

This was a watershed event in international relations—the first time that the U.N. Security Council had authorized the use of force for the purpose of restoring democracy to a member state. The following August, President Clinton decided that the U.S. would take the lead in an invasion.

The next month, on Sept. 15, President Clinton publicly warned the Haitian military leaders to leave power immediately. He said all diplomatic options were exhausted, but in fact, the U.S. government had stopped talking to the Haitian military six months before. Nonetheless, Gen. Raoul Cedras, the commander of the Haitian military, had opened a dialogue during the previous week with former president Jimmy Carter, whom he had met during the 1990 elections. The president, who had been told by Carter of the talks, decided on Friday, Sept. 16, to send Carter, Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and General Colin Powell to try one last time to negotiate the departure of Haiti's military leaders.

The Carter team had a deadline of less than 24 hours. They arrived Saturday afternoon and began their meeting with the Haitian military high command about 2:50 p.m. After one hour, the three statesmen had convinced the generals, for the first time, that force would be used against them if the talks failed. But the Carter team understood what some in the Clinton administration did not—that the Haitian military leaders were not interested in negotiating their exit, wealth or safety. Representing the traditional elites, the military were desperately fearful that Aristide would unleash the masses against them. Moreover, like President Aristide, the generals were proud Haitians, who did not want to surrender or be lectured.

By about 1 p.m. on Sunday, Sept. 18, the Carter team had succeeded in gaining agreement to allow the peaceful entry of U.S. forces into Haiti and the restoration of President Aristide. But there were some details that needed to be negotiated, and time was running out. Suddenly, Gen. Philippe Biamby burst into the room with the news that the men of the 82nd Airborne were being readied for attack, a fact not known to the Carter team, and he accused the three Americans of deception. He informed the three he was taking Cedras to a secure area. The negotiations were over.

It is hard to find a better example of the difference between a credible threat, which was essential to reach an agreement, and the actual use of force, which in this case, was counterproductive. Although ready to sign the agreement, Cedras would not do so after learning the attack had begun. Carter reached deep into his soul to try to persuade the generals to complete the agreement, but he could not overcome their anger and fear. He then tried a different tactic—to change the venue of negotiations, and he asked Cedras to accompany him. At the new site, the presidential palace, de facto President Jonnaissant announced that he would sign the agreement. This created problems for President Clinton and for President Aristide, who was in Washington, and was reluctant to accept any agreement with the military or the de facto government. With the U.S. Air Force halfway to Haiti, President Clinton finally turned the planes around and authorized Carter to sign the agreement on his behalf.

The president asked Carter, Nunn and Powell to return to the White House immediately, and they asked me to remain to brief the U.S. Ambassador and Pentagon officials, who had not participated in the negotiations, and to arrange meetings between Haitian and U.S. military officers. This proved to be extremely difficult because the Haitian general went into hiding, and U.S.

government officials in Port-au-Prince did not trust the Haitian generals to implement the agreement; they feared a double-cross like Harlan County. With less than two hours before touch-down by the U.S. military, I was able to arrange the crucial meetings by sending a mixed harsh-and-intimate message to Cedras through his wife.

U.S. forces arrived without having to fire one shot and 20,000 U.S. troops disembarked without a single casualty or injured civilian.

There was no question that U.S. forces would prevail, but because of the Harlan County, the Somalia experience, and the need to minimize U.S. casualties, the U.S. military plan called for a ferocious assault that would have involved hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Haitian casualties, and inevitably, some Americans. Moreover, as Gen. Hugh Shelton, the commanding officer, told me, such an invasion would have engendered long-term bitterness in some of the Haitian population, making it more difficult for the United Nations to secure order and for the country to build democracy.

Gen. Cedras stepped down from power on Oct. 12 and only then, at the moment that he had the fewest bargaining chips, sought to rent his houses and find a place for asylum.

On Oct. 15, Aristide returned to the presidency and Haiti. He had a second chance, and he showed that he had learned some lessons. He called for national reconciliation and assembled a multi-party government. He proposed an economic program that elicited both praise from the international community and pledges of \$1.2 billion. He establishes a Truth Commission to investigate human rights violations during the military regime but not in a vindictive way. A Police Academy was established to train a new, professional police force. A project on the administrative of justice aimed to train justices of the peace and dispatch them throughout the country. The armed forces had been so thoroughly discredited that Aristide moved quickly to reduce their size and influence and, by spring of this year, to virtually dismantle the institution. In the year since Aristide's return, there have been some political assassinations, but to most Haitians, it has been a period of less fear than ever before.

In December 1994, Aristide created a CEP to prepare for municipal and parliamentary elections. Virtually all of the political parties, including KON-AKOM, PANPRA and FNCD, which had been partners of Aristide in the 1990 election, criticized the CEP for being partial to one faction of the president's supporters, Lavalas, and for being completely unresponsive to their complaints. Unfortunately, there was no mediation between the parties and the CEP and no quick count. Three political parties boycotted the June 25 election, and many of the 27 parties that participated were skeptical that the CEP would conduct a fair election.

An estimated 50 percent cast their ballots, according to OAS estimates. But the most serious problem occurred after the voting stopped, and the counting began. Officials were poorly trained, and I witnessed the most insecure and tainted vote count that I have seen in the course of monitoring 13 "transitional" elections during the last decade. Even before the results were announced, almost all of the political parties, except Lavalas, called for an annulment and the recall of the CEP members. On July 12, the CEP finally released some of the results that showed Lavalas doing the best, with the FNCD and KONAKOM trailing far behind. Perhaps as many as one-fifth of the elections needed to be held again, and the majority of the Senate and Deputy seats required a runoff. Of the 84 main mayoral elections, Lavalas won 64, including Port-au-Prince, by

a margin of 45-18 percent over incumbent Mayor Evans Paul.

The CEP went ahead with the rerun of some elections on Aug. 13 and the runoff of other elections on Sept. 17 despite the boycott of virtually all the political parties. Again, there was practically no campaign, and despite great efforts by President Aristide to get people to vote, the turnout was very low.

Therefore, the parliamentary and municipal elections cannot be viewed as a step forward. Moreover, the government hurt the fragile party system by seducing opposition candidates to participate in the runoff contrary to their parties' decision. Partly because of the opposition boycott, and partly because of Aristide's continued popularity, Lavalas swept the runoff elections, giving it 80 percent of the Deputy and two-thirds of the Senate seats.

The opposition parties condemned the Parliament as illegitimate, and many feared that Haiti was moving to a one-party state. Lavalas could prove as fractious as the original Aristide coalition, but regardless, an opportunity for a more inclusive democracy and an impartial electoral process was lost.

If an effective mediation does not enlist the participation of the opposition parties in time for the presidential elections next month, the new president's authority will be impugned, especially if the Constitution were changed illegally to permit Aristide to run again. If the U.N. forces depart on the inauguration of the new president, the old elite of the country will no doubt try to use the questionable authority of the new president to weaken him even as they try to seduce the new police force. The only way that democracy can be preserved in Haiti is if the new police force remains professional and accountable to the rule of law. If the force is co-opted by the rich, as has occurred in the past, then a popular democracy cannot survive.

The international community and Haiti formed a remarkable partnership in the summer of 1990 to reinforce the democratic process and to respond positively to Haiti's double challenge—to respect Haitians and to make the country a part of a democratic hemisphere.

Returning to Haiti with Carter and Powell last February, Sen. Nunn said, "We have a one-year plan for a 10-year challenge." Haiti's democratic experiment will be endangered if it does not ask the United States and the United Nations to remain after February 1996, and if those two entities do not agree to stay. To keep the process on track, the Haitian government needs to respond fully to the legitimate concerns with the electoral process raised by the opposition parties. Only then can meaningful presidential elections occur. The second step is for the international community to ensure that a multi-party democracy takes root in Haiti.

HISPANIC BUSINESS WEEK

HON. WILLIAM J. MARTINI

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, November 30, 1995

Mr. MARTINI. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in honor and recognition of Hispanic Business Week, acknowledging the contributions of the Hispanic community. This week was recognized the week of October 30—November 4, 1995.

The Hispanic community exemplifies daily the strong work and business ethic so very important in every career and in our lives. Our

proud Hispanic-American community in New Jersey is indeed one of the reasons the Garden State is a national leader in job creation and economic growth. Through the work of the statewide Hispanic Chamber of Commerce of New Jersey, Hispanic business leaders expand their enterprises and develop a strong work ethic. I thank them for their special and invaluable contributions to my home State.

On behalf of my colleagues, I would like to acknowledge our appreciation of, and pride in, the Hispanic community and congratulate them for a successful celebration this year of Hispanic Business Week.

TRIBUTE TO DEV ANAND

HON. HOWARD L. BERMAN

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, November 30, 1995

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am honored to pay tribute to Dev Anand, one of the giants of Indian cinema, who will be honored this fall by the National Federation of Indo-American Associations. Mr. Anand made his first film in 1945. Since then he has not only starred in countless films, but has produced, written, and directed numerous projects under the banner of Navketan Films. He is both a prolific and talented performer.

The key to Mr. Anand's continued success lies in his willingness to change and mold himself according to the times, as well as in his never-say-die spirit. He is always involved in new projects which sustain his bubbling enthusiasm and dynamism. These range from being the first to use Himalayan backgrounds for love stories, to producing a smash hit based on the hippie phenomenon as seen from the point of view of the Indian popular establishment, to singing rap songs. The word "impossible" simply does not exist in Mr. Anand's dictionary. His impact on the Indian film industry is such that many producers ask their heroes to imitate Dev Anand.

In 1963, Mr. Anand collaborated with Pearl S. Buck on an award-winning film entitled "Guide," which was recorded in Hindi and English. In the film, he stars as the scurrilous guide who redeems himself by fasting to death for rain to save the lives of millions of drought-stricken villagers.

Mr. Anand is celebrating his 50 years of work in the Indian film industry with the release of "Gangster," which will premiere in eight U.S. cities. This will give American audiences the rare treat of being able to see Mr. Anand's skills for themselves. Prior to his U.S. appearances, he will be exhibiting his film at the Shanghai Film Festival, and is invited to address the union at Oxford University.

I ask my colleagues to join me today in saluting Dev Anand, a legend in Indian cinema, and a true artist. All Americans who care about film and culture are honored by his presence on our shores.

CONGRATULATIONS TO ST. JOSEPH'S HIGH SCHOOL

HON. TIM ROEMER

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, November 30, 1995

Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to honor and pay tribute to one of the most domi-

nant teams in the history of Indiana high school football: the South Bend St. Joseph's Indians. On Saturday, November 25, the Indians and Head Coach Frank Amato defeated favored Jasper High School 28-0 to claim the 1995 Class 3-A State Championship, the first football title for the city of South Bend since the Washington Panthers won the 3-A crown in 1973.

This victory was an appropriate climax to an unforgettable season. In finishing the year with a perfect 14-0 record, St. Joe's outscored its opponents by a combined 588-72. The offense, which averaged 42 a game, compiled close to 300 yards on the ground in the championship. Thanks to a powerful offensive line, St. Joe's quarterback Blair Kyle, tailback Sean Waite, and fullback Christian Hurley each rushed for close to or over 100 yards.

The defensive unit of Marques Clayton, Ben Downey, Trevor Dokes, Jeff Harris, Dan Luther, Pace McCormick, Jason Pikusa, Jeremy Remble, Pete Riordan, Rashwan Seward and Sean Waite, was just as spectacular. The Championship victory was their seventh shut-out in a season in which they allowed an average of just 5.1 points a game. In the second half of the victory over Jasper, the defense gave up just 1 yard of offense until the final 2 minutes.

It is often commented that no team in the National Football League will ever be able to duplicate the undefeated season of the 1972 Miami Dolphins. Mr. Speaker, I believe the same can be said of the 1995 South Bend St. Joseph's Indians. They have set a standard of excellence which champions of the future will have a difficult time equalling or even approaching.

LOBBYING REFORM: FINALLY

HON. THOMAS M. BARRETT

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, November 30, 1995

Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, in the last 2 weeks, we have witnessed an incredible change in the balance of power here in Washington. The influence of lobbyists is declining, and the layer of wealthy special interests that shields the American people from their elected officials has begun to disappear.

On November 16, the House adopted a rule prohibiting Members and staff from accepting almost all gifts. And yesterday, we unanimously passed a Senate bill requiring increased disclosure by those who are paid to lobby Congress and the executive branch. This bill, the first substantial change in lobbying disclosure requirements in 50 years, now goes to the President for his signature.

Up until the final vote, however, the lobbying bill was in grave danger of death by amendment. Senate passage of the tough new requirements in July represented a hard-fought compromise painstakingly crafted by Members of both parties. In the House, some Members were not satisfied and proposed to amend the bill, knowing that the adoption of any amendments would send the measure back to the Senate and would threaten that body's fragile compromise. In other words, amending the bill would mean the end of lobbying reform.

During consideration of the bill in the House, I voted against each of the four amendments

that was offered. Most of them have merit, and under different circumstances would win my support. But on this occasion, I joined a majority of my colleagues in demanding that a clean bill be passed and sent on to the President.

Last year, both the House and Senate passed similar lobbying reform bills, but the effort was derailed in conference by those who opposed the cause of reform. For that reason, it was imperative to avoid a conference this time around. The Senate sent us a good bill, and I am delighted that we passed it unanimously without change. Once the President signs it, this chapter in the history of reform will be complete.

MEDICARE

HON. RON PACKARD

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, November 30, 1995

Mr. PACKARD. Mr. Speaker, I was proud to cast a historic vote to save Medicare for current and future beneficiaries. This is a serious effort to deal with a tough problem. We simply cannot sustain Medicare's current astronomical growth.

Our plan gives seniors new choices. Now, they will have the same access to health care their children and grandchildren have—whether it is managed care, preferred provider networks, medical savings accounts, provider services, or traditional fee for service.

Each and every senior will have all of these health care providers competing for their business. Once market forces do their magic, seniors will find they have better health care at less cost. For the first time, beneficiaries will be able to take advantage of new, advanced technologies that previously were unavailable under the old Medicare. Medicare-plus will provide seniors with new choices. Each year, beneficiaries will receive information outlining all of their choices. Every plan offered must be at least as good as the current Medicare.

Mr. Speaker, there is only one plan to save Medicare. The Republican plan. The plan offered by my colleagues on the other side of the aisle is simply a Band-Aid. The substitute they have proposed reveals, yet again, that Democrats are willing to let Medicare go bankrupt. It is not an alternative for seniors who rely on Medicare now or in the future.

Medicare needs a big fix, not a Band-Aid.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SUSTAINABLE CONTRIBUTION OF FISHERIES TO FOOD SECURITY

HON. DON YOUNG

OF ALASKA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, November 30, 1995

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, December 4 through December 9, 1995, the