Foglietta	Moakley	Waters
Ford	Morella	Watt (NC)
Frank (MA)	Nadler	Waxman
Furse	Neal	Williams
Gephardt	Oberstar	Wise
Gordon	Obey	
Green	Orton	

Wolf  
Woolsey

Wyden  
Wynn

Yates  
Zimmer

□ 1358

## NOES—262

Allard  
Archer  
Army  
Bachus  
Baesler  
Baker (CA)  
Baker (LA)  
Baldacci  
Ballenger  
Barcia  
Barr  
Barrett (NE)  
Bartlett  
Barton  
Bass  
Bentsen  
Bereuter  
Bevill  
Billbray  
Billarakis  
Bliley  
Blute  
Boehner  
Bonilla  
Bono  
Brewster  
Browder  
Brown (FL)  
Brownback  
Bryant (TN)  
Bunn  
Bunning  
Burr  
Burton  
Buyer  
Callahan  
Camp  
Canady  
Castle  
Chabot  
Chambliss  
Chapman  
Chenoweth  
Christensen  
Chryser  
Clinger  
Coble  
Coburn  
Collins (GA)  
Combust  
Cooley  
Cox  
Cramer  
Crane  
Crapo  
Cremeans  
Cunningham  
Davis  
de la Garza  
Deal  
DeLauro  
DeLay  
Deutsch  
Dickey  
Dicks  
Dingell  
Doolittle  
Doyle  
Dreier  
Duncan  
Dunn  
Edwards  
Ehrlich  
Emerson  
English  
Ensign  
Everett  
Ewing  
Fawell  
Fields (TX)  
Flanagan  
Foley  
Forbes  
Fowler  
Fox  
Franks (CT)  
Franks (NJ)  
Frelinghuysen

Frisa  
Frost  
Funderburk  
Gallegly  
Ganske  
Gejdenson  
Gekas  
Geren  
Gibbons  
Gilchrest  
Gillmor  
Gilman  
Gonzalez  
Goodlatte  
Goodling  
Goss  
Graham  
Greenwood  
Gunderson  
Gutknecht  
Hall (TX)  
Hamilton  
Hancock  
Harman  
Hastert  
Hastings (WA)  
Hayes  
Hayworth  
Hefley  
Heineman  
Herger  
Hilleary  
Hobson  
Hoekstra  
Hoke  
Holden  
Hostettler  
Hunter  
Hutchinson  
Hyde  
Inglis  
Istook  
Jefferson  
Johnson (CT)  
Johnson, E. B.  
Johnson, Sam  
Jones  
Kelly  
Kennelly  
Kim  
King  
Kingston  
Klink  
Klug  
Knollenberg  
Kolbe  
LaFalce  
LaHood  
Largent  
Latham  
LaTourette  
Laughlin  
Lazio  
Lewis (CA)  
Lewis (KY)  
Lightfoot  
Linder  
Livingston  
Lofgren  
Longley  
Lucas  
Manzullo  
Martini  
Mascara  
Matsui  
McCollum  
McCrery  
McHugh  
McInnis  
McIntosh  
McKeon  
McNulty  
Metcalf  
Mica  
Molinari  
Mollohan  
Montgomery  
Moorhead

Murtha  
Myers  
Myrick  
Nethercutt  
Neumann  
Ney  
Norwood  
Nussle  
Ortiz  
Oxley  
Packard  
Parker  
Paxon  
Payne (VA)  
Petri  
Pickett  
Pombo  
Portman  
Pryce  
Quillen  
Quinn  
Radanovich  
Ramstad  
Regula  
Riggs  
Roberts  
Roemer  
Rogers  
Ros-Lehtinen  
Roth  
Roukema  
Royce  
Salmon  
Sanford  
Saxton  
Schaefer  
Schumer  
Seastrand  
Sensenbrenner  
Shadegg  
Shaw  
Shays  
Shuster  
Skeen  
Skelton  
Smith (MI)  
Smith (TX)  
Smith (WA)  
Solomon  
Souder  
Spence  
Spratt  
Stearns  
Stenholm  
Stockman  
Stump  
Talent  
Tate  
Tauzin  
Taylor (MS)  
Taylor (NC)  
Tejeda  
Thomas  
Thornberry  
Thornton  
Thurman  
Tiahrt  
Torkildsen  
Upton  
Visclosky  
Vucanovich  
Waldholtz  
Walker  
Walsh  
Wamp  
Watts (OK)  
Weldon (FL)  
Weldon (PA)  
Weller  
White  
Whitfield  
Wicker  
Wilson  
Young (AK)  
Young (FL)  
Zeliff

## NOT VOTING—15

Andrews  
Bateman  
Calvert  
Cubin  
Fazio

Hansen  
Klecicka  
McDade  
Meyers  
Miller (FL)

Moran  
Olver  
Peterson (FL)  
Scarborough  
Sisisky

□ 1400

Mr. COX and Mr. DICKS changed their vote from "aye" to "no."

Messrs. REYNOLDS, DOOLEY, and EHLERS changed their vote from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment, amendment No. 26.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by BEREUTER: At the end of the bill, add the following:

## DIVISION D—ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS

## TITLE XLI—PUBLIC LAW 480

**SEC. 4001. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR TITLE III.**

(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section 3242 of this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated \$25,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 1996 and 1997 for the provision of agricultural commodities under title III of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (7 U.S.C. 1727 et seq.).

(b) AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER AMOUNTS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, amounts authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) may be used to carry out title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (7 U.S.C. 1721 et seq.).

**SEC. 4002. REDUCTION IN AUTHORIZATIONS FOR CERTAIN UNITED STATES INFORMATIONAL, EDUCATIONAL, AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS.**

Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (3)(F) of section 2106 of this Act, the following amounts are authorized to be appropriated to carry out international information activities and educational and cultural exchange programs under the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, Reorganization Plan Number 2 of 1977, the United States International Broadcasting Act of 1994, the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act, the Television Broadcasting to Cuba Act, the Board for International Broadcasting Act, the Inspector General Act of 1978, the North/South Center Act of 1991, the national Endowment for Democracy Act, and to carry out other countries in law consistent with such purposes:

(1) SALARIES AND EXPENSES.—For "Salaries and Expenses", \$445,645,000 for the fiscal year 1996 and \$423,080,000 for the fiscal year 1997.

(3) EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS.—For "Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship Program", "Edmund S. Muskie Fellowship Program", "International Visitors Program", and "Mike Mansfield Fellowship Program", "Claude and Mildred Pepper Scholarship Program of the Washington Workshops Foundation", "Citizen Exchange Programs", "Congress-Bundestag Exchange Program", "Newly Independent States and Eastern Europe Training", "Institute for Representative Government", and "Arts America", \$67,265,800 for the fiscal year 1996 and \$67,341,400 for the fiscal year 1997.

Mr. BEREUTER (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Nebraska?

There was no objection.

restores the \$25,160,000 to the current funding level of the Food for Development United States food assistance program for fiscal year 1996 and 1997. This is the Food for Peace Program, title III.

The current funding is \$157 million. The legislation before us cuts it to zero. What I am attempting to do is to take \$25 million from the USIA, the U.S. Information Agency's education and cultural exchange programs, and restore at least \$25 million to the title III program.

The Bereuter amendment helps ensure that U.S. foreign assistance is directed to the world's most deserving aid recipients, starving people in famine- and war-stricken countries.

Mr. Chairman, the U.S. food assistance has been reduced by 24 percent in the last 2 years. In March the United States told other food donor countries that we would decrease our minimum commitment of food aid from 4.47 to 2.5 million metric tons. Over the past decade, the United States has provided between 6.5 and 8 million metric tons. The Bereuter amendment, through authorizing \$25 million for the Food for Peace Program, still represents a 50-percent cut in the President's fiscal year 1996 budget request.

U.S. food assistance funds are spent here in the United States on agricultural commodities, processing, bagging, enrichment, internal transportation, port facilities and shipping. My amendment is supported by the merchant marine organizations.

I am pulling the \$25 million in this amendment from USIA's education and cultural exchange programs and administrative accounts. The Congressional Quarterly May 6, 1995, article pointed out a \$2 billion international exchange program, "They have exploded into a hodgepodge of seemingly duplicative and overlapping overseas activities."

Mr. Chairman, I think it is an appropriate place for us to move \$25 million to the Title III Food for Peace Program so it is not completely zeroed out. It is important for humanitarian reasons. It is important for our domestic purposes, as well, and it keeps a commitment we have made. It still cuts the President's request by 50 percent. I think that is too much, but \$25 million seems to me at least to be a start back up the hill.

I urge my colleagues to strongly support the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Kansas [Mr. ROBERTS], the chairman of the Committee on Agriculture.

(Mr. ROBERTS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the gentleman's amendment to restore the \$25 million in funding for title III of the Food for Peace Program.

I think it is essential, as the gentleman has pointed out, that we fund

all titles of the Food for Peace Program. The amendment does not increase spending. Let me emphasize that to all of my colleagues. It cuts spending responsibly without really gutting the program.

Last year marked the 40th anniversary of the Food for Peace Program. It started in the Eisenhower years. It started with a gentleman who formerly represented the district I have the privilege of representing now, Mr. Cliff Hope, Sr.

We on the Committee on Agriculture have a very keen interest in making the Food for Peace Program as sound and as effective as possible. We are going to work very closely with the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], the chairman, and the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER], and the rest of the committee to see that the Food for Peace Program effectively and efficiently meets its goals.

The gentleman from Missouri [Mr. EMERSON], chairman of the Subcommittee on Department Operations, Nutrition, and Foreign Agriculture, intends to hold hearings on this program. We intend to address any concerns with the program as a whole in the 1995 farm bill.

I urge support in regards to the Bereuter amendment. I thank the gentleman for his leadership in this regard.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. EMERSON].

Mr. EMERSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Nebraska for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I, too, rise in strong support of his amendment. I wonder if we could have a brief colloquy here.

I am concerned that the most basic fundamental humanitarian assistance, food and medical assistance, be maintained in the posture that it currently sits; that is to say, immune from politics and the whims of the State Department. I would like some assurance that it will remain a tool of the PVO's who are so committed in the administration of the most fundamental humanitarian assistance.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman, we have done our best to assure that in fact we have an increase in the title II program which is most important. Sometimes, as the gentleman knows, however, we have to take from the title III program for those title II-related humanitarian programs. This amendment I am offering will continue to provide us that flexibility.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. BEREUTER was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I will come back to the gentleman from

Missouri in a second, but I yield to the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], the chairman.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to join with the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. EMERSON] and the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. ROBERTS] with regard to their concern on the Public Law 480 proposal. We want to make certain that we keep that at reasonable levels. It is an important program. I want to assure the gentleman we will do our best to make certain it is going to be effectively administered.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for that assurance, and I yield back to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. EMERSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding further.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is very important to point out that what we are talking about here is fundamental humanitarian assistance, food that goes to people when they are starving to death. We are not talking about pouring money down a rat hole here, or giving some Ambassador the opportunity with the use of taxpayer dollars to build the Taj Mahal.

We are talking about keeping starving people alive. I think that point needs to be made, and I think an understanding of the fact that the Food for Peace Program is part of the foreign assistance program is a fact with which most Americans are unfamiliar.

I mean, most Americans, I believe, would think that we are just throwing money willy-nilly around the world for no good purposes, and I happen to be one who believes that most Americans think that when there are people who are starving, they ought to be fed.

I thank the gentleman for his contribution to this cause, and I look forward to continuing to work with him to pursue our mutual interests in this subject area.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his strong statement. He is exactly right. This is the program that ends up putting food in people's mouths across the world, in the most terrible situations that we have seen so much in our electronic media.

The gentleman is a former ranking member of the Hunger Committee, he knows well how directly this food assistance has been provided in Ethiopia and Somalia and other places. I thank the gentleman for his comments.

Mr. Chairman, I urge a strong "aye" vote.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BROWNBACK TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BEREUTER

Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BROWNBACK to the amendment offered by Mr. BEREUTER: Strike section 4002 of the Bereuter Amendment and insert the following:

**SEC. 4002. REDUCTION IN AUTHORIZATIONS FOR CERTAIN UNITED STATES INFORMATIONAL, EDUCATIONAL, AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS.**

Notwithstanding paragraphs (1), (3)(F), (4)(A), and (5) of section 2106 of this Act, the following amounts are authorized to be appropriated to carry out international information activities and educational and cultural exchange programs under the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, Reorganization Plan Number 2 of 1977, the United States International Broadcasting Act of 1944, the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act, the Television Broadcasting to Cuba Act, the Board for International Broadcasting Act, the Inspector General Act of 1978, the North/South Center Act of 1991, the National Endowment for Democracy Act, and to carry out other authorities in law consistent with such purposes:

(1) SALARIES AND EXPENSES.—For "Salaries and Expenses", \$445,645,000 for the fiscal year 1996 and \$402,080,000 for the fiscal year 1997.

(2) EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS.—For "Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship Program", "Edmund S. Muskie Fellowship Program", "International Visitors Program", "Mike Mansfield Fellowship Program", "Claude and Mildred Pepper Scholarship Program of the Washington Workshops Foundation", "Citizen Exchange Programs", "Congress-Bundestag Exchange Program", "Newly Independent States and Eastern Europe Training", "Institute for Representative Government", and "Arts America", \$82,265,800 for the fiscal year 1996 and \$62,341,400 for the fiscal year 1997.

(3) RADIO CONSTRUCTION.—For "Radio Construction", \$70,164,000 for the fiscal year 1996 and \$52,647,000 for the fiscal year 1997.

(4) INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING ACTIVITIES.—For "International Broadcasting Activities", \$311,191,000 for the fiscal year 1996 and \$246,191,000 for the fiscal year 1997.

Mr. BROWNBACK (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kansas?

There was no objection.

Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, my amendment has been agreed to by the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER] and a copy of it has been shared with the minority.

What my amendment simply does is it spreads the \$25 million in cuts around a little bit further than what the Bereuter proposal has. The gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER] suggests cuts to USIA salaries and exchanges, and my amendment would lighten those cuts in the salaries and exchanges areas and broaden the reductions to radio construction and broadcasting.

What we are attempting to do by this is to support what the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER] is doing to put this money into the hunger programs, to be able to feed those who are starving, but spreading around a little bit more the cuts in the USIA program. That is what my amendment to the Bereuter amendment would do. I would ask for it to be considered.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BROWNBACK. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman my colleague and my neighbor for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I have no objections to the additional flexibility he provides to USIA and where those cuts must come to make this basic amendment budget neutral. I thank him for his initiative.

Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, with that, I would hope that we could vote on this because I think it does do what most people would like, let the USIA agency be able to take care of this within its own, and that would be then supportive of the Bereuter amendment to put \$25 million in additional food aid program.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BROWNBACK. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the proposed amendment by the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. BROWNBACK] that has been accepted by the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER], the proponent of the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. BROWNBACK] to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER].

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER], as amended.

The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. WYNN

Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. WYNN: In section 3414 of the bill (in subsection (e) of section 711 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961)—

(1) in paragraph (1) of such subsection (e), strike "\$3,000,000" and insert "\$15,000,000";

(2) redesignate paragraph (2) of such subsection as paragraph (3); and

(3) insert after paragraph (1) of such subsection the following new paragraph:

"(2) USE OF AMOUNTS FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.—Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated under paragraph (1) for fiscal years 1996 and 1997, \$12,000,000 for each such fiscal year shall be made available for the sale, reduction, and cancellation of loans, or portions thereof, for countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Mr. WYNN (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Maryland?

There was no objection.

Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, the amendment I am proposing today is a very straightforward one that address-

es our economic interest in Latin America. This amendment would put \$12 million into a debt relief program for Latin America and the Caribbean.

Yesterday in the course of our debates, we cut money out of a fund called International Organizations, which is dues-assessed, International Organizations. I want to take a portion of that money, \$12 million, and put it toward debt relief.

I believe in so doing we can advance our economic interests. One of the things I said a little earlier today was this: that in a post-cold war era, we have to understand that our foreign policy ought to advance our interests. We have specific interests in the Western Hemisphere in terms of encouraging and expanding trade opportunities.

Why? Because these trade opportunities in our own backyard can create jobs in the United States. But unfortunately the debt burden in many of our neighboring countries in Latin America and the Caribbean is a major factor in inhibiting economic growth and decreases the absorptive capacity. In other words, they cannot trade with us because they are paying off these very old debts. A debt relief program would help address this concern.

To be eligible for this program, these countries would have to meet specific economic and political criteria included in existing legislation for the region.

These requirements include an IMF program, a World Bank program, significant investment reform and normalized relations with commercial creditors. In addition, eligible countries must have governments which have been democratically elected, are not in gross violation of human rights, and have supported our efforts to combat narcotics and terrorism. In other words, we want to deal with friendly, democratic countries that are working with us and have normalized economic conditions.

Why are we doing this? Debt reduction provides a catalyst for Caribbean and Latin American countries undertaking economic reforms and liberation programs.

□ 1415

Debt reduction is specifically important for small countries in the Caribbean, where most debt is bilateral. In Jamaica, for example, debt service continues to consume more than 49 percent of the government's budget. Debt relief will accelerate trade links by freeing vital foreign exchange reserves that otherwise would have been used for debt service. These reserves can now be used to import products from the United States.

For example, with 70 cents of each dollar buying U.S. goods and services in the Caribbean, debt reduction in the region can stimulate significant U.S. exports. Think about that, 70 cents of every dollar in that region is spent on our goods and services. We need to do business with them.

After a decade of economic adjustment and reform, many countries in Latin America and in the Caribbean are enjoying their best economic prospects. Policy reforms in these countries and the resulting economic stability encouraged will help our economic ties with these countries. Total trade between the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean has grown since 1987. There has been a steady growth in terms of both imports and exports.

Latin America is the fastest-growing U.S. export market in the world, and the only region where the United States now enjoys a trade surplus.

Open markets also promote economic development in poor Latin American countries. This will help them stem the flow of illegal immigration to the United States. My colleagues are going to hear my colleagues from across the aisle say well, perhaps these are laudable goals, but we just cannot afford it, but I think that argument misses the boat.

In the business of economic trade and foreign policy we have to promote our long-term interests. It is terribly shortsighted not to spend this small amount of money, only \$12 million from our own backyard to ultimately create jobs for our own people.

They can either spend the money on debt service or they can spend the money buying U.S. products. Debt reduction, especially for heavily indebted countries of the Caribbean basin, will send an important signal of U.S. commitment to democratically elected governments in the region.

I would like to urge all Members of the House to consider the importance of our regional neighbors, to consider the importance of trade in terms of our long-term economic picture, and begin to think of foreign policy as a proactive endeavor and not just a reactive endeavor and not just an area where we can find some savings here.

I think in that context Members will find this amendment is certainly reasonable, modest in the amount of money involved, but the long-term investment will certainly serve America's economic interests.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, this is a budget-breaking amendment. It simply adds money to the bill without reducing funding elsewhere.

The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH] gave us clear direction to cut this bill, and we did so yesterday under the Brownback amendment by reducing our spending by an additional over \$400 million. This amendment earmarks funds. The distinguished chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, Mr. LIVINGSTON, has made it clear to all of us that the Committee on Appropriations would oppose such earmarks.

Furthermore, the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. WYNN] is seeking to add

funds to a new and untested program. And I would like to note that already in the bill we authorized \$3 million for fiscal year 1996, and \$3 million for fiscal year 1997, to do what the gentleman is suggesting. It is a total of \$6 million for an initial start on this program to begin operations in a limited way.

Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to oppose the Wynn amendment even though it has a worthy endeavor as its objective.

Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. Let me emphasize first to my colleagues the amount of money that I am proposing to expend is less than the amount of money that was in the bill when it came out of committee. There is not one nickel more than came out of the committee in its original form.

Had I gone ahead of the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. BROWNBACK] yesterday, I would have proposed moving \$12 million out of the international organizations account. Unfortunately, because he moved ahead of me, he took \$400 million out across the board. I am only suggesting that of that \$400 million he would remove that we preserve \$12 million to advance our economic interests in the region. But clearly this is not a budget-buster in any form or fashion.

I would have to reiterate to the chairman that I believe that this is also an opportune time to advance our interests in that region.

It seems to me that all of our foreign policy positions to date have been reactive. Nothing has been done to advance or leverage the direction in which we want to go. Nothing has been done to create new jobs or new trade markets.

Mr. GILMAN. If I may reclaim my time from the gentleman, the gentleman I think is incorrect in that he does specifically add \$6 million to this proposal, without any offsets. So that creates a budgetary problem for us, and it is for that reason that we are opposing the gentleman's amendment.

Mr. WYNN. If the gentleman will yield further, I would say that all of the money I am proposing to spend comes out of the money that the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. BROWNBACK] has already cut, so it is not any additional money added on. The money has already been cut. I am just suggesting it be moved into a second area.

Let me make one comment about appropriations. I feel very strongly about this. This is an authorization bill. We are the Committee on International Relations. We are the ones who ought to set foreign policy that we recommend to our colleagues in the Congress. We should not let the appropriators dictate to us what direction this money should be spent. The purpose of the authorizing bill is just the opposite, to give direction in terms of our priorities. We studied this issue. We

need markets in Latin America and the Caribbean. It seems to me our directive to appropriators ought to be this is a worthwhile purpose. It does not bust the budget. It does not exceed what we came out of committee with.

Mr. GILMAN. If I may reclaim my time, once again I would like to submit that the gentleman has a worthy purpose, but he has not provided any offset. Mr. BROWNBACK's measure put us in conformance with the budget so we would not meet a budgetary problem.

Moreover we are trying to work very closely with the Committee on Appropriations so we are not spinning our wheels here and so our authorization measure will be finally met with approval by the Committee on Appropriations.

So, I think since this is a new program, I will be pleased to work with the gentleman in the future to see if we can work out a better method of funding for the gentleman's worthy objective.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment. I think the gentleman from Maryland is making a very worthy initiative here. What you have in the context of the total bill is very, very sharp reductions for all of Latin America. There is very little in this bill which sends a favorable signal to Latin America. The gentleman from Maryland is merely requesting \$12 million, as he has requested.

This is a terribly important amendment from the standpoint of the Caribbean. Our economic interests in that region are growing very, very rapidly and the gentleman from Maryland has called that to our attention again and again, and that is one of the fastest-growing markets for us in the world. So the \$12 million is a very modest move, it is an important signal to countries that are much neglected in this bill, and I commend him for it and I support the amendment.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I would just like to follow up on Chairman GILMAN's remark that this may well be a worthy purpose, but I want the people of this House to know that we already have \$3 million authorized for 1996 and 1997 for this program. What this amendment would do is to add another \$12 million to this bill, and that is going in the wrong direction. We need to go in the opposite direction.

I will soon be offering an amendment to make some additional cuts, but while this may be a worthy purpose, it would earmark some \$12 million additional for Latin America. And as I mentioned, we already have authorized in 1996 and 1997 \$3 million to authorize this program. So we are going along with the Treasury initiative. That is why we authorized the program.

There are many, many good programs, but we have to draw fine lines,

and the fine line we drew was to start this program and authorize it at 1996 and 1997 levels at \$3 million, and what the gentleman wants to do in this amendment is add \$12 million onto that. This is in the wrong direction, so I would have to be constrained to ask the House to vote against this particular amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. WYNN].

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 125, noes 297, not voting 12, as follows:

[Roll No. 352]

AYES—125

Abercrombie	Gephardt	Owens
Ackerman	Gonzalez	Pallone
Andrews	Gutierrez	Pastor
Barrett (WI)	Hall (OH)	Payne (NJ)
Becerra	Hamilton	Pelosi
Beilenson	Hastings (FL)	Rangel
Bentsen	Hefner	Reed
Berman	Hilliard	Reynolds
Bishop	Hinches	Richardson
Bonior	Hoyer	Rose
Brown (CA)	Jackson-Lee	Royal-Allard
Brown (FL)	Jefferson	Rush
Brown (OH)	Johnson, E. B.	Sabo
Bryant (TX)	Johnston	Sawyer
Cardin	Kennedy (MA)	Schumer
Clay	Kennedy (RI)	Scott
Clayton	LaFalce	Serrano
Clement	Lantos	Skaggs
Clyburn	Lewis (GA)	Slaughter
Coleman	Lofgren	Stark
Collins (IL)	Lowey	Stokes
Collins (MI)	Maloney	Studds
Coyne	Manton	Tejeda
de la Garza	Markey	Thompson
DeLauro	Martinez	Thurman
Dellums	Matsui	Torres
Deutsch	McKinney	Torricelli
Dicks	Meek	Towns
Dixon	Menendez	Tucker
Doggett	Mfume	Velazquez
Dooley	Miller (CA)	Vento
Edwards	Mineta	Visclosky
Engel	Mink	Waters
Evans	Moakley	Watt (NC)
Farr	Mollohan	Waxman
Fattah	Moran	Williams
Filner	Murtha	Wilson
Flake	Nadler	Wise
Foglietta	Neal	Woolsey
Frank (MA)	Oberstar	Wynn
Frost	Olver	Yates
Gejdenson	Ortiz	

NOES—297

Allard	Boehner	Chrysler
Archer	Bonilla	Clinger
Armey	Bono	Coble
Bachus	Borski	Coburn
Baesler	Boucher	Collins (GA)
Baker (CA)	Brewster	Combest
Baker (LA)	Browder	Condit
Baldacci	Brownback	Cooley
Ballenger	Bryant (TN)	Costello
Barcia	Bunn	Cox
Barr	Bunning	Cramer
Barrett (NE)	Burr	Crane
Bartlett	Burton	Crapo
Barton	Buyer	Cremeans
Bass	Callahan	Cunningham
Bateman	Camp	Danner
Bereuter	Canady	Davis
Bevill	Castle	Deal
Bilbray	Chabot	DeFazio
Bilirakis	Chambliss	DeLay
Bliley	Chapman	Diaz-Balart
Blute	Chenoweth	Dickey
Boehlert	Christensen	Dingell

Doolittle	Kasich	Rahall
Dornan	Kelly	Ramstad
Doyle	Kennelly	Regula
Dreier	Kildee	Riggs
Duncan	Kim	Rivers
Dunn	King	Roberts
Durbin	Kingston	Roemer
Ehlers	Klink	Rogers
Ehrlich	Klug	Rohrabacher
Emerson	Knollenberg	Ros-Lehtinen
English	Kolbe	Roth
Ensign	LaHood	Roukema
Eshoo	Largent	Royce
Everett	Latham	Salmon
Ewing	LaTourette	Sanders
Fawell	Laughlin	Sanford
Fields (LA)	Lazio	Saxton
Fields (TX)	Leach	Scarborough
Flanagan	Levin	Schaefer
Foley	Lewis (CA)	Schiff
Forbes	Lewis (KY)	Schroeder
Ford	Lightfoot	Seastrand
Fowler	Lincoln	Sensenbrenner
Fox	Linder	Shadegg
Franks (CT)	Lipinski	Shaw
Franks (NJ)	Livingston	Shays
Frelinghuysen	LoBiondo	Shuster
Frisa	Longley	Sisisky
Funderburk	Lucas	Skelton
Furse	Luther	Smith (MI)
Galleghy	Manzullo	Smith (NJ)
Ganske	Martini	Smith (TX)
Gekas	Mascara	Smith (WA)
Geren	McCarthy	Solomon
Gibbons	McCollum	Souder
Gilchrest	McCreery	Spence
Gillmor	McHale	Sperr
Gilman	McHugh	Stearns
Goodlatte	McInnis	Stenholm
Goodling	McIntosh	Stockman
Gordon	McKeon	Stump
Goss	Meehan	Stupak
Graham	Metcalfe	Talent
Greenwood	Mica	Tanner
Gunderson	Miller (FL)	Tate
Gutknecht	Minge	Tauzin
Hall (TX)	Molinari	Taylor (MS)
Hancock	Montgomery	Taylor (NC)
Harman	Moorhead	Thomas
Hastert	Morella	Thornberry
Hastings (WA)	Myers	Thornton
Hayes	Myrick	Tiahrt
Hayworth	Nethercutt	Torkildsen
Hefley	Neumann	Traficant
Heineman	Ney	Upton
Henger	Norwood	Volkmer
Hilleary	Nussle	Vucanovich
Hobson	Obey	Waldholtz
Hoekstra	Orton	Walker
Hoke	Oxley	Walsh
Holden	Packard	Wamp
Horn	Parker	Ward
Hostettler	Paxon	Watts (OK)
Houghton	Payne (VA)	Weldon (FL)
Hunter	Peterson (MN)	Weldon (PA)
Hutchinson	Petri	Weller
Hyde	Pickett	White
Inglis	Pombo	Whitfield
Istook	Pomeroy	Wicker
Jacobs	Porter	Wolf
Johnson (CT)	Portman	Wyden
Johnson (SD)	Poshard	Young (AK)
Johnson, Sam	Pryce	Young (FL)
Jones	Quillen	Zeliff
Kanjorski	Quinn	Zimmer
Kaptur	Radanovich	

## NOT VOTING—12

Calvert	Green	McDermott
Conyers	Hansen	McNulty
Cubin	Klecicka	Meyers
Fazio	McDade	Peterson (FL)

1445

The Clerk announced the following pairs: On this vote:

Mr. Conyers for, Mr. Calvert against.

Mr. Gene Green of Texas for, Mrs. Cubin against.

Ms. ESHOO changed her vote from "aye" to "no."

Messrs. MARTINEZ, HILLIARD, and PALLONE, Ms. DELAURO, Mrs. MINK of Hawaii, and Messrs. WILSON, ORTIZ, BARRETT of Wisconsin, and

DOGGETT changed their vote from "no to "aye."

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

## PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I was unavoidably detained and was not able to vote on the Wynn amendment, rollcall No. 352. Had I been present, I would have voted "yes".

□ 1445

## AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BEREUTER: In section 2104(a)(1)(A) (relating to authorizations of appropriations for migration and refugee assistance) strike "\$560,000,000" and insert "\$590,000,000".

In section 2104 strike subsection (a)(4), subsection (b), and subsection (d).

In section 2104 redesignate subsection (c) as subsection (b).

Mr. BEREUTER (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Nebraska?

There was no objection.

(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, this Member rises to offer an amendment to section 2104 of H.R. 1561, along with my colleagues, Mr. LAMAR SMITH and Mr. OBEY, which would restore common sense to the bill's handling of the 47,000 Indochinese asylum seekers in refugee camps in Southeast Asia. While the issues here are, in one sense, emotional and complex, the justification for our amendment can be boiled down to one short sentence. Economic migrants have no claim to resettlement in the United States as political refugees and should return to their home countries.

The Bereuter-Obey-Lamar Smith amendment would allow the repatriation of Indochinese in Southeast Asian camps who have been determined by the U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees to have no, I repeat no, claim to refugee status. These migrants—at least 12,000 of whom are North Vietnamese—have been screened out by the UNHCR, i.e., they have been declared economic migrants, not political refugees.

Let me make one crucial point so there is no misunderstanding about the intent of this amendment. Since our departure from Vietnam in 1975 the United States has resettled more than 1 million Indochinese refugees. This Member has always supported that effort and continues to believe the United States must offer refuge to bona fide political refugees who have a well founded fear of persecution in Indochina, as elsewhere. This Member will work with others concerned about fair treatment of legitimate refugees, but

this Member cannot support a program to give non-refugees the rights and privileges of bona-fide political refugees.

The language in this section appears to be doing just that by calling for the bulk of the 47,000 Indochinese in the camps to be, and I quote, "offered resettlement outside of their countries or origin." Another fundamental issue in this debate is the role of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. The legislation suggests that UNHCR can no longer be trusted to make fair and objective refugee determinations. If that is what the drafters intended, then I would ask them who should take over this international refugee determination role, the United States? Clearly, we cannot fill the breach. This is a very dangerous precedent, which could undermine future refugee efforts worldwide.

Let me take a minute to point out the problems I see with the existing language in the bill. Section 2104 calls for the resettlement of tens of thousands of Indochinese economic migrants to the United States. While the language does not name the United States explicitly as the resettlement country, there should be no misunderstanding about it—no other country would take them. The Governments of Canada and Australia, also home to thousands of Indochinese refugees, have told my office that they and the other resettlement countries would not be willing to take any of the screened out from the camps.

In addition to the immigration problems that this language would cause us, there are some real dangers in this legislation for the asylum seekers themselves. I must say that I have been somewhat surprised at the breadth and depth of concern about the legislation among the non-government organizations which advocate refugee rights and interests. Not only the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, but also the U.S. Committee on Refugees, Save and Children, World Vision, World Education, World Learning, and the Southeast Asian Resource Action Center have all make issued statements opposing major elements of this section. Many other groups have raised similar concerns with us orally. These NGO's with many years of direct experience working with Indochinese asylum seekers, have convinced me that the bill as written holds the following dangers.

This provision could prompt a new exodus of Indochinese seeking entry into the United States, putting them at risk on the high seas and swelling the refugee camp populations. My colleagues, you should be aware that last year, as reported in the New York Times, more than a thousand Vietnamese took to the sea when a false rumor was spread that Japan was offering employment opportunities. The bill's message of hope for resettlement in the

United States would likely have a similar effect on large numbers of Vietnamese.

The UNHCR and the refugee groups have expressed fears that the provision would increase the chance for violence in refugee camps by giving the 47,000 asylum seekers false hope for resettlement in the United States when the countries where the camps are located are unlikely to give us access to them and, even if they did, many of the asylum seekers would not be eligible for resettlement.

The bill would cause the absolute collapse of voluntary repatriation through which 72,000 Indochinese have already returned home without evidence of persecution. Now asylum seekers who can demonstrate that the negative screening decision of the UNHCR was mistaken can request reconsideration from U.S. officials or other resettlement countries in Vietnam.

Finally, for my colleagues who have an interest in refugee issues in other parts of the world, you should understand that this section would reduce the funds available for other refugee programs, such as for bona fide refugees from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, by earmarking \$30 million dollars to resettle economic migrants from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Moreover, by conditioning use of these funds on unmeetable conditions, it is likely that the funding would disappear completely and not be available for any refugee programs.

In closing, let me reiterate what the Bereuter-Obey-Lamar Smith Amendment would do. It would:

Stop the resettlement of Indochinese economic migrants in the United States.

Make full refugee funding available for bona fide political refugees, for example from the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Prevent a new outflow of boat people from Indochina seeking entry into the United States.

Allow the international voluntary repatriation program to proceed with U.S. assistance and under close U.S. monitoring.

Assist U.S. nongovernment agencies monitoring the migrants who have returned home to ensure that they are not persecuted.

Maintain U.S. refugee policy that only bona fide political refugees enter as refugees.

Support an international consensus on refugee determination and processing that prevents the United States from having to bear the full brunt of refugee programs all over the world.

Stop yet another example of refugee decisions being made without regard to costs for local communities to educate, train and assist the refugees.

I request your support for the Bereuter-Obey-Lamar Smith amendment to the refugee provisions of H.R. 1561

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BEREUTER

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. SMITH of New Jersey to the amendment offered by Mr. BEREUTER: Strike everything after "\$590,000,000", and insert the following:

In section 2104(a)(4) (relating to authorizations of appropriations for the resettlement of Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians) strike "There" and all that follows through "who—" and insert "Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1996 under paragraph (1) there are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as are necessary for the admission and resettlement, within numerical limitations provided by law for refugee admissions, of persons who—"

At the end of section 2104 add the following new subsection:

(e) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section may be construed to require or permit an increase in the number of refugee admissions for fiscal year 1996 from the numerical limitation for refugee admissions for fiscal year 1995.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, this amendment perfects the language of section 2104, which protects certain high-risk refugees from forced repatriation to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. This bill, as it currently stands, contains important language that will prevent United States tax dollars from being spent for the forcible repatriation to Vietnam and Laos of people who fought side by side with American forces.

Under current U.S. law, these people are refugees, and they are also our friends. They should not be forced back to the places where they were persecuted, but, at the very least, U.S. tax dollars should not be spent to force them back. Thousands of people who served on our side in the war and were later persecuted by the Communists on account of such service are now being detained in camps throughout Southeast Asia. The camps also hold Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists punished for religious observance, and others who served time in reeducation camps or new economic zones for their anti-communist views or activities.

Despite the strength of their claim to refugee status, almost all of these people are scheduled for repatriation to Vietnam and Laos within the next few months under a scheme known as the comprehensive plan of action. I suppose the comprehensive plan of action [CPA] was intended as a sincere effort to deal humanely with the Vietnamese boat people. Unfortunately, it has turned out to be just the opposite. First, the responsibility for deciding who is and who is not a refugee, which used to be done by United States and U.N. refugee interviewers, was transferred to local immigration officials who had no real experience or training. Big mistake. Some of the interviewers were not only incompetent but also corrupt. There are well-documented in-

stances of local officials demanding money and sexual favors from refugees as a condition of favorable screening. And to the surprise of no one, almost nobody now is a refugee.

The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights visited and did in-depth analysis of the refugee process in Hong Kong. Their conclusion, after looking over several hundred cases, was the following: The entire screening process and review procedures remain seriously flawed. The process remains hostile to genuine refugees. Several international standards were ignored. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Vietnamese refugees have been wrongly rejected.

Because of unfair screening and defective screening, Mr. Chairman, our tax dollars are about to pay to send back soldiers who served for years in reeducation camps. They are going to send back anti-Communists, writers and poets, members of the underground resistance movement, and even people who work for the CIA.

□ 1500

They are going to send back Buddhist monks whose temples were shut down because they would not join the official church and Catholic nuns whose convents were violated. That is what U.S. taxpayers will pay for if the underlying amendment is adopted.

Mr. Chairman, a core provision of the CPA, the comprehensive plan of action, that has been deep-sixed, was that repatriation to Vietnam and Laos was to be strictly voluntary. The idea was that the United Nations would work with governments of these countries to make sure that it was safe, and then would work to convince the people in the camps that it was safe for them to return. Unfortunately, some of the people who returned were persecuted. In Laos some were even killed.

The U.N. monitoring program consists of only eight monitors for all of Vietnam and two for the country of Laos, along with support staff that has been hired through the Communist governments of these countries. So they have been unable to check up on most of the people who were returned.

Wonders of wonders, with government people interacting as translators and being there as part of this process, they never seemed to have discovered a single instance of persecution. I would ask my friends if you were in the situation of having been sent back against your will, and a so-called observer comes in, or repatriation monitor, to talk to you, and with that person happens to be a translator hired by the government, are you going to talk about harassment, knowing when they walk out the door you are going to be probably mistreated?

It reminds me of the visits to the POW camps during the Vietnam war when people would go over there to Vietnam, Hanoi, and elsewhere, and would meet with our prisoners. They would be told stories that there is no torture. Of course, those prisoners, our



POW's would not talk of torture. They would only go back to even more torture had they spoken the truth.

One of our POW's, you might recall, ingenuously with his eyes flashed out "torture" in Morse Code, getting the word out that indeed they were using torture against these people.

Mr. Chairman, somehow the people in the camp with this situation just do not believe there has not been a single instance of persecution.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey was allowed to proceed for 4 additional minutes.)

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, so the CPA soon ran out of volunteers. They then began selecting people to volunteer and imprisoning them when they refused. Sometimes they just dragged them into airplanes, sometimes literally kicking and screaming. If they know someone is going to resist, they may tranquilize him or her before putting them on the plane.

So the CPA has become a looking glass world in which refugees are not refugees and voluntary repatriation is not voluntary. Yet the United States has given over \$150 million during the last 6 years. The language now in section 2104 that has been put there by myself and my good friend, the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], the chairman of our committee, and other members of our subcommittee, would cut further funding to the CPA unless the United Nations and other countries involved agree to fix the program, to provide resettlement opportunities for a limited number of high-risk refugees, again the old soldiers, the nuns and others with compelling cases, within existing refugee allotments.

Mr. Chairman, the amendment I am offering today is a perfecting amendment to meet the objections raised by some, making it absolutely clear that this language in the bill would not mean the admission of large numbers of immigrants or even refugees. It provides explicitly that the provision should not be construed either to require or to permit an expansion of the numerical limitation on refugees beyond the number that it was allocated for 1995. It gives the State Department more flexibility in its refugee budget by eliminating separate authorization of funds for resettlement of people.

The State Department has been lobbying very hard against this provision. But after my perfecting amendment, the only thing to say to the State Department is take a hard look at these people in high-risk categories. If they are refugees under U.S. law, we should not hide behind an inadequate third country screening to pay for them to be forced back to persecution; second, no more money for the repatriation program until you can certify that it has been fixed and everyone has been given a fair screening and everyone

that should be resettled has been resettled.

Mr. Chairman, I do hope that Members will support the Smith amendment to the Bereuter amendment. It has the support of a number of organizations in the refugee communities who are adamantly opposed to the Bereuter amendment and have come out as such within the last couple of days, the list of which I will talk about further.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Smith perfecting amendment.

(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief. This is not a simple problem, but I think one of the darkest chapters in our country's history in this century was called Operation Keelhaul. It occurred in Europe after World War II when defecting Russians who were amassed in camps were forcibly repatriated in boxcars back, to return and never to be seen again. Our troops and our soldiers at gunpoint forced these people, who had fled from the tyranny of the Soviet Union, back into these boxcars. As I say, they were never seen again.

Forcibly repatriating people who have fled from their own homeland is an atrocious act. We ought not to countenance it. We ought to help people who have risked the seas and pirates and risked their lives to flee to what they thought was a safe haven, and then finding that we are participating in forcibly repatriating them.

These people deserve better. It is a matter of honor. They worked with us, they fought with us, they moved where we are, the land of liberty and freedom. We are not asking that they be repatriated to America. We are asking only that they not be forcibly returned to the places from which they fled.

A person born in a faraway country loves their homeland. If they could return, they would. But these people face all sort of dangers. They lived in reeducation camps. They have finally escaped. Now we are going to forcibly repatriate them? I hope my country never does that. If people want to leave tyranny and leave abuse and move towards the light of freedom, we should facilitate that, not inhibit it.

So I strongly support, and I do not criticize Mr. BEREUTER or Mr. OBEY or Mr. SMITH, they are as well-intentioned as anybody can be. But I just think they are dead wrong. We ought never at the point of a gun or barbed wire or anything else force people to go back from whence they have fled in terror.

So I hope the Smith amendment is adopted.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Smith perfecting amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I take a back seat to no one in this institution in terms of my concern about decent treatment for refugees. I think all who know me

know that. But the fact is that section 2104 of this bill, in the original bill, sets aside \$30 million specifically for the purpose of admitting for resettlement in the United States thousands of Southeast Asian refugees who do not qualify for legitimate refugee status. It also creates artificial incentives for those people to come to the United States rather than return to their homeland, because it in effect cuts off any aid to Southeast Asians who want to return to their homeland and need tiny amounts of help to do so.

In my view, that is wrong-headed. The amendment that Mr. BEREUTER and Mr. SMITH and I are trying to offer would eliminate that section of the bill.

Now, I am supporting and offering this amendment with these other two gentlemen for two reasons: First of all, I think the committee provision really breaks an international agreement which was made by the United States with 78 other countries. It makes no distinction between legitimate political refugees and persons who simply want to come to the United States for economic reasons. It also, I would point out, leaves local communities holding the bag for the cost of educating and training refugees who can often be very difficult to resettle and train, because some of them, for instance, do not even have a written language.

I want to get into the case of the Hmong, for instance. The United States Government has allowed more than 120,000 of the 400,000 Hmong who were living in Laos in 1975 to enter this country. There was a very good reason for the United States doing that. The Hmong had done our dirty work in Laos during the Vietnam War. When the government collapsed, we allowed many of them to come into this country because of the service they had provided to the United States during the war.

I understand that. But I would point out that the obligation that the United States has to recognize what people like the Hmong did for us is an obligation of the Federal Government. It is not an obligation of the county government, it is not an obligation of the municipal government. In fact, what we have now is the Federal Government in effect posing for political holy pictures by allowing into this country all of the refugees that we can allow in, but then transferring the responsibility to pay for the cost of those refugees to the States and local government. I do not believe that is an equitable arrangement.

It seems to me that if this committee wants to create the impression that it is allowing any and all refugees under this amendment to enter this country, then they ought to be guaranteeing that the Federal Government in fact is going to meet its responsibility by sharing the costs of educating and training those refugees. If it does not, the Federal Government is welching on

its commitment not only to those refugees, but to local communities as well.

I would also point out that if you adopt the Smith amendment to the Bereuter-Obey-Smith amendment, what you are doing in effect is creating false expectations and making a shambles of what an orderly refugee process is supposed to be.

I do not favor forcing a single refugee back into their original country if they do not want to go. I believe even in the case of refugees who have initially determined they want to go back to their country of origin, that in the case of the Hmong, which is the one case I know pretty intimately, it seems to me they ought to be given a chance to change their minds so that there can be no doubt that the United States is not forcibly repatriating a single refugee.

I did my graduate thesis on Operation Keelhaul. I am very familiar with it. It was an outrageous chapter in American history. I do not want to see us repeat that chapter. But neither do I want to see us in a soft-headed way simply appear to be doing a favor for refugees, when in fact what you will be doing is causing more turmoil in those refugee camps, causing more confusion, causing them to believe that the refugee program is now blown away and that they will therefore all have an opportunity to enter the United States.

I would point out or simply ask why we should be creating an artificial incentive so that not only do we make available resources to bring refugees to this country, but we also shut off, in effect, the resources necessary to allow refugees who want to return to their original country to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. OBEY was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, it just seems to me in this instance the opponents of the Bereuter amendment are well meaning, but I think in my heart they are misguided. I would urge Members to reject the Smith amendment because it will simply leave a false impression out there, which will cause great additional turmoil in those refugee camps.

What we ought to be doing is saying to the Thai Government and other governments in the area, we ought to be asking them to help us in the process by which we give every refugee an opportunity to determine for themselves whether they want to be repatriated or whether they want to come to this country. We ought not be creating artificial incentives so that in the end they have no financial alternative to coming to the United States, unless this committee is willing to guarantee that it is the Federal Government that will then bear the financial burden of that decision. I do not think this committee is going to do that. Absent that guarantee, I think we ought to support the Bereuter amendment.

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

(Mr. DAVIS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Smith amendment.

Mr. Chairman, many of the Vietnamese boat people and Hmong asylum seekers in Southeast Asia are facing imminent deportation to communist Vietnam and Laos. Many of them have been severely persecuted because of their U.S. ties during the war or because of their political or religious beliefs. However, many of them have been unfairly denied refugee status by local governments under a screening program established by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and heavily funded by the U.S. Government. This screening program is rife with corruption and other fundamental flaws. Among those already denied refugee status, there are some 100 religious leaders, thousands of former political prisoners and officers of South Vietnam, and many human rights activists and dissident intellectuals.

□ 1515

Classified as nonrefugees, they now face deportation to Vietnam. Many of them have taken their own lives to protest the injustices in screening to avoid deportation.

Thousands of Hmongs already recognized as refugees are also facing deportation to Laos. In my judgment, no U.S. contribution to the UNHCR should be used to finance such refolement of refugees. Any use of United States money for the repatriation of Vietnamese boat people or Hmong asylum seekers must be conditioned on a fair review of their refugee claims.

I would like to review with the House who some of these individuals are, because you need to look sometimes beyond the numbers and the rhetoric to look at who are the individuals we are talking about that would be protected under the Smith amendment.

One of the people comprehensive plan of action would force back to Vietnam is a lady, a Sister K, a Catholic nun. Her father served as a counterintelligence officer for the Republic of Vietnam of Vietnam. After 1975, he was sent to a reeducation camp for more than 6 years.

In 1988, the communists raided Sister K's convent. They arrested her and the mother superior, who was accused of plotting against the government. The seminary was confiscated. Sister K was sentenced to 6 months at hard labor. She then went to live with her family, but in 1991 her father and other Catholics were arrested for planning to build a church. Sister K went into hiding and escaped from Vietnam. Sister K has been labeled an economic migrant by the Thai immigration inspector who was in charge or her interview under the comprehensive plan of action. She is scheduled to be forced back to Vietnam. Her story of persecution has been

corroborated by her mother superior, who also eventually escaped to the United States and is hospitalized through the effects of the torture she underwent while in prison.

Another individual called Captain Tran was an officer in the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam. He served side by side with American troops. After 1975, he managed to evade capture and joined an underground anti-Communist resistance movement. Eventually the movement was uncovered by the Communist authorities. Many of its members were tracked down, viciously tortured, and executed.

The members of the movement who managed to escape then plotted the assassination of the Communist officer who had ordered the torture and extrajudicial killings. Captain Tran eventually escaped from Vietnam. But the Hong Kong authorities found him to be credible. They agreed that he had reason to fear punishment by the Communists upon return, but held that his participation in the counterrevolutionary plot was a non-political crime and that made him ineligible for asylum.

Captain Tran is scheduled to be forced back to Vietnam this year under the comprehensive plan of action. Staff members of the House Committee on International Relations interviewed him and found him highly credible. He said he will commit suicide before returning to Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, as a nation, I think we have to take steps that will bring about a fair, humane, and dignified solution to the Indo-Chinese refugee problem once and for all within United States laws and without any increase in quota or budget. So, Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Smith amendment and ask my colleagues to support it.

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Bereuter amendment regarding Southeast Asian refugees. I have visited refugee camps in Thailand and Hong Kong over the last 20 years, most recently just last summer in Hong Kong. It is my observation that while the early refugees were certainly tied in with U.S. interests and support of our war efforts, the present refugees do not reflect this early perception by the American people and veteran organizations.

Most of the refugee population in the Hong Kong camps have been through a screening process and have been classified as economic migrants, or to put it explicitly many are northern Vietnamese fishermen who had nothing to do with supporting our war efforts.

The United States was a signature to the Comprehensive Plan of Action in 1989 which strengthened the principles of first asylum in Southeast Asia. For

example this program enabled the repatriation of Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotians back to their country of origin if not classified as a refugee. By this action countries like Thailand that had become weary of holding refugees were able to see the end of the tunnel, and stopped pushing back potential refugees into the sea. We all remember the terrible piracy and raping of women on boats that occurred. This new program helped to reduce such incidents. It also worked out agreements with countries that were the source of the migration like Vietnam to take back these people and encourage them to utilize internationally accepted immigration programs like the Orderly Departure Program that has allowed 500,000 to start new lives in the United States and other countries. While there may be some refugees who have been improperly classified, these cases could be reviewed with U.S. intervention under the flexibility of the present agreement.

Moreover, the root cause of the migration is the poor economic conditions in these countries, especially Vietnam. By continuing our agreement we encourage additional cooperation with Vietnam which will lead to increased cooperation on the POW issue and complete the normalization of relationships between our two countries.

The Bereuter amendment will also maintain funding to continue the Comprehensive Plan of Action. It will also send a signal that the United States remains a partner in this well-thought-out plan.

This will discourage those still detained in the Hong Kong camps from rioting. Over 200 were wounded yesterday in Hong Kong fighting with handmade metal spears according to this morning's edition of the New York Times. It is downright cruel for us to build expectancies that the United States will take these migrants as refugees. Support the Bereuter amendment and help to stop the bloodshed in Hong Kong.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, what is even worse is to send them back to possible death and torture at the hands of the Communist Vietnamese Government. Some of those people have been disappearing.

Mr. Chairman, I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. WOLF].

Mr. WOLF. Mr. Chairman, I will be brief. I urge every Member to read the letter of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCOLLUM] before they vote on this. The gentleman is going to speak, so I will not reiterate his letter. But his letter probably sums it up better than anything. In his letter he points out in the PS that the important provision in H.R. 1561 has been endorsed by the American Legion. This is what the American Legion says. They said:

These former members of the South Vietnamese armed forces who escaped certainly

have great reason to fear being forcefully repatriated. All one needs to do is review the latest State Department report on human rights in Vietnam to realize that little has changed with respect to what happens.

We have talked to families in my area who have talked about their family members who have literally committed suicide. I think the gentleman is right, and I strongly support the Smith amendment. I think it will be very good for the country.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH].

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

I think it needs to be reiterated that human rights groups have reported several instances of people being hurt upon their return, jailing, interrogation about anticommunist political activities in the camps, discrimination in employment and housing, and in Laos the disappearance and the probable killing of Hmong leader Vue Mai.

The American Legion again, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. WOLF], brought the American Legion, relying on their own contacts with former Vietnamese comrades in arms who corroborate these accounts. One reason that the United Nations cannot find any persecution is that they have only eight monitors for all of Vietnam and only two for Laos.

I wanted to remind the membership we are talking about people that are going out with a support staff that has been hired through the Vietnamese and the Laotian Government. This is a situation where the person that is with the repatriation monitor is reporting to a government, and the government is hostile in many instances to these individuals. Who can blame them for not speaking openly after being forcibly repatriated in the first place? I do think there is underreporting as well.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, let me just end up by saying that there is an anti-illegal-immigration attitude in America today with justification. We have millions of people coming across the Mexican-American border for economic reasons, and that has caused a real problem with our economy in many States. But the fact of the matter is there are still people in this world who are fleeing Communist dictatorships, and to send them back to death or worse is a horrible thought. It is analogous to taking people who came across the Berlin Wall. It is a wrong-headed move. I hope my colleagues will support the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH].

□ 1530

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON] has expired.

(At the request of Mr. OBEY and by unanimous consent, Mr. BURTON of Indiana was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from yielding to me.

Mr. Chairman, I very much respect the gentleman's concern about the refugees in question, but I would simply ask this: Why should we engage in a legislative process which in fact cuts off the assistance to refugees who do, on a voluntary basis want to go back to their own country? Why should we eliminate the financial assistance provided to those people?

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, because, with all due respect, I would say to the gentleman from Wisconsin, the process has been corrupted by money and sexual abuse, so some of these people are volunteering to go back out of coercion.

Mr. OBEY. If the gentleman will continue to yield, the fact is that under the process for Hmong refugees, each refugee will have to again resign a statement indicating that he or she is engaging in voluntary repatriation, and if they do not sign a statement, they are not repatriated. It seems to me the gentleman's statement is off base.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, this is part of the problem. If they do not sign the voluntary agreement, they are put in jail, in many instances. In Thailand six Hmong leaders, all of whom were screened in as refugees, but scheduled for voluntary repatriation to Laos anyway, were jailed because they were actively resisting voluntary repatriation.

Mr. OBEY. Tell the whole story.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. This is the whole story, if the gentleman will yield further. These people, we wonder why there may be people who may react, and I do not condone the violence, but when people come in in riot gear to tell these people "It is time for you to be voluntarily repatriated," they react with an attitude.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON] has expired.

(At the request of Mr. OBEY and by unanimous consent, Mr. BURTON of Indiana was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, let me simply ask the gentleman, why do we not also explain the fact that the same organization which is peddling those stories in fact is also raising funds by selling military, police, and civilian titles in their resistance army? Why do we not talk about the intimidation

from them that is going on within the Hmong community? There is intimidation going on on both sides.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, let me make clear to the gentleman that our embassy confirmed this story. I want to go back to something I said earlier on. The Refugee Committee of Lawyers for Human Rights has so blasted the process of screening they have changed international standards. The credibility is one where they are viewed with unbelievable skepticism before they even open their mouths. It is a flawed process.

We are saying that the President should certify, and if it is not a flawed process, then the money is okay, but if he can certify these people are being voluntarily repatriated, that is a different story.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON] has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. BURTON of Indiana was allowed to proceed for 30 additional seconds.)

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, let me just end real briefly by saying this. If there is any doubt about these people being sent back to possible death, or worse, at the hands of the Vietnamese Communists, then we should err on the side of safety. That is the reasonable and humanitarian thing to do.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Smith amendment. We should not support the shameful forced repatriation of our allies who fought by our side during the Vietnam war. The gentleman's amendment would permit our Nation to end that period with honor and dignity.

The American Overseas Interest Act does not require one extra penny to be spent nor would it increase the number of refugees admitted to the United States. It merely disassociates the United States with sending people back to Vietnam and Laos who have genuine refugee claims because they fought with us during the war.

It is not accurate to speculate that it is safe for our allies to return to Vietnam and Laos. The U.N. repatriation monitoring process in place in Vietnam and Laos are run by Vietnamese and Laotian citizens hired in coordination with those Governments. In Laos 14 of the 18 UNHCR repatriation monitoring personnel are citizens of Laos hired by UNHCR with the coordination of the Laotian Government. In Vietnam 30 of the 38 UNHCR repatriation monitoring personnel are Vietnamese citizens hired by UNHCR with the coordination of the Vietnamese Government. It is no small wonder that it is claimed that there have been no cases of retribution.

The Governments of those two repressive governments are investigating themselves. This is clearly a case of allowing the fox to guard the hen house.

It is for this reason that the American Legion and other veteran organizations support Mr. SMITH's amendment and fully support the provision in the bill. Our military men and women who fought in Vietnam and in Laos are unanimously opposed to any effort to abandon our allies.

Permit me to read from a letter dated May 23 sent to me by John Summer, the executive director of the American Legion.

The American Legion supports the initiative . . . which would provide for a reexamination of the refugee status of thousands of Vietnamese who fled their homeland out of fear of political reprisal, up to and including death.

The American Legion considers it a debt of honor to strongly support your efforts to authorize the proper screening of those individuals who continue to be held in refugee camps in Asia, and to allow for the resettlement of those refugees who fought side-by-side with the American forces during the Vietnam war, as well as their families.

The United Nations will not allow our Hmong allies living in camps in Thailand and eligible under United States law to immigrate here, to leave the camps. Instead the Thai Government and the U.N. are using our funds to forcefully send our Hmong allies back to a dangerous fate in Laos.

The screening process of refugees administered by the comprehensive plan of action must be broadly reviewed in order to remedy unfair and otherwise defective status determination. The use of U.S. funds must be conditioned on a thorough review of this process. The American Overseas Interests Act would allow for such a review.

Accordingly, I strongly support the Smith amendment, and oppose the Bereuter amendment. Let us end this sad period of history in Vietnam and Laos with honor and dignity.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask the gentleman, does he really believe that Save the Children would be participating in forced repatriation? Does the gentleman really believe that? That is one agency we have provided the \$1.5 million to to assist people who want to return to their own country.

Does the gentleman really believe Save the Children Foundation is in the business of forcing people to be repatriated?

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, we are not talking about Save the Children now, we are talking about the Vietnamese UNHCR personnel, the Laotian UNHCR personnel, who are apparently not doing an effective job.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, I would simply say that I sent two of my staff-

ers into the region to try to determine what the facts were. They came back with many indications that the voluntary agencies involved do not support the elimination of the ability to assist people who want to go back to their own country.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would ask the gentleman, does he believe there has not been one single case of retribution? We sent our own staff people over to look into the refugee camps, and they were refused entrance and examination.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman continue to yield so I could answer his question?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN] has expired.

(At the request of Mr. OBEY and by unanimous consent, Mr. GILMAN was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I would, frankly, be surprised if there had not been any cases of retribution, because, after all, this is not heaven. However, the fact is that I do not oppose anybody's efforts to try to see to it that each and every refugee has an honest choice about where they want to go, but I do think it is softheaded for this Congress or for the American Legion or any other organization in this country to say "Oh, yes, we will accept the system which will in fact bring financial incentives for all of them to come to the United States, and by the way, we will not provide the funds for it, and we will let the local units of government get stuck with having to support them." That is not good.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, it does not help this debate one iota for the gentleman to call it softheaded to say that the screening process was influenced. The overwhelming consensus by the human rights groups is that it is flawed.

Let me just, again, remind the gentleman, and this is not a conservative human rights organization, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights Refugee Project concluded, and I quote, "The entire screening process and review procedures remain seriously flawed." They went on to state: "The process remains hostile to genuine refugees, and thousands may have been wrongly rejected."

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Smith amendment to the Bereuter amendment.

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, before I make any comments, I yield to my colleague, the gentlewoman from California.

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

I also support the Smith amendment, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to say how proud I am to be involved with a movement that would allow boat people to be treated as the refugees that they really are. There are thousands of these refugees lingering in miserable camps throughout Southeast Asia, waiting for freedom. I think we need to stand by our former allies and make sure that they are treated as the refugees they are.

Mr. Chairman, I remember a few years back refugees were forced out of the camps in Hong Kong, and a number of refugees committed suicide rather than return to the Communist regimes from which they fled. Mere economic refugees do not commit suicide when faced with repatriation.

Mr. Chairman, I know lawyers who have been involved in the Lawyers Committee on Human Rights. They tell me what the gentleman has said, that the process has been flawed. We need to stand by our former allies. I remember when Vietnam fell 20 years ago, the efforts I made to save those who were escaping from communism. We must not forget them today.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me, and I strongly urge support of the Smith amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. BERMAN] has expired.

(At the request of Mr. VENTO and by unanimous consent, Mr. BERMAN was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. VENTO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BERMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

(Mr. VENTO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. VENTO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Smith amendment and the underlying intent of the bill.

It is really a difficult one. I understand the good intentions, but I think there has been a shadow over this process. The increased interest of the governments in camps, the Thai Government, to close refugee camps has, I think, rushed the process greatly. There has been repeated reports, and I mean extensive reports, even in the Minnesota papers, concerning mistreatment and abuse of individuals in these areas.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Smith amendment to the Bereuter amendment which would rewrite a provisions in the legislation. Specifically, I am very concerned that the Hmong currently in refugee camps in Thailand, first, that they are voluntarily returning, and second, that they receive whatever funding has been promised if they do repatriate. These people are returning to very difficult

conditions in Laos and are in dire need of the minimal assistance being provided to them in order to survive. They are often sent to locations where they must glean a living from lands and communities with few resources. It is, however, vital that we support the non governmental organization and a truly objective UNHCR presence in Laos and Vietnam, because of the necessary monitoring to ensure the safety of those repatriated. There has been a great deal of trouble getting credible information out of Laos with regards to the Hmong.

The Hmong are in a special situation. It is my understanding that most of the Hmong have refugee status and therefore are already eligible for resettlement in the United States or another country. There are now reported less than 500 Hmong who have been determined to be ineligible for resettlement. Other reports indicate a much higher number. This legislation and initiative should be viewed as ensuring that the process is credible and that the resettlement decisions are voluntary.

Hopefully with the modifications now presented the Smith language will more precisely resolve the questions raised.

Certainly some groups opposed to funding repatriation assistance because of the possibility of persecution of the Hmong by the Laotian Government. Unfortunately, our own State Department has done a poor job of laying these fears to rest. The Hmong in the United States and those still in the refugee camps hear from the State Department that there is no need to worry about those who return to Laos at the same time they hear stories of Hmong who have disappeared or been shot. It has been extremely difficult to get satisfactory information or answers to specific circumstances hence this legislative language attempts to ensure certification of the circumstance, a common practice to verify or qualify support that Congress has written into law, certainly we can assume that the Clinton administration will proceed with dispatch and a good faith effort.

The Hmong are special because the large majority of them already have refugee status and are eligible for resettlement in the United States or another country. What the United States Government needs to ensure is that the Thai Government and other camp governments and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees is making a proper determination of the Hmong who are requesting resettlement. The Hmong are under considerable pressure from the Thai to repatriate because the Thai want to close the refugee camps and be done with this 20-year-old problem. We and certainly the Clinton administration and most in Congress don't want anyone to be forced to repatriate nor do we want to cut off aid for those who choose to return, who do not want to resettle in the United States or elsewhere.

Clearly, the situation of Hmong refugees in Thai refugee camps is an ugly and sad one which we would all gladly see resolved. It is crucial that these people be treated fairly, that they not be denied the opportunity to resettle in the United States or elsewhere because they have not previously chosen this option. Many of these people, although they suffered persecution by the Government in Laos, many in fact some would say most, hoped one day to be able to return to their native land. They stayed in the refugee camps, a bad place to live, because they dreamed that one day they

would be able to return to life in their country. Now these people are being faced with a choice they must make now and they should be allowed to make the choice for which they are eligible.

The United States cannot neglect its obligation to the Hmong people who sacrificed lives and homeland to fight on the side of the United States in the Vietnam war. They cannot be allowed to forget those who are still suffering as a result of the Vietnam war. This amendment maintains the fragile status quo, a situation that much concerns the Hmong-Americans in Minnesota. Certainly, reports of serious human rights violations need to be fully resolved and rectified. Often the choice of Hmong within a refugee camp is being questioned as to whether such a person made a voluntary choice to return to Laos. That must be resolved. There can be no misunderstanding that when a refugee returns to his or her homeland that there basic rights and personal safety are secure. That funding and assistance provided for reintegration is necessary should be obvious. The certification process in this measure is viewed by my Hmong-American constituents as the last hope to rectify this situation that affects their family members. The hearings held in Congress and the letters written too often have left more questions than answers, therefore I oppose stripping the language from the bill, and am in support of the rewritten Smith amendment and the Hmong refugees.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BERMAN. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

(Mr. NADLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Smith amendment. I want to simply state that I differ from my friend, the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. DUNCAN], in that we ought to protect refugees, whether they are refugees from communistic dictatorships or from any other dictatorships. They have the same human rights, and we ought to protect them.

Clearly in this instance the Smith amendment ought to be adopted, and the Bereuter amendment replaced, because we should protect these refugees, and because the so-called screening over there, most human rights observers and organizations have said is not adequate.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Smith amendment to the Bereuter amendment. If adopted without the Smith amendment the Bereuter amendment will make the United States complicit in the persecution of thousands of Southeast Asian refugees.

Forget the rhetoric of the nativism demagogues, the Bereuter amendment would not close any loophole in our immigration law, because none exists. In fact, it would shatter what is best and most balanced in our refugee policy.

Without Smith, the Bereuter amendment would eliminate language in the bill requiring that no one can be returned to Vietnam with the assistance of American taxpayer money until they receive a fair and impartial screening to determine if they are genuine refugees.

Is there something wrong with that?

The language of the bill is straightforward:

It provides up to \$30 million for the relocation of Vietnamese, Laotian, or Cambodian refugees.

It prohibits the use of U.S. funds to repatriate those refugees unless the President can certify that bona fide refugees, and only bona fide refugees, have been offered, not even placed in but offered resettlement outside their countries of nationality. That means relocation anywhere else, not only to the United States.

It also requires the President to certify that the process of determining refugee status conforms to our basic commitment to fairness, honesty, and due process.

The bill does not, as you may have heard, require that all these refugees come to the United States. Read the bill, it's on pages 102-103.

The bill does not steal money away from refugees from the former Soviet Union. Eighty million dollars is set aside for that purpose on page 101.

So what is all the excitement about?

These refugees are not on U.S. soil; our Government is not running these refugee camps. Is it too much to suggest that we should not pay for their forced repatriation until we can be assured that they will not face persecution?

For those refugees who will come to the United States, this bill does not create any new refugee slots. In fact it does not even use all of the slots available. These are refugees who qualify for resettlement, that is, refugees who are persecuted for their past affiliation with the United State or who have been persecuted on the basis of religion or ethnicity.

We must not abandon our commitment to honesty, fairness, and decency.

I know money for refugee programs is politically unpopular these days. At the very least we should agree that those scarce dollars that are available should not be used to move refugees involuntarily to their countries of origin to face persecution.

Mr. Speaker, I opposed the war in Vietnam. Many of our colleagues here supported that war, and some even fought there. Those differences still have the power to divide this Nation. The mere suggestion that some may come from the northern part of Vietnam still seems to have the power to suggest to some Members that these refugees will make war on us when they arrive here. I think that, regardless of the stand you took 25 years ago, if you ever cared about the people of Southeast Asia, or if you were moved to take a stand on either side because the preservation of fundamental American values was important to you, then you must help adopt the Smith amendment. I urge a yes vote on Smith and no vote on Bereuter.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, this is a very complicated and important issue. There is a lot of right on both sides. The fact is the Orderly Departure Program and CPA have dealt with the problem of boat people, dealt with a way to allow people who are in fear of political persecution to leave Vietnam directly to resettle in countries, and have set up a process which, unfortunately, has been too flawed in the camps on the countries of first asylum to resettle in other countries.

The gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH], by his amendment, has taken a

major step toward ameliorating concerns earlier expressed during committee debate on the language which is in the bill. He has softened the earmark, he has made it clear that the intention of his amendment is not to increase the number of refugees admitted to the United States above those currently permitted.

The gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER] and the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY] are pointing out the potential problems with some of the restrictions in the language of the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH], or some of the requirements in the language. However, I, at least at this particular point in time, want to focus on energizing our State Department to get the UNHCR and the people in charge of that screening process to take a look at a number of cases where it is clear that people with a well-founded fear of persecution, if they were to be repatriated back to Vietnam, should have a chance to prevent what could be a catastrophe for them.

□ 1545

Between now and the conference committee, we can look at how to do this. I do not think every candidate should be rescreened. I do not think we want to end voluntary repatriation. I do not think we want to give the people in the camps false hopes about things that are going to happen.

I do not want them to think we want to embark on something which would become politically unsustainable in the United States, but the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE] and others were right. When you are talking about people who fought on our side, who were imprisoned for 10 years for political acts and now are talked about being sent back, you want to make sure that that is not being done in a fashion that is going to put their lives and their liberty in jeopardy.

I think the Smith language in the bill as modified now helps to send the message to the State Department, to the international community about our concerns about the flaws in the rescreening process and in the repatriation process and that between now—I actually hope this bill does not get to a conference committee, but if it were to get to a conference committee, we can deal with some of the problems that people have correctly pointed out.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, I rise in strong opposition to the Smith amendment. It is well-intended but it is a disastrously bad approach.

The gentleman from California has said the section of the bill is made slightly better, by the amendment of the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH]. The gentleman, Mr. BERMAN, was the person that raised the initial

concerns about this section in the committee. I say this section of the bill is a disastrously bad approach. I do not use that language very often. I know that the intention of the gentleman from New Jersey is to be highly respected, and I respect it, too, but the results, the bloodshed, the tragedies that will result from this reversal of policy are just going to be extraordinary.

If we make this change in the refugee program in Southeast Asia the blood is going to be on our hands for the additional boats of refugees that are going to be launched. This section of the bill and the Smith amendment completely devastates the UNHCR-multinational Comprehensive Plan for Action which is being implemented.

Why is it that most of the refugee groups that have spoken out on the issue have spoken against the language in the bill and would speak, if they have not done so already, against the language offered by the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH] as an amendment to my amendment? It is because they understand that what you are unleashing here by approving the Smith amendment is a tragedy.

Mr. Chairman, we have heard many comments about forced repatriation. Of course no one is in favor of forced repatriation. We have accepted over 1 million Indochinese refugees into this country because we have a responsibility as our former allies to do so. We have done that generously. Now we have the UNHCR trying to get a reasonable hold on this economic refugee and boat people process. We have 47,000 refugees waiting there at this moment, which are categorized by the UNHCR as economic refugees.

I want to see any Member stand up in front of their local VFW chapter and American Legion chapter and say, "We granted refugee status to economic refugees from North Vietnam, our former enemies." That is what I want to see you do. If you vote in favor of this amendment which guts my amendment offered for myself and for the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY] and for the gentleman from Texas [Mr. SMITH], you are devastating the Comprehensive Plan for Action.

What about UNHCR? Is it a corrupt process? Well, no, it is not. Are there corruptive elements in it? Absolutely, there are.

Take a look at this. Since the screening process began in 1989, about 125,000 Indochinese have been screened under close supervision of the UNHCR. One-quarter of those screened, representing more than 31,000 asylum seekers, have been found to be bona fide refugees and have been resettled in the West. The screening process included the right to appeal directly to UNHCR, which did not hesitate to overturn bad screening decisions. In fact, it overturned 1,500 initial refusals.

While there are undoubtedly examples of error in such a massive screening process, the bulk of informed opinion, both government and NGO, disputes the assertion of mass fraud and corruption in the process. If you destroy this process by the Smith language in the bill, you have left the United States holding all of the responsibilities for the tide of refugees that you are about to launch. I ask you to think seriously about that.

What about the egregious cases that are mentioned and identified by the NGO's? I will work with my colleagues and the NGO's to press UNHCR and the State Department to be more active in seeking redress. I understand that at least 48 cases from the list have been successfully overturned, and more perhaps should be. But I caution my colleagues in the House, do not launch this wave of refugees.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BEREUTER. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a specific question with respect to a specific group of refugees.

Right now, there are a lot of Hmong refugees trapped in Thailand. Some of them want to go back to Laos. A lot of them want to come to the United States. And a lot of them, if given the opportunity, would prefer to stay in Thailand.

I would simply ask this question of those who are supporting the Smith amendment. If this country today unilaterally takes this action, and sends a message to refugees around the world that we are about to absorb all of the refugees discussed under this amendment, and if under those circumstances the Thailand Government then decides against allowing those Hmong refugees to resettle in Thailand, are we really doing those Hmong refugees any good?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER] has expired.

(On request of Mr. OBEY, and by unanimous consent, Mr. BEREUTER was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I continue to yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY].

Mr. OBEY. Are we not in fact by this action today going to make it highly unlikely that the Thai Government would in fact make that third option available to those Hmong refugees? And does that not in fact mean, just as the gentleman says, that the United States is going to unilaterally assume onto its own shoulders all of the burden for the turmoil that will result and all of the financial burden that will result as well?

It just seems to me that if we want to change the screening process, we ought to focus on demands to change the screening process. We should not in the process blow up an international agreement unilaterally, which this language does.

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the gentleman. That is exactly what it would mean with respect to the Hmong refugees. About 2 months ago, I wrote to the State Department in support of the Hmong. I now understand an agreement is being worked out with the Thai Government to grant us access to the Hmong in the camps later this year. But if we blow it up by this action today, that is gone.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], the committee chairman, asked me in his absence to make a unanimous-consent request. I do that in concluding my remarks.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that debate on the pending amendments and any amendments thereto be limited to 30 minutes, to be controlled by the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH] for 15 minutes, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY] for 7½ minutes, and myself, the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER], for 7½ minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Nebraska?

Mr. GUNDERSON. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, there are a number of us who have been patiently waiting to engage in this debate and we are not about, when we have constituents and their families whose fate is at the mercy of the outcome of this, to agree to that kind of a unanimous-consent request when we have had no time, when certain Members have continued to ask for more time, more time and more time so they can conduct their discussions at our expense. At this point, I object, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I have heard a lot of emotional debate today and I would just like to try to put this in some perspective. I do not serve on this particular committee, but I have served on the Immigration and Refugee Subcommittee for over 14 years. I personally have visited the Hmong camps, I have personally visited Hong Kong, I have been there more than once, and I think I have some feel for the history of this matter since about 1980.

The story that I would like to tell a little bit of to put it in perspective is the story of the way in which the decisions were being made back in the 1980's with regard to how we screened people in and out among these groups of boat people and the Hmong and so on. In the very early 1980's, there was a very strict screening. President Reagan when he came into office, was in office a couple of years, and some of us reported to him from our visits over there that this was a major problem, that indeed the standards being used to screen in were not allowing those to come in who had been those who had assisted us during the war, who were truly people who have credible fears of persecution, and so on and so forth.

So in light of that, in 1983 President Reagan adopted a command performance, if you will, from our Immigration and Naturalization Service and the State Department, for how we were going to handle the screenings of refugees to come in from over in that part of the world. That series of standard criteria, if you will, were later adopted into statute in what is known as the Lautenberg amendment.

It is those criteria which the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH] has offered and put in the bill which is underlying this today and which we are trying to defend on this side, and I must reluctantly oppose my good friend, the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER], because he wants to strike that more liberal standard, if you will.

That standard prevailed, this standard I am talking about, for nearly 6 years, until 1989, when this comprehensive plan was adopted. It is only since the comprehensive plan has been adopted that the U.S. screeners are out of the picture pretty much, and all of the UNHCR folks are doing the screening we are hearing the complaints about.

We do not want to let everybody in. The standard that Ronald Reagan promoted and adopted and we operated under for 6 years is the standard that we simply want, those of us supporting the Smith and the underlying bill position want to have adopted at least for 1 year, to look at the group that we are talking about forcibly repatriating in many cases. Let's screen them under that standard.

Let me tell you what the preferences are to that standard, the presumption almost that they still have to prove credible fear:

Former officials of the government in the south existing prior to the takeover in 1975, and we are talking about Vietnam, national and local officials.

Former members of the military of the government in the south existing prior to the takeover in 1975.

Catholics and Buddhist monks. Now, there might be some of them, a very tiny few of them, from the north. I think they are going to be the only ones you hear today who could be even under this list.

Persons formerly or presently employed by the United States or Western institutions, or persons educated in the West.

Persons required after the takeover in 1975 to undergo reeducation in reeducation or labor camps, or who were imprisoned or sent involuntarily to new economic zones because they were considered politically or socially undesirable.

Ethnic Chinese.

Montagnards.

Chams.

Accompanying members of households or persons falling into any of the preceding categories.

The same type of list, I am not going to read it, is there for the Laotian and the Cambodian situation.

We are not talking about just letting everybody in who is an economic refugee. With all due respect to the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER], that is not what this whole debate is about.

What those of us who believe in the underlying bill and believe in the modest amendment that the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH] is offering today want to see happen is that for at least a year, maybe two if it takes it, that we take a look at the boat people from Hong Kong, the Hmong who are over in Thailand, the others in the camps in Malaysia, and judge them and have them judged by the standards that were on that list in 1983 to 1989, so that we can be satisfied in our consciences as American people that we have indeed allowed those to come out who really should and not be sending those back that would be sent back in harm's way.

A lot of us just do not have confidence in the current process. We have seen too many examples where it is not working. I do not see the harm in it. I personally do not see the draw of the boat people, that we are going to draw a whole bunch more people out with this.

The standard is pretty darn clear and it is pretty narrow. It is not economic refugees, again, with all due respect. It is substantially below the 40,000 figure some have used that would ever be allowed in under this standard. I suspect a very small number, comparatively speaking, would actually qualify under this Lautenberg or this Ronald Reagan standard, which is really what it is. It would be a modest number of people who would be ultimately screened out.

Again, we are not actually going to accomplish this necessarily because the underlying proposal simply says we are not going to provide money for the comprehensive plan anymore. We are not going to be a party to what we think is wrong unless these standards are adopted and used in the screening process. That is all it does.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. MCCOLLUM] has expired.

(On request of Mr. BEREUTER, and by unanimous consent, Mr. MCCOLLUM was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I appreciate his expertise and his experience.

Mr. Chairman, I have two questions for the gentleman. I will ask them both first and let the gentleman respond.

First of all, the gentleman said we may need a year, perhaps two years. What happens when the country of first asylum begins to fail to cooperate, an action which I fully expect to take place immediately?

The second question: In light of the fact that even a small rumor floated that there were jobs available in Japan

caused a boat flotilla of over 1,000 people to leave. They had to be rescued from the sea. Given that example, why does the gentleman think we are not about to launch a major exodus of boat people?

Mr. MCCOLLUM. First of all, I do not personally believe we are going to launch any major exodus, because the amount involved in this as far as what the changes are concerned is modest. They are not comprehensive like the gentleman I know in all due respect believes; I understand he does.

Second, I believe, yes, there is a chance that Thailand and some of the other countries, Hong Kong perhaps, will not accept this standard that we would say we will impose. If we do not provide them the money, they may very well forcibly send a lot of these folks on back, anyway, and I think that that may very well continue to happen. I do not know.

But I do not want my name and the name of this Congress and the money of the American people being spent for the kind of forcible repatriation that I believe is going on with a substantial number, not all, but a substantial number of these folks.

□ 1600

I in good conscience, and I think most of the Members who are on our side of this issue are really voting with that in mind, and we believe the downside is not as great as the upside of what we are doing. There is some risk, but I think it is a modest risk.

Mr. BEREUTER. If the gentleman will yield one more time, the UNHCR I believe the gentleman understands, has screened in 125,000 Indochinese. And then when we had the appeals process for those screened out at least 1,500 were screened in. So in fact it is not a totally corrupt process and it isn't a hopeless process for legitimate political refugees.

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Reclaiming my time, I realize they have done a modestly good job, maybe a good job in some cases, but there have been enough reports to this Member and experienced staff, including one sitting beside me in the gentleman's committee that have not been able to get the answers to satisfy this Member that convinces me there is a corruption in its process and there is something going on I cannot condone. While some may have been good, all of it has not been good. It is my personal belief, with all due respect to the gentleman, if we need to give it a second look, we will give it, and if it does not work, so be it. But we owe it to the people involved and all those who came out in the past and that have been allies of us in the process and in the long since Vietnam period to do this, in my judgment, and that is why I feel as passionate about it as I do.

I think we need to give them the one more chance. I urge an aye vote for the Smith amendment as a major alteration and as the gentleman said, it will

change your amendment. It restores the basic bill to what it should be, allowing all of the refugees to come in under the existing ceiling now so we would not be taking in any additional, and at no additional cost, I submit.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I have friends on all sides of this debate. But I rise in strong support of the Smith amendment and sadly against the Bereuter amendment, and I do so not only as a matter of intellect but with some measure of heart.

It was in the Central Highlands 27 years ago this summer when the village chieftain of a Hmong tribe, the Montagnard mountain people, wound a small piece of cheap silver around my wrist, and I have not had it off in 27 years. And I promised him I would not take it off until, as he put it, the Communists stopped kidnaping, killing, and abusing his people.

Now we have finally gotten around to treating native Americans with respect simply because they were here first by 10,000 to 20,000 years. The Hmong people are perfectly analogous to our American native Indian tribes in this country. And they have been terribly abused.

And it is not only for them but for the Vietnamese, and all of the other various backgrounds in that small abused country for almost two centuries of Laos that I speak.

Once about every 10 years, Mr. Chairman, so this may be the last time I will be sitting in the front bench, I will look at these Roman letters that are cut into the front bench of our clerks and our leadership. It reads union on the eastern end and peace on the western side, but these three words I think are apropos to this debate—justice, tolerance and liberty. Most of them, even the economic refugees, are yearning for freedom and for liberty so badly that it enables them to be horribly abused.

I have been fascinated that all sides here agree there is abuse. We are arguing over how much abuse. To ask a man to give you his daughter for sexual abuse, a type of coercive rape over seeking liberty, is probably the most offensive sex crime that you could possibly imagine. To keep upping the ante from a few hundred dollars to thousands of dollars. I have gotten names of people here that I will not put in the RECORD, because we have a defense mechanism in this well where we can name people, and I am not prepared to do it outside of this Chamber so I will not use their names. But they are colonels, higher ranking men, hired by the United Nations refugee people to operate in this screening process. Some of these high-ranking men will make families in the camps put together their money and fly a leader all the way down to the capital of Indonesia, to then be told that half his family will get refugee status but the other half,



generally including wives and daughters, will have to submit to more bribes if not to this form of coercive rape.

I think it is terrible that screening officials have charged as low as \$400 U.S. dollars, demanding U.S. currency, up to \$4,000 and there have been substantiated cases as high as \$10,000 or \$12,000.

I have been to Southeast Asia eight times while the war for freedom was going on, twice to Hanoi as a Congressman and several times to go back to those camps. My oldest of my five children, my daughter Robin, spent a year in those camps in 1980 and 1981. She saw abuses then, Mercedes Benz cars arriving from Bangkok, air-conditioned cars extorting money from those people. This corruption has been going on for 14 years. I do not care if it is 3 percent, 5 percent, or 10 percent. My evidence shows me it is even more than that. We have got to come to a screeching halt here.

Of course we do not like to see people fashioning spears and stakes. God forbid they get hold of guns to fight for their liberty as this country has done. There are excesses and innocent people in Hong Kong who are law enforcement authorities that have been terribly wounded, but the whole process, we must step back from it and look at it. The Smith amendment is the best way to do it.

As the gentleman from Florida, Mr. MCCOLLUM, did not point out in his letter, but the gentleman from Virginia, FRANK WOLF, who is an absolutely sterling person in this Chamber in either party on these human rights issues, pointed out that the American Legion is asking us to step back from this process. I have never found people in any American Legion hall, with all due respect to the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. OBEY, to be soft-headed. Far from it. I think what we have got to do is give these people the benefit of the doubt that they have put their lives at stake, on the road and more often at sea, have fielded Thai raping, pirates. They have fielded shark attack, dehydration and at least 700,000 or 800,000 people drowned on the high seas.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORNAN. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I want to make clear when I used the term soft-headed I was referring to Members of Congress, not members of the American Legion.

Mr. DORNAN. I will try not to take that personally. As a member of the American Legion I guess I have a pass on that. I would urge to rarely vote "no" on my good friend the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. BEREUTER, and "yes" for my friend, the gentleman from New Jersey, CHRISTOPHER SMITH.

[From the Washington Times, May 22, 1995]

#### U.S. BANKROLLS CORRUPT U.N. PROGRAM

Since 1989, the United States has contributed roughly 150 million dollars to a United

Nations program that screens refugees for resettlement and non-refugees for repatriation. This screening program is, however, seriously corrupt and has placed numerous refugees at risk. It affects thousands of U.S. citizens whose tax dollars have gone into financing it, ironically.

In Indonesia, for instance, screening officials have charged asylum seekers 500-4,000 U.S. dollars for refugee status at the initial screening stage. At the final appeal stage, the price goes as high as \$10,000-12,000.

The head of the corruption racket is none other than Colonel Wim Roesdi, Chairman of the Indonesian Task Force, in charge of Vietnamese asylum seekers. He has even opened a bank account under the name of Obrien Sitepu, his right-hand man, at Chemical Bank, New York to collect cash directly from U.S. relatives of the asylum seekers.

Several lawyers working for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to oversee the screening process also took part in the racket. Rahmad Irwan, representing UNHCR on the Refugee Status Appeal Board, is known to have demanded both money and sexual favors from asylum seekers in exchange for refugee status. He then shared the proceeds with his Indonesian counterparts on the Appeal Board.

In a number of instances, the boat people had to offer their wives and daughters for several nights or longer, sometimes for weeks, as part of the deal. Many refugees with strong persecution claims have been denied refugee status because they could not afford the bribes or because they refused to offer their wives or daughters.

In some cases, U.S. relatives were required to travel to Jakarta to pay cash directly to Colonel Roesdi. Some female relatives had to satisfy his sexual demands in addition to the cash.

A number of officials affiliated with U.S. consular offices are also involved. For instance, Sumarno, an Office Manager of the Joint Voluntary Agency—a U.S. agency funded by the State Department and operating out of U.S. consular offices—routinely proposed deals to U.S. citizens who came to visit their relatives in Galang Camp. Several U.S. citizens have denounced his criminal activities to U.S. consular officials but were met with bureaucratic indifference. Meanwhile, their relatives in Galang Camp suffered retaliation by the Indonesian authorities. They have become victims of threats and physical abuses, and their correspondences have been intercepted and confiscated.

As a consequence of corruption, those with cash as well as collaborators, operators, and mistresses of screening officials are recognized as refugees and resettled. On the other hand, genuine refugees with compelling claims but without money to pay, or who refuse to offer their wives or daughters to screening officials, have often been denied refugee status and now face deportation.

Many religious leaders severely persecuted in Vietnam, have been "screened out" because they have nothing to offer. For instance, Ven. Thich Thanh Lien, Chief Representative of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam in Galang Camp was denied refugee status despite his strong refugee claims. In 1993, his disciples and colleagues in the United States and other countries had to pool money to pay Colonel Roesdi \$7000 to get the screening decision reversed. Similarly, Ven. Thich Minh Hau, another Buddhist monk, was granted refugee status only after his disciples paid \$5000 to the screening authorities so as to prevent his deportation to Vietnam. Several other monks are less fortunate. They have spent the past seven months in prison awaiting eventual deportation to Vietnam, where their Church had been outlawed.

Thousands of former political prisoners, human rights activists, resistance fighters, who had been imprisoned for their U.S. ties during the war or because of their political beliefs have also been denied refugee status.

In a number of instances, screening officials intentionally screen in only have of the family. Once resettled, they must pay to get the rest of their family out. Those who do not have the means to pay have to accept indefinite separation from their loved ones.

Many boat people recently resettled have offered to testify. A number of former UNHCR lawyers have gone public. In late 1993, Simon Jeans, formerly with UNHCR in Indonesia, publicly denounced the flawed screening system. In his words, "several refugees whose status had been accepted by UNHCR officials were turned down by Indonesian officials after failing to come up with the cash."

Another lawyer, who established the screening program in Indonesia but who later resigned, reported that "the reason why corruption was possible to such an extent in Indonesia was that the UNHCR leadership in that country was never interested in enforcing qualitative standards in screening."

Despite the many appeals by asylum seekers and refugee advocates and the many undeniable evidences, UNHCR has steadfastly denied any wrongdoing by its own officials or local screening officials. Instead, the agency has invested considerable resources into silencing protesters and into explaining away the egregious screening decisions.

The United States ends up bank rolling a corrupt U.N. program, which victimizes not only victims of persecution in Vietnam but also thousands of U.S. citizens who have been coerced into paying bribes to screening officials. Those who refuse to cooperate have seen their relatives abused and threatened by camp officials. Some of their relatives have committed suicide to protest the injustice or to escape deportation to Communist Vietnam.

It is time to stop the tragedy and save lives.

Mr. GUNDERSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. GUNDERSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GUNDERSON. Mr. Chairman, I think I am as much of an establishment guy or at least accused of that as any of my colleagues, and I come here today with the highest respect for the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER] and the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY], and frankly, I think they are partially right. But it is the part where they may not be right that drives me to this particular debate and why I rise in such strong support for the Smith amendment.

The fact is that we are dealing with either an intentional or an unintentional misinformation game, and people's lives are at stake as this game goes on.

I want Members to know that last fall the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], the distinguished chairman of this committee, the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. LEACH], and myself wrote a letter to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. We wrote that letter because six members of the Hmong community who were in the

Ban Napho camp had tried to provide a petition to Mr. GILMAN's staff raising their concerns about the repatriation process. Those six gentlemen were as a result of that effort arrested, and they were taken to a prison or an immigration detention center at Suan Phlu.

Now we wrote asking about them, and we received a letter back on December 7 which said: "Their well-being, like that of other persons of concern to UNHCR, are monitored by full-time UNHCR personnel. You might be interested to know that the persons concerned are in good health and are receiving preferential treatment, including English classes. They are only complaining of boredom."

Why do I tell Members that? I tell them that because between Christmas and New Year's of this past year a member of my staff and five other staff people gave up of their holidays to go over to Thailand and to try to investigate the circumstances. They were able to get in during visitation hours to that detention center, and while they were there they were able to talk to these six individuals. Do you know what these six individuals told them? They told them that there had only been one visit over the entire 4-month detention process by anyone from the U.N. High Command on Refugees. They had only been out of their cell once, and that was when a friend from the Ministry of Interior came to visit them. No one from the United States Embassy, despite our requests, had been there to visit them, and the U.S. Embassy was only 2½ blocks away. They were quarantined in a small cell of 18 people. They were required to sleep on concrete floors with only a towel as their bedding. They were given only two meals a day of bamboo and rice. They were given no medical care at all. Two people complained of fevers and two others complained of ulcers.

Now, I tell you all of that because as this debate was emerging last week, our State Department sent a new letter regarding this same situation at which they said, "Although the six were taken to Suan Phlu, they were still considered refugees by the Thai Government and UNHCR. They were well treated and their welfare was monitored by the UNHCR."

I do not enjoy calling people like our State Department or the UNHCR liars, but I have to tell my colleagues when we are talking about truth, when we are talking about justice, when we are talking about people's lives, both of these agencies are misrepresenting the truth.

I do not doubt for 1 second that what the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BE-REUTER] and the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY] are suggesting is that there is some room for some problems that need to be resolved. But let us not kid ourselves about this debate this afternoon. This is a debate that is going to be heard around the world, because this is a debate about whether

the United States Congress approves of the forced repatriation procedures as they are ongoing at this very moment, and if we reject the Smith amendment, Members will reject the hopes and the lives of many people of the Hmong community to torture and in many cases eventual death.

I would suggest that since we voted on the Desert Storm resolution and the vote to send our troops into hostility and harm's way, it is this vote this afternoon on the Smith amendment which will affect more lives of more individuals than any vote since that time.

I plead with Members for the sake of these people who stood with us as our friends, support the Smith amendment.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I think that we have had a good debate on this amendment this afternoon, and I compliment the previous speaker from Wisconsin. I think that his heart is in the right place, and like him and many of you I have been contacted by our Hmong community, and our hearts go out to them. But we also have an obligation to our own people and our own taxpayers.

We are being flooded with legal and illegal immigrants in this country. Now we are going to open up the borders. In fact we do not have borders over our own country anymore. We are going to take in tens of thousands of economic refugees again.

Yes, we should help these people in the camps. We should look out for them. They did stand with us. But the war was 20 years ago. How many more are we going to bring into this country? Yes, we would like to bring everybody into America, but that is not possible.

This is well-intentioned, but we cannot allow a new outflow of boat people. Is that fair to these people, to give them hope to bring them on the high seas again? This would not be in their best interests.

Yes, we also have to consider our own people. You know who is going to pay for this. We had unfunded mandates we passed in the first 100 days. These people coming into local communities, who is going to educate them, who is going to train them? This is going to cost a lot of money. I heard here in debate before that we have 1 million that we have brought into the country. How many more can we absorb?

□ 1615

Yes, the Hmong are good citizens. We have a million here now. How many more can we absorb? How many more can we assimilate?

We have an obligation to our own people, too, and we have to draw fine lines, our own people, your taxpayers and mine. The American people are a people with a great heart, but we must also have a level head, and that is why this is a good amendment. It is an amendment with a heart, but it is also

an amendment with reason, and that is why I am for the Bereuter-Obey amendment.

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of last words.

I rise in support of the Bereuter-Obey amendment and against the amendment by my friend, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH].

Mr. Chairman, there are two very fine Vietnamese restaurants in Arlington, Cafe Saigon and Nam Viet. They are owned by a Vietnamese gentleman who served South Vietnam in the army. In fact, he was imprisoned afterward, tortured.

I met with him in my office, as he is a constituent, on Friday. He showed me dozens of pictures. One of those pictures was of the chief of intelligence for the South Vietnamese army, who is a very wealthy man now. He is a consultant to the Vietnamese Government. He showed me any number of other pictures of people who had been very active in high-ranking positions for the South Vietnamese army who had been considered enemies of the people on the fall of Saigon but are now very much a part of society and the economy. He showed me pictures of him standing in Hanoi, pictures of him standing in every place that we would have thought was off limits.

He explained that he was able to travel anyplace. He went over there because he has helped to set up an orphanage for Vietnamese children, particularly the Amerasian children, the children of American GIs, who had been orphaned who are left in Vietnam, and he told me, Mr. Chairman, that the real need is for American involvement, not for us to turn our backs and continue trying to punish Vietnam. He felt his country and his people had been punished enough, that it is now time for healing, it is time for people like him and others like him to participate in Vietnam's economy.

He feels very strongly that the people who are living in very difficult conditions in refugee camps ought to be repatriated back to Vietnam to see, as he did, the changes that have occurred in Vietnam, to realize that time marches on, that the Vietnamese people now are far more focused on the future, a fairly bright economic future, than they are obsessed in the past.

There seem to be more people in this country who are looking upon Vietnam with the blinders of the past than there are in Vietnam itself. This body time and again has made wrong decisions with regard to that country. That country has suffered a great deal. I do not want that country to be a Communist nation, but when you trace the history, we were in many ways complicit with what occurred.

I am not going to go through a whole history at this point, but I think we would be far better off taking a constructive role, helping Vietnam develop a free enterprise economy, develop a democracy at some point,

which I think is possible, and work with them to show them how important protection of human rights is to us and should be to them. We can only do that when we have face-to-face contact with the Vietnamese people.

That is why the Bereuter-Obey amendment is the appropriate, constructive one, and I think the Smith amendment, with all due deference to my friend from New Jersey, is focused too much in the past and past bigotries and does not take into consideration the enormous progress that has been made in the last few years.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH] to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER].

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.

## RECORDED VOTE

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 266, noes 156, not voting 12, as follows:

[Roll No. 353]

AYES—266

Ackerman	DeLay	Hyde
Allard	Diaz-Balart	Inglis
Andrews	Dickey	Istook
Army	Dooley	Jackson-Lee
Bachus	Doolittle	Johnson (SD)
Baesler	Dornan	Johnson, E. B.
Baker (CA)	Doyle	Johnson, Sam
Baker (LA)	Dreier	Kasich
Ballenger	Dunn	Kelly
Barcia	Edwards	Kennedy (MA)
Barr	Ehlers	Kennedy (RI)
Barrett (NE)	Ehrlich	Kennelly
Bartlett	Emerson	Kildee
Bateman	Engel	Kim
Becerra	English	King
Bentsen	Evans	Kingston
Berman	Everett	Klink
Bevill	Farr	Knollenberg
Bilirakis	Fawell	Kolbe
Bishop	Fields (LA)	LaHood
Bliley	Flake	Lantos
Blute	Flanagan	Largent
Boehlert	Foglietta	LaTourette
Boehner	Forbes	Lazio
Bonilla	Fox	Leach
Bono	Franks (CT)	Levin
Brewster	Franks (NJ)	Lewis (CA)
Browder	Frisa	Lewis (KY)
Brownback	Funderburk	Lincoln
Bryant (TN)	Ganske	Linder
Bunn	Gekas	Livingston
Bunning	Geren	LoBiondo
Burr	Gilman	Lofgren
Burton	Goodling	Longley
Buyer	Graham	Lowe
Callahan	Gunderson	Lucas
Camp	Gutierrez	Manzullo
Canady	Gutknecht	Martini
Chabot	Hall (OH)	Mascara
Chambliss	Hall (TX)	McCollum
Chapman	Hancock	McCreary
Chenoweth	Hastings (WA)	McHale
Christensen	Hayes	McHugh
Chrysler	Hayworth	McInnis
Coble	Hefley	McIntosh
Coburn	Heineman	McKeon
Collins (GA)	Herger	McKinney
Condit	Hilleary	Menendez
Cooley	Hinche	Metcalf
Cox	Hobson	Mica
Cramer	Hoekstra	Mineta
Crane	Hoke	Molinari
Crapo	Holden	Mollohan
Cremeans	Hostettler	Montgomery
Cunningham	Hoyer	Moorhead
Davis	Hunter	Murtha
de la Garza	Hutchinson	Myers

Myrick	Salmon	Tejeda
Nadler	Sanford	Thornton
Nethercutt	Saxton	Tiahrt
Neumann	Scarborough	Torkildsen
Ney	Schaefer	Torricelli
Norwood	Schiff	Towns
Nussle	Schumer	Upton
Oberstar	Scott	Velazquez
Ortiz	Seastrand	Vento
Orton	Sensenbrenner	Volkmer
Owens	Serrano	Vucanovich
Oxley	Shadegg	Waldholtz
Packard	Shaw	Walker
Pastor	Shays	Walsh
Paxon	Shuster	Wamp
Peterson (MN)	Skeen	Waters
Pombo	Skelton	Watts (OK)
Pomeroy	Smith (NJ)	Waxman
Porter	Smith (WA)	Weldon (FL)
Portman	Solomon	Weldon (PA)
Poshard	Souder	Weller
Pryce	Spence	White
Quillen	Spratt	Whitfield
Radanovich	Stark	Wicker
Rahall	Stenholm	Williams
Rangel	Stockman	Wilson
Regula	Stupak	Wise
Rohrabacher	Talent	Wolf
Ros-Lehtinen	Tate	Young (AK)
Roybal-Allard	Tauzin	Young (FL)
Royce	Taylor (MS)	Zimmer
Sabo	Taylor (NC)	

## NOES—156

Abercrombie	Frost	Moran
Archer	Furse	Morella
Baldacci	Gallegly	Neal
Barrett (WI)	Gejdenson	Obey
Barton	Gephardt	Olver
Bass	Gibbons	Pallone
Beilenson	Gilchrest	Parker
Bereuter	Gillmor	Payne (NJ)
Bilbray	Gonzalez	Payne (VA)
Boniior	Goodlatte	Pelosi
Borski	Gordon	Petri
Boucher	Goss	Pickett
Brown (CA)	Green	Ramstad
Brown (FL)	Greenwood	Reed
Brown (OH)	Hamilton	Reynolds
Bryant (TX)	Harman	Richardson
Cardin	Hastert	Riggs
Castle	Hastings (FL)	Rivers
Clay	Hefner	Roberts
Clayton	Hilliard	Roemer
Clement	Horn	Rogers
Clinger	Houghton	Rose
Clyburn	Jacobs	Roth
Coleman	Jefferson	Roukema
Collins (IL)	Johnson (CT)	Rush
Collins (MI)	Johnston	Sanders
Combest	Jones	Sawyer
Costello	Kanjorski	Schroeder
Coyne	Kaptur	Sisisky
Danner	Klug	Skaggs
Deal	LaFalce	Slaughter
DeFazio	Latham	Smith (MI)
DeLauro	Laughlin	Smith (TX)
Delums	Lewis (GA)	Stearns
Deutsch	Lightfoot	Stokes
Dicks	Lipinski	Studds
Dingell	Luther	Stump
Dixon	Maloney	Tanner
Doggett	Manton	Thomas
Duncan	Markey	Thompson
Durbin	Martinez	Thornberry
Ensign	Matsui	Thurman
Eshoo	McCarthy	Torres
Ewing	McDermott	Trafcant
Fattah	Meehan	Tucker
Fields (TX)	Meek	Visclosky
Filner	Mfume	Ward
Foley	Miller (CA)	Woolsey
Ford	Miller (FL)	Wyden
Fowler	Minge	Wynn
Frank (MA)	Mink	Yates
Frelinghuysen	Moakley	Zeliff

## NOT VOTING—12

Calvert	Hansen	Meyers
Conyers	Klecza	Peterson (FL)
Cubin	McDade	Quinn
Fazio	McNulty	Watt (NC)

□ 1649

Messrs. EWING, MANTON, THORNBERRY, STEARNS, BARRETT of Wisconsin, JACOBS, MATSUI, and

MEEHAN, and Ms. WOOLSEY changed their vote from "aye" to "no".

Messrs. ALLARD, LAZIO of New York, BONO, JOHNSON of South Dakota, UPTON, MARTINI, BACHUS, HOYER, NETHERCUTT, PETERSON of Minnesota, BROWDER, HALL of Texas, STENHOLM, MONTGOMERY, CRAMER, CONDIT, BEVILL, McHALE, TAUZIN, BISHOP, TOWNS, CHAPMAN, SPRATT, HOLDEN, KILDEE, PASTOR, THORNTON, TORKILDSEN, WILLIAMS, POMEROY, WISE, DE LA GARZA, PORTER, and EDWARDS, and Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas changed their vote from "no" to "aye".

So the amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER], as amended.

The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

## AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. HASTINGS OF FLORIDA

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. HASTINGS:

At the end of the bill add the following new title:

## TITLE XXXVI—ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS

## SEC. 3601. ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR THE DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR AFRICA.

Notwithstanding section 3221(a)(2) of this Act, \$802,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated for each of the fiscal years 1996 and 1997 to carry out chapter 10 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2293 et seq.).

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment today to increase by \$173 million the Development Fund for Africa account. This additional \$173 million will restore this account to the current funding level.

The Development Fund for Africa was established by a bipartisan majority in 1987. Why? Because development aid is clearly in our long-term interest. Development assistance ensures that underdeveloped economies become stable friends and future trading and business partners.

The Development Fund for Africa has been critical to supporting the transition in South Africa, crucial in turning around Africa's economic decline, has helped bring about market liberalization efforts in some 20 countries, and has addressed basic issues such as girls education, vaccinations against curable diseases, and halting the spread of AIDS.

The Development Fund for Africa helps develop the physical infrastructure, the human resource base, and the rule of law structures which provide a safe and hospitable locale for American businesses to operate successfully. The Development Fund for Africa was specifically created to target development resources efficiently in countries that both need the assistance and have the potential to become self-sufficient economies which can later buy our products.

Cuts in the Development Fund for Africa account would undercut our efforts to strengthen export markets and fledgling democracies in southern Africa; undermine our ability to prevent Somalia-like crises and famine; and diminish support for democracy building to countries in political transition, allowing countries like Mozambique and Angola (which are on the cusp of recovery) to slip into chaos and crises similar to Rwanda.

Those who would dismiss Africa as being unimportant are taking a narrow, shortsighted view of American interests. We are making a long-term investment in Africa, and we know from our own experience that the United States benefits directly from the development which foreign aid helps fuel.

We hear a lot of talk about Africa being a sinkhole for foreign aid and that the U.S. has no reason to remain engaged in Africa.

But I am not sure that many Members are aware that South Africa played a key role in the recent indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

U.S. engagement, and U.S. assistance, has played an important part in the emergence of South Africa as a democratic partner for the United States.

South Africa's role in the NPT conference shows that our support is already bringing dividends.

Nor are many Members aware that American exports to Africa are growing faster than U.S. exports to Europe and that U.S. trade with Africa exceeds our trade with the former Soviet Union.

It is in our national interest to prevent crises like we have witnessed in Rwanda and Somalia, which together cost us \$2.25 billion in emergency assistance funds. Preventive diplomacy will help us avoid these crises.

Aid to Africa is not only in our self-interest, it is consonant with our national values. We have a long and proud tradition in this great country of helping the needy both home and abroad. Emergency aid is invaluable for relieving human suffering, but sustainable development assistance is critical to breaking the cycle of dependency and despair by addressing the root causes of poverty.

We have unavoidable responsibilities around the world. Some of the problems around the world which currently demand our attention are problems of our own making. Our foreign policy

goal for the past 40 years was the dissolution of the communist system. We have been largely successful in achieving this goal, but the repercussions of the breakup mean that there is both a political and financial vacuum in many troubled spots. Now that we have forced so many countries to abandon either their type of government or their support system, do we now say, "Sorry, you're on your own? We can't help?" I don't think so.

Senator Claude Pepper of Florida was the only Member of Congress to criticize the isolationist mood in the U.S. Congress when Hitler began toppling nations in 1939. Senator Pepper argued that it was the responsibility of all mankind to intervene in the face of evil. Senator Pepper said, "when a few men are wronged and the force of brutality and the jungle are let loose, when civilization is denied and godliness and goodness scorned, that is no private war, that is a war against man. Hence, to vindicate those things for which good men stand, good men everywhere must stand together against wrong, not only wrong to a chosen few, but wrong to any man, woman or child."

To ignore our responsibilities to nations less fortunate, to refuse to share our bounty, to silence our teachers, to shut out friends who cry for our help, these are crimes against humanity. The American people are not that cruel, nor should we be. I beg my colleagues, support the Hastings amendment.

□ 1700

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, it is with great reluctance that I rise to oppose this amendment to increase the funding level for aid to Africa.

If we had an unlimited amount of money to allocate to foreign aid, I would join Mr. HASTINGS in supporting \$802 million for the Development Fund for Africa.

Mr. HASTINGS has been a good friend, both as a fellow member of the Florida delegation, and, as one of the most active members of the Subcommittee on Africa.

Whenever we have a subcommittee meeting—not just at the hearings or formal briefings, but in the many informal, private activities we have, such as meetings with foreign officials or the local members of the African diplomatic corps—I can always count on Mr. HASTINGS to be there and to be a very active participant.

And, as someone who is new to the assignment on the Africa Subcommittee, I have found that Mr. HASTINGS is a very valuable resource as I study the issues of American policy toward Africa.

But we don't live in an age of unlimited resources.

We live in a time of fiscal austerity and we have to make the hard decisions on how to allocate limited re-

sources among the various spending priorities.

It was in that context of competing priorities that the committee, while considering the bill at our mark up sessions, gave a great deal of attention to the funding of the Development Fund for Africa.

While the budget climate required that all programs contribute their fair share to the deficit reduction effort, we cut aid to Africa less than other development assistance programs.

Aid for Latin America and the Caribbean, areas of the world also of great concern to every member of the Florida delegation, has not been protected with funds destined as a separate line item in this bill.

What will happen is that by raising the aid for Africa without specifying the source of the funds, eventually it could hurt the poor nations of the Caribbean and Latin America whose development assistance programs will be cut or perhaps other areas will be cut.

This has been the history of the aid program over the last few years—as other regions of the world have received increased development assistance funding, at least some part of the money to provide that assistance has been taken from the aid programs in Latin America and the Caribbean or other areas of the globe.

I think this would be a mistake.

We are trying to help countries in the Caribbean to improve their standard of living, just as we are trying to help Africa, Latin America, Europe and on and on.

Economic development programs in Latin America are an important part of our overall efforts to control the illegal immigration and drug trafficking that has had an impact on the people of Florida and other southern States.

There was an intensive debate in Committee, and the bill's funding level of \$629 million for the Development Fund for Africa is one that was given great care.

We had to find other programs in the bill and forced them to accept disproportionately large cuts in order to provide this level of aid to Africa.

I should note that the Development Fund for Africa is not the only source of funding for aid programs in Africa.

It is important to keep this in mind.

President Clinton has the authority to take funds from the PL-480 program and channel PL-480 resources to Africa.

He also has the authority to allocate general development assistance funds and apply them to projects and programs in Africa.

In addition to the DFA funding, Africa projects are funded by A.I.D., through its Global Programs Bureau and out of regular Development Assistance funding.

About \$60 million a year in Peace Corps programs, and a quarter billion dollars of PL-480 programs, are also provided to Africa each year.

One should, in the current climate of cutbacks in all programs, allow the administration some flexibility in managing these program cuts.

Increasing the funding for Africa will actually deprive President Clinton, and his Secretary of State, of the flexibility they need to manage the program cutbacks in accord with their foreign policy needs and priorities.

I therefore urge Members to vote against this amendment.

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, I ask most respectfully, is the gentlewoman aware that the accounts that she identified are all being cut as well?

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman, absolutely, we agreed. That is part of the basis of my speech. All of the programs are being cut.

In fact, the Africa program, in relation to the other programs that are being cut, is not nearly cut as much. I think that is the point that I was making; all of the programs are cut, just as we are cutting domestic programs, so we should cut foreign programs.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

I yield to the gentlewoman from Texas [Ms. JACKSON-LEE].

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Mr. Chairman, I rise to support restoring the development fund for Africa to its current funding levels which is good for people and for business and for all of America.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of the Development Fund for Africa. The DFA protects some of the most vulnerable people on earth. And efforts to slash it by \$173 million are simply unacceptable.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the African continent represents one of the last untapped markets in the world. And the continent has seen tremendous progress, with new democracies taking root throughout:—South Africa being the most shining example.

If the DFA is cut by \$173 million, not only will ordinary people suffer, but the U.S. image as a world leader will be seriously damaged:

The aid program to South Africa—a role model of evolutionary change with respect for market economics—will be undermined. Should the United States cut and run after campaigning against apartheid for so long?

The AIDS epidemic will worsen—an estimated two million additional people will become infected with HIV due to cutbacks in U.S.-supported programs.

Programs that help prevent hunger by investing in sustainable farming will be decimated.

And the expansion of United States exports to the African continent, which now amount to over \$4.4 billion, will be hindered.

Mr. Chairman, U.S. aid is not a give away; it's an investment that brings

about exports to the developing world—exports which amount to 40 percent of all U.S. exports.

But for there to be a market there needs to be healthy, educated and economically productive societies. Slashing the DFA to bits will not accomplish that goal. Not at all.

That is why I am cosponsoring this amendment, along with some of my distinguished colleagues on the International Relations Committee, to raise the DFA to the fiscal year 1995 level of \$802 million.

Strangely enough, while this bill slashes lifesaving programs like the DFA, we are finding room to increase our military sales program.

Unlike the DFA, this is not a program geared to help people that are starving, or are in the midst of democracy building. Maintaining aid to Africa is within our responsibility as a world leader and it is the least that we can do for people who are deserving of our assistance. I strongly urge your support for this amendment.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, as a member of this subcommittee, the Subcommittee on Africa, I know how heartfelt this amendment is. I congratulate the author of this amendment. I agree that the people of Africa need help. I would like to support my friend from Florida in his efforts to help deserving people in Africa. Like everyone else, I have a question, however. Where is the money going to come from?

If my colleague could offer a corresponding cut and make his amendment budget neutral, then possibly we could all support his amendment. But just to come in with a blank amendment is not going to get the job done. It is only a wish list.

If instead the money must come from the taxpayers packets, then I must oppose the amendment. I cannot agree to add \$173 million to the budget deficit. It is clear as a bell that there are many worthwhile programs, but that is how we got into this budget mess that cries out today for a solution. So let me reiterate; the goals here are laudable, but the ladder to the goal is missing.

If the 167 million can be found in other programs, if we can find the money in other projects, then I think this would be an amendment that we should go with. But this Congress cannot abide and adhere to every Member's wish list.

On my way into the Capitol this afternoon I was looking again. Is there any money growing on the trees? And to everybody's surprise, I must say I did not find any money growing on trees. Until that happens, i.e., money grows on trees, we must find money from sources in this bill. Reallocate or find new funds.

Again, the goals of this amendment are laudable. I appreciate what the gentleman is trying to do. But the question remains, the \$173 million, where will it come from?

Therefore, without the funding, I must be opposed to this amendment.

Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, at the markup of the full committee, I made probably the improper observation that this bill is racist. And I want to point out that it is not racist through malice, it is racist through ignorance. The fact is that I do not think that many of the Members of the full committee have any idea about Africa.

For the last 2 years, I chaired the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations. I toured 26 countries during that period of time. Each time I went, I asked Members of the minority party, then Republicans, to accompany me. In fact, I begged them to come with me to Africa, and in that 2-year period not one ventured to travel.

In the majority report to this bill, they refer to "Africa did this" and "Africa did that." You would think that Africa was a country in itself. I made the flip remark in the committee that someday I am going to expect a Republican to come up to me and ask me where the capital of Africa is. But would we say the same thing about Asia? Would we say Asia did this and Asia did that and, therefore, let us cut off relief to this entire continent?

My colleagues, this is Africa. This is a continent four times larger than the United States. It is a continent that has over 56 countries in there, and it is a continent which is exploding with democracies.

Let me go around there. Let us start out with South Africa, the jewel of the crown. South Africa now is an emerging democracy. It has \$100 billion in GNP. You can just go around the continent. Botswana. Botswana has surplus now in its treasury. Malawi just ended up having its elections and is a democracy.

Zimbabwe. Mozambique is coming out of a depression there. Uganda, Idi Amin's country, is now a democracy there and is trading with the United States.

Tanzania. Look at the French francophone countries, Chad, Niger, Benin, Carte de Vois, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mali, all of these countries want to have better relationships with the United States and are breaking away from the French codes there and will be great trading partners.

Look at Ghana. Jerry Rawlings now in Ghana is trying to settle the dispute in Liberia, a great ally there and a great trading partner.

□ 1715

Namibia down here, free elections, and a democracy. Seychelles, Mauritius, Eritrea, such a new country it is not even on my map here. Eritrea is a democracy which we will trade with. Next year, see Angola come around. Angola can feed this entire continent. Zambia, Central African Republic, the

Congo and even Kenya. Look at 1997, where Liberia, our colony in this continent and our responsibility, will probably be a democracy, along with Ethiopia and Nigeria.

My friend, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ROTH], at the committee meeting said "Gee, Egypt is in Africa." Of course it is in Africa. Egypt gets about \$1.5 billion. I might point out, though, that Egypt is not sub-Saharan Africa. Egypt is not black Africa, which I came up with the phrase, this being racist. Egypt is not in the jurisdiction of the subcommittee on Africa. Egypt is not under the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa. Egypt is now considered the Middle East. Let us talk about sub-Saharan Africa.

We now have the development fund for Africa. The development fund for Africa is \$600 million for 600 million people. There is where I think it is immoral. That is why I feel this bill is immoral.

If we want to get the funds for this, last night the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON], said "We can cut the State Department by 5 percent and nobody will be harmed." Why not cut the Defense Department by 5 percent, that is \$12 billion 5 million, and it can underwrite the entire foreign affairs bill that we are stripping to pieces here today.

Mr. Chairman, I strongly support the Hastings amendment. I think these funds should be restored, or we are going to lose Africa. We are going to lose a great trading partner. We are going to lose 28 emerging democracies, which we have pumped money into, and we are seeing results for the first time.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN. Our visitors in the gallery are admonished not to applaud during the debate.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

First of all, Mr. Chairman, I am very sympathetic to the remarks made by my colleague, the gentleman from Florida. I do not believe anybody in this Chamber is racist, but I do believe there are problems in Africa that should be addressed. We are trying our best to do that. We are sending \$629 million there this year, and \$614 million next year. This amendment would, over a 2-year period, increase by \$360 million the amount of money that is going over there.

I notice we have a lot of young people visiting with us today. Many of them applauded. Many of us in this Chamber are very concerned about their futures, because we know if we do not get control of Government spending in this country, that at one point, some point in the future, we are going to have a debt so great that the interest on the debt alone is going to gobble up a lot of our tax dollars, and their quality of life will start to deteriorate. We have to get control of Federal spending, so we have to make hard choices.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? I would like to know why he is cutting student loans.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. The school lunch program was increased 4 percent per year. We are just sending it back in block grants, we are not cutting it. We are cutting the rate of growth. However, that is another subject.

The fact of the matter is we have to control spending. That means we have to make hard choices. I am very concerned about the people in the Sudan. My colleague, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. WOLF], has been down here on the floor talking about that.

We have met with some of the people from the Sudan about the horrible atrocities that are taking place, and the people starving to death over there. We worked very hard to get food aid in there. We did the same thing in Somalia. However, we cannot cut the defense budget to take care of those problems. The fact of the matter is the defense budget has been used in large part for a lot of the new military forays and objectives in Somalia and in Haiti, and we have used an awful lot of our military money in those areas.

The budget is so strapped in that area that we have a lot of people who are in the military whose quality of life is already suffering. We all know that. In fact, some of those people have been on food stamps, people in our own military. We have to be careful when we start talking about cutting the defense of this Nation.

Mr. Chairman, let me just get back to the case at hand. We need to set priorities. Make no mistake about it, Africa is a priority. Maybe it should be a higher priority, but as my colleague, the gentleman from Wisconsin, said a while ago, let us find the money someplace else. If we can find it someplace else and we can do it, then I do not have any problem with doing that in conference committee.

The fact of the matter is that at this point, \$629 million, plus \$5 million for the Africa regional peacekeeping force, \$1.1 million for the Organization of African Unity, \$10 million for Angola, or \$5 million, and some other funds from other areas of government, is about all we can afford.

I would just like to say to my colleagues, we are doing what we can. This is a lean, mean foreign affairs budget, foreign aid package, but it is one that I think is realistic and one that deals with the problem.

I would like to end up by saying one other thing. I think the last speaker that spoke on the Democrat side alluded to the fact that Angola in a few short years could take care of the whole continent. There are a number of countries in Africa that are mineral-rich. They have large resources. They have diamond mines, all kinds of minerals. As a matter of fact, during the cold war, 11 minerals that we had to have to survive as a Nation only came from two sources, the Soviet Union, and the southern part of Africa. Yet,

because of the wars and because of lack of democracy over there and because of the problems, those minerals and those things that would make them self-sufficient have not been mined.

Therefore, rather than just throwing money at the problem, we as a Nation need to be working with those governments to bring about the democracy that my colleagues have talked about, so they can start taking care of themselves, so we can wear them away from the United States foreign aid program. We cannot take care of the entire world indefinitely. We are the only superpower left, we do have responsibilities, but the amount of money we have in this budget is realistic. I think this amendment, therefore, should be defeated.

Mr. FOGLIETTA. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this important amendment which would restore funding for the Development Fund for Africa.

The African continent is in a state of transition. This transition holds great promise as well as peril for the people of Africa and the community of nations. In South Africa, we have witnessed the peaceful transition to a multiracial democracy. In Rwanda, untold innocents have been killed in the struggle between rival Hutus and Tutsis.

Despite the challenges, I believe that Africa's future can be one of peace and economic prosperity.

However, they will need our help.

The Development Fund for Africa has proven to be a successful economic development tool which has enabled many nations to begin the transition to free market economies and stable democratic institutions. This proven program has made valuable investments which have greatly improved health care services, expanded educational opportunities and boosted small business development.

Several years ago, Mozambique was embroiled in a vicious civil war. Last year, with the help of American assistance, free and fair elections were held and ninety percent of registered voters went to the polls.

In Guinea, American assistance and training programs have helped to increase elementary school attendance by 43 percent. In the country of Mali, agricultural production has doubled since 1981 with the help of American technical assistance.

These are the building blocks of a stable continent—a community of nations which can help advance American interests in the world and can become an important trading partner.

Working in partnership with the people of Africa we have made great progress. With a relatively small investment—representing roughly 0.05 percent of our 1.5 trillion budget, we can continue this work and build a bright future.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the people of Africa and

American interests in this important part of the world by supporting this amendment.

Mrs. CLAYTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by my colleague, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. HASTINGS] and others. I believe it is shortsighted to think that we can promote democracy, encourage world peace and expand trade opportunities in America, while pursuing a policy of isolation. That is particularly true when it comes to developing nations—nations that may hang in the balance—when it comes to their tilt towards democracy. I have been encouraged, in recent years, by the growing number of African nations that have converted to democracy, and, I believe, foreign aid has been a vital element in those conversions.

I also believe that foreign aid is particularly critical to the expansion of trade opportunities. Although, I believe that the policies we pursue to encourage the expansion of trade should be evaluated, an across-the-board budget cutting is an unwise position. Unfortunately, the House-passed budget resolution and the Senate committee budget resolution propose the elimination or major reduction of the International Trade Administration, the Trade Development Agency, the Eximbank and agricultural export promotion programs. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation [OPIC] would be privatized. On top of that restructuring, the bill we are now considering, H.R. 1561, would reduce the amount of foreign aid authorized by \$1 billion, and would eliminate three agencies—The Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The functions of those agencies would be moved to the Department of State. The Senate version of the bill had proposed moving the functions of the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service to the Department of State and combining the Eximbank, the Trade Development Agency and OPIC into one quasi-independent agency. Those provisions, however, did not survive committee consideration last week and are not now included in the Senate bill.

Mr. Chairman, I do not think we should lose sight of the fact that, compared to other, major industrialized nations, the United States ranks last in terms of the percentage of gross national product [GNP] devoted to exports. There seems, therefore, to be little wonder that we have a growing balance of trade deficit when Britain, France, Canada, Italy, Germany, and Japan, spend more per thousand dollars of gross national product than we do. The irony of these proposals is that this radical change comes at a time when our export promotion programs and, presumably, our foreign aid programs, are helping to produce unprece-

dent gains in peace and commerce. In the area of agriculture, for example, we now export about one-third of the products we produce. Last year, farm and farm-related exports generated more than \$100 billion in economic activity for America, producing nearly 1 million jobs here. With respect to merchandise trade, farm production actually generates a trade surplus which, this year, is expected to be some \$20 billion. In North Carolina, farm and farm-related jobs constitute at least one-fifth of the employment and, on average, 25 to 30 percent of the revenue. It, therefore, greatly concerns me when I see proposals to impose deep cuts in foreign development for Africa programs which provide opportunity for trade. We should not blindly cut programs in our march toward a balanced budget by the year 2002. We should pass a budget bill that aims at a balanced budget. I support that goal.

We must be certain that our actions do not further weaken the United States as we seek to compete in an increasingly competitive global marketplace. This is not 1946, Mr. Chairman. America no longer maintains the dominant position we once held in the world marketplace. We are being dramatically outspent by other nations whose goal is to promote their products and replace us whenever they can. Perhaps, even more importantly, Mr. Chairman, I believe we can best achieve security in this Nation by interacting economically with other nations. Foreign aid and economic interaction with other nations is not a giveaway, it is a sound and prudent investment in our own security. The best way to avoid war is to promote peace. An effective way of promoting peace is to engage in commerce and finance with the World community. The Hastings amendment focuses on mineral rich and strategically important Africa—a continent where democracy can flourish. By investing in Africa now, we can assure that we will continue and expand trade with them in the future. And, by investing in Africa now, we establish relationships that will be vital if the security of the United States is threatened. Support the Hastings amendment.

Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Hastings amendment to restore the \$802 million level for the Development Fund for Africa.

In order to put this subject in perspective it would be helpful to look at the three periods in recent Africa history that have bearing on changing the course of events for Africa. First, the independence era in the early 1960's when the continent was freed of their colonial masters, and leaving them without adequate resources and preparation for their new freedom.

Second, during the cold war, when Africa was used and abused. Used by both the Soviet Union and the United States to fight hot wars on African soil. The most symbolic were in Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia, and you know there were others.

Abused, because we ignored humanitarian principles, and turned our eyes away from corruption and human rights abuses when it seemed in the interest of winning.

It now would seem fair that preferential rehabilitation assistance is needed to right the wrongs of the past, even though they may have been justified in winning the cold war.

We really were not very good teachers in preparing Africa for our grand plans of multi-party democracies and free markets economies to be operated free of corruption.

Measures of the quality of life in Africa have spiralled down in the last two decades, at the same time going up in other parts of the developing world. Many, like Vice President GORE, who read the Kaplan article in Atlantic Monthly were appalled at the condition of Africa, and determined to assist the continent. Unfortunately, others doubted Africa was even salvageable.

We are now a few years into the third period, which I would call the post cold war period. Armed conflict continues to afflict sub-Saharan Africa where fighting persists in Sudan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and we have our fingers crossed on Angola, despite the cease fire agreement. The potential for renewed outbreaks in Rwanda, Burundi, and Somalia is high, and other countries like Zaire and Nigeria are at risk. Human rights problems have been accelerated due to overpopulation and lack of sustainable development. However, all is not gloom and doom. There have been historic advances. In South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Ghana, and other countries we could name.

I would also like to relate the historic Congressional Black Caucus efforts to reverse the inequalities of the past led by former Congressmen Diggs, Dymally, and Gray, not to mention the contribution of RON DELLUMS in sponsoring the Anti-Apartheid Act which mobilized Americans against racial discrimination in South Africa. And, remember the late Mickey Leland, who gave his very life in pursuit of increasing the awareness of all Americans to the plight of our Africa.

I do not feel aid to Africa should be considered a partisan issue. Both the Republicans and Democrats have been most cooperative in preserving the Subcommittee on Africa when Congress was requested to scale down the number of committees. Africa, which usually comes last, was considered important by both parties. Members like former Chairman HAMILTON, Chairman GILMAN, Speaker GINGRICH, and HENRY HYDE were most helpful.

There are many Republicans on the Senate side like NANCY KASSEBAUM, Chair of the Senate Africa Affairs Committee, JAMES JEFFORDS, PAUL

COVERDELL. All have Africa's interest at heart.

Just think, Africa has almost 60 countries with a population over 600 million. If we do not adopt the Hastings Amendment this will leave us providing less than \$1 per person in the neediest of all continents.

In closing I would like to quote Tony Lake, the President's national security advisor in a recent speech he made on May 3. He said:

If the United States cuts aid to Russia, the pace of economic reform will be slowed and important American interests will be harmed. If the United States cuts Aid to Africa, while our interests are less effected, people will die.

I ask you—is an African life not worth the investment of a few more pennies per person to come back to the \$802 million level for the Development Fund for Africa. Support the Hastings amendment and save African children.

□ 1730

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have been informed that we have 5 speakers on the other side remaining and that we have several on this side.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this amendment be concluded by 6 p.m. with the time to be equally divided on both sides.

The CHAIRMAN. On this amendment and all amendments thereto?

Mr. GILMAN. On this amendment and all amendments thereto, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. With 12 minutes on each side and the time to be managed by the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN] and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. HASTINGS].

Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, preserving the right to object, if I could engage the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], the chairman, in dialogue further, I misunderstood the gentleman.

Did the gentleman say 12 minutes for each side total?

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, the total would be concluded by 6 p.m., with the time remaining to be equally divided.

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, further reserving the right to object, I most respectfully will have to object because I do have a number of speakers that have been waiting, and I recognize that they, too, deserve an opportunity to be heard.

Mr. GILMAN. How many speakers does the gentleman have?

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Probably there are 6 additional speakers. I could ask them to curtail some of their remarks and doubtless they will be able to do that.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I will be pleased to reduce our time to 10 minutes and give the remainder of the time to the gentleman as long as we conclude by 6 p.m.

Would the gentleman find that acceptable?

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Further reserving the right to object, I would still need an additional 15 minutes, Mr. Chairman. If we could conclude by 6:15, then that would be acceptable.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, we will accept the 6:15 deadline, with the time to be equally divided.

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN] will be recognized for 20 minutes, and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. HASTINGS] will be recognized for 20 minutes.

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN].

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think since they have more speakers on the other side, I would reserve my time and allow the other side to proceed.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida [Mr. HASTINGS].

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. WYNN].

Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of the amendment of the gentleman from Florida to restore full funding to the Development Fund for Africa.

You have heard a lot of talk about how we cannot afford it. Let me set the record straight. For anyone who is under a misconception, foreign aid amounts to 1 percent of the United States budget.

I think we can afford it, because it is consistent with our long-term objectives. Someone said, "Well, money doesn't grow on trees. Where are we going to get the money?"

I suggest that there are a lot of Republican pork projects laying around from which we can get the money. I suggest there are a lot of tax breaks for the wealthy from which we can get the money. At any rate, when you are only talking about a fraction, 1 percent, of the budget, it seems to me the money ought to be found.

I would like to talk today about some of the success stories involved in the Development Fund for Africa because I think they illustrate the point. Our foreign aid program ought to advance our interests. Our interests are reflected in these successes.

American exports to Ghana expanded by 73 percent between 1992 and 1993 as a result of U.S. programs that helped revise the investment code, remove regulatory bottlenecks and improve infrastructures.

In Zimbabwe, U.S. programs to strengthen the business climate have helped to formulate antitrust laws, lowered interest barriers for U.S. exporters, and investors.

Forty years ago we had a very different situation. Nine out of ten Afri-

can countries were still under colonial rule. That is not true today. Today nearly two-thirds of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have or are in the transition to democratically elected governments.

In some of the poorest regions of Africa, U.S. support for childhood immunization and oral rehydration therapy has resulted in saving 800,000 children per year. We have had great successes.

But the important point today is we can have far greater successes if we make a very small investment. An investment has two benefits: First, it helps us avoid humanitarian crises which we may ultimately be called on to address. Second and most importantly, though, it opens new markets for U.S. goods. What does that mean? It means jobs for American workers.

I think we have an opportunity to advance our long-term interests, provide assistance with infrastructure in Africa, and create new open markets receptive to U.S. exports. We have got examples of our export situation improving dramatically in Africa. We need to take advantage of it. The money is there. It may not grow on trees but it is certainly available in this budget. I hope the House will concur and support the Hastings amendment.

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my friend, the gentleman from New York [Mr. ENGEL].

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend, the gentleman from Florida, for yielding me the time.

Mr. Chairman, last November he was my colleague, along with the gentleman from Florida [Mr. JOHNSTON] and the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. JEFFERSON] on a trip to West Africa. We visited five countries in West Africa, and it was just unbelievable.

These countries, many of which were leaning toward the Soviet bloc during the 1960's, are now looking to the United States for aid and help. I said it the other day. I will say it again now. My colleagues, did we win the cold war to just throw it all away?

A little bit of U.S. money goes such a long way, No. 1, in helping democracy take root in these countries; No. 2, in making these countries effective as a trading partner with the United States; No. 3, in ensuring that these countries will continue to have friendly relations with the United States; and, No. 4, in ensuring that the United States will have influence in these countries.

The other side talks a lot about free market economies and business and whatever. I can think of no better way to spend our money than in these emerging African nations which will develop free market economies which will be good trading partners with the United States with just a little bit of help from us.

It makes no sense for me, and that is why I have problems with this bill. This is essentially an isolationist bill. We are retreating from our traditional role in the world. I know some people



say, well, America cannot be the policeman of the world. I do not think we can, either, but we certainly can help with technology. We certainly can help democracy take root.

My colleagues, it is to our benefit, it is to America's benefit. Seventy-five percent of all foreign aid moneys are spent right back in this country, stimulating our economy, helping us by creating jobs. One percent of our budget, that is all foreign aid is, and all we hear is cut, cut. It makes no sense whatsoever.

I am on the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations. I want to be on that subcommittee because I want to be part of a generation of Americans that does something for this continent, that shows a partnership with the countries of Africa. I can think of no more important place whereby America can establish democracy in these emerging republics.

Mr. Chairman, I support the gentleman's amendment to restore funding for the Development Fund for Africa to current levels. If I had my druthers, we would do even more. I hope my colleagues support this amendment.

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my colleague and neighbor in service, the distinguished gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. MEEK].

Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I have the greatest amount of respect and admiration for my colleague, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. HASTINGS] who has conducted himself so notably in his pursuit of fairness for Africa.

Today we keep talking about cuts and reductions in the Development Fund for Africa. We all know that there must be cuts. The cuts are too deep, Mr. Chairman, for the development funds in Africa, because these deep reductions could prove to be penny wise and pound foolish, and we will need to respond to humanitarian emergencies, and it will be more costly than our investment that we make in development activities.

For example, Mr. Chairman, we have spent \$2 in humanitarian aid for every \$1 in development aid in the greater Horn of Africa in recent years. The record is already there. It has already been spent. We need to address some of the root causes and not the symptoms, and I am hoping that you are willing to do that for Africa as you have some other developing countries.

It is very, very important that you think of the image of providing lesser funds for Africa now when they were not even in the very beginning. We did not have a Development Fund for Africa until the 1980's, and now that they are at the bottom of the list, it would show a greater strength if this Congress were to bring them up to par so then they could take a cut that would not ostensibly take away everything.

Foreign aid for Africa has never received full funding. That is really not an argument here.

It is not hard to imagine reductions severely compromising the many gains that you have made in helping create strong economies, reduce population growth and protect the environment in Africa. Deep cuts could also lead to the rapid destabilization of these early democracies, possibly resulting in untenable and costly human crises and conflicts.

This is not a situation in which the United States would want to find itself. It is very, very important that we protect our interests in Africa. Three of them. We want to help them develop the economies which will create exports, which we have heard before, and jobs here in the United States. We do not want to have any more Somalias or Rwandas which had a terrible cost in terms of human suffering and social significance.

The Development Fund for Africa is our main policy instrument in developing these interests. I think we should just be fair and be sure that the Development Fund for Africa does not keep the deep, deep cuts which you have done to them already.

□ 1745

Remember that to support the Hastings amendment; it is a good amendment.

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from Michigan [Miss COLLINS].

Miss COLLINS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. HASTINGS]. This amendment will restore funding for the Development Fund for Africa. Maintaining effective aid programs for Africa is in our national interests. The amount of development assistance we provide to Africa is so small, even a slight reduction in the Development Fund will have a drastic consequence that far outweigh any short-term savings.

Cuts of funding will prevent us from providing African countries with the resources needed to promote educational and economic opportunities for its people.

Africa is a potentially significant partner in world trade, thus it is in our national interest to assist African nations.

To the gentleman from Indiana who said that we must start getting African nations to wean off of aid from America so they can develop their own resources, I would like to say that two countries in this entire world get one-half the foreign aid; Israel gets \$3 billion, and they have been getting that for the past 9 years or 10 years; Egypt gets \$2 billion. I do not want that money cut, I want Israel and Egypt to get that money.

But we are talking about merely \$802 million for 56 countries, a mere \$802 million for 56 countries. Gentleman, \$629 million is simply too little.

I urge my colleagues to support the Hastings amendment. The Development Fund for Africa must not be singled out to carry a disproportionate share of cutbacks simply to meet my colleagues' commitment to reduce the budget.

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, how much time is remaining?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. HASTINGS] has 8 minutes remaining.

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Does my distinguished chairman have any additional speakers?

Mr. GILMAN. We have one more speaker on this side, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Do I have the right to close, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The manager of the bill has the right to close. The gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN] has the right to close.

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. That being the case, Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, to close the debate on our side, nowhere is the justification for foreign aid clearer and more compelling in terms of our national values than Africa. Africa is the final frontier for development. The great global challenges of tomorrow can be seen in the challenges facing Africa today, and even if I were to turn to the tragedy of disease which obviously foments within the confines of the rain forests in that great country, there are also many discoveries yet to be made in that same rain forest for medicinal purposes for the rest of the world.

If we give up Africa, the continent could well slide into chaos, we could find ourselves in a world of two distinct communities where the difference between the rich and poor become unbearably extreme, and that is not a world which we want for our children.

A lot of times my colleagues in this body need to have for them language couched in business terms. Let me see if I can do that briefly. In 1993 the United States exported more to sub-Saharan Africa, \$4.8 billion precisely, than to Eastern Europe, which was \$2.3 billion, or to the NIS, which was \$4 billion, including Russia, where the United States exports a total \$3 billion.

The current 1992 figures for sub-Saharan international markets, excluding South Africa, is \$28.5 billion. If that market were to grow at a nominal rate of 3 percent a year in constant terms, it would double every 21 years, reaching a level of \$83.2 billion in the year 2025. That market would exceed the size of Korea's market today.

I make those points for the reason that foreign aid is often thought of by the American people as a giveaway. But there is something else that is given away with foreign aid, and that is stability for American companies to do business.

In my district alone, there is one company that does \$20 million a year of exports to the continent of Africa. There are numerous countries from Africa that provide immense resources ranging from crude oil to other minerals for this country. I ask my colleagues to stop looking at this continent as a battleground and to start looking at it as marketplace as rightly we should.

I have asked not that there be money taken from any account. I have asked merely that we restore to an account an amount for the Development Fund of Africa that was already in existence and is meager by comparison to the multiplier effect of the good that it does.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Florida [Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN], our ranking chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman, we have heard a number of Members come forward in support of this amendment. Unfortunately, I must remain opposed to the Hastings amendment. It is a budget buster. Without making corresponding cuts in other accounts, this amendment deviates from our plan to balance our Federal budget by the year 2002.

Many Members have talked about the importance of development in Africa. I agree. Chairman GILMAN agrees. That is why, in this bill, aid to Africa is cut less than any other region.

Those who say that the majority in this body do not care about Africa are wrong. As my good friend Mr. PAYNE noted, the majority kept the Subcommittee on Africa despite a reduction from seven subcommittees to five.

The Development Fund for Africa, the DFA, is maintained in this bill.

Mr. Chairman, the American Overseas Interests Act is an excellent bill. It keeps the United States engaged throughout the world, including the continent of Africa. It does so while complying with our plan to balance the Federal budget by the year 2002. Chairman GILMAN deserves great credit for this accomplishment.

I regret very much that I cannot support this amendment, but I firmly believe that this bill maintains our United States commitment to Africa.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I must oppose the Hastings amendment.

This amendment busts the budget, simply adds hundreds of billions of dollars back into the bill.

I support aid to Africa, and we added money for Africa above the level in the introduced bill because of our concerns, and the concerns of the gentleman. Our committee supported the Houghton amendment and added back even more funding for Africa. In the end we added \$100 million back for aid to Africa above the amount introduced in the bill initially.

Therefore, reluctantly, while I support the proposals of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. HASTINGS], I oppose his amendment.

We are underbudgeted because we did make those cuts. Under the bill, Africa was cut far less than all other development assistance. This amendment, offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. HASTINGS], while well-intended, would add over a period of 2 years some \$360 million in foreign assistance in this bill. In addition to all of the aid that the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON] mentioned such as peacekeeping, economic support, et cetera, we also provide funds for many U.N. programs, and we also provide food aid under title II of Public Law 480.

Our bill is within the constraints of our budget resolution, and will help to cut the deficit. But if we adopt the Hastings amendment, it will add substantially to deficit spending, forcing us to borrow even more.

Accordingly, I am urging my colleagues to oppose the Hastings amendment.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the unanimous-consent agreement, all time on this amendment has expired.

The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. HASTINGS].

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 141, noes 278, answered “present” 1, not voting 14, as follows:

[Roll No. 354]

AYES—141

Abercrombie  
Ackerman  
Andrews  
Barrett (WI)  
Becerra  
Beilenson  
Bentsen  
Berman  
Bishop  
Bonior  
Borski  
Brown (CA)  
Brown (FL)  
Brown (OH)  
Bryant (TX)  
Cardin  
Clay  
Clayton  
Clement  
Clyburn  
Coleman  
Collins (IL)  
Collins (MI)  
Coyne  
DeLauro  
Dellums  
Deutsch  
Dicks  
Dixon  
Doggett  
Durbin  
Engel  
Eshoo  
Evans  
Farr

Fattah  
Filner  
Flake  
Foglietta  
Ford  
Frank (MA)  
Franks (CT)  
Frost  
Furse  
Gejdenson  
Gephardt  
Gibbons  
Gonzalez  
Green  
Gutierrez  
Hall (OH)  
Hamilton  
Hastings (FL)  
Hayes  
Hefner  
Hilliard  
Hinchev  
Hoyer  
Jackson-Lee  
Jacobs  
Jefferson  
Johnson, E. B.  
Johnston  
Kennedy (MA)  
Kennelly  
Kildee  
LaFalce  
Levin  
Lewis (GA)  
Lofgren

Lowey  
Maloney  
Manton  
Markey  
Martinez  
Matsui  
McCarthy  
McDermott  
McKinney  
Meek  
Menendez  
Mfume  
Miller (CA)  
Mineta  
Mink  
Moakley  
Mollohan  
Moran  
Murtha  
Nadler  
Neal  
Oberstar  
Olver  
Ortiz  
Owens  
Pallone  
Pastor  
Payne (NJ)  
Pelosi  
Pomeroy  
Rangel  
Reed  
Reynolds  
Richardson  
Rivers

Rose  
Roybal-Allard  
Rush  
Sabo  
Sanders  
Sawyer  
Schroeder  
Schumer  
Scott  
Serrano  
Skaggs  
Slaughter

Stark  
Stokes  
Studds  
Stupak  
Tejeda  
Thompson  
Thornton  
Torres  
Torrice  
Towns  
Tucker  
Velazquez

Vento  
Visclosky  
Volkmer  
Ward  
Waters  
Waxman  
Wilson  
Wise  
Woolsey  
Wyden  
Wynn  
Yates

NOES—278

Allard  
Archer  
Armey  
Bachus  
Baesler  
Baker (CA)  
Baker (LA)  
Baldacci  
Ballenger  
Barcia  
Barr  
Barrett (NE)  
Bartlett  
Barton  
Bass  
Bateman  
Bereuter  
Bevill  
Bilbray  
Billirakis  
Bliley  
Blute  
Boehlert  
Boehner  
Bonilla  
Bono  
Boucher  
Brewster  
Browder  
Brownback  
Bryant (TN)  
Bunn  
Bunning  
Burr  
Burton  
Buyer  
Callahan  
Camp  
Canady  
Castle  
Chabot  
Chambliss  
Chapman  
Chenoweth  
Christensen  
Chrysler  
Clinger  
Coble  
Coburn  
Collins (GA)  
Combest  
Condit  
Cooley  
Costello  
Cox  
Cramer  
Crane  
Crapo  
Cremeans  
Cunningham  
Danner  
Davis  
de la Garza  
Deal  
DeFazio  
DeLay  
Diaz-Balart  
Dickey  
Dingell  
Dooley  
Doolittle  
Dornan  
Doyle  
Dreier  
Duncan  
Dunn  
Edwards  
Ehlers  
Ehrlich  
Emerson  
English  
Ensign  
Everett  
Ewing  
Fawell

Fields (TX)  
Flanagan  
Foley  
Forbes  
Fowler  
Fox  
Franks (NJ)  
Frelinghuysen  
Frisa  
Funderburk  
Gallegly  
Ganske  
Gekas  
Geren  
Gilchrest  
Gillmor  
Gilman  
Goodlatte  
Goodling  
Gordon  
Goss  
Graham  
Greenwood  
Gunderson  
Gutknecht  
Hall (TX)  
Hancock  
Hastert  
Hastings (WA)  
Hayworth  
Hefley  
Heineman  
Herger  
Hilleary  
Hobson  
Hoekstra  
Hoke  
Holden  
Horn  
Hostettler  
Houghton  
Hunter  
Hutchinson  
Hyde  
Inglis  
Istook  
Johnson (CT)  
Johnson (SD)  
Johnson, Sam  
Jones  
Kanjorski  
Kaptur  
Kasich  
Kelly  
Kennedy (RI)  
Kim  
King  
Kingston  
Klink  
Klug  
Knollenberg  
Kolbe  
LaHood  
Largent  
Latham  
LaTourette  
Laughlin  
Lazio  
Leach  
Lewis (CA)  
Lewis (KY)  
Lightfoot  
Lincoln  
Linder  
Lipinski  
Livingston  
LoBiondo  
Longley  
Lucas  
Luther  
Manzullo  
Martini  
Mascara  
McCollum  
McCrery

McHale  
McHugh  
McInnis  
McIntosh  
McKeon  
Meehan  
Metcalfe  
Mica  
Miller (FL)  
Minge  
Molinar  
Montgomery  
Moorhead  
Morella  
Myers  
Myrick  
Nethercutt  
Neumann  
Ney  
Norwood  
Nussle  
Obey  
Orton  
Oxley  
Packard  
Parker  
Paxon  
Payne (VA)  
Peterson (MN)  
Petri  
Pickett  
Pombo  
Porter  
Portman  
Poshard  
Pryce  
Quillen  
Radanovich  
Rahall  
Ramstad  
Regula  
Riggs  
Roberts  
Roemer  
Rogers  
Rohrabacher  
Ros-Lehtinen  
Roth  
Roukema  
Royce  
Salmon  
Sanford  
Saxton  
Scarborough  
Schaefer  
Schiff  
Seastrand  
Sensenbrenner  
Shadegg  
Shaw  
Shays  
Shuster  
Sisisky  
Skeen  
Skelton  
Smith (MI)  
Smith (NJ)  
Smith (TX)  
Smith (WA)  
Solomon  
Souder  
Spence  
Spratt  
Stearns  
Stenholm  
Stockman  
Stump  
Talent  
Tanner  
Tate  
Tauzin  
Taylor (MS)  
Taylor (NC)  
Thomas  
Thornberry

Thurman	Walsh	Wicker
Tiaht	Wamp	Williams
Torkildsen	Watts (OK)	Wolf
Traficant	Weldon (FL)	Young (AK)
Upton	Weldon (PA)	Young (FL)
Vucanovich	Weller	Zeliff
Waldholtz	White	Zimmer
Walker	Whitfield	

ANSWERED "PRESENT"—1

Fields (LA)

NOT VOTING—14

Calvert	Harman	Meyers
Conyers	Klecza	Peterson (FL)
Cubin	Lantos	Quinn
Fazio	McDade	Watt (NC)
Hansen	McNulty	

□ 1819

Mr. EHLERS changed his vote from "aye" to "no."

Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas changed her vote from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I rise to express my strong opposition to H.R. 1561, the American Overseas Interest Act, and the proposal to eliminate the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). This agency performs a unique advocacy role in formulating our nation's foreign policy. Under this legislation, ACDA's strong and knowledgeable voice on arms control and non-proliferation issues will be muted by a new State Department "super-bureaucracy."

The State Department performs the necessarily broad mission of advancing and protecting the global interests of the United States and its citizens. To accomplish its responsibilities, the State Department must consider many different issues as it formulates our Nation's foreign policy. On the other hand, ACDA's mission is sharply focused on strengthening our national security by advocating, formulating, negotiating, implementing, and verifying sound arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament policies and agreements. As a result, ACDA is staffed with physicists, chemists, engineers, and other specialists who spend their entire careers dealing with one issue—arms control. To fold ACDA into the State Department would be a serious mistake. This nation needs ACDA to maintain a strong, independent voice for arms control.

Even if the State Department could match ACDA's arms control expertise, the goals of arms control and non-proliferation are sometimes at odds with the broader objectives of the State Department. In fact, if this bill had been enacted thirty years ago, we would not have a nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT]. In the 1960's, it was ACDA that pressed for the NPT. The State Department had opposed the original negotiations out of deference to friendly countries that wanted to explore the nuclear option.

I have listened to the arguments that, because the cold war is over, an independent voice for arms control is no longer needed. One only needs to look at the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran or the recent gas attacks in Japan to understand the continued importance of battling the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction. Some have also claimed that the reorganization proposed in this bill will save the taxpayers money. However, no study has

identified any savings from eliminating ACDA. In fact, a recent Congressional Research Service study has found that merging ACDA into the State Department could actually cost \$10 million.

Clearly, this legislation doesn't take into account the importance of having a strong and independent arms control and non-proliferation viewpoint within the United States government. Instead, it appears to me that organizational boxes are simply being moved in an arbitrary manner. I urge my colleagues to oppose this bill, ACDA must be protected.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to support a provision in the American Overseas Interests Act, which modifies section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export and Control Act to require greater congressional oversight and scrutiny of arms sales to the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia until such time as the Secretary of State certifies and reports to Congress that the unpaid claims of American companies described in the June 30, 1993 report by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to section 9140(c) of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1993 (Public Law 102-396; 106 Stat 1939), including the additional claims noticed by the Department of Commerce as page 2 of the report, have been resolved satisfactorily.

The \$43.4 million claim of Gibbs & Hill, Inc. is one of the claims as yet unresolved. Gibbs & Hill was decimated by financial losses incurred in the design of the desalination and related facilities for the Yanbu Industrial City in Saudi Arabia in the late 1970's and early 1980's as a result of the Kingdom's failure to honor its contractual obligations and pay for additional work required of the company.

My involvement in this matter dates back almost 2 years. The company, which is a large employer in my district, approached me for assistance in having its claim paid through the Special Claims Process established for the resolution of claims of American companies which had not received fair treatment in their commercial dealing with the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This Special Claims Process was established between our Government and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, following congressional hearings on the unfair commercial practices of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia first held in the House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East in May 1992. In response to my letter to Saudi Ambassador Bandar bin Sultan Abdulaziz of April 29, 1993, the Ambassador promised to spare "no efforts in resolving this claim in an expeditious and fair manner." Since this date, the company, the Congress and the past and present administrations have received a series of promises and commitments from the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to resolve the claim favorably for Gibbs & Hill. The most recent commitment coming on October 6, 1994, one day prior to our country once again coming to the defense of the Kingdom when threatened by invasion from Iraq, in fulfillment of our commitment to our bilateral relationship.

I should note that I am not alone in my support of the full and prompt resolution of the Gibbs & Hill claim. More than 3 dozen Senators and Members of Congress, the President, the National Security Council, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senate Armed Services Committee, the Department of Defense, State and Commerce have all ex-

pressed their desire to see this claim resolved so as to successfully conclude the Special Claims Process.

On January 23, 1995, I expressed my growing frustration with the delaying tactics of the Saudi Embassy in fulfilling its commitment to the company, the Congress and our Government. I also noted that the failure of the Saudi Embassy to resolve this claim, under the mandate established by its own Government, was beginning to grow into a significant strain on the United States-Saudi relations. Again, this was a sentiment shared by numerous of my colleagues in the Congress, who wrote and communicated with the Department of State, and the Saudi Embassy in January of this year. In these communications, it was made clear that the delaying tactics of the Saudi Embassy would no longer be tolerated, and unless serious discussions were held between the company and the Kingdom leading to the full and prompt resolution of the claim, legislative alternatives would be considered to bring this matter to a close.

Despite several attempts to resolve the claim successfully, the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has shown no signs of cooperation. Therefore, I introduced H.R. 1243, which would focus its attention on resolving all the unresolved claims with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Under the leadership of Congressman CHRIS SMITH, this bill was made part of the American Overseas Interest Act. I hope in the long run we will focus on other remedies in our bilateral relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to ensure the prevention of unfair treatment of any other United States company doing business with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. FOX of Pennsylvania) having assumed the chair, Mr. GOODLATTE, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the foreign affairs agencies of the United States; to authorize appropriations for the Department of State and related agencies for fiscal years 1996 and 1997; to responsibly reduce the authorizations of appropriations for United States foreign assistance programs for fiscal years 1996 and 1997, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

#### LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

(Mr. GEPHARDT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I ask for this 1-minute for the purpose of inquiring of the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Rules about the schedule for the rest of today and tomorrow.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEPHARDT. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and let me