

ready for a big catastrophe: a lot of body bags, casualties, and MASH operations. What about the food? Most of it is coming from here. The fuel? Most of it is coming through the courtesy of the United States Navy, bringing it up in that area. What about intelligence? Good grief, nobody has our super satellite architecture or our unmanned aerial vehicles.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Remember when some of our colleagues wanted to cut the intelligence budget? If anything, we need to increase, whether we go in there with troops or not, we need to increase our intelligence folks in that portion of the world and in other portions of the world.

Mr. DORNAN. Absolutely. When the chairman, the gentleman from Texas, LARRY COMBEST, took his subcommittee chairmen, me, three or 4 other Members, the gentleman from Florida, PORTER GOSS, and we went into a new intelligence operation, moved into a new unit inside the Pentagon. I said, "What is your principal duty of intelligence in a peacemaking, peacekeeping, nation-building operation?" "To protect our men and women in the field." So they are dedicated to not losing a single person.

Then after they gave us the 3-D view of Tuzla and that whole area, I say, let us see an overlap of the mines. Duke, the biggest hill around Tuzla has so many mines around it indicated in red that it is a giant solid red horseshoe. Then they gave us an intelligence weather briefing, all declassified. Do you know what is coming there? If it is the mildest winter in the last 50 years above the 1,500 foot level where the mortar men and the snipers sit, it goes below freezing and stays there for 3 or 4 months.

That is where the mines are, and any division commander, and I have the general's bio here from the First Armored, and I will put it in after the special order of the gentleman from Hawaii, NEAL ABERCROMBIE, what would you do there, if you were ground commander? You would say, I need my anti-sniper teams up in the hills. You are living in tents here. If you think it is freezing here with these little tent heaters and with this floor, single floor we put in, you are going to have fun up there in the hills below zero, so take all your Arctic clothing. Maybe that is why they sent the First Armored division.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. You are going to be vulnerable.

Mr. DORNAN. You go up there, thread your way through the mine fields, dig a foxhole, hunker down and wait for the snipers. Then if the troops have to use Clinton's rules of engagement, they can shoot even if they suspect somebody is coming at them, they had better pray it is not a Moslem woman, a Serbian woman, or a Croatian woman ever with a plate of cookies or with hot tea, because if they blow her away, as I read last night from a top Marine gunney, you will

live with that psychological scar, you will live with that for the rest of your life. So the commanders in the field, do not think you are going to get court martialed for killing innocent people, and you are going to go quoting quote Bill Clinton, you can fire if you are being assaulted, but you had better be afraid of ghosts in the night that are friendly people or people trying to infiltrate back from one side to the other.

Here is something that was handed to me today. You have been tracking Chechnya, English Chechnya. Colonel General—what is a Colonel General, three-star, yes, three-star, Colonel General, Leonty Shevtsov, Chief of Staff of the Russian forces in Chechnya from December 1994 to April of 1995, has now become the commander of the Russian peacekeeping forces to be placed in the American sector in Bosnia.

How ironic, the Russian military acting as peacekeepers in Bosnia when they themselves are still committing atrocities in Chechnya against the Muslims. Some 40,000 civilians died in Chechnya on Shevtsov's watch, and the killing goes on. Russian bombs continue to fall on Chechnyan villages. Women and children continue to die. American silence is unconscionable.

I am going to ask permission to put this whole article in, from the Washington Post. What are we going to do with the Russians in our sector? What I read in last night, and I will continue it out of these Readers Digests, outrageously revealing reports; they have been so partial to the Serbs, they have been letting people who did commit atrocities go back and forth across the lines. They opened up a bridge with the greatest mass movement of Bosnian Serb tank power in the whole 3-year conflict.

We have got one overlapping problem, and now today, in Sarajevo, for the third day in a row, 100,000 Serbian Sarajevo citizens are saying, "We don't want the French and we are not giving up our neighborhoods."

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I think I only have a couple of minutes left. I would like to kind of wind it up.

Mr. Speaker, this Member, the position that I would like to take, and I hope the House, and the House has on two separate occasions taken, is first of all we not send our troops to Bosnia. All three sides in this have said they want peace. Belgrade does not have all the cards like it had before. Both the Moslems and the Croatians got pretty much of a stinger from the infusion of arms that have gone in there and the training under the Mujaheddin. If they really want peace, I think they can achieve it.

It does not mean we cannot help with intel and some of our SATCOM communication type systems, and AWACs in other areas, or even with communications or even with humanitarian food. But I want to at all costs keep us out of Bosnia-Herzegovina with our troops.

Mr. Speaker, I do believe we are going in, even after that. I do not think it is unfair to ask the President, what is it going to cost short- and long-term? How is he really going to protect our troops? And how do we get out, and what are the costs? Because I truly believe with all my heart that after we pull out of there, we are not going to have solved very much, just like we have in Haiti, just like we have in Somalia; billions of dollars, with very little to show for it, with personnel killed, and most of them from the United States.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my friends and I would like to thank my friend, the gentleman from California, for joining this special order. I think it is in the great interest of the American people. I know in our Caucus and on the Committee on National Security, Republicans and Democrats alike said they are getting phone calls 13 to 1 against us going into Bosnia.

I hope that the American people would focus on that, that they would write their Senators, their Congressmen, and do everything that they can to keep us out of there, because, Mr. Speaker, I think it is a travesty.

#### THE BALANCED BUDGET MYTH

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LONGLEY). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Hawaii [Mr. ABERCROMBIE] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Speaker, I believe, if I understood the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN] correctly, he was not quite finished with his remarks. If he would like, inasmuch as I have something I have to do off the floor for a few moments, I would yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN] at this point. Did I understand correctly that he was not quite finished?

Mr. DORNAN. If the gentleman will yield, Mr. Speaker, I was not. I thank the gentleman. If I can do this quickly in 10 minutes, I will not keep our hard-working staff here after your special order.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mine will not take the full hour. I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN].

#### KEEPING AMERICA'S TROOPS OUT OF THE BALTIC CONFLICT

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, I can save some of this for next week if I do not get my conference to meet, Mr. Speaker, tomorrow and plan our vote, irrespective of what the Senate does, with our great Members over there. I would like to finish, and I will ask permission to put the whole article from Time magazine by J.F.O. McAllister, including interviews with Clinton, into the paper.

Mr. Speaker, one of my sons or daughters sent me the front page of the L.A. Times. You have already heard me, Mr. Speaker, say today that I find this the most offensive, and I do not know what they did in the San Diego

Union, DUKE, but look at this. This is a staged photograph. This is the photograph of the Officer Corps of the First Armored Division.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, I would like to make this perfectly clear. When I talk about the radical Muslim Islamic movement, it is not the Muslims across this world. Just as we have in any religion radical groups, these are the groups that are sworn to take blood, to take blood of anyone that does not believe as they do. That is wrong, but yet, I do not want to make any implication that it is Christians, Muslims, or any other religious group, other than the radicals that we are talking about in the 4,000 Mujaheddin.

Mr. DORNAN. To show that I am fair too, and that there is plenty of guilt to spread around, the map that the gentleman from California [Mr. CUNNINGHAM] was holding up earlier, that takes a nation, Bosnia and Herzegovina, that looks like an arrowhead, and that is what it was, the arrowhead, the tip of the spear of Islamic penetration into the soft underbelly of Europe, stopped up at Vienna and Prague, totally burned Ottoman empire warriors, the cities of Buda and Pest on the other side of the Danube, now the capital city of Budapest, Hungary, and then they were eventually driven back by knights from Austria, from Styria, one of the major provinces, and there is an incredible armor museum of all of the Medieval and Renaissance ages of the armored war that went on between Islam and Christendom, and this was one of the main armories. The oldest and last surviving armory from that period in Europe is at Graz in Austria, a fascinating visit for historians and for even peaceniks to contemplate man's inhumanity to man, with women either standing by the sidelines crying because they have lost their son, their husband, their father, their uncle, or they are killed in the process of men tearing one another apart.

But here is this normal-looking country, the shape of an arrowhead or a triangle, and it now looks like a distorted amoeba or a Rorschach test that the Bosnian government in Sarajevo, recognized by us on April 7 of 1993, by the United Nations on May 22 of 1993, it is now cut into this bizarre shape. You have the Croats, and Catholic Croats, in an uneasy confederation with the Muslim Bosnians, while the Serbs are in two big globs, held together by a four kilometer little corridor called Posavina corridor, with Brijco, their main armament source on the border with Milosevic's Serbia proper, let me look at the 20 miles here, 20, 40, 60, 80, less than 100 miles from Belgrade, which has been one of the main problems in all of this.

I look at this, and here is a brand new footprint, just sort of an oblong glob that is now held by Croatian forces from Croatia, with Croatian Bosnians, and Muslim Bosnians out of

the Bihac pocket up in the north, the very tip of the Islamic spear. They now hold this area that they have been ordered to give back to the Serbs.

There are two villages in there, I learned this morning, it is declassified, called Sipovo and Mrkonjic grad, grad being city, like Belgrade. These two cities, as we speak, or they are asleep now, when they wake up in the morning, and that is about another 4 hours, the Croatian forces, with the total acquiescence of the Muslim forces, are burning these villages to the ground, because if they are going to give these villages back to the Bosnian Serbs, they want them to be utter rubble, because that is what the Serbs did to 3,800 villages on the other side, destroying every minaret, every town hall meeting place, burned down all the homes; that if the people come back as refugees when they get tired of killing one another and a peace comes back to this land, however tentatively, given its 600 or 700 year history, 2,000 year history, for that matter, they will come back to rubble. There is no City Hall, no marketplace, no minaret, no church. It is all gone. It is dirt.

So they turn around and say that that is where my father died, there is my family home, my sister was raped there, I do not want these memories, and they go back to being a refugee. So the guilt is on all sides; the Croats, who I admired so much in their special forces training camps down on the Dalmatian coast, they are now burning villages at this, tit for tat, giving to the Serbs what the Serbs did to them. So when they open this area up, and this is going to be in the British sector, the British will have to keep them apart here, the people come back to villages they fled from in September and the villages are rubble.

I see the gentleman from Hawaii [Mr. ABERCROMBIE] has come back. Let me ask for a special order, an hour next Tuesday night, next Wednesday night, and next Thursday night. Hopefully I will have gotten votes out of my leader, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. GINGRICH], my majority leader, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. ARMEY], and I know the majority whip, the gentleman from Houston, TX [Mr. DELAY] wants to do this, and let me put in the RECORD four articles. I beg, Mr. Speaker, people listening to our voices here today to read this material that is in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

The material referred to is as follows:

RÉSUMÉ OF SERVICE CAREER OF WILLIAM LAFAYETTE NASH, MAJOR GENERAL

(Commanding Officer, 1st Armored Division)  
Date and place of birth—10 August 1943, Tucson, AZ.

Years of active commissioned service—over 26.

Present assignment—Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe Seventh Army, APO AE 09252, since June 1995.

Military schools attended—The Armor School, Officer Basic Course; The Infantry School, Officer Advanced Course; U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; U.S. Army War College.

Educational degrees—U.S. Military Academy—BS Degree; no major; Shippensburg University—MS Degree, Public Administration.

Foreign language(s)—Russian.

#### Major Duty Assignments

From	To	Assignment
Aug 68	Oct 68	Student, Ranger Course, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA.
Oct 68	Nov 68	Student, Armor Officer Basic Course, U.S. Armor School, Fort Knox, KY.
Dec 68	Apr 69	Platoon Leader, Troop L, 3d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Lewis, WA.
Apr 69	Feb 70	Platoon Leader, Troop A, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, U.S. Army, Vietnam.
Feb 70	Jun 70	Executive Officer, Troop B, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, U.S. Army, Vietnam.
Jun 70	Jul 71	Assistant G-3 (Operations) Training Officer, later Assistant G-3 (Operations) Chief of Force Development, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC.
Jul 71	Nov 71	S-3 (Operations), 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, later Procurement Officer, Board for Dynamic Training, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC.
Nov 71	Feb 73	Commander, Troop A, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC.
Mar 73	Jul 73	Student, Officer Rotary Wing Aviator Course, U.S. Army Helicopter Center/School, Fort Wolters, TX.
Jul 73	Dec 73	Student, Officer Rotary Wing Aviator Course, U.S. Army Aviation School, Fort Rucker, AL.
Jan 74	Sep 74	Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA.
Sep 74	Jun 77	Platoon Leader and Assistant Operations Officer, later Platoon Commander, and later Regimental Plans Officer, Air Cavalry Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, United States Army Europe, Germany.
Aug 77	Jun 78	Student U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
Jun 78	Apr 79	Staff Officer, Regional Operations Division, Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, U.S. Army, Washington, DC.
Apr 79	Jun 82	Aide and Assistant Executive Officer, later Executive Officer to the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army, Washington, DC.
Jun 82	Jun 83	Deputy Executive Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.
Jun 83	Jun 85	Commander, 3d Squadron, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 8th Infantry Division, United States Army Europe, Germany.
Aug 85	Jun 88	Student, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
Jun 86	May 88	Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX.
May 88	May 89	Executive Officer to the Commander-In-Chief, United States Army Europe, Germany.
Jun 89	Dec 90	Commander, 1st Brigade, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.
Dec 90	Apr 91	Commander, 1st Brigade, 3d Armored Division, Desert Storm, Saudi Arabia.
Apr 91	Jul 91	Commander, 1st Brigade, 3d Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.
Jul 91	Jun 92	Assistant Division Commander, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.
Jun 92	Jul 93	Deputy Commanding General for Training, U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
Jul 93	Jun 95	Program Manager, United States Army Office of the Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program.

#### Dates of appointment

	Temporary	Permanent
Promotions:		
2LT .....	5 Jun 68 .....	5 Jun 68
1LT .....	5 Jun 69 .....	5 Jun 71
CPT .....	5 Jun 70 .....	5 Jun 75
MAJ .....		10 Jun 77
LTC .....		1 Nov 82
COL .....		1 May 89
BG .....		1 Mar 92
MG .....	Froked .....	

#### U.S. DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Silver Star.  
Legion of Merit.  
Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters).  
Purple Heart.  
Meritorious Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster).  
Army Commendation Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters).  
Army Achievement Medal.  
Senior Parachutist Badge.  
Army Aviator Badge.  
Ranger Tab.  
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge.

Army Staff Identification Badge.  
Source of commission—USMA.

## SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

Assignment	Dates	Grade
Deputy Executive Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC, as of 23 June 1995.	Jun 82–Jun 83 .....	Major/Lieutenant Colonel

[From Reader's Digest, October 1995]

THE FOLLY OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING  
(By Dale Van Atta)

Sonja's Kon-Tiki café is notorious Serbian watering hole six miles north of Sarajevo. While Serb soldiers perpetrated atrocities in nearby Bosnian villages, local residents reported that U.N. peacekeepers from France, Ukraine, Canada and New Zealand regularly visited Sonja's, drinking and eating with these very same soldiers—and sharing their women.

The women of Sonja's, however, were actually prisoners of the Serb soldiers. As one soldier, Borislav Herak, would later confess, he visited Sonja's several times a week, raping some of the 70 females present and killing two of them.

U.N. soldiers patronized Sonja's even after a Sarajevo newspaper reported where the women were coming from. Asked about this, a U.N. spokesman excused the incident by saying no one was assigned to read the newspaper.

The U.N. soldiers who frequented Sonja's also neglected to check out the neighborhood. Less than 200 feet away, a concentration camp held Bosnian Muslims in inhuman conditions. Of 800 inmates processed, 250 disappeared and are presumed dead.

Tragically Sonja's Kon-Tike illustrates much of what has plagued U.N. peacekeeping operations: incompetent commanders, undisciplined soldiers, alliances with aggressors, failure to prevent atrocities and at times even contributing to the horror. And the level of waste, fraud and abuse is overwhelming.

Until recently, the U.N. rarely intervened in conflicts. When it did, as in Cyprus during the 1960s and '70s, it had its share of success. But as the Cold War ended, the U.N. became the world's policeman, dedicated to nation building as well as peacekeeping. By the end of 1991, the U.N. was conducting 11 peacekeeping operations at an annual cost of \$480 million. In three years, the numbers rose to 18 operations and \$3.3 billion—with U.S. taxpayers paying 31.7 percent of the bill.

Have the results justified the steep cost? Consider the U.N.'s top four peacekeeping missions:

Bosnia.—In June 1991, Croatia declared its independence from Yugoslavia and was recognized by the U.N. The Serbian dominated Yugoslav army invaded Croatia, ostensibly to protect its Serbian minority. After the Serbs agreed to a cease-fire, the U.N. sent in a 14,000-member U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to build a new nation. (The mission has since mushroomed to more than 40,000 personnel, becoming the most extensive and expensive peacekeeping operation ever.)

After neighboring Bosnia declared its independence in March 1992, the Serbs launched a savage campaign of "ethnic cleansing" against the Muslims and Croats who made up 61 percent of the country's population. Rapidly the Serbs gained control of two-thirds of Bosnia, which they still hold.

Bosnian Serbs swept into Muslim and Croat villages and engaged in Europe's worst atrocities since the Nazi Holocaust. Serbian thugs raped at least 20,000 women and girls. In barbed-wire camps, men, women and chil-

dren were tortured and starved to death. Girls as young as six were raped repeatedly while parents and siblings were forced to watch. In one case, three Muslim girls were chained to a fence, raped by Serb soldiers for three days, then drenched with gasoline and set on fire.

While this was happening, the UNPROFOR troops stood by and did nothing to help. Designated military observers counted artillery shells—and the dead.

Meanwhile, evidence began to accumulate that there was a serious corruption problem. Accounting procedures were so loose that the U.N. overpaid \$1.8 million on a \$21.8 million fuel contract. Kenyan peacekeepers stole 25,000 gallons of fuel worth \$100,000 and sold it to the Serbs.

Corruption charges were routinely dismissed as unimportant by U.N. officials. Sylvana Foa, then spokesperson for the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva said it was no surprise that "out of 14,000 pimply 18-year-olds, a bunch of them should get up to hanky-panky" like blackmarket dealings and going to brothels.

When reports persisted, the U.N. finally investigated. In November 1993 a special commission confirmed that some terrible but "limited" misdeeds had occurred. Four Kenyan and 19 Ukrainian soldiers were dismissed from the U.N. force.

The commission found no wrongdoing at Sonja's Kon-Tiki, but its report, locked up at U.N. headquarters and never publicly released, is woefully incomplete. The Sonja's Kon-Tiki incidents were not fully investigated, for example, because the Serbs didn't allow U.N. investigators to visit the site, and the soldiers' daily logbooks had been destroyed.

Meanwhile, Russian troop commanders have collaborated with the Serb aggressors. According to U.N. personnel at the scene, Russian battalion commander Col. Viktor Loginov and senior officer Col. Aleksandr Khromchenkov frequented lavish feasts hosted by a Serbian warlord known as "Arkan," widely regarded as one of the worst perpetrators of atrocities. It was also common knowledge that Russian officers directed U.N. tankers to unload gas at Arkan's barracks. During one cease-fire, when Serbian materiel was locked in a U.N. storage area, a Russian apparently gave the keys to the Serbs, who removed 51 tanks.

Eventually, Khromchenkov was repatriated. Loginov, after finishing his tour of duty joined Arkan's Serbian forces.

Problems remained, however, under the leadership of another Russian commander, Maj. Gen. Aleksandr Perelyakin. Belgian troops had been blocking the movement of Serb troops across a bridge in northeastern Croatia, as required by U.N. Security Council resolutions. Perelyakin ordered the Belgians to stand aside. Reluctantly they did so, permitting one of the largest movements of Serbian troops and equipment into the region since the 1991 cease-fire.

According to internal U.N. reports, the U.N. spent eight months quietly trying to pressure Moscow to pull Perelyakin back, but the Russians refused. The U.N. finally dismissed him last April.

Cambodia.—In 1991, the United States, China and the Soviet Union helped broker a peace treaty among three Cambodian guerrilla factions and the Vietnamese-installed Cambodian government, ending 21 years of civil war. To ease the transition to Cambodia's first democratic government, the U.N. created the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). In less than two years, about 20,000 U.N. peacekeepers and other personnel were dispatched at a cost of \$1.9 billion.

Some of the Cambodian "peacekeepers" proved to be unwelcome guests—especially a

Bulgarian battalion dubbed the "Vulgarians." In northwest Cambodia, three Bulgarian soldiers were killed for "muddling" with local girls. One Bulgarian was treated for 17 different cases of VD. The troops' frequent carousing once sparked a mortar-rifle battle with Cambodian soldiers at a brothel.

The Bulgarians were not the sole miscreants in Cambodia, as internal U.N. audits later showed. Requests from Phnom Penh included 6500 flak jackets—and 300,000 condoms. In the year after the U.N. peacekeepers arrived, the number of prostitutes in Phnom Penh more than tripled.

U.N. mission chief Yasushi Akashi waved off Cambodian complaints with a remark that "18-year-old hot-blooded soldiers" had the right to enjoy themselves, drink a few beers and chase "young beautiful beings." He did post an order: "Please do not park your U.N. vans near the nightclubs" (i.e., whorehouses). At least 150 U.N. peacekeepers contracted AIDS in Cambodia; 5000 of the troops came down with V.D.

Meanwhile, more than 1000 generators were ordered, at least 330 of which, worth nearly \$3.2 million were never used for the mission. When U.N. personnel started spending the \$234.5 million budgeted for "premises and accommodation," rental costs became so inflated that natives could barely afford to live in their own country. Some \$80 million was spent buying vehicles, including hundreds of surplus motorcycles and minibuses. When 100 12-seater minibuses were needed, 850 were purchased—an "administrative error," UNTAC explained, that cost \$8.3 million.

Despite the excesses, the U.N. points with pride to the free election that UNTAC sponsored in May 1993. Ninety percent of Cambodia's 4.7 million eligible voters defied death threats from guerrilla groups and went to the polls.

Unfortunately, the election results have been subverted by the continued rule of the Cambodian People's Party—the Vietnamese-installed Communist government, which lost at the ballot box. In addition, the Khmer Rouge—the guerrilla group that butchered more than a million countrymen in the 1970s—have refused to disarm and demobilize. So it was predictable that they would repeatedly break the ceasefire and keep up their killing. The U.N. has spent nearly \$2 billion but there is no peace in Cambodia.

Somalia.—When civil war broke out in this African nation, the resulting anarchy threatened 4.5 million Somalis—over half the population—with severe malnutrition and related diseases. U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the first African (and Arab) to hold the position, argued eloquently for a U.N. peacekeeping mission to ensure safe delivery of food and emergency supplies. The U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was deployed to Mogadishu, the capital, in September 1992. It was quickly pinned down at the airport by Somali multiarmen and was unable to complete its mission.

A U.S. task force deployed in December secured the Mogadishu area, getting supplies to the hungry and ill. After the Americans left, the U.N. took over in May 1993 with UNOSOM II. The \$2-million-a-day operation turned the former U.S. embassy complex into an 80-acre walled city boasting air-conditioned housing and a golf course. When U.N. officials ventured out of the compound, their "taxis" were helicopters that cost \$500,000 a week.

The published commercial rate for Mogadishu-U.S. phone calls was \$4.91 a minute, but the "special U.N. discount rate" was \$8.41. Unauthorized personal calls totaled more than \$2 million, but the U.N. simply picked up the tab and never asked the callers to pay.

Meanwhile, the peacekeeping effort disintegrated, particularly as warlord Mohammed Aidid harassed UNOSOM II troops. As the civil war continued, Somalis starved. But U.N. peacekeepers—on a food budget of \$56 million a year—dined on fruit from South America, beef from Australia and frozen fish from New Zealand and the Netherlands.

Thousands of yards of barbed wire arrived with no barbs; hundreds of light fixtures to illuminate the streets abutting the compound had no sockets for light bulbs. What procurement didn't waste, pilferage often took care of. Peacekeeping vehicles disappeared with regularity, and Egyptian U.N. troops were suspected of large-scale black-marketing of minibuses.

These losses, however, were eclipsed in a single night by an enterprising thief who broke into a U.N. office in Mogadishu and made off with \$3.9 million in cash. The office door was easy pickings; its lock could be jimmied with a credit card. The money, stored in the bottom drawer of a filing cabinet, had been easily visible to dozens of U.N. employees.

While the case has not been solved, one administrator was dismissed and two others were disciplined. Last summer, UNOSOM II itself was shut down, leaving Somalia to the same clan warfare that existed when U.N. troops were first deployed two years before.

Rwanda.—Since achieving independence in 1962, Rwanda has erupted in violence between the majority Hutu tribe and minority Tutsis. The U.N. had a peacekeeping mission in that nation, but it fled as the Hutus launched a new bloodbath in April 1994.

Only 270 U.N. troops stayed behind, not enough to prevent the butchery of at least 14 local Red Cross workers left exposed by the peacekeepers' swift flight. The U.N. Security Council dawked as the dead piled up, a daily horror of shootings, stabbings and machete hackings. The Hutus were finally driven out by a Tutsi rebel army in late summer 1994.

Seven U.N. agencies and more than 100 international relief agencies rushed back. With a budget of some \$200 million, the U.N. tried unsuccessfully to provide security over Hutu refugee camps in Rwanda and aid to camps in neighboring Zaire.

The relief effort was soon corrupted when the U.N. let the very murderers who'd massacred a half-million people take over the camps. Rather than seeking their arrest and prosecution, the U.N. made deals with the Hutu thugs, who parlayed U.N. food, drugs and other supplies into millions of dollars on the black market.

Earlier this year the U.N. began to pull out of the camps. On April 22, at the Kibeho camp in Rwanda, the Tutsi-led military opened fire on Hutu crowds. Some 2000 Hutus were massacred.

Where was the U.N.? Overwhelmed by the presence of nearly 2000 Tutsi soldiers, the 200 U.N. peacekeepers did nothing. A U.N. spokesman told Reader's Digest, meekly, that the U.N. was on the scene after the slaughter for cleanup and body burial.

With peacekeeping operations now costing over \$3 billion a year, reform is long overdue. Financial accountability can be established only by limiting control by the Secretariat, which routinely withholds information about peacekeeping operations until the last minute—too late for the U.N.'s budgetary committee to exercise oversight.

In December 1993, for example, when the budget committee was given one day to approve a \$600-million budget that would extend peacekeeping efforts in 1994, U.S. representative Michael Michalski lodged an official protest. "If U.S. government employees approved a budget for a similar amount with as little information as has been provided to the committee, they would likely be thrown in jail."

More fundamentally, the U.N. needs to re-examine its whole peacekeeping approach, for the experiment in nation building has been bloody and full of failure. Lofty ideas to bring peace everywhere in the world have run aground on reality: member states with competing interests in warring territories, the impossibility of lightly armed troops keeping at bay belligerent enemies, and the folly of moving into places without setting achievable goals.

It has been a fundamental error to put U.N. peacekeepers in place where there is no peace to keep," says Sen. Sam Nunn (D., Ga.), ranking minority member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. "We've seen very vividly that the U.N. is not equipped, organized or financed to intervene and fight wars."

[From Time, Dec. 11, 1995]

#### THE ART OF SELLING BOSNIA

(By Michael Kramer)

The man whose brilliant head knocking finally produced a Bosnian peace agreement two weeks ago traveled to Capitol Hill last Wednesday seeking another miracle: congressional support for the plan that will shortly land 20,000 American troops in an area steeped in hatred and skilled at war. "It was kind of like running into a brick wall," says U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, "and the critics weren't just Republicans." Holbrooke addressed about 100 members of the House Democratic Caucus and received a standing ovation. It was "great," he says, "for about two minutes. Everyone was polite at first, saying things like 'Blessed are the peacemakers.' And then, one by one, they got up and shouted, 'But I haven't gotten a single call from a constituent supporting you yet.' It was the most friendly hostile experience I've ever had."

The vote the Administration hopes to win will be taken soon, and the outcome remains uncertain. In the Senate, the support of majority leader Bob Dole will probably win the backing that Bill Clinton desires, and Dole's courage should not be minimized. With the exception of Senator Richard Lugar, all the other G.O.P. presidential candidates oppose Clinton on Bosnia—the most vocal being Phil Gramm, who, in declaring his position even before the President made his case, showed again that he seems never to have encountered a principle he won't rise above in the service of ambition. Dole knows what is coming ("I'll take some hits for this," he says), but he, more than most, respects presidential prerogatives and would like to enjoy them himself in 1997.

In moving to Clinton's side last Thursday, Dole highlighted an irony. Had the President earlier forced an end to the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims, Dole argued it might not be necessary for U.S. soldiers to enforce the peace agreement, an accord whose ultimate goal is to strengthen the Bosnians so they can defend themselves when the U.S. leaves. As a consistent opponent of the embargo, Dole had the standing to complain. But the heart of the matter, he said on the Senate floor, is simple: "The troops are on their way. We cannot stop their deployment," and they deserve "our support."

Will that rationale resonate in the House? Early indications are that Speaker Newt Gingrich will declare a "conscience vote," which means members can do as they please without regard to party loyalty. "The problem with that," says Holbrooke, "is that many Representatives are so new that they've never had to cast a pure national security vote." Indeed, 210 of the House's 435 members (including 134 Republicans) weren't

in Congress in 1991, when it narrowly voted to support George Bush's war against Iraq. "Most of them," says Holbrooke, "don't like spending money on anything, view all issues as partisan fights and have never had to wrestle with something like Bosnia."

The Administration will clearly take any resolution it can get, even a weak one that says, in effect, "The President is sending the troops; we support the troops." That there will be a vote of some kind seems all but certain. Clinton has asked for a congressional expression. If Congress ignores that call, it will marginalize itself, which Holbrooke insists would be a "dumb" move. "It may seem paradoxical, but the best way to stick the policy on us is to support us. If we fail, and Congress hasn't voted, they'll share the blame. If they vote to support the troops in the field, they can still blast the policy," he says.

By pushing an unpopular course, Clinton looks presidential (a rarity for him), and if all goes well, he could win some credit on Election Day. In fact, if all he has done is buy time, that could help too. The President could claim that he tried, and if the factions delay resuming their war till the U.S. goes home, he could be saying that from the cozy perch of a second term.

But far more than the politics of 1996 is involved here. A "no" vote by Congress would be "catastrophic" to use Vice President Al Gore's word. It would constrain the Bosnian operation (both strategically, if the mission must be changed, and financially, if more must be spent), but the true downside of a negative congressional resolution could come later during a future horror. Then, when a U.S. President seeks to lead, those asked to follow could not be faulted for wondering if Congress will go along. "We only have one President at a time," says Dole, and his word must count. Since other crises will surely come, the question of who leads in dealing with them will always matter. "And no one but us will ever lead," says Gore. "And who would we want to lead besides us, even if they were willing?" asks Dole. "The Germans? The Japanese? Gimme a break."

As the drama plays out this week, Clinton may yet again speak to the nation. "If Dole says Clinton needs to give another speech to win the vote," says a White House aide "he will." If he does, the President might consider repeating the lines he used last Wednesday in London: "In this new era, we must rise not to a call to arms but to a call to peace. . . . To do so we must maintain the resolve we share in war when everything was at stake. In this new world our lives are not so very much at risk, but most of what makes life worth living is still very much at stake."

[From Newsweek, Dec. 11, 1995]

#### WE'RE THE ONES WHO DIE

(By David H. Hackworth)

The fog was so thick in Baumholder that President Clinton had to drive from Ramstein AFB, instead of choppering in. This miserable spot in Germany hasn't changed much since I trained here in the early 1960s. It's now the home of the "Old Ironsides"—as the first commanding general dubbed the First Armored Division, comparing the inside of his tank to the famous American warship. As dismal a place as Baumholder—known as a soldier's Siberia—is, it's a perfect setting for a pep talk about the grim mission ahead.

Our warriors know what they're up against. I hooked up with the Third Platoon of Company B, Fourth Battalion, 12th Infantry, which will move out in mid-December. When I asked them if they were "good to

go," all 23 voices shouted, "Hoo ah!"—the equivalent of a paratrooper's "Airborne!" or a marine's "Semper par!" But like all soldiers going into a potential killing field, they're concerned about the unknown "Our biggest worry is the mines," says Sgt. Darrell McCoy. The Third Platoon has been well trained to handle those widow-makers. But that doesn't make the "gnawing feeling go away," confides Sgt. Robert Crosbie, "We're a mech unit, and our Bradleys are vulnerable" to land mines, which can pierce the thin armor like a sledgehammer going through a watermelon.

The division looked formidable as it awaited the commander in chief. At attention, the soldiers stood like tall rows of corn when the 21-gun salute sounded. Clinton spoke for 22 minutes. The troops especially liked hearing about the rules of engagement. "If you are threatened with attack," (the president said) "you may respond immediately—and with decisive force."

But after Clinton took off, a certain gloom set in. One soldier complained that the visit was "a pain in the ass" because it ruined his Saturday, normally a day off. Some griped about spending Christmas in Bosnia. Others felt the president's address reduced them to props "His talk seemed more designed to motivate the American public than us," grouched an NCO. Some of the grumbling was plain old bitching—as familiar and comforting as an old pair of boots. But one sergeant, miffed at Clinton's pledge to accept "full responsibility" for any U.S. casualties, expressed a collective resentment. "We're the ones who are going to die," he said.

While Washington debates the exit strategy, the grunts are worried about what will happen when they get there. Many soldiers I talked to think the 12-month mission to cool down the warring factions is too short a time, a "fairy tale" invented by politicians. "If we don't do this right," explains a sergeant, "we'll end up being the meat in the sandwich; it will be Vietnam all over again." The First Armored Division now designated Task Force Eagle—will go in cocked, locked and ready. It can deliver a terrifying punch; tank M-1 Bradley and artillery fire, Apache and Kiowa armed helos shooting Hellfire missiles, 30-mm cannons and 50-caliber machine guns, and infantry weapons and all the thunder that NATO aircraft can bring. No one's afraid of a fire fight.

But what about an ambush? The Third Platoon is currently down nine guys for the rugged, hilly terrain of central Bosnia. Will the new recruits click with the team during dangerous and uncertain operations? Lt. Salvatore Barbaria, the platoon leader with recruiting-poster good looks, left little doubt about his men's resolve. "War fighting or peace enforcement," he said. "That's our job."

[From the New York Times, Dec. 5, 1995]

#### EUROPE HAS FEW DOUBTS ON BOSNIA FORCE

(By Craig R. Whitney)

PARIS, Dec. 4.—Except in Germany, the European debate about sending troops to join the NATO peacekeeping force in Bosnia was over before it started in most other countries. Nearly every other European country already had troops there with the United Nations force, which NATO will replace after a peace treaty is signed here 10 days from now.

"France has lost 54 soldiers in Bosnia, and almost 600 have been wounded," Defense Minister Charles Million said recently, explaining his Government's willingness to join the NATO force. France led an effort last summer to give the United Nations soldiers more artillery firepower and ground reinforcements, and Mr. Million said that the heavily armed NATO force was the best

chance yet of permitting peace to take root in Bosnia.

France and Britain, which has lost 18 soldiers in Bosnia, will provide the NATO operation with about 24,000 troops together, drawing many of the soldiers from their United Nations contingents already there. This is nearly as many as the United States will have in Bosnia and in support assignments in Croatia.

Both countries were empires until half a century ago, and are used to deploying troops to trouble spots.

"We have a long history of having an essentially professional army which was sent all over the Empire to fight, and that attitude has tended to survive a bit," said Sir Laurence Martin, the director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. "Sending troops for limited operations is something the British take great pride in, and because of the history of fighting colonial wars, there is a belief that the British are particularly good at peacekeeping operations short of war."

Officials from these and other European countries believe American fears of casualties in Bosnia are overdrawn.

"If you go to war, you get killed from time to time," said Andre Querdon, spokesman for the Belgian Foreign Ministry and formerly the ministry's liaison officer with several hundred Belgian troops in the United Nations force in Croatia.

In most European countries, there is more anguish about Europe's failure to stop the war in Bosnia in spite of the sacrifices it has made over the past four years.

Christian Soussan, 22, a student at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris, said, "At least these troops will be able to shoot back when attacked, and they won't just look on passively at ethnic cleansing."

Sibylle Dura, a 21-year-old student of French literature at the Catholic Institute in Paris, said of the lightly armed United Nations mission: "They were quite useless in going just to sit there. They should have been more forceful at the start."

France and Britain have made clear that they will pull their troops out of Bosnia at the same time the United States does, in about a year.

The Netherlands, whose soldiers with the United Nations force near Srebrenica were unable last summer to prevent the Bosnian Serb army from overrunning Bosnian Government positions there and executing hundreds of Muslim men and boys, will put its 2,100 troops now in Bosnia under NATO command.

"The debacle at Srebrenica has made a difference," said Gerrit Valk, a Dutch Labor Party Member of Parliament. "People are now asking more questions. There are more reservations about this than, say, two years ago."

Peter Paul Spanjaard, an 18-year-old Dutch high school student in Sittard, in the southeastern Netherlands, said: "I'd be scared if I had to go. But as long as this is for a good purpose and all the other countries are taking part, I think we should, too."

The Dutch Parliament is expected to approve the NATO mission later this week.

Germany sent no ground troops to the United Nations force in Bosnia, out of concern that memories of the Nazi occupation in the Balkans during World War II were still too vivid even 50 years later. But on Wednesday, the Parliament in Bonn is expected to give approval to Chancellor Helmut Kohl's decision to provide 4,000 support troops to the NATO force. Most of them will be stationed in neighboring Croatia.

"Nobody in Germany or anywhere else would understand if we said we had to stay out even though all the combatants have

asked us to come in," said Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the onetime leader of the 1968 student uprising in Paris and now a member of the largely pacifist Greens party. "I am sure that quite a few Green members of Parliament will support the Government on Wednesday."

In the student bars of Frankfurt and Bonn, many young Germans seem less reluctant to consider military involvement than the 1968 generation, whose thinking dominates both the Greens and the opposition Social Democratic Party today.

"I think it is good for German soldiers to be part of the peacekeeping force," said Daniela Paas, a graduate student in American Studies in Bonn. "Germany should have taken part a long time ago. We are members of NATO, after all."

Martin Zieba, 21, a law student in Bonn, said: "If they are attacked, they should be allowed to defend themselves. But they shouldn't take the offensive."

But Klaus Eschweiler, a 24-year-old history student, said, "Because of our history, it could leave a bad taste in a lot of people's mouths."

Walther Leisler Kiep, a Christian Democratic party leader, said: "German participation grows from recognition that we can no longer use our past as an alibi. Our past makes us duty-bound to step in where genocidal policies or racism lead to horrible events like the things we've seen in the former Yugoslavia in recent years."

#### OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

United States.—20,000 heavily armed U.S. ground troops, about 13,000 of them from U.S. 1st Armored Division, based in Bad Kreuznach, Germany. Other Germany-based U.S. units are to supply most of the rest, along with 2,000 to 3,000 reservists. Troops are to be equipped with about 150 M1-A1 Abrams tanks, about 250 Bradley fighting vehicles and up to 50 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters.

Headquarters: Tuzla, northeast Bosnia.

Britain.—13,000 troops, incorporating units from its U.N. contingent already in Bosnia. The force will comprise a divisional HQ, a brigade with armor, infantry and artillery. Air and sea forces in the area will contribute to the operation.

Headquarters: Gornji Vakuf, central Bosnia.

France.—10,000 troops, with about 7,500 in the peace force itself and the remainder on logistics duty, either on ships in the Adriatic or at air bases in Italy. There are already about 7,000 French soldiers on the ground, including about 3,300 with the NATO Rapid Reaction Force and 3,800 with the United Nations.

Headquarters: Probably Mostar, southern Bosnia.

Germany.—4,000 soldiers, primarily to support logistics, transport, engineering and medical units. It will also make available radar-busting Tornado fighter-bombers based in Italy. Most of the German contingent will be based in Croatia.

Italy.—2,300 troops, with 600 more in reserve at home.

Norway.—1,000 troops as part of a Nordic brigade.

Spain.—1,250 ground troops, two frigates, eight F-18 aircraft, two Hercules C-130s and a C-235.

Portugal.—900 troops. The government approved sending troops from the Independent Air-Transport Brigade, including about 700 combat troops, 200 support troops and 120 vehicles.

Netherlands.—About 130 Dutch soldiers will leave for Bosnia next week as a preparatory force. A cabinet decision on the full complement will be made Dec. 8 and submitted to parliament for approval Dec. 13. The

Dutch media say the force will include 2,000 military personnel, including an armored infantry battalion, a tank squadron, one Hercules transport aircraft, two F-27 aircraft and 12 F-16 jets.

Troops from Denmark and Turkey will also join the peace force.

#### Non-NATO members

Russia.—2,000 combat troops and a 2,000-strong logistical support unit.

Troops from Finland, Sweden (about 870), Estonia, Hungary (about 100 technical personnel), Latvia, Lithuania and Poland will be offered to the peace force.

□ 2230

Save them from going to their libraries and looking up old Reader's Digest. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to put four articles into the RECORD at this point, and then turn his own time back to Mr. ABERCROMBIE, or if I could ask unanimous consent to put them at the end of the special order of the gentleman from California [Mr. CUNNINGHAM] and myself. That keeps the special order of the gentleman from Hawaii [Mr. ABERCROMBIE] clean.

As a matter of fact, this article, "Europe Has Few Doubts on Bosnian Force," which gives the best troop breakdown on our NATO allies, and how they are not equaling what we are doing anywhere nearly close enough in manpower. This is by Craig Whitney, and I believe it is from the New York Times. Another page of facts and figures that goes with it with the same article.

I neglected to put in the Reader's Digest article last night from the October issue, "The Folly of U.N. Peacekeeping With Scandals in Bosnia, Cambodia, Somalia and Rwanda," all of the U.N. vehicles lined up at the warehouses with documents saying, try not to put your vehicles too near the night clubs, they call them.

Then I would like to put in the November article, the "United Nations Is Out Of Control," last month's Reader's Digest. This will at least bring American taxpayers to an angry point of saying, if the United Nations must be saved, it must be saved from itself. It has no accountability. They treat money like it grows on trees. None of them pay taxes, nobody is accountable.

Again, I want to close on this picture, a two-page spreadout, the same one that is on the front page of the L.A. Times, of Clinton in Bosnia with the troops, our forces there; here it is; and I am all through with this one last picture, even though it is going to be a long shot. There is Clinton with all the top sergeant majors, the commanding general whose biography I would like to put in at this point, as I am going to put in the history of first armored division fighting from Algiers, Tunisia, Anzio, Salerno, and all the way up into the area where BOB DOLE was so savagely wounded. How did Clinton set this up where he said to all of these people, will you follow me? Will you follow me down this driveway, chin up in the air like Mussolini, jaw jutted out, neck muscles flexing, and there he

walks saying, follow me, but only as far as the reviewing field. You will go on to Bosnia by yourselves; I will be back in the White House thinking about a 7-year balanced budget.

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the courtesy of the gentleman from Hawaii [Mr. ABERCROMBIE], and I would say to the gentleman, what goes around comes around. I will do it for you sometime, NEAL.

#### MAGIC FORMULA FOR BALANCED BUDGET IS ILLUSION

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LONGLEY). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Hawaii [Mr. ABERCROMBIE] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, Mr. DORNAN has given me, with his last sentence, literally a transition point for the issue that I wish to discuss this evening yet once again, and that has to do with the so-called balanced budget.

Mr. Speaker, as you may know, and certainly others of our colleagues who have been paying attention to both debate during the bills at hand, and in special orders with respect to the budget reconciliation bill, that I have, among others, been saying for some time now, that this magic formula that is being proposed by the majority about a balanced budget is in fact an illusion.

Now, Mr. Speaker, rather than just taking into consideration the observation of the majority leader, Mr. ARMEY, the other day that politicians could get hit by a train and get back up and say I got the best of that deal, so therefore, we cannot pay much attention to politicians, let me make some references then to some of the people in the press, some of the journalists who have been doing their homework on this issue. Here is the fundamental premise, Mr. Speaker.

I am maintaining that there is no balanced budget in 7 years. What bothers me is that most journalists, when they report this, and when I say most journalists I am talking across the board up to and including public radio and public television, all of the networks, they simply report what is said and then what the reaction to that is as if they were covering a tennis match from one side to the other. Nobody asked the basic question of the Speaker of the House, who has, despite his indications that he was going to take a more reticent position, to step back; I think he said he was going to bench himself.

In the last 2 days the Speaker has come forward with threats about crashing the stock market, driving interest rates through the roof, demanding that his plan for a balanced budget be the basis of the budget reconciliation bill.

Mr. Speaker, I submit to you and to my other colleagues, and I have offered again and again during special orders the opportunity to other Members to

come down and refute what I am saying. It is not that I want to engage in a contest, because this is far too important for trying to score points, but it is a simple question of whether we are in fact, as Mark Twain has said that the truth is so rare we ought to be very careful in spending it.

The fact of the matter is that there is no balanced budget proposal on the table. There is no balanced budget proposal on the table that is being negotiated between Speaker GINGRICH and the White House. I say Speaker GINGRICH; I know there are other negotiators there, but I think we all know that nothing is going to move in the House, according to the Speaker, in any event today, if I am to understand his declaration today correctly, that we have to abide by his proposal for a balanced budget in 7 years, or we do not move.

Now, as I say, all kinds of threats are involved in that. I am a legislator all my elected life. Maybe Speaker GINGRICH, having only run for the Congress of the United States and spent all of his time in the Congress of the United States, and for the first time being in the majority, has not had the same kind of opportunities or experiences that I have had as a legislator.

I have been a legislator as well as a member of civic organizations and community organizations; I have been an officer of them. I have been on the city council, I have been in the State House, I have been in the State Senate. I do not cite that as any particular virtue, but simply as a recitation of the record with respect to legislative experience. That experience tells me that you do not get anywhere in negotiations by threatening the other side or laying down absolutes to them, particularly when there is no basis from your side.

I am perfectly willing at any time, and I am sure members of the Democratic Caucus are and those who are doing the negotiating, up to and including the President of the United States and his representative, Mr. Pannetta, are quite willing to try to come to an agreement. This is not a Parliament. This is a constitutional system with a division of houses, a legislative and executive branch, and as much as the Speaker would like to be Prime Minister of the United States, he is not. He is the Speaker of the House. Therefore, if he is going to negotiate with the Executive, he is going to have to come to the table with some honest numbers.

He says that that is what it is that he wants to do, but the fact is, and I will repeat it again and again and again until some people I hope in the media, whom we have to depend upon; and Mr. Speaker, Mr. Jefferson said at one point that he would prefer in a democracy as opposed to free elections and a free government and a free press, he preferred a free press, because the press is what secures our freedom. Yet the free press in this particular instance has been remiss and not doing