President Clinton has submitted to Congress his budget proposal for fiscal year 1996. Unlike the budgets submitted by Presidents Reagan and Bush, which were dead on arrival in Congress, I applaud President Clinton for presenting a budget that demonstrates his continued commitment to improving the lives of working Americans. His proposal would raise the current \$4.25 hourly minimum wage to \$5.15 over a 2 year period.

I support the President's position that the minimum wage should be increased. At a time when we are considering the reform of our Nation's welfare system, and putting more individuals to work, we need to be able to guaranteed our workers a wage they can live on.

Mr. Speaker, in the United States, we continue to make strides toward full economic recovery, with 1994 noted as the best year for economic growth in 10 years. Yet, we continue to have a permanent class of working poor—individuals who go to work every day but find it impossible to make ends meet. These are the individuals who must choose between health care and day care; food for their children or electricity; warm clothing for their children or mortgage payments. It is these individuals for whom this modest increase in the minimum wage will make a significant difference.

In my home district of Cuyahoga County, the percentage of households living below the poverty level is 20 percent. I therefore realize from firsthand experience why it is so imperative that we support the President's call for a minimum wage increase. I will certainly do all that I can to advance this important effort to improve the conditions of working Americans.

Mr. Speaker, in Dr. Martin Luther King's lifetime, America needed a war on poverty. It is my hope that with this small step we will fulfill Dr. King's mission to end poverty for all Americans

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. OWENS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on the subject of my special order tonight.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. QUINN). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

THE CONTRACT WITH AMERICA IS GOOD FOR AMERICA

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, let me just start off by saying that I have spent the last hour listening to my distinguished colleagues from the Democrat Party talking about the Contract With America and what is wrong with it. Let me start off by saying, before I get into my special order, that the capital gains tax cut that they maligned so viciously over the past hour would end up probably bringing \$2 to \$3 trillion of investment into the economy which would create jobs, \$2 to \$3 trillion

Mr. OWENS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I am very sorry. I only have a half hour, but I would be happy to have a colloquy with the gentleman at a different time.

But when people sell a farm, when people sell stocks, when people sell a business, that money just does not disappear. That money is reinvested in our society, and we are talking about two to three thousand, thousand, million dollars that would be reinvested in new plants, and equipment, and job expansion in this country. That is one of the things that they discounted.

Now their party had control of this place for the last 40 years, and during those 40 years we saw the great War on Poverty that Lyndon Johnson talked about that was supposed to eradicate poverty in one decade end up being an abject failure, and the people of this country have said, "Enough welfarism, enough socialism. We want to get back to the free enterprise concepts that made this country great," and that is why the Republican Party won the majority in both the House and Senate in the last election.

Now they talked about corporate taxes. "Let's soak the corporations."

Corporations do not pay taxes. Those taxes are added to the price of the product. If you raise corporation taxes on the automobile industry, for instance, then they add that to the price of a car. It is the cost of doing business, and when you go to buy a car, you pay more money for that care because the corporation has a fixed profit margin in their books.

So, when you raise corporate taxes, that means the consumer is going to pay more for that car, so they in effect are paying the tax when you raise corporate taxes. The consumer always pays, and the tax and spend policies of the Democrats are the reason for their demise in the last election, and I think that everybody in the country now realizes that, at least a majority.

They talked about the Contract With America being bad for America. The fact of the matter is every one of the 10 items in the Contract With America was approved by more than 70 percent of the American people. In polling data that we got before we came up with the Contract With America, Mr. Speaker, we found the top 10 items that Americans were concerned about, and many of those items were approved or requested by more than 70 percent of the people of this country. The problems is they do not have any ideas. They are attacking our Contract With America, and they are going to lose that battle because the American people simply want the things that we put in that Contract With America to be passed by this Congress.

They want a balanced budget amendment. They want a line-item veto. They want tax fairness for seniors. They want to stop violent criminals. They want welfare reform. They want

to protect our kids. They want a strong national defense. They want to roll back government regulations. All these things we are going to bring to the floor for a vote, which they would not do over the past 40 years.

□ 2320

I think the American people will see the difference very clearly in the weeks and months to come. They are seeing it already, because polling data shows American people support what the Congress of the United States is doing under the new Republican leadership.

Tonight I want to talk briefly about some unethical contacts that have taken place in the Whitewater debacle that has taken place over the last several years we have been talking about in this body and the other body, unethical contracts between the White House and the Treasury Department.

Mr. Speaker, last November 7 members of the Senate Banking Committee asked Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr to investigate possible perjury charges by two high-ranking White House officials, White House senior advisor George Stephanopoulos and deputy chief of staff Harold Ickes.

Members of the committee believe these two men lied under oath to the Banking Committee during hearings last August about Whitewater and unethical contacts between the White House and the Treasury Department. charges against Stephanopoulos and Mr. Ickes are a very serious matter. However, this only touches the tip of the iceberg of how improper conduct within the Clinton administration was to slow down and coverup the White House investigation. Tonight I would like to review this whole matter, and the best place to start is at the beginning.

Criminal referrals from the RTC, the Resolution Trust Corporation: When Madison Guarantee Savings & Loan in Little Rock failed, its debts and its assets were inherited by the Government-run Resolution Trust Corporation.

Madison Guarantee was owned by then Gov. Bill Clinton's business partner, James McDougal, and the Governor. In March 1992, the RTC began an investigation of possible criminal activity at Madison after the New York Times broke a major story about the Whitewater Development Corp. In September 1992, the RTC sent a criminal referral, criminal investigation request, to the Justice Department. The RTC urged a thorough investigation of a "check kiting scheme" in which over \$100,000 in Madison funds were alleged to be illegally funneled into the Whitewater Development Corp. to pay its bills. President and Mrs. Clinton were named as potential beneficiaries of this scheme.

A year later the Resolution Trust Corporation sent a second criminal referral to the Justice Department regarding Madison Guarantee. This referral contained nine specific allegations of criminal wrongdoing. The second referral named President and Mrs. Clinton as possible witnesses.

The U.S. attorney in Little Rock, Paula Casey, had been appointed by President Clinton. She let the first referral sit on her desk for over a year without taking any action on it. She should have recused herself, excused herself from acting in that capacity in this case because she was a friend and political ally of the President of the United States. In October 1993 she formally declined to investigate any of the allegations in the first referral.

Later in October the second referral was reported in the press, and only then did Paula Casey excuse herself from the entire matter.

Here are some questions that need to be answered. Why did the Resolution Trust Corporation's first referral sit on Paula Casey's desk for over a year? Was that because of her connections with people at the White House? Why did she refuse to open an investigation into the serious charges raised by the Resolution Trust Corporation? Why did Paula Casey wait until the criminal referrals became public knowledge before she recused herself? As a friend of President Bill Clinton and one of his campaign workers, she should have recused herself immediately because of that connection. Are Paula Casey's actions being investigated by the Justice Department's Ethics Office?

Let's talk about Roger Altman and his Senate testimony. In March 1993, Roger Altman, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, became the acting chief of the Resolution Trust Corporation. This became necessary when Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen forced out the RTC chief Albert Casey. At the time, the first RTC referral involving Whitewater and Madison Guarantee was sitting on Paula Casey's desk gathering dust for over a year.

In a routine hearing in February 1994, Roger Altman testified before the Senate Banking Committee that he had participated in one substantive meeting with White House officials about the RTC referrals. Under questioning from the Senators, he testified that he could not recall, remember, any other substantive contacts. In fact, from September 1993 to February 1994, there had been a flurry of improper meetings, phone calls, and faxes between the White House and the Treasury Department about this case. Treasury Department general counsel Jean Hanson has testified that she prepared talking points for Mr. Altman-this is unethical—outlining all of the contacts that he took, outlining all those contacts, and he took those talking points with him to the hearing. Mr. Altman denied he ever saw those talking points.

The full scope of these contacts became clear when the Senate Banking Committee held full hearings on the issue last August. After the hearings, even Democrat Senators criticized Mr. Altman and his counterparts at the

White House because of this involvement, one with the other.

Senator Chris Dodd said, "In my view, there were far too many meetings, there were far too many people involved, and the testimony gets just too cute for my tastes, quite frankly."

Senator SHELBY. "I think he, Roger Altman, has been less than candid. He has been very selective in his answers." Senators Reigle and SARBANES told Lloyd Bentsen they no longer had confidence in Mr. Altman.

On August 17, Roger Altman resigned his position after his testimony. The next day general counsel Jean Hanson also resigned her post.

Here are some questions that need to be answered. Did Roger Altman lie to the Banking Committee during the February hearings, or did he actually forget all but one of the contacts between the Treasury Department and the White House?

It seems farfetched to me he would forget all of those meetings. Did Roger Altman read the talking points Jean Hanson prepared for him before the February hearing? These talking points listed the contact.

Three, were there any other meetings or contacts that we still do not know about?

Four, how much information about the investigation of Madison Guarantee did the Treasury Department give to the White House? And this would be unethical, very unethical.

No. five, was the RTC or the independent counsel's investigation jeopardized by these contacts?

Now, why were the contacts improper? When the Resolution Trust Corporation investigates a failed savings and loan that the taxpayers are going to have to bail out, it has two avenues it can pursue. First, it can recommend investigation of criminal wrongdoing to the Justice Department. That is called criminal referrals. Or, second, it can file civil suits against people who are responsible for the S&L's failure and try to recover some of those losses. When the RTC is in the middle of an investigation, it is very important that the details remain confidential. So if Mr. Altman was talking to Treasury and the White House about these things, he sure was not keeping these things confidential.

If information about an investigation is leaked to a potential target of the investigation, that person could potentially destroy evidence, like shred files, hide assets, or take other actions to impede the investigation. If a police department investigates a bank robbery, it does not share any of the information it has with any of the suspects. And that is exactly the kind of thing that was taking place between Mr. Altman, Treasury and the White House.

Neither of the criminal referrals from the RTC accuses the Clintons of wrongdoing. However, the Clintons are named as potential witnesses in one and potential beneficiaries in the other. Many of the top officials at the White House were from Arkansas and friends of the President. Some were probably friends and political allies of targets of the investigation. Any details of the investigation could have been leaked from the White House to people being investigated in connection with the failure of Madison Guaranty which cost the taxpayers, get this, \$47 million.

Now, here is the chronology of events and contacts between Treasury and the White House. In March of 1993, after becoming Acting Chief of the Resolution Trust Corporation, Roger Altman was briefed on the first criminal referral by RTC vice president William Roelle. Altman faxed a copy of the New York Times article which broke the Whitewater story to White House counsel Bernie Nussbaum, Mr. Nussbaum was the chief counsel to the President of the United States.

He later testified that he does not remember either being briefed or sending the article to Nussbaum. However, the fax cover sheet, which is a document that tells when it was sent, the fax cover sheet confirms that it did come from Mr. Altman's office.

□ 2330

So once again, he conveniently forgot something that came from his office to the White House, to Bernie Nussbaum, the chief legal counsel to the President.

September 1993, the Resolution Trust Corporation is preparing its second criminal investigation or referral. Treasury Department General Counsel Jean Hanson briefs Altman on the confidential referral. According to Hanson, Roger Altman then directed her to brief the White House on the situation, which was against RTC procedure. That, once again, is letting people who may be under criminal investigation is about. You just do not do that. Mr. Altman denies this.

September 29, 1993, Jean Hanson initiates the first formal contact with the White House. At a White House meeting, she briefs Chief Counsel to the President, Bernie Nussbaum, in detail on the referral. Also at the meeting was Clifford Sloan, a lawyer on Nussbaum's staff. Nussbaum appoints Clifford Sloan to be Hanson's designated White House liaison on the issue. She should have not been talking to the White House and here they are setting up an official liaison.

During the next several days, Hanson and Sloan have several follow up conversations on the phone.

October 4, 1993. Senior White House aide Bruce Lindsey, who is traveling with the President, informs President Clinton about the RTC referrals.

October 7, 1993, Jean Hanson calls Clifford Sloan at the White House to tell him about press inquiries into the Whitewater investigation.

October 14, 1993, a full-fledged meeting is called at the White House to discuss the RTC investigation. Attending

from the Treasury Department, Communications Director Jack DeVore, General Counsel Jean Hanson, Chief of Staff Joshua Steiner, and attending from the White House was White House Counsel to the President, Bernie Nussbaum and Senior Advisor, Bruce Lindsey. They should not have even been talking about this. Here they are having a full-scale meeting.

February 2, 1994, the second fullfledged meeting on the Whitewater investigation is held at the White House. This meeting was reportedly called to discuss potential civil claims against Madison and people associated with Madison by the Resolution Trust Corporation. Attending this meeting from the Treasury Department, Deputy Treasury Secretary Roger Altman, General Counsel Jean Hanson. Attending from the White House again, White House Chief Counsel Bernie Nussbaum. Chief Counsel to the President, Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes, Hillary Clinton's Chief of Staff, Margaret Williams comes. According to those in attendance, the substance of the case was not discussed, only procedures. But once again, a formal meeting involving this investigation which should not have been discussed between those doing the investigating and those who are being investigated.

February 24, 1994, as I mentioned earlier, on this day, Roger Altman appeared before the Senate Banking Committee at an RTC oversight hearing. He testified that he attended one meeting concerning the White House investigation and denied any recollection of any other contacts. He had a lot of failures of memory.

March 4, 1994, then independent counsel Robert Fiske subpoenaed 10 Treasury and White House officials who participated in the contacts and questioned them before a grand jury. Here are some questions that need to be answered.

Did Roger Altman order Jean Hanson to brief the White House about the first criminal investigation or referral in September of 1993 as Hanson alleges? Would Hanson go and brief the White House officials without approval from higher up? I do not think so. Why would she go over there and start briefing them unless somebody asked her to do it?

Number two, why was it necessary for Jean Hanson to have a liaison at the White House with whom to discuss the Resolution Trust Corporation's investigation of Whitewater and Madison? She was not even supposed to be discussing the investigation with the White House.

Number three, did officials from the Treasury Department who had attended the three White House meetings discuss only procedures and policies of the RTC as they have claimed or did they reveal substantive information about the Madison Guarantee case as well? And how can we ever know for sure.

Number four, did White House officials share any of the information they received through these meetings and phone conversations with any potential targets of the investigation, and how can we know about that for sure?

All of the details about these meetings that I have been just discussing became public knowledge during the Senate and House banking committee hearings last August. And additional detail that was revealed at that time concerned White House efforts to stop Roger Altman from excusing, recusing himself from the Whitewater investigation?

In January 1994, Altman was considering recusing himself, stepping aside, from the entire Madison-Whitewater case because of his close friendship with President Clinton. They had attended college together at Georgetown University and had been friends ever since. Treasury Department General Counsel Jean Hanson advised Altman that he should recuse himself, step aside, according to her testimony. Prior to the February 2 meeting at the White House, Altman reportedly had decided to step aside and recuse himself. However, during the meeting, the Chief Counsel to the President, Bernie Nussbaum, talked Altman out of it.

Nussbaum testified that he simply asked Altman to reconsider his decision. However, Treasury Department Chief of Staff Josh Steiner tells a different story in his personal diary. Steiner's diary says that Nussbaum told Altman this his decision to excuse himself or step aside was "unacceptable". They didn't want him stepping out of the picture because there might be some incriminating evidence that he could stop. At least that is what it appears to be.

After the meeting Jean Hanson spoke to White House Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes. According to Hanson's testimony, Ickes asked her who else knew that she had advised Altman to step aside or recuse himself. Hanson told him that only three people knew. According to her testimony, Ickes told her that that was good that nobody else should know about it. According to Jean Hanson's testimony at the hearings last August, Mr. Ickes asked me, this is her quote, "Mr. Ickes asked me who else knew that I had recommended to Mr. Altman that he recuse himself, and I gave him three names. He said, 'that's good, because if it gets out, it will look bad.'

When Harold Ickes testified before the Senate banking committee in August, he denied ever making such a statement. Ickes maintains that all he said to Hanson at the meeting was, hello, nice to see you and goodbye.

At the beginning of my statement, I said that the 7 Members of the Senate banking committee have asked the independent counsel to investigate possible perjury by Mr. Ickes. The Senators were particularly concerned about his statements about his con-

versation or lack of conversation with Jean Hanson. The whole episode raises a number of questions.

First, why would Jean Hanson lie about her conversation with Harold Ickes?

Two, why would Bernie Nussbaum, legal counsel to the President, try to talk Roger Altman out of stepping aside, recusing himself, when Altman was clearly such a close personal friend of President Clinton?

Three, how forcefully did Chief Counsel to the President, Bernie Nussbaum, discourage Mr. Altman from recusing himself? Is Nussbaum lying or is Josh Steiner lying?

Four, did Bernie Nussbaum, Chief Counsel to the President, take this action on his own or did someone higher up in the White House urge him to do so?

Now, let us talk about Jay Stephens. As I mentioned earlier, the Senators also asked the independent counsel to investigate the testimony of George Stephanopoulos from the White House. Stephanopoulos' alleged perjury involved the hiring of Jay Stephens from by the Resolution Trust Corporation as an outside counsel in the Madison Guarantee case. Jay Stephens was hired by an independent board at the Resolution Trust Corporation for the Whitewater investigation. Stephanopoulos and other officials at the White House were really upset. They were furious because Stephens was a Republican and had been a U.S. Attorney under President Reagan.

In his testimony before the Senate committee in banking August, Stephanopoulos testified about a conversation he had with Treasury Department Chief of Staff Josh Steiner. He said that he complained about Stephens to Josh Steiner, but he denied trying to get rid of him. Mr. Stephanopoulos testified, and I quote, "I did blow off steam in the conversation, based on my belief that Mr. Stephens could not be an impartial investigator. Mr. Steiner informed me that the decision had been made by an independent board. That ended the conversation. I took no further action.' That is what Stephanopoulos testified. However, Josh Steiner's personal diary tells a different story.

The February 27 entry reads: 'Stephanopoulos and Ickes also asked about how Jay Stephens had been hired to be outside counsel on this case. Simply outrageous, they said, that RTC had hired him, Stephens, but even amazing when George Stephanopoulos then suggested to me that we needed to find a way to get rid of him." Obviously because he did not want him to go on and conduct an investigation. "Persuaded George," he vestigation. "Persuaded George," he persuaded George Stephanopoulos, 'that firing him would be incredibly stupid and improper.'

Stephanopoulos's testimony was also contradicted by Roger Altman.

□ 2340

Altman testified that in a phone call on February 25, Stephanopoulos and Ickes complained about Stephens being hired by the RTC. Altman testified that he told Josh Steiner that he thought it was unwise for them to be complaining so vocally about Jay Stephens, because he was a Republican and he might get too deeply involved in the investigation.

Stephanopoulos was also contradicted by Jean Hanson.

Here are some questions:

No. 1, did George Stephanopoulos and Harold Ickes lie to the Senate Banking Committee, and if they did, should they be prosecuted for it?

Two, what motive could Josh Steiner, Roger Altman, and Jean Hanson all have to falsely contradict their testimony? Why would they do that?

Three, how many other people did George Stephanopoulos call to attempt

to get Jay Stephens fired?

All of these questions need to be thoroughly investigated and answered by the independent counsel. There is so much that smells about what has gone on between the RTC, Mr. Altman, Treasury, and the White House that a full and thorough investigation needs to be conducted, not only by the independent counsel but by the committees of Jurisdiction in this House and in the other body, and possibly hiring other people to conduct this investigation.

The House, the Senate, and the independent counsel need to thoroughly investigate this. If there is lying, if people have committed perjury before the House and Senate Banking Committees, they need to be brought to justice. We need to follow this all the way to its final conclusion. There are all kinds of questions about shredded documents involving Whitewater and Madison that go all the way to the top.

We need to get to the bottom of it for the benefit of the American people. We are talking about \$47 million of taxpayers' money that has been squandered or stolen. We need to get to the bottom of it, no matter where it leads

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. QUINN). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WELDON] is recognized for 60 minutes.

[Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Miss COLLINS of Michigan (at the request of Mr. GEPHARDT) for today, on account of illness.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. WATT of North Carolina) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. Gutierrez, today, for 5 minutes.

Ms. KAPTUR, today, for 5 minutes.

Mr. SKAGGS, today, for 5 minutes.

Mr. HILLIARD, today, for 5 minutes.

Mr. LAFALCE, today, for 5 minutes.

Mr. HOYER, today, for 5 minutes.

Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas, today, for 5 minutes.

Mrs. Clayton, today, for 5 minutes. Mr. Clyburn, today, for 5 minutes.

(The following Member (at the request of Mr. Fox of Pennsylvania) to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material:)

 $Mr.\ Solomon,\ today,\ for\ 5\ minutes.$

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. WATT of North Carolina) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. MANTON.

Mr. Hamilton in three instances.

Mr. DINGELL in two instances.

Mr. Skelton.

Mr. WARD.

Mr. Menendez in two instances.

Mr. Traficant.

Mr. Stokes in two instances.

Ms. KAPTUR.

 $Mr.\ Engel.$

Mr. RAHALL.

Mr. ORTON.

Mr. FAZIO.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. Fox of Pennsylvania) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. PACKARD.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey.

Mr. HOUGHTON.

Mr. GINGRICH.

Mr. Kolbe.

Mr. DUNCAN.

Mr. Camp.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. Burton of Indiana) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. de la Garza.

Mr. Hoyer.

 $Mr.\ RICHARDSON.$

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 11 o'clock and 41 minutes p.m.), the House adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, February 9, 1995, at 10 a.m.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

339. A letter from the Chief of Legislative Affairs, Department of the Navy, transmitting notice that the Navy intends to renew the lease of the *Albert David* (FF 1050), pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 7307(b)(2); to the Committee on National Security.

340. A letter from the Secretary of Health and Human Services, transmitting a copy of the fiscal year 1993 report on the Native Hawaiian Revolving Loan Fund [NHRLF], pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2991-1; to the Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities.

341. A letter from the Secretary of Labor, transmitting a report on the enforcement activities of the Directorate of Civil Rights concerning the nondiscrimination and equal opportunity provisions of the JTP act, pursuant to Public Law 97-300, section 167(e); to the Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities.

342. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. Act 10-382, "Maurice T. Turner, Jr., Education and Training Center Designation Act of 1994," pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

343. A letter from the Chairman, Council of

343. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. Act 10-383, "Privatization of Government Services Task Force Establishment Act of 1994," pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

344. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. Act 10–385, "Anti-Sexual Abuse Act of 1994," pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1–233(c)(1); to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

345. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. Act 10-386, "Probate Reform Act of 1994," pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

346. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. Act 10–387, "Clean Air Compliance Fee Act of 1994," pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1–233(c)(1); to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

347. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. Act 10-388, "District of Columbia Housing Authority Act of 1994," pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on Government Reform and Over-

sight.

348. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. Act 10–390, "Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Compact Amendment Act of 1994," pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1–233(c)(1); to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

349. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. Act 10–391, "Closing of a Public Alley in Square 750, S.O. 94–123, Act of 1994," pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1–233(c)(1); to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

350. A letter from the Acting Inspector General, Federal Communications Commission, transmitting the annual report regarding an evaluation of the compliance by the FCC with, and the effectiveness of, the requirements imposed by 31 U.S.C. 1352 on the FCC and on persons requesting and receiving