

leave the area, if NATO leaves the area, and we allow the Bosnians to arm themselves. I ask this question: Is it right for American blood to be spilled in Bosnia when the American President has not allowed the Bosnians to fight their own war?

CONCERNS REGARDING AMERICA SENDING PEACEKEEPING TROOPS TO BOSNIA

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. CUNNINGHAM] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I know Members on both sides of the aisle are anguishing on whether we send troops or not to Bosnia. Let me give a few of this Member's concerns. First of all, I have had not one constituent walk up to me and say, "Duke, send our troops." Quite on the contrary, it has been overwhelmingly "Duke, try to stop it if you can."

Second, General Boyd and General MacKenzie, both in charge in that portion of the world in Bosnia-Herzegovina have stated: "Stay out. It will be a disaster." These are the two generals that headed up our forces in that particular part of the world.

I look at the cost. NATO has said that it is not \$2.2, but by the end it will cost us \$3 billion to \$6 billion. The President just signed a balanced budget in 7 years agreement. Where is the money going to come from? Even if you have a supplemental, you have to offset it. You have to pay for it. We cannot do that.

NATO is broke today, billions of dollars. France said just 2 weeks ago that we can plan on a 20-year commitment with NATO in that portion of the world. Who is going to end up paying for that, Mr. Speaker? We are. The President said that the primary source of nation building will come from Europe. It also leaves a lot of room for the United States. We are looking at billions of dollars when we are talking about a time when balancing a budget, providing for Medicare, and a lot of other things that the other side is arguing against it.

I also look at the \$4,000, much of it deemed. These are not the Bosnian Muslims, but primarily those from Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Albania, that are the radicals. If they are allowed to stay in that portion of the world, these are the ones that have sworn a worldwide Jihad against Jews, Christians, and all nonbelievers. They will attack our troops, and they have got to go. We have got to demand equal treatment.

That has not happened in the past. Have Serbs and Croats and Muslims committed atrocious acts? Absolutely, all three groups. But we need not to train one side. Can you imagine during this peace agreement, we go in and train any side or give arms to any side? If I was on any one of the other two, I

would say that is an act of war. I think that is the plan.

Who would come in with arms? France, Iran, Iraq, Russia, and yes, Mr. Speaker, even the United States, to sell arms. I think that would be disastrous.

I have another concern. President Clinton is going to be in a campaign mode over the next year. During Desert Storm, President Bush was focused. Colin Powell was focused. Dick Cheney was focused on Desert Storm, not on political activities coming up. I feel that if you look at Secretary Perry, I think he is a fairly good Secretary of Defense, but with all due respect, he is not a tactician. He is a politician and a bean counter. He is not a Dick Cheney.

I look at the problems of what we could end up with, as we did in Vietnam with Johnson and McNamara, that we are ill-suited for the job of the defense of our kids. We could get bogged down in Bosnia. I also look at what could happen to Saddam Hussein, in North Korea, and other areas, and the terrorist activities that could pick up.

We are \$200 billion below the bottom-up review in defense dollars. That is the bare-bone minimum to fight two conflicts. The GAO has said we are \$200 billion. The Chairman of our Joint Chiefs said is our military ready; yes, we are, but it is a paper-thin readiness that will not last more than a few weeks. If we get bogged down there, Mr. Speaker, I am afraid we will be in big trouble.

I look at replies that we had from Turkey that said they would come in with 20,000 troops around Sarajevo, Russia would send in 20,000 troops to align themselves between the Croats and the Serbs, without a single U.S. soldier involved. Why has the President not taken them up on this, without committing our troops? We must not arm or disarm any party, we must not train or arm any party, we must not get involved in civil disobedience protests, we must treat all even-handedly.

We must demand that all Mideast radical 4,000 Mujahidin be eliminated, all foreign regular troops be eliminated. I would like to submit for the RECORD this article from the Associated Press on the death of an American citizen at the hands of the radical Muslims.

The material referred to is as follows:

AMERICAN SLAIN IN NORTHERN BOSNIA

SARAJEVO, BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA.—An American man working for the United Nations has been murdered in Bosnia, and a U.N. official yesterday said Middle Eastern fighters backing the Bosnian government are suspected.

The body of the American citizen, whose identity was not immediately released, was found by Bosnian police Sunday evening near the town of Banovici, 10 miles northwest of Tuzla.

Tuzla is the biggest Bosnian government-held city in northeastern Bosnia, and would be the headquarters for U.S. soldiers taking part in a NATO peace mission in Bosnia.

A U.N. official said the body was found just 500 yards from where Norwegian peacekeepers were stopped last month by mujahe-

deen, fighters from Middle Eastern countries helping the Muslim-led Bosnian government. The official said investigators suspect the mujahedeen were responsible for the American's death.

These fundamentalist cutthroats must be out by the time our troops are in place.

CONCERN ABOUT DEPLOYING GROUND TROOPS TO BOSNIA

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. RAMSTAD] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. RAMSTAD. Mr. Speaker, I too am deeply concerned about the President's announced commitment to deploy 20,000 United States ground troops in Bosnia. I do not believe, Mr. Speaker, that document has articulated a compelling national interest in Bosnia worth the loss of American soldiers. We have no overriding national interest in Bosnia, and there is absolutely no reason American troops should be placed in harm's way as part of an ill-defined mission there.

Mr. Speaker, calling this mission a peacekeeping mission is a misnomer. This is a tenuous peace at best, and a potential quagmire for our troops at worst.

This is clearly not a legitimate peacekeeping mission, or 240,000 troops would not be required. Yes, I say 240,500, as the spokesperson at the Pentagon was quoted in Defense News today, counting the support troops. We hear the number 60,000, including 20,000 American servicemen and women, but the total number of troops, according to this statement today, is 240,000 troops.

Mr. Speaker, this mission goes way beyond peacekeeping to nation building. History should have taught us that we cannot build a nation from the outside.

Mr. Speaker, I ask, how much longer can the United States be denying a one-one number for the rest of the world? This is a European conflict, and using United States troops as a global peace force is neither a defensible function nor a practicing pragmatic reality for our military. Using our troops as a global police force in my judgment, and I say this respectfully, but I believe that it reflects a basic misunderstanding of our military's historic mission and capabilities.

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Mr. Speaker, this situation is fraught with danger. Our troops will be sitting ducks, literally, physically, sitting ducks, positioned between the two warring factions.

Mr. Speaker, I think we have to recognize what is going on, what the political realities are in this part of the world. This is a war that has been going on for ethnic strife for 4,000 years. The present fighting has been going on for 40 years and longer.

Just today, just today, the Serb leader, Karadzic, and the mayors of the Sarajevo suburbs held a protest march; and some of the things they were saying, and I am quoting now, that the Dayton Agreement has created a new Beirut in Europe, referring of course to Lebanon's 15-year civil war, and that there will be bloodshed for centuries to come, that the ethnic Serbs will not be dominated by the Croats and the Moslems, that this is a Balkan powder keg.

We all know, Mr. Speaker, there are 6 million land mines waiting in the former Yugoslavia for our troops. Sixty thousand ethnic Serbs, according to Karadzic, will have grenades in their pockets. Well, Mr. Speaker, we have to be aware of these dangers.

The President mentioned the unspeakable human rights' violations. Certainly these crimes against humanity are as loathsome as any in the history of the world. But, Mr. Speaker, similar crimes have been documented by Amnesty International in 58 other countries. Why not Afghanistan? Why not go to Rwanda, to China, to Cuba, and all of the other countries in which similar crimes are being perpetrated against humanity?

Mr. Speaker, this mission is a logistical nightmare and will be extremely dangerous for U.S. troops who will be potentially under fire from all three factions.

Mr. Speaker, what is the solution here in this very complex and difficult situation? I would ask unanimous consent to submit for the RECORD, and I would commend all of my colleagues' attention to this editorial from today's Wall Street Journal, November 28, 1995, by two former Under Secretaries of Defense. Let me quote from this very provocative and profound piece:

The goal of U.S. policy toward Bosnia should be Bosnian self-reliance. We should aim to make it possible for the Bosnian government to defend its own country militarily. Congress should oppose the deployment of U.S. forces to Bosnia unless the administration make clear and binding commitment to create, by arming and training Bosnian Federation forces, a qualitative military balance between Bosnian-Croatian and Serb forces in the former Yugoslavia.

Mr. Speaker, that criterion has not been met.

This article goes on to say, very wisely,

Unfortunately, the Dayton Accords lack clear commitments to equip and train the Bosnian forces. Administration statements are disturbingly ambiguous on this point.

This piece concludes by saying,

If we are unable to help put the Bosnian government in a position to defend itself, the administration will find, when it wants to withdraw our forces after a year or so, that it cannot do so without triggering a catastrophe.

This piece is written by two people who served in previous administrations in the Defense Department who know about what they are writing.

Mr. Speaker, I hope and pray that the Congress will have its say on behalf of the American people before this de-

ployment is made. I fear that we will not have such a voice in this deployment. I think each one of us here in this body, in the people's House, needs to examine our consciences, needs to listen to the people we represent and press this issue in the people's House. I know in Minnesota, in the Third District, my calls in the last 2 days have run 178 to 2 against this deployment.

Mr. Speaker, I offer for the RECORD the following article which I referred to earlier.

[From the Wall Street Journal, Nov. 28, 1995]

THE ARGUMENT CLINTON ISN'T MAKING ON BOSNIA

(By Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas J. Feith)

Having committed an armored division of American "peacekeepers" for Bosnia with little analysis and even less consultation, the Clinton administration now contends that Congress has no responsible choice but to concur. To be sure, if it repudiates the president's troop commitment, Congress would be blamed for bringing about resumption of the war, a collapse of American leadership in NATO and perhaps of the alliance itself, and a dangerous perception around the world of the U.S. becoming isolationist and unreliable.

But even worse than not backing the president's commitment would be for Congress to approve uncritically a flawed policy that could fail disastrously. Congress has a duty to try to force the administration to define sensible goals for the mission. Americans remember Lebanon and Somalia, where we managed to lose both men and credibility. We remain dubious of the operation in Haiti, which may succeed in restoring dictatorship rather than democracy. If U.S. troops end their Bosnia mission without having achieved what they came to do, especially if they take significant casualties, the consequences will be graver by far.

LITTLE GUIDANCE

The administration acknowledges the problem by stressing that U.S. troops will not be deployed unless there is a peace to enforce. But this rather sensible condition for getting in gives little guidance for how and when to get out.

There is one compelling rationale for U.S. participation in the international peacekeeping force: Bosnia has been the victim of international aggression and of crimes against humanity that the Bosnian Serbs, supported by the Milosevic regime in Belgrade, have committed against hundreds of thousands of predominantly Muslim Bosnians. The U.S. and our European allies and others bear a large measure of responsibility for these horrors because we have maintained an international arms embargo on Bosnia. The Bosnian government's troops have numerical superiority over their enemies, but, as a result of the embargo, they have remained inferior in equipment, especially heavy armor and artillery.

The goal of U.S. policy toward Bosnia should be Bosnian self-reliance. We should aim to make it possible for the Bosnian government to defend its own country militarily. Congress should oppose the deployment of U.S. forces to Bosnia unless the administration makes a clear and binding commitment to create, by arming and training Bosnian Federation forces, a qualitative military balance between Bosnian-Croatian and Serb forces in the former Yugoslavia.

If the peacekeeping force is conceived as a means of keeping Bosnia subject to unrealistic arms limitation schemes, and therefore doomed to remain a ward of NATO or the U.S., Congress should oppose it. But if peace-

keepers are intended to deter aggression for the year or so needed for the Bosnian government to move toward self-reliance in the defense field, then the strategic and moral case for U.S. participation should be easier for Americans to credit.

Unfortunately, the Dayton Accords lack clear commitments to equip and train the Bosnian forces. Administration statements are disturbingly ambiguous on this point. U.S. officials say they have assured the Bosnians that federation forces will be equipped and trained, but that assurance itself is hedged by a misplaced faith that new arms control agreements might make it unnecessary. According to the accords, no weapons will be delivered for 90 days and no heavy weapons for 180 days, pending arms control talks. Also, U.S. statements make it clear that we will try to get others to do the equipping and training. (It is not reassuring that we still lack a good estimate of Bosnian requirements, even though for three years the Clinton administration said that it aimed to lift the arms embargo.)

These limitations imply that moving quickly or openly to arm the Bosnians would be destabilizing, but the opposite is true. To ensure a stable Bosnia and to be able to withdraw our troops on schedule, we must be committed, publicly and resolutely, to a rapid equip-and-train program. (Defensive systems not covered by the envisioned arms control regime, such as anti-tank missiles and counter-battery radars, are needed with particular urgency, given the precarious position of Sarajevo.)

The administration's hesitations seem to reflect a belief that equipping and training federation forces would be inconsistent with a "neutral" role for American peacekeepers.

It is important, however, to see clearly the purpose of the peacekeeping force: It must uphold the peace agreement generally, but it is intended also to deter the Serbs from taking advantage of their current (temporary) advantage in armaments. It is not correct or constructive to talk of the peacekeepers as "neutral." They do not have to be neutral to perform their mission any more than police have to be neutral as between shopkeepers and robbers. In fact, pretending to be neutral when none of the parties so regards us actually increases the danger to U.S. forces at a tactical level, by making it more difficult for them to decide how to respond to provocations or ambiguous situations on the ground. It was this posture that helped produce the inadequate security precautions taken by U.S. Marines in Beirut. The best way to shore up the peace is through a policy that deters Serbian aggression and secures Bosnian compliance through American support and cooperation.

EXIT STRATEGY

If the administration is to allay public and congressional skepticism about the troop deployment, it must make clear that arming and training Bosnian Federation forces is not only consistent with our role in the peacekeeping force, it is also the key to the "exit strategy" for our troops. If we are unable to help put the Bosnian government in a position to defend itself, the administration will find, when it wants to withdraw our forces after a year or so, that it cannot do so without triggering a catastrophe.

BOSNIA, MEDICARE, AND THE BUDGET

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. CHRYSLER). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. KINGSTON] is recognized for 60 minutes.