

shall be managed as a unit throughout its range, and interrelated stocks of fish shall be managed as a unit or in close coordination.

(b) *General.* The purpose of this standard is to induce a comprehensive approach to fishery management. The geographic scope of the fishery, for planning purposes, should cover the entire range of the stocks(s) of fish, and not be overly constrained by political boundaries.

(c) *Unity of management.* Cooperation and understanding among entities concerned with the fishery (e.g., Councils, states, Federal Government, international commissions, foreign nations) are vital to effective management. Where management of a fishery involves multiple jurisdictions, coordination among the several entities should be sought in the development of an FMP. Where a range overlaps Council areas, one FMP to cover the entire range is preferred.

(d) *Management unit.* The term “management unit” means a fishery or that portion of a fishery identified in an FMP as relevant to the FMP’s management objectives.

(1) *Basis.* The choice of a management unit depends on the focus of the FMP’s objectives, and may be organized around biological, geographic, economic, technical, social, or ecological perspectives.

(2) *Conservation and management measures.* FMPs should include conservation and management measures for that part of the management unit within U.S. waters, although the Secretary can ordinarily implement them only within the EEZ. The measures need not be identical for each geographic area within the management unit, if the FMP justifies the differences. A management unit may contain stocks of fish for which there is not enough information available to specify MSY and OY or their proxies.

(e) *Analysis.* An FMP should include discussion of the following:

(1) The range and distribution of the stocks, as well as the patterns of fishing effort and harvest.

(2) Alternative management units and reasons for selecting a particular one. A less-than-comprehensive management unit may be justified if, for

example, complementary management exists or is planned for a separate geographic area or for a distinct use of the stocks, or if the unmanaged portion of the resource is immaterial to proper management.

(3) Management activities and habitat programs of adjacent states and their effects on the FMP’s objectives and management measures. Where state action is necessary to implement measures within state waters to achieve FMP objectives, the FMP should identify what state action is necessary, discuss the consequences of state inaction or contrary action, and make appropriate recommendations. The FMP should also discuss the impact that Federal regulations will have on state management activities.

(4) Management activities of other countries having an impact on the fishery, and how the FMP’s management measures are designed to take into account these impacts. International boundaries may be dealt with in several ways. For example:

(i) By limiting the management unit’s scope to that portion of the stock found in U.S. waters;

(ii) By estimating MSY for the entire stock and then basing the determination of OY for the U.S. fishery on the portion of the stock within U.S. waters; or

(iii) By referring to treaties or cooperative agreements.

[81 FR 71903, Oct. 18, 2016]

#### § 600.325 National Standard 4—Allocations.

(a) *Standard 4.* Conservation and management measures shall not discriminate between residents of different states. If it becomes necessary to allocate or assign fishing privileges among various U.S. fishermen, such allocation shall be:

(1) Fair and equitable to all such fishermen.

(2) Reasonably calculated to promote conservation.

(3) Carried out in such manner that no particular individual, corporation, or other entity acquires an excessive share of such privileges.

(b) *Discrimination among residents of different states.* An FMP may not differentiate among U.S. citizens, nationals, resident aliens, or corporations on the basis of their state of residence. An FMP may not incorporate or rely on a state statute or regulation that discriminates against residents of another state. Conservation and management measures that have different effects on persons in various geographic locations are permissible if they satisfy the other guidelines under Standard 4. Examples of these precepts are:

(1) An FMP that restricted fishing in the EEZ to those holding a permit from state X would violate Standard 4 if state X issued permits only to its own citizens.

(2) An FMP that closed a spawning ground might disadvantage fishermen living in the state closest to it, because they would have to travel farther to an open area, but the closure could be justified under Standard 4 as a conservation measure with no discriminatory intent.

(c) *Allocation of fishing privileges.* An FMP may contain management measures that allocate fishing privileges if such measures are necessary or helpful in furthering legitimate objectives or in achieving the OY, and if the measures conform with paragraphs (c)(3)(i) through (c)(3)(iii) of this section.

(1) *Definition.* An “allocation” or “assignment” of fishing privileges is a direct and deliberate distribution of the opportunity to participate in a fishery among identifiable, discrete user groups or individuals. Any management measure (or lack of management) has incidental allocative effects, but only those measures that result in direct distributions of fishing privileges will be judged against the allocation requirements of Standard 4. Adoption of an FMP that merely perpetuates existing fishing practices may result in an allocation, if those practices directly distribute the opportunity to participate in the fishery. Allocations of fishing privileges include, for example, per-vessel catch limits, quotas by vessel class and gear type, different quotas or fishing seasons for recreational and commercial fishermen, assignment of ocean areas to different gear users, and limitation of permits to

a certain number of vessels or fishermen.

(2) *Analysis of allocations.* Each FMP should contain a description and analysis of the allocations existing in the fishery and of those made in the FMP. The effects of eliminating an existing allocation system should be examined. Allocation schemes considered, but rejected by the Council, should be included in the discussion. The analysis should relate the recommended allocations to the FMP’s objectives and OY specification, and discuss the factors listed in paragraph (c)(3) of this section.

(3) *Factors in making allocations.* An allocation of fishing privileges must be fair and equitable, must be reasonably calculated to promote conservation, and must avoid excessive shares. These tests are explained in paragraphs (c)(3)(i) through (c)(3)(iii) of this section:

(i) *Fairness and equity.* (A) An allocation of fishing privileges should be rationally connected to the achievement of OY or with the furtherance of a legitimate FMP objective. Inherent in an allocation is the advantaging of one group to the detriment of another. The motive for making a particular allocation should be justified in terms of the objectives of the FMP; otherwise, the disadvantaged user groups or individuals would suffer without cause. For instance, an FMP objective to preserve the economic status quo cannot be achieved by excluding a group of long-time participants in the fishery. On the other hand, there is a rational connection between an objective of harvesting shrimp at their maximum size and closing a nursery area to trawling.

(B) An allocation of fishing privileges may impose a hardship on one group if it is outweighed by the total benefits received by another group or groups. An allocation need not preserve the status quo in the fishery to qualify as “fair and equitable,” if a restructuring of fishing privileges would maximize overall benefits. The Council should make an initial estimate of the relative benefits and hardships imposed by the allocation, and compare its consequences with those of alternative allocation schemes, including the status quo. Where relevant, judicial guidance

and government policy concerning the rights of treaty Indians and aboriginal Americans must be considered in determining whether an allocation is fair and equitable.

(ii) *Promotion of conservation.* Numerous methods of allocating fishing privileges are considered “conservation and management” measures under section 303 of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. An allocation scheme may promote conservation by encouraging a rational, more easily managed use of the resource. Or, it may promote conservation (in the sense of wise use) by optimizing the yield in terms of size, value, market mix, price, or economic or social benefit of the product. To the extent that rebuilding plans or other conservation and management measures that reduce the overall harvest in a fishery are necessary, any harvest restrictions or recovery benefits must be allocated fairly and equitably among the commercial, recreational, and charter fishing sectors of the fishery.

(iii) *Avoidance of excessive shares.* An allocation scheme must be designed to deter any person or other entity from acquiring an excessive share of fishing privileges, and to avoid creating conditions fostering inordinate control, by buyers or sellers, that would not otherwise exist.

(iv) *Other factors.* In designing an allocation scheme, a Council should consider other factors relevant to the FMP’s objectives. Examples are economic and social consequences of the scheme, food production, consumer interest, dependence on the fishery by present participants and coastal communities, efficiency of various types of gear used in the fishery, transferability of effort to and impact on other fisheries, opportunity for new participants to enter the fishery, and enhancement of opportunities for recreational fishing.

[61 FR 32540, June 24, 1996, as amended at 63 FR 24234, May 1, 1998]

#### **§ 600.330 National Standard 5—Efficiency.**

(a) *Standard 5.* Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, consider efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources; except

that no such measure shall have economic allocation as its sole purpose.

(b) *Efficiency in the utilization of resources—(1) General.* The term “utilization” encompasses harvesting, processing, marketing, and non-consumptive uses of the resource, since management decisions affect all sectors of the industry. In considering efficient utilization of fishery resources, this standard highlights one way that a fishery can contribute to the Nation’s benefit with the least cost to society: Given a set of objectives for the fishery, an FMP should contain management measures that result in as efficient a fishery as is practicable or desirable.

(2) *Efficiency.* In theory, an efficient fishery would harvest the OY with the minimum use of economic inputs such as labor, capital, interest, and fuel. Efficiency in terms of aggregate costs then becomes a conservation objective, where “conservation” constitutes wise use of all resources involved in the fishery, not just fish stocks.

(i) In an FMP, management measures may be proposed that allocate fish among different groups of individuals or establish a system of property rights. Alternative measures examined in searching for an efficient outcome will result in different distributions of gains and burdens among identifiable user groups. An FMP should demonstrate that management measures aimed at efficiency do not simply redistribute gains and burdens without an increase in efficiency.

(ii) Management regimes that allow a fishery to operate at the lowest possible cost (e.g., fishing effort, administration, and enforcement) for a particular level of catch and initial stock size are considered efficient. Restrictive measures that unnecessarily raise any of those costs move the regime toward inefficiency. Unless the use of inefficient techniques or the creation of redundant fishing capacity contributes to the attainment of other social or biological objectives, an FMP may not contain management measures that impede the use of cost-effective techniques of harvesting, processing, or marketing, and should avoid creating strong incentives for excessive investment in private sector fishing capital and labor.