

my commanding officer, who informed me that whenever headquarters called we were always ready. The military, he explained correctly, prized a "can do outfit," and the services promoted those who performed regardless of circumstances.

My next encounter was in 1980, when I was preparing a monograph on the subject for the American Enterprise Institute. When word of my project reached the Pentagon I was drowned in data (some of which was highly classified) and anecdotes from normally tight-lipped bureaucrats. When I went to the Pentagon to conduct some interviews, I was treated like a foreign dignitary.

One of my conclusions was that readiness is a slippery and poorly understood concept. To most people it is a synonym for military capability or preparedness. To the military, however, readiness is only one of four components of preparedness, and not necessarily the most important one. To obtain a true picture, one had to look at the other three pillars—force structure (the number of ships, planes, tanks), modernization (the age of the forces) and sustainability (staying power). Thus, a very ready force could be considered militarily impotent if it was too small, too old and lacked staying power. By the same token, a force that was bigger, more sophisticated and better armed than its adversaries could be deemed unready if it was considered improperly trained and outfitted.

I also concluded that readiness is a hot-button political issue, subject to unlimited manipulation. Even the informed public can't judge such matters as the appropriate force structure, the proper time to replace a plane or tank and the level of effort necessary to win a war. But everybody wants and expects a ready force.

Military leaders were quick to grasp the political potential of readiness scares. In the late 70's, word went out that reports of readiness problems would be welcomed by headquarters. The only exception was the Marine Corps. I was told by a general that the Marines had been C-2 (ready) for 200 years!

I also came to understand that measuring readiness is hardly an exact science. Each service defined readiness differently, and I found similar units with similar problems reporting different levels of readiness. The Air Force claimed that a fighter pilot needed to fly 20 hours a month to stay battle fit. The Navy and Marine Corps said their pilots needed a minimum of 24 hours a month; Air National Guard units needed only 10 hours per month. No one could ever explain why readiness demanded that Army tanker trucks drive 800 miles a year, why ships needed to steam 55 days per quarter or why helicopter pilots needed only 14 hours a month flying time.

Finally, I discovered that a unit's readiness was determined by the lowest grade it received in any of the four categories (personnel, equipment and supplies on hand, equipment readiness and training). Thus, a fully manned unit with modern equipment in perfect working order would be classified as not ready if it trained for only a brief period of time.

Nonetheless, my report for the American Enterprise Institute concluded that the armed forces were indeed experiencing severe readiness problems, for three reasons. Given the threat posed by our principal adversary, the Soviet Union, military expenditures in the 1970's were too low. Moreover, the civilian and military leaders of the Department of Defense decided to spend the few extra dollars they received on stealth war planes, cruise missiles and other new technologies at the expense of flying hours and spare parts. Finally, the Carter Administration allowed military pay and benefits to fall 25 percent behind comparable rates in the private sector. Consequently, the quality of recruits fell

below acceptable standards and retention rates dropped precipitously.

My conclusions were attacked by the Secretary of Defense but embraced by the military and candidate Reagan. My reward, following the Reagan triumph, was to be appointed "readiness czar" in the Pentagon.

Once in office, I was introduced to another side of the politics of readiness. The military chiefs, having skillfully used the issue to help secure a large spending increase, were much less interested infixing readiness than in modernizing and enlarging their forces. The same Army chief who had coined the term "hollow military" told the Secretary of Defense that the best way to improve a soldier's readiness was to buy him a new rifle.

Spending for readiness did increase by about 20 percent, or nearly \$10,000 per person (in total, less than one-fifth the increase in procurement). Nonetheless, according to the Joint Chiefs, by 1984 the readiness of all major units, except Navy ships, had gone down and I was being pilloried by the Democrats.

How did this happen? Without telling their civilian "superiors," the service chiefs had raised the standards for readiness right along with the Reagan buildup. After these standards were made more realistic, readiness began to grow significantly during the last half of the 1980's, reaching all-time highs. The performance of the American forces in the gulf in 1990 and 1991 showed just how capable and ready they were.

With the ascension of Bill Clinton to the Presidency, readiness once again emerged as the hot-button issue. Senator John McCain, the Arizona Republican, issued a report called "Going Hollow," in which he drew heavily on the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Last December, a weakened President Clinton pledged an additional \$25 billion for readiness. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the current readiness gap, like others since the 1970's, was designed and manufactured by the Pentagon to serve its political agenda—to maintain the cold war status quo.

Despite several reviews of force structure in recent years, the services remain configured to contain a non-existent Soviet empire. The Navy still keeps three active carrier battle groups, with thousands of battle-ready marines, while the Army and Air Force have nearly 200,000 troops stationed in Europe and Asia. Thus, when a crisis erupts in a Haiti or a Rwanda, these forces must take on these assignments as "extra tasks," for which they often lack training and equipment. The question here is not readiness but why we continue to train and deploy forces for cold war tasks.

Additionally, the services have inflated the threat against which readiness is measured. According to President Clinton, the armed forces should be prepared to fight two major regional wars simultaneously: one against Iraq and one against North Korea. According to the Pentagon and many Republicans, the services have neither the money nor the forces to accomplish this. Since defense spending is at about 85 percent of its average cold war level, this leads to the absurd conclusion that Iraq and North Korea (which together spend less than \$20 billion a year on the military) equal 85 percent of the might of the Soviet empire.

Finally, the joint chiefs are simply manipulating the system. Two of the three Army divisions that they identified as unready were in the process of being demobilized. Other units were not able to do routine training because they were involved in a real war, that is, the October deployment to the Persian Gulf to deal with Saddam's thrust toward Kuwait. The Marines, who have finally caught on, now say that their readiness is lower than in 1980!

The U.S. has the finest and best financed military in the world. It is also the most ready, prepared to go thousands of miles on short notice. But it is inadequately controlled by its civilian superiors. Because of Bill Clinton's perceived political vulnerability on defense issues, the civilian leaders do not wish to risk a confrontation with the Republicans or the military chiefs. As a result, the "nonpolitical" admirals and generals running the military are taking all of us to the cleaners, using the readiness gap to snatch up precious dollars to defend against a threat that no longer exists.

DELAURO HONORS LOCAL HERO

HON. ROSA L. DeLAURO

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, March 23, 1995

Ms. DELAURO. Mr. Speaker, today, I would like to ask my colleagues to join me in mourning the passing of a true hero. Mr. John Willsher of Woodbridge, CT, died of a heart attack last month after helping to rescue two young boys, whom he had never met, from the freezing waters of Lily Pond in New Haven.

Having stopped to buy gas, he heard the boys screaming from across the street and ran to help. As part of a brave and selfless rescue effort, he helped remove the boys from the frigid waters of the pond. After making the rescue, John Willsher suffered a fatal heart attack.

Mr. Willsher died the same way he lived for 57 years—helping others. He was known among relatives and neighbors as helpful and generous. His countless acts of selflessness cannot be listed, but will long be remembered by those who knew him.

Mr. Willsher is remembered by his friends and family for his good sense of humor, his interest in politics, and his love of cooking. He and his wife, Elizabeth (Buddy), to whom he had been married for 30 years, and his three children, Michael, Peter, and Jennifer, were very close.

Mr. Willsher moved to the United States from Colchester, England in 1963. He worked as a plumber for 18 years at the AlliedSignal Corp. in Stratford and was 2 years away from retirement.

John Willsher reminds us of the best in people. His generosity and selflessness renew our faith in ourselves.

I am confident that my colleagues in the House join me as I send my deepest condolences to the Willsher family and my gratitude for the selflessness and bravery demonstrated by John throughout his life.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

HON. ESTEBAN EDWARD TORRES

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, March 23, 1995

Mr. TORRES. Mr. Speaker, I was unavoidably absent on official business on Wednesday, March 22, 1995, for rollcall vote No. 255. Had I been present on the House floor I would have cast my vote as follows: "nay" on agreeing to the resolution, House Resolution 119,

for further consideration of H.R. 4, the Personal Responsibility Act.

STATE ROUTE 905—NAFTA'S MISSING LINK

HON. BOB FILNER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, March 23, 1995

Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, I hope my colleagues will be interested in testimony I gave today before the Transportation Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations:

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony on a project that is critical to the economic success of the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] and the economic development of not only southern California, but the whole Nation.

When the 103d Congress approved and the President signed NAFTA, we all knew that ensuring the success of the agreement would require that all parties provide the necessary infrastructure to facilitate the flow of trade. I am asking this committee and this Congress to honor this commitment to San Diego.

State Route 905 is the critical missing link in our United States-Mexico border trade and transportation system on the West Coast. The current road serves as the only connection between the Otay Mesa point of entry [POE] in San Diego and the Nation's interstate highway system. State Route 905 is a part of that infrastructure which is needed to accommodate international trade and deserves to be funded and completed.

I am here today to urge you to consider funding this vital link during your upcoming deliberations of transportation projects to be funded during fiscal year 1996.

DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS

There is a critical need for continued Federal funding of "special highway demonstration projects." States undergo a constant struggle to build and maintain their own intrastate roads and bridges. They do not have sufficient funds to single-handedly complete highway projects which supplement the national highway system and which support Federal trade policy—as in our case.

This project will produce benefits far beyond the local region as only 16 percent of trade using this border crossing has a San Diego origin or destination. Every State in the continental United States, Hawaii, Canada, Asia, and the Canal Zone all profit from trade through this point of entry.

The Federal Highway Administration has proposed that this road be a part of the National Highway System—and I am confident that the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure will include this in its list of authorized projects.

LOCAL COMMITMENT

The city of San Diego and the State of California already have demonstrated their good faith commitment to their share of this project. They have invested \$14 million and have begun work to widen the existing road from four to six lanes of traffic. However, due to the increasingly heavy flow of trans-border commercial traffic, this road will be at—or above—capacity when completed. This is only a short-term solution, however, and a permanent answer to America's growing trade with Mexico is needed.

We have worked closely with the city and county of San Diego, the State Department of Transportation [CALTRANS], and the

local regional council of governments in identifying this as our county's top transportation need.

In addition, CALTRANS, the General Services Administration and the California Highway Patrol Department all concur on the vital need for completion of this highway to meet the pressing needs created by the substantial increase in trade transportation.

TRADE FACILITATION

This is a necessary and vital road because the Otay Mesa crossing is the only commercial vehicle border crossing facility between the two largest cities on the United States-Mexico border. With the recent opening of a new border crossing facility at Otay Mesa, this point of entry handles the third highest value of commerce along the entire United States-Mexico border.

The recent Federal Highway Administration report to Congress estimated that, because of the adoption of NAFTA, the value of commercial goods crossing the border would increase by 208 percent by the year 2000—but only if additional infrastructure improvements are made. If we achieve this 208 percent growth—the estimated value of goods crossing this border would be \$18.8 billion annually.

The Otay Mesa border crossing facility can handle this increase in business. We simply need an additional incremental investment on the part of the Federal Government to put us in a position to take full advantage of future increases in trade.

The one road that leads from the interstate highway, to this border crossing cannot accommodate the increase in traffic. This link is a four-lane city street—Otay Mesa Road—which is already over capacity and which has been the location of a number of fatal vehicular accidents due to its congestion. This road was never intended to handle heavily loaded cargo trucks traveling at high speeds to and from the international border. We need a highway to take this commercial traffic inland.

Mr. Chairman, the Federal Government made the decision to process all international commercial traffic at the Otay Mesa border crossing. The Federal Government also made the decision to approve NAFTA—which will soon double the volume of our cross-border traffic. These two new federal trade policies have created the urgent need for this highway. Not funding this project would be the worst kind of unfunded mandate. The Federal Government must meet this responsibility—our local communities simply cannot.

TRAFFIC AND SAFETY

As I have mentioned, an overcrowded four lane city street—Otay Mesa Road—provides the only connection between the Otay Mesa point of entry and the interstate highway system. This road, which has the appearance of a country road, was not intended to carry a high volume of automobile traffic and certainly never a high volume of heavy commercial vehicles.

With the closing of the nearby San Ysidro border crossing to commercial traffic, an additional 1,200 trucks per day carrying commercial goods to and from Mexico now travel on this city street. While the average mix of commercial trucks on any city street is 5 percent, this road experiences a 20 to 25 percent truck mix during regular business hours. Wear and tear on this road is occurring at an alarming rate due to these heavy loads.

When major traffic accidents occur on this road—as they do with increasing frequency now—all border traffic slows to a stop. It is typically 4 hours and occasionally more before accidents are cleared away and traffic returns to normal. This constitutes a major

impediment to the implementation of NAFTA.

This road also does not meet requirements for the transportation of hazardous materials through communities. With the closing of the San Ysidro crossing to commercial traffic, trucks carrying hazardous materials must travel to the Calexico-Mexicali point of entry to cross the border—a 90-mile detour!

COST

We are asking that the Federal Government help San Diego accommodate this increasing international trade by approving a three-year project to build State Route 905, which would link the Otay Mesa border crossing with the interstate highway system, and to make the necessary street improvements to manage this commercial traffic that is so vital to our economic growth.

While the total cost for the 3-year project is \$96.7 million, our request for fiscal year 1996 is \$500,000. These funds would allow for the completion of necessary environmental and cultural reports on the proposed route of the new highway. These studies are important and invaluable as they will influence the highway's alignment and potentially reduce expensive mitigation costs in the future. Funding for these studies is critical for this project to move forward.

CONCLUSION

It is a Federal responsibility to connect ports of entry with the interstate highway system. The Federal Government has not met its obligations. The State of California and the city of San Diego have invested more than \$14 million in interim remedies. The private sector has invested far more than that to finance the necessary local street network. Existing State and Federal funds are being used to improve two existing highways, Interstates 5 and 15. These two highways would carry NAFTA-related traffic from the new highway to destinations throughout the county and beyond.

San Diego County's transportation and infrastructure needs are many. I hope that this committee will agree that the relatively small Federal investment required for this critical portion of border infrastructure, State Route 905, is in the national interest and that you will include funding for this road in our fiscal year 96 budget.

AMERICAN HOLOCAUST SURVIVOR HUGO PRINCZ

HON. CHARLES E. SCHUMER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, March 23, 1995

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to bring your attention and that of my colleagues to the case of Hugo Princz. Mr. Princz is the only known America survivor of the Nazi death camps. He has been denied Holocaust reparations by Germany for 40 years because of his U.S. citizenship while in the camps, despite numerous diplomatic entreaties on his behalf by successive administrations and Congress.

During the 103d Congress, the House and Senate unanimous resolutions supporting Mr. Princz and took numerous other steps on his behalf, including unanimous passage last October in the House, and near passage in the Senate, of legislation I authored which would have permitted the lawsuit he filed against Germany in 1992 to proceed; the courts had found Germany immune from the suit. My colleagues and I are prepared to reintroduce that