

# EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

## THE UNITED STATES MISSION IN BOSNIA

HON. TOM LANTOS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, October 25, 1995

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I commend my colleagues' attention to an excellent analysis of the difficult issues surrounding a possible United States troop deployment in Bosnia by our former Secretary of State and my good friend, Dr. Henry Kissinger. The article, which appeared in last Sunday's Washington Post, rightfully calls for Presidential leadership and congressional approval for a well-defined and realistic mission in Bosnia—including American military forces.

Dr. Kissinger offers a persuasive argument for why a U.S. participation in such a NATO mission is necessary, and he identifies the dire consequences for inaction. The President has extended a "commitment of U.S. troops for every foreseeable contingency," according to Dr. Kissinger, and therefore must lead Congress and the American public in a discussion of American objectives in the Balkans.

I enthusiastically agree with Dr. Kissinger's call for an open and frank discussion of these extremely important matters, and I hope that a debate of this magnitude, on an issue where American lives will be at stake, will not be tainted by partisan politics. I made that point during the recent International Relations Committee hearing on this issue with Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher, Secretary of the Treasury William J. Perry, and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John Shalikashvili. In the past partisanship stopped at the water's edge, but lately, unfortunately, our Nation's foreign policy has become a domestic political issue, and this has made it increasingly difficult to conduct a rational and effective international policy.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to read and carefully consider the issues raised by Dr. Kissinger and to fully participate in the upcoming debate.

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 22, 1995]

WHAT IS THE MISSION?

(By Henry Kissinger)

President Clinton's pledge to contribute 25,000 American troops to a peacekeeping force for Bosnia has been greeted with a mixture of resignation and uneasiness. Resignation because, despite deep misgivings, it would be a grievous blow to NATO if America failed to back an agreement it had negotiated on behalf of NATO—an agreement that U.S. air power, buttressed by British and French ground forces, played a major role in bringing about. And uneasiness because failure to fulfill the president's promise would almost certainly lead to the withdrawal of British and French forces, testing yet another presidential promise: that U.S. troops will protect any allied withdrawal.

To send troops when there is ambiguity regarding the objectives, rules of engagement or relationship of NATO to non-NATO forces such as Russia's would be to stockpile dilem-

mas that the passage of time would be sure to magnify. Therefore, the administration, Congress and NATO must clarify goals and strategies in Bosnia. The agreements they reach must be incorporated into the peace negotiations slated to begin Oct. 31. Far better to pay the price to delay than to have a NATO peacekeeping effort break down under the weight of its internal contradictions or of American domestic pressures. Repeating the experience of Somalia, where an ill-defined commitment concluded in ignominious withdrawal, would gravely damage America's leadership position in the world as well as in the Atlantic Alliance.

Recent American efforts to bring peace to Bosnia have been constructive. American power was used skillfully, and our negotiator Richard Holbrooke has displayed persistence and ingenuity.

Nevertheless, before we go any further we must examine the two "commitments" made by President Clinton that created the dilemma on the horns of which we are in danger of being impaled. The first was to promise some 10,000 troops to assist in the withdrawal of British and French forces should our NATO allies abandon their effort. The second was to pledge an American contingent of 25,000 toward a NATO force of 50,000 if a Bosnian peace agreement is concluded. Both undertakings, amounting to a commitment of U.S. troops for every foreseeable contingency, represented attempts to ease immediate pressures without examining the full implications.

The commitment to facilitate British and French withdrawal was designed to provide a safety net to encourage our allies to continue NATO's role in Bosnia. If a peace agreement fails, the nearly inevitable British and French withdrawal is expected to last 24 weeks, assuming such a redeployment is possible at all.

Whatever the schedule, a situation in which American forces were being committed while allied forces were progressively being reduced could tempt the three Bosnian ethnic rivals to involve us in their brutal struggle, whether by inflicting casualties to speed up withdrawals or by trying to incite us against ethnic enemies by committing atrocities that would be blamed on the other side, as has already happened. And at a moment when our allies had washed their hands of the whole affair, our military commitment would become increasingly lonely. Thus the deployment of American forces to cover a British and French retreat is the most precarious option. But an American refusal to police a settlement would be likely to make such a deployment unfavorable.

I opposed the War Powers Act when it was legislated; current domestic realities, however, permit no other choice than to obtain clear and unambiguous congressional backing. As a first step, the administration must answer these threshold questions: What exactly is the peacekeeping force supposed to protect? And how do we measure success?

Until now, the administration has been extremely vague (or perhaps merely confused) about its political objectives. This ambiguity may have been helpful in encouraging the cease-fire negotiations but when it comes to determining what is to be safeguarded, ambiguity is dangerous and, in the end, self-defeating.

Two schools of thought have dominated the debate about America's objectives. The

first treats Bosnia as a case of Serb aggression calling for a collective response by the world community or NATO or the United States. Convinced that Serbia should be punished, this school of thought would fortify the Bosnian Muslims with American arms, instructors and perhaps air support to resist pressures and reestablish a multi-ethnic, unitary state. Advocates of this approach consider a cease-fire tantamount to collusion with aggression, and are willing to agree to American peacekeeping forces only to provide a secure basis from which to compel dissident Serbs and Croats to return to a unified Bosnia.

The other point of view sees Bosnia as an ethnic conflict sparked by thoughtless NATO decisions in 1991 to treat Bosnia as a unitary state, which it is not and never has been. Composed of Croats, Serbs and Muslims united only by their common determination never to be ruled by either of the other groups, the resulting—nearly inevitable—ethnic conflict was waged with the barbarities unfortunately characteristic of all its forerunners.

While the Serbs initiated the present round of slaughter, they would no doubt hark back to comparable depredations inflicted by Croats and Muslims within the memory of most family groups. Early resistance by the Western allies to ethnic cleansing might well have stopped the outrage, but by now too many brutalities have been wrought by all groups against their enemies to envision co-existence under a single government as a realistic option.

Indeed, such a project would court resumption of the slaughter. Any change in territorial boundaries by any side would produce ethnic cleansing; the quest for a unitary state is therefore a prescription for open-ended war and continued suffering.

So far the administration has tried to carry water on both shoulders. Its policy has promoted a cease-fire, which implies partition, while its rhetoric has advocated a unitary, multi-ethnic Bosnia that is unachievable without continued war. Our action on the ground is not synchronized with our rhetoric. As a result, the peacekeepers could end up in an intellectual as well as physical no man's land. Is the central government entitled to try to extend its authority? Can the various ethnic enclaves receive arms from the outside? Who controls the armed forces of the state and how?

We need to stop dodging the central issue. An independent, ethnically diverse Bosnia would require a concerted Western strategy with a vast program of troops, arms and training and constitutional tutoring for an indefinite time. Are we and our allies prepared for a program of transforming peacekeeping into nation-building—as we were not in Somalia—and for the casualties it entails? Would it actually work? How would other countries, especially Russia, react?

The three ethnic groups have in effect been separated by the revolting ethnic cleansing they have practiced. The so-called Croat-Muslim federation is a fraud. No Muslim authorities are permitted in Bosnia's Croatian territory, and the currency remains Croat. Therefore, the first question to be settled is what the peacekeeping force is supposed to protect—the dividing lines between ethnic groups or the borders of a unified Bosnia? If it is the former, the political goal must be

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Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor.

partition; if the latter, we need to be prepared for an open-ended, brutal conflict. Ironically, a continuation of the war in the name of a unified Bosnia is likely to be most disadvantageous to the original victims, the Muslim community. For it is likely to result in the partition of Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia.

Bosnia is not Haiti, where we can declare victory while the country relapses into historical squalor under only slightly modified oppression. In Bosnia, fudging the issue spells continued conflict; the only outcome that has a slight chance of surviving a time limit is partition, and even that is unlikely to be effective in the one-year period that so many American experts believe will be imposed by our electoral timetable.

It will not do for the president to try to propitiate media and congressional concerns by assuring his interlocutors that American troops will not be put in harm's way, as he has done in some recent comments. In Bosnia, troops are inherently in harm's way. And if we insist that the front lines be manned primarily by allies, with little U.S. participation, we will undermine the NATO alliance.

What the American people, Congress, and the allies must hear is precisely what the risks are in Bosnia, why they must be run and over what period of time. And we must ask ourselves where we will be a year from now, after casualties have been suffered and journalists and other observers report that they can discern no moral distinction among the warring parties.

No magic solutions are available to avoid the need for clarity and purpose. Defense Secretary William Perry mentioned a time limit of one year for American peacekeepers. He has yet to explain what will have changed in one year and who will then take on the burden if ethnic hatreds persist. The feasibility of withdrawal depends on conditions on the ground that cannot possibly be predicted at this juncture. Nor will the use of American peacekeepers to arm and train the Bosnians change the problems described here.

I favor abandoning the arms embargo, which in any event does not seem to have inhibited the Croats (and through them, the Muslims) from developing a significant military capability. But no military aid program, even backed by American instructors, can change the demographic realities in which Serbs and Croats between them outnumber the Muslims nearly 10 to one.

If we want an ethnically diverse, unitary Bosnia, we must be prepared to pay the price—which is not peacekeeping but the support of one side in a civil war. At the same time, if American peacekeepers are deployed for whatever purpose, care should be taken to convey determination, doubt and hesitation will invite attacks to speed our departure. Reducing the size of our troop contribution too much might also have the effect of limiting the risk to potential violators. Adversaries must understand in advance that attacks on the peacekeeping force will not, as in Somalia, go unpunished.

Endurance becomes vitally important if non-NATO, especially Russian troops join the peacekeeping operation. Given Russia's historical ties to Serbia, a Russian role in negotiations is desirable, and a Russian role in peacekeeping could prove useful, provided we are ready to maintain a symmetry of commitments.

Still, it would be ironic if Russian peacekeepers on the Serbian side and NATO peacekeepers on the Muslim side moved an East-West confrontation line from the Elbe to the Drina. And if we leave precipitately, we tilt the scales toward Serbia and enhance Moscow's influence in the Balkans—all in the name of peacekeeping.

The deployment of troops to Bosnia is a fateful decision requiring a full national debate that, in the nature of our system, must be led by the president. He must clarify America's political objectives—especially our view of the relationship of the three ethnic groups to each other—and explain the rules of engagement, the risks and the duration of our commitment. There must be public agreement with our allies about strategies and rules of engagement.

In addition, the Bosnian parties must agree on dividing lines and undertake not to change them by force.

And Congress must unambiguously endorse the program.

The word of the president is a national asset not to be trifled with; the cohesion of NATO remains a vital national interest. But we serve these causes only by devising undertakings that can command consensus and be sustained over a period of time.

#### TRIBUTE TO ASSEMBLYWOMAN CARMEN ARROYO

HON. JOSÉ E. SERRANO

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Wednesday, October 25, 1995*

Mr. SERRANO. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to Assemblywomen Carmen Arroyo, who was honored for her outstanding service to the community on October 6, at the 1995 St. Benedict the Moor Neighborhood Center's Dinner Dance, in the South Bronx.

She is one of eight individuals who were recognized for their remarkable success in helping rehabilitate individuals who had been struggling with substance abuse. The rehabilitation program is being carried out at St. Benedict the Moor Neighborhood Center.

A native Puerto Rican who holds a Bachelor of Arts from the College of New Rochelle, Ms. Arroyo overcame many economic difficulties during her youth. She had to fight in a world where women were mostly relegated to the home. First, Ms. Arroyo was determined to become a bookkeeper, and studied to finish a course leading to secretarial-bookkeeper certification.

Her studies were interrupted when she moved to New York and started working at a factory. Her seven children joined her a year after, but unable to find day care services for them, Ms. Arroyo was forced to rely on public assistance. This experience moved Ms. Arroyo to help those who, like her, were struggling to improve their lives. She founded the South Bronx Action Group, an organization dedicated to empower women, Latinos and blacks in the community. Later, suitably empowered herself, she became president of the Puerto Rican Women in Political Action Organization.

In 1977, Ms. Arroyo became the executive director of the South Bronx Community Corporation, an organization committed to aggressive urban development in the South Bronx. As a Puerto Rican woman, she understood the need to advance the socioeconomic condition of Hispanic women.

Ms. Arroyo is the first Puerto Rican woman elected to the New York State Assembly and the first Puerto Rican woman appointed to the New York State Medical Advisory Board.

Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to join me in honoring the Assemblywoman of New York's 74th Assembly District, Carmen Arroyo,

for her lifelong career and dedication in the service of the poor, the disenfranchised, women, children, and the elderly.

#### TRIBUTE TO SARAH FABRY SMEJA

HON. DAVE CAMP

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Wednesday, October 25, 1995*

Mr. CAMP. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to honor Sarah Fabry Smeja as she is recognized for her vast contribution to polka and the State of Michigan. Sarah Fabry Smeja was inducted into the State of Michigan Polka Music Hall of Fame on Sunday, October 1, 1995.

America was built by the hard work and commitment of settlers who brought with them a rich and varied heritage. Polka flourished in Michigan largely due to the devotion of those who brought with them their families' traditions and customs, as well as their love of polka. Sarah is just one of those special individuals who is proud to keep an honored tradition alive.

Sarah Fabry Smeja is Swartz Creek, MI, especially enjoys Czechoslovakian melodies first introduced to her by her father at a very early age. Throughout her career she has played the piano, trumpet, and baritone. Sarah also conducted a choir which consisted of 56 regular members. With some help in language editing, Sarah research, composed, and typed three song books which helped maintain the singers club. Sarah and her husband, Al Smeja, are now retired and reside in Plant City, FL. They are currently associated with the St. Petersburg, C.S.A. and are members of the Czech-American Tourist Club.

Mr. Speaker, thanks to Sarah's efforts, we are all able to enjoy an old musical tradition from many years ago. She was honored at a reception in Owosso, MI, because of her dedication and commitment to spreading the polka tradition and helping others enjoy this special music. I am confident that the musical legacy of this outstanding individual will be remembered for decades to come.

#### WORK FORCE DEVELOPMENT

HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Wednesday, October 25, 1995*

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to insert my Washington Report for Wednesday, October 25, 1995, into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

#### INVESTING IN A SKILLED WORKFORCE

As business technology has become more complex and the world economy more competitive, the strength of the American economy increasingly depends on the skills and training of our workforce. A strong back and the patience to do the same task over and over, day after day, is no longer enough to command a well-paid and secure job. Today's good jobs, including many factory jobs, require much more sophisticated skills. Some skills are job-specific but many are more basic, such as good math, communication, decisionmaking, and teamwork skills. People who develop these skills will be in high demand by employers as we move into the 21st century; people who don't will not.