

Just today, just today, the Serb leader, Karadzic, and the mayors of the Sarajevo suburbs held a protest march; and some of the things they were saying, and I am quoting now, that the Dayton Agreement has created a new Beirut in Europe, referring of course to Lebanon's 15-year civil war, and that there will be bloodshed for centuries to come, that the ethnic Serbs will not be dominated by the Croats and the Moslems, that this is a Balkan powder keg.

We all know, Mr. Speaker, there are 6 million land mines waiting in the former Yugoslavia for our troops. Sixty thousand ethnic Serbs, according to Karadzic, will have grenades in their pockets. Well, Mr. Speaker, we have to be aware of these dangers.

The President mentioned the unspeakable human rights' violations. Certainly these crimes against humanity are as loathsome as any in the history of the world. But, Mr. Speaker, similar crimes have been documented by Amnesty International in 58 other countries. Why not Afghanistan? Why not go to Rwanda, to China, to Cuba, and all of the other countries in which similar crimes are being perpetrated against humanity?

Mr. Speaker, this mission is a logistical nightmare and will be extremely dangerous for U.S. troops who will be potentially under fire from all three factions.

Mr. Speaker, what is the solution here in this very complex and difficult situation? I would ask unanimous consent to submit for the RECORD, and I would commend all of my colleagues' attention to this editorial from today's Wall Street Journal, November 28, 1995, by two former Under Secretaries of Defense. Let me quote from this very provocative and profound piece:

The goal of U.S. policy toward Bosnia should be Bosnian self-reliance. We should aim to make it possible for the Bosnian government to defend its own country militarily. Congress should oppose the deployment of U.S. forces to Bosnia unless the administration make clear and binding commitment to create, by arming and training Bosnian Federation forces, a qualitative military balance between Bosnian-Croatian and Serb forces in the former Yugoslavia.

Mr. Speaker, that criterion has not been met.

This article goes on to say, very wisely,

Unfortunately, the Dayton Accords lack clear commitments to equip and train the Bosnian forces. Administration statements are disturbingly ambiguous on this point.

This piece concludes by saying,

If we are unable to help put the Bosnian government in a position to defend itself, the administration will find, when it wants to withdraw our forces after a year or so, that it cannot do so without triggering a catastrophe.

This piece is written by two people who served in previous administrations in the Defense Department who know about what they are writing.

Mr. Speaker, I hope and pray that the Congress will have its say on behalf of the American people before this de-

ployment is made. I fear that we will not have such a voice in this deployment. I think each one of us here in this body, in the people's House, needs to examine our consciences, needs to listen to the people we represent and press this issue in the people's House. I know in Minnesota, in the Third District, my calls in the last 2 days have run 178 to 2 against this deployment.

Mr. Speaker, I offer for the RECORD the following article which I referred to earlier.

[From the Wall Street Journal, Nov. 28, 1995]

THE ARGUMENT CLINTON ISN'T MAKING ON BOSNIA

(By Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas J. Feith)

Having committed an armored division of American "peacekeepers" for Bosnia with little analysis and even less consultation, the Clinton administration now contends that Congress has no responsible choice but to concur. To be sure, if it repudiates the president's troop commitment, Congress would be blamed for bringing about resumption of the war, a collapse of American leadership in NATO and perhaps of the alliance itself, and a dangerous perception around the world of the U.S. becoming isolationist and unreliable.

But even worse than not backing the president's commitment would be for Congress to approve uncritically a flawed policy that could fail disastrously. Congress has a duty to try to force the administration to define sensible goals for the mission. Americans remember Lebanon and Somalia, where we managed to lose both men and credibility. We remain dubious of the operation in Haiti, which may succeed in restoring dictatorship rather than democracy. If U.S. troops end their Bosnia mission without having achieved what they came to do, especially if they take significant casualties, the consequences will be graver by far.

LITTLE GUIDANCE

The administration acknowledges the problem by stressing that U.S. troops will not be deployed unless there is a peace to enforce. But this rather sensible condition for getting in gives little guidance for how and when to get out.

There is one compelling rationale for U.S. participation in the international peacekeeping force: Bosnia has been the victim of international aggression and of crimes against humanity that the Bosnian Serbs, supported by the Milosevic regime in Belgrade, have committed against hundreds of thousands of predominantly Muslim Bosnians. The U.S. and our European allies and others bear a large measure of responsibility for these horrors because we have maintained an international arms embargo on Bosnia. The Bosnian government's troops have numerical superiority over their enemies, but, as a result of the embargo, they have remained inferior in equipment, especially heavy armor and artillery.

The goal of U.S. policy toward Bosnia should be Bosnian self-reliance. We should aim to make it possible for the Bosnian government to defend its own country militarily. Congress should oppose the deployment of U.S. forces to Bosnia unless the administration makes a clear and binding commitment to create, by arming and training Bosnian Federation forces, a qualitative military balance between Bosnian-Croatian and Serb forces in the former Yugoslavia.

If the peacekeeping force is conceived as a means of keeping Bosnia subject to unrealistic arms limitation schemes, and therefore doomed to remain a ward of NATO or the U.S., Congress should oppose it. But if peace-

keepers are intended to deter aggression for the year or so needed for the Bosnian government to move toward self-reliance in the defense field, then the strategic and moral case for U.S. participation should be easier for Americans to credit.

Unfortunately, the Dayton Accords lack clear commitments to equip and train the Bosnian forces. Administration statements are disturbingly ambiguous on this point. U.S. officials say they have assured the Bosnians that federation forces will be equipped and trained, but that assurance itself is hedged by a misplaced faith that new arms control agreements might make it unnecessary. According to the accords, no weapons will be delivered for 90 days and no heavy weapons for 180 days, pending arms control talks. Also, U.S. statements make it clear that we will try to get others to do the equipping and training. (It is not reassuring that we still lack a good estimate of Bosnian requirements, even though for three years the Clinton administration said that it aimed to lift the arms embargo.)

These limitations imply that moving quickly or openly to arm the Bosnians would be destabilizing, but the opposite is true. To ensure a stable Bosnia and to be able to withdraw our troops on schedule, we must be committed, publicly and resolutely, to a rapid equip-and-train program. (Defensive systems not covered by the envisioned arms control regime, such as anti-tank missiles and counter-battery radars, are needed with particular urgency, given the precarious position of Sarajevo.)

The administration's hesitations seem to reflect a belief that equipping and training federation forces would be inconsistent with a "neutral" role for American peacekeepers.

It is important, however, to see clearly the purpose of the peacekeeping force: It must uphold the peace agreement generally, but it is intended also to deter the Serbs from taking advantage of their current (temporary) advantage in armaments. It is not correct or constructive to talk of the peacekeepers as "neutral." They do not have to be neutral to perform their mission any more than police have to be neutral as between shopkeepers and robbers. In fact, pretending to be neutral when none of the parties so regards us actually increases the danger to U.S. forces at a tactical level, by making it more difficult for them to decide how to respond to provocations or ambiguous situations on the ground. It was this posture that helped produce the inadequate security precautions taken by U.S. Marines in Beirut. The best way to shore up the peace is through a policy that deters Serbian aggression and secures Bosnian compliance through American support and cooperation.

EXIT STRATEGY

If the administration is to allay public and congressional skepticism about the troop deployment, it must make clear that arming and training Bosnian Federation forces is not only consistent with our role in the peacekeeping force, it is also the key to the "exit strategy" for our troops. If we are unable to help put the Bosnian government in a position to defend itself, the administration will find, when it wants to withdraw our forces after a year or so, that it cannot do so without triggering a catastrophe.

BOSNIA, MEDICARE, AND THE BUDGET

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. CHRYSLER). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. KINGSTON] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Speaker, having just returned from a series of meetings in Georgia and meeting with a number of constituents during the work recess period, there are three predominant things that people have on their minds back home, and I think this is probably true all over America, and that is Bosnia, Medicare, and the budget.

I would like to speak very briefly on Bosnia, because we are now in a new phase where the President, our Commander in Chief, has officially decided to embark in a new phase of the debate by sending and committing to send 20,000 of our troops over there. We all want to support troops who are anywhere fighting in the world at the order of the Commander in Chief, and yet certainly in Bosnia we have a lot of questions.

The questions that we had debated 2 weeks ago when we had a very critical vote on Bosnia, which in that vote Congress decided against sending troops over there, and our questions were at the time: What is our peril? What is the timetable that we will be there? What is the plan? Who are our allies? How long will we be there? How will we get out of being there? And what is the exact mission?

These questions need to be answered. I think within the next couple of weeks the President will be answering these through his staff members to Congress. Senate hearings, I believe, began today, Mr. Speaker. So I think it is appropriate that we look at this and continue this debate.

Mr. Speaker, as the previous speaker, the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. RAMSTAD] said, clearly the people of America at this point are not in support of sending troops to Bosnia; and I think, because of that, we need to define what the American peril is, and I have yet to hear what that peril is. It is very important for us to know before we send our sons and daughters over there.

Mr. Speaker, I was in Italy in August and had the opportunity to be briefed by NATO on the Bosnian situation. In August, when one talked about Bosnia, it was years and years away in terms of everything that has happened; and yet, in that discussion, one of the things that struck me was who are our allies. It is not just Bosnians and Croats and Serbians. There are all kinds of subgroups and counter groups and local warlords and so forth.

I know often when we try to take humanitarian supplies into one section another group down the road or up the road from them would block the supply trucks, even though they all had the same label as being Bosnians. Yet they were different, because they were from a different territory. So one of my main questions is going to be that I hope to find out in the next couple of weeks who will our allies be.

Then a question that has come up more and more lately as we debate balancing the budget is what is this going to cost us? Will we really be able to get

out of there in a year or is it going to be like so many other peaces that we have won worldwide?

The peace that we got in Somalia, the peace that we got in Haiti, the peace that we got anywhere is really purchased peace. It is a matter of the United States of America pulling out the checkbook and buying off the warring factions. I would like to know what those costs are. I know our taxpayers back home would like to know also.

Mr. Speaker, we are going to have debates and we are going to have hearings, and this is a good process. The War Powers Act has been debated since the inception of our great democracy, and yet the Congress and the President still view these things differently. Again, we do want to support the troops individually. It looks like at this point they are going to go over there, yet at the same time we have congressional duties of our own and we will begin immediately in due diligence to answer some of the questions that we have been asking on the floor of the House.

Mr. Speaker, on Medicare let me just say this. The gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. SHAYS], who is the budget expert, is down here. Our colleague, the gentlewoman from Connecticut [Mrs. JOHNSON] was able to come to Savannah this weekend and found the time to meet with a lot of our hospitals and nursing homes and home health care professionals and other health care providers, and we talked about the fact that in April the Medicare trustees said Medicare is going to run out of money in 2 years, it will be bankrupt in 6 years; it is the obligation and duty of the Congress to act to preserve and protect Medicare, which we have been doing.

We are trying to slow down the inflation rate of Medicare, the growth of it. It is right now at about 11 percent; regular medical inflation is more in the 4 to 6 percent range. We believe if we can get Medicare costs in that 4 to 6 percent range, we can save it. Yet at the same time, we are committed to increased spending per recipient from \$4,800 to \$6,700.

As I said that to the people back home, they said, well, that is not a cut. We said, well, yes, it is true. We are going from about \$178 billion to \$278 billion.

Mr. Speaker, let me yield back the balance of my time, and maybe the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. SHAYS] would yield a few minutes to me to complete that thought.

BOSNIA AND THE BUDGET

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of May 12, 1995, the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. SHAYS] is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Speaker, I yield to my colleague, the gentleman from

Georgia [Mr. KINGSTON] to complete his presentation.

INCREASING MEDICARE BENEFITS

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I will just say real quickly something that is very appropriate to the subject that the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. SHAYS] is going to address, which is the budget, and that is that in Washington, a decrease in the anticipated increase is considered a cut, which means if you are wanting to spend \$15,000 and you only spend \$10,000 more than you did last year, then that is a \$5,000 cut instead of a \$10,000 increase.

Therefore, so much of the debate I think is tainted by the fact that we use what are normal, every day, commonplace words, but we change them into an illegitimate-type usage so that the word "cut" again is a decrease in the anticipated increase.

Again, Mr. Speaker, I will say in that context we are increasing Medicare benefits per recipient from about \$4,800 to \$6,700 over a 7-year period of time, and we are doing that by giving seniors more options than normal Medicare. We are going to opt to have Medicare Plus, we are going to have managed care options, health maintenance organizations options; we will have medical savings account options and physician service network options, preferred provider organizations, all kinds of things which I think are very exciting. I have discussed these options with my parents and other senior citizens that I know, and they are excited about it and they are glad that we are going to move to protect and preserve Medicare.

Mr. Speaker, I now need to yield back to the gentleman from Connecticut his time, and maybe we can have a good discussion on the budget.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman and I would encourage him to participate in this special order. We are joined also by the gentleman from Maine [Mr. LONGLEY].

Mr. Speaker, this is obviously a time that many of us are focused in on Bosnia, and whether or not we are going to be committing troops. We are going to devote most of this special order to the budget, not Bosnia. However, I just want to put on the record that the vote on what Congress does and decides to do on the issue of whether we commit troops to Bosnia is going to be not a partisan debate.

Each member of a vote like that is going to look to his own conscience, is going to be checking and talking with people in the administration and outside of the administration to know ultimately what is the proper vote. I know that if I had to vote today, I would not be sending troops to Bosnia, but I have pledged to have a very open mind about this issue.

The President has committed our Government to send 20,000 troops, has made it very clear that he intends to work with NATO, and that obviously has to count for a lot. He is the Commander in Chief. However, then we