

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

TRIBUTE TO THE MURRAY HOUSE

HON. WILLIAM J. MARTINI

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, March 23, 1995

Mr. MARTINI. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take a moment to recognize a truly outstanding organization in the Eighth Congressional District of New Jersey, and the very special family who have done so much to support it over the years.

On February 19, 1995, I was honored to attend the annual dinner-dance on behalf of the Murray House, a facility in Passaic County, NJ, which provides for the needs of the developmentally disabled.

Murray House was the first group home in the State of New Jersey. It was created through the love and dedication of the family of Jimmy Murray of Passaic County. Jimmy, the first of five children of Kit and Jim Murray, was born a healthy baby. But during his first year, he suffered a fever that left him with brain damage.

As is so often the case, it was an unfortunate circumstance that has resulted in so much good for the people of northern New Jersey. Through Jimmy's situation, the Murray family came to know Monsignor John B. Wehren, who to this day is still fondly called Father Jack. Inspired by the need to create a new ministry to address the needs of families with disabled children, Father Jack founded the Department of Persons with Disabilities within the Diocese of Paterson.

It was through this relationship that Murray House came to be. Father Jack wanted to find a home, instead of an institution, for disabled adults whose parents had passed away or had no family to care for them. In 1970, he found his home—a 150-year-old diocese building on Main Street in Paterson.

It was with the help and efforts of special people like the Murray family that Father Jack was able to transform a once-vacant building into a home that could nurture and serve the needs of those with disabilities. With the help of others in the community, including churches, civic organizations and students, New Jersey's first group home was opened. It was named "Murray House," after Jimmy Murray.

Since then, Jimmy's brother, Dennis M. Murray, and other members of the Murray family, have dedicated their lives to helping others by raising much-needed funds for the Department for Persons with Disabilities, which operates Murray House and more than a half-dozen other group homes, supervised apartments, and vocational programs for the disabled of north Jersey.

I recently had the pleasure of meeting the Murray family and several hundred of their supporters. This family is a shining example of how a few committed and caring people can change the lives of hundreds or thousands. Their selfless dedication and concern for persons with disabilities is remarkable, and reminds us all that there are lessons about love

and compassion we can each learn from the tireless efforts of our friends and neighbors.

ZINGERMAN'S DELI'S PAUL AND ARI

HON. LYNN N. RIVERS

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, March 23, 1995

Ms. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, today, I am pleased to recognize Paul Saginaw and Ari Weinzwieg, owners of Zingerman's Delicatessen in Ann Arbor, MI. Since opening Zingerman's in 1982, Paul and Ari have worked tirelessly to enrich the lives of the less fortunate people in their community.

To help alleviate the problem of hunger in the Ann Arbor area, Paul and Ari established Food Gatherers, which collects surplus food from restaurants, dorms, and stores and distributes the food to homeless shelters and halfway houses. Since the program was established almost 6 years ago, more than a half million pounds of food has been delivered.

Paul and Ari's generosity extends to their own delicatessen business as well. They hire, train, and promote recently arrived immigrants as well as employees with special needs and they offer job training for members of Trailblazers, an organization that helps those recovering from mental illness. Furthermore, Paul and Ari give financial backing to these employees who wish to become partners in new business ventures.

As a result of their kind endeavors, Paul and Ari are the recipients of the Jewish Federation of Washtenaw County's first annual Humanitarian Award. I can think of none more deserving of this honor than Paul and Ari. I would like to congratulate both of them as well as express my deep pride and admiration in having such fine citizens in my community.

LAWRENCE KORB: THERE IS NO READINESS GAP

HON. BARNEY FRANK

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, March 23, 1995

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, it has occurred to me that people who are thinking of launching military action against the United States are probably likeliest to do it in November of every year, because it is in November, just before the budget is prepared and sent to us, that our friends in the Pentagon and their supporters often argue that America is militarily vulnerable and must spend billions of dollars more than we were planning to spend to defend ourselves.

Most recently, this came in the form of an argument that our readiness was below where it should have been. Lawrence Korb, who was in part responsible for maintaining readiness during the Reagan administration as an assist-

ant secretary of defense, very effectively refutes this argument in the article he published in the Sunday New York Times of February 26. Lawrence Korb has done his country enormous service, both when he was in government, and even more so afterward by his willingness to speak out forcefully and honestly, even when this has unfortunately been at some cost to his own professional career. His refutation of the most recent arguments that have been advanced to send an already excessively high Pentagon budget even higher make an extremely contribution to our national debate and I ask that they be printed here.

[From the New York Times, Feb. 26, 1995]

THE READINESS GAP

(By Lawrence J. Korb)

To listen to Republicans and the military brass, you would think America's armed forces have fallen into the same 1970's morass that spawned the term "hollow military" and gave Ronald Reagan a potent issue for the 1980 campaign. Is it possible that just four years after one of the most stunning military triumphs in modern times the services could be suffering from inadequate training, shortages of spare parts and poisonous morale? Just to pose the question in those terms points strongly to the common-sense answer—of course not. This is not the 1970's and the Clinton Administration is not repeating the mistakes of the Carter Administration.

Today, the United States spends more than six times as much on defense as its closest rival, and almost as much on national security as the rest of the world combined. In 1995, Bill Clinton will actually spend \$30 billion more on defense, in constant dollars, than Richard Nixon did 20 years ago and substantially more than his own Secretary of Defense argued was necessary in 1992.

Since the collapse of the Berlin wall, the Pentagon's forces have declined by 25 percent and financing for new weapons has fallen by 50 percent while readiness spending has dropped by only 10 percent. In the last year, readiness accounts increased by \$5 billion while the overall military budget dropped by 3 percent. The Pentagon now spends more on readiness (about \$60,000 per person) than it did in the Reagan and Bush Administrations (when readiness hit all-time highs) and 50 percent more than during the Carter years.

And the quality of entering recruits is still very high (96 percent) and retention rates are so good that the Pentagon is still dismissing people.

If readiness spending is higher than in the Reagan and Bush years, and if the manpower situation is still so solid, why do so many politicians and generals warn darkly about a readiness gap? That—not the theological question of whether our forces are combat ready—is the crucial question. The answer is more nuanced than most people would imagine, and sheds a great deal of light on Pentagon politicking in the post-cold-war era.

I first encountered the politics of military readiness 30 years ago when I was a Naval flight officer in the Far East. One Sunday afternoon, in response to a call from the Seventh Fleet, I reported that only 3 of our 12 planes were ready for combat. For my honesty, I received a severe tongue-lashing from

• This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor.

Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor.

my commanding officer, who informed me that whenever headquarters called we were always ready. The military, he explained correctly, prized a "can do outfit," and the services promoted those who performed regardless of circumstances.

My next encounter was in 1980, when I was preparing a monograph on the subject for the American Enterprise Institute. When word of my project reached the Pentagon I was drowned in data (some of which was highly classified) and anecdotes from normally tight-lipped bureaucrats. When I went to the Pentagon to conduct some interviews, I was treated like a foreign dignitary.

One of my conclusions was that readiness is a slippery and poorly understood concept. To most people it is a synonym for military capability or preparedness. To the military, however, readiness is only one of four components of preparedness, and not necessarily the most important one. To obtain a true picture, one had to look at the other three pillars—force structure (the number of ships, planes, tanks), modernization (the age of the forces) and sustainability (staying power). Thus, a very ready force could be considered militarily impotent if it was too small, too old and lacked staying power. By the same token, a force that was bigger, more sophisticated and better armed than its adversaries could be deemed unready if it was considered improperly trained and outfitted.

I also concluded that readiness is a hot-button political issue, subject to unlimited manipulation. Even the informed public can't judge such matters as the appropriate force structure, the proper time to replace a plane or tank and the level of effort necessary to win a war. But everybody wants and expects a ready force.

Military leaders were quick to grasp the political potential of readiness scares. In the late 70's, word went out that reports of readiness problems would be welcomed by headquarters. The only exception was the Marine Corps. I was told by a general that the Marines had been C-2 (ready) for 200 years!

I also came to understand that measuring readiness is hardly an exact science. Each service defined readiness differently, and I found similar units with similar problems reporting different levels of readiness. The Air Force claimed that a fighter pilot needed to fly 20 hours a month to stay battle fit. The Navy and Marine Corps said their pilots needed a minimum of 24 hours a month; Air National Guard units needed only 10 hours per month. No one could ever explain why readiness demanded that Army tanker trucks drive 800 miles a year, why ships needed to steam 55 days per quarter or why helicopter pilots needed only 14 hours a month flying time.

Finally, I discovered that a unit's readiness was determined by the lowest grade it received in any of the four categories (personnel, equipment and supplies on hand, equipment readiness and training). Thus, a fully manned unit with modern equipment in perfect working order would be classified as not ready if it trained for only a brief period of time.

Nonetheless, my report for the American Enterprise Institute concluded that the armed forces were indeed experiencing severe readiness problems, for three reasons. Given the threat posed by our principal adversary, the Soviet Union, military expenditures in the 1970's were too low. Moreover, the civilian and military leaders of the Department of Defense decided to spend the few extra dollars they received on stealth war planes, cruise missiles and other new technologies at the expense of flying hours and spare parts. Finally, the Carter Administration allowed military pay and benefits to fall 25 percent behind comparable rates in the private sector. Consequently, the quality of recruits fell

below acceptable standards and retention rates dropped precipitously.

My conclusions were attacked by the Secretary of Defense but embraced by the military and candidate Reagan. My reward, following the Reagan triumph, was to be appointed "readiness czar" in the Pentagon.

Once in office, I was introduced to another side of the politics of readiness. The military chiefs, having skillfully used the issue to help secure a large spending increase, were much less interested infixing readiness than in modernizing and enlarging their forces. The same Army chief who had coined the term "hollow military" told the Secretary of Defense that the best way to improve a soldier's readiness was to buy him a new rifle.

Spending for readiness did increase by about 20 percent, or nearly \$10,000 per person (in total, less than one-fifth the increase in procurement). Nonetheless, according to the Joint Chiefs, by 1984 the readiness of all major units, except Navy ships, had gone down and I was being pilloried by the Democrats.

How did this happen? Without telling their civilian "superiors," the service chiefs had raised the standards for readiness right along with the Reagan buildup. After these standards were made more realistic, readiness began to grow significantly during the last half of the 1980's, reaching all-time highs. The performance of the American forces in the gulf in 1990 and 1991 showed just how capable and ready they were.

With the ascension of Bill Clinton to the Presidency, readiness once again emerged as the hot-button issue. Senator John McCain, the Arizona Republican, issued a report called "Going Hollow," in which he drew heavily on the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Last December, a weakened President Clinton pledged an additional \$25 billion for readiness. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the current readiness gap, like others since the 1970's, was designed and manufactured by the Pentagon to serve its political agenda—to maintain the cold war status quo.

Despite several reviews of force structure in recent years, the services remain configured to contain a non-existent Soviet empire. The Navy still keeps three active carrier battle groups, with thousands of battle-ready marines, while the Army and Air Force have nearly 200,000 troops stationed in Europe and Asia. Thus, when a crisis erupts in a Haiti or a Rwanda, these forces must take on these assignments as "extra tasks," for which they often lack training and equipment. The question here is not readiness but why we continue to train and deploy forces for cold war tasks.

Additionally, the services have inflated the threat against which readiness is measured. According to President Clinton, the armed forces should be prepared to fight two major regional wars simultaneously: one against Iraq and one against North Korea. According to the Pentagon and many Republicans, the services have neither the money nor the forces to accomplish this. Since defense spending is at about 85 percent of its average cold war level, this leads to the absurd conclusion that Iraq and North Korea (which together spend less than \$20 billion a year on the military) equal 85 percent of the might of the Soviet empire.

Finally, the joint chiefs are simply manipulating the system. Two of the three Army divisions that they identified as unready were in the process of being demobilized. Other units were not able to do routine training because they were involved in a real war, that is, the October deployment to the Persian Gulf to deal with Saddam's thrust toward Kuwait. The Marines, who have finally caught on, now say that their readiness is lower than in 1980!

The U.S. has the finest and best financed military in the world. It is also the most ready, prepared to go thousands of miles on short notice. But it is inadequately controlled by its civilian superiors. Because of Bill Clinton's perceived political vulnerability on defense issues, the civilian leaders do not wish to risk a confrontation with the Republicans or the military chiefs. As a result, the "nonpolitical" admirals and generals running the military are taking all of us to the cleaners, using the readiness gap to snatch up precious dollars to defend against a threat that no longer exists.

DELAURO HONORS LOCAL HERO

HON. ROSA L. DeLAURO

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, March 23, 1995

Ms. DELAURO. Mr. Speaker, today, I would like to ask my colleagues to join me in mourning the passing of a true hero. Mr. John Willsher of Woodbridge, CT, died of a heart attack last month after helping to rescue two young boys, whom he had never met, from the freezing waters of Lily Pond in New Haven.

Having stopped to buy gas, he heard the boys screaming from across the street and ran to help. As part of a brave and selfless rescue effort, he helped remove the boys from the frigid waters of the pond. After making the rescue, John Willsher suffered a fatal heart attack.

Mr. Willsher died the same way he lived for 57 years—helping others. He was known among relatives and neighbors as helpful and generous. His countless acts of selflessness cannot be listed, but will long be remembered by those who knew him.

Mr. Willsher is remembered by his friends and family for his good sense of humor, his interest in politics, and his love of cooking. He and his wife, Elizabeth (Buddy), to whom he had been married for 30 years, and his three children, Michael, Peter, and Jennifer, were very close.

Mr. Willsher moved to the United States from Colchester, England in 1963. He worked as a plumber for 18 years at the AlliedSignal Corp. in Stratford and was 2 years away from retirement.

John Willsher reminds us of the best in people. His generosity and selflessness renew our faith in ourselves.

I am confident that my colleagues in the House join me as I send my deepest condolences to the Willsher family and my gratitude for the selflessness and bravery demonstrated by John throughout his life.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

HON. ESTEBAN EDWARD TORRES

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, March 23, 1995

Mr. TORRES. Mr. Speaker, I was unavoidably absent on official business on Wednesday, March 22, 1995, for rollcall vote No. 255. Had I been present on the House floor I would have cast my vote as follows: "nay" on agreeing to the resolution, House Resolution 119,