

119TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 417

To develop a strategy for increasing access to independent information for Chinese citizens, to establish an interagency task force to carry out such strategy, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 5, 2025

Mr. SULLIVAN (for himself and Mrs. SHAHEEN) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To develop a strategy for increasing access to independent information for Chinese citizens, to establish an interagency task force to carry out such strategy, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) SHORT TITLES.—This Act may be cited as the
5 “Informing a Nation with Free, Open, and Reliable Media
6 Act of 2025” or the “INFORM Act”.

7 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
8 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short titles; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Definitions.
- Sec. 3. Findings.
- Sec. 4. Sense of Congress.
- Sec. 5. Statement of policy.
- Sec. 6. Strategy for increasing access to independent information for citizens of the People's Republic of China.
- Sec. 7. Establishment of the Global News Service.
- Sec. 8. Increasing coordination and resources for censorship circumvention, secure sharing, and content creation initiatives.
- Sec. 9. Addressing the lack of reciprocity between the United States and the People's Republic of China in the information space.

1 **SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.**

2 In this Act:

3 (1) CCP.—The term “CCP” means the Chinese
4 Communist Party.

5 (2) COORDINATOR.—The term “Coordinator”
6 means the coordinator of the interagency task force
7 appointed by the President pursuant to section 8(b).

8 (3) DEPARTMENT.—The term “Department”
9 means the Department of State.

10 (4) PRC.—The term “PRC” means the Peo-
11 ple's Republic of China.

12 (5) RFA.—The term “RFA” means Radio Free
13 Asia.

14 (6) USAGM.—The term “USAGM” means the
15 United States Agency for Global Media.

16 (7) VOA.—The term “VOA” means Voice of
17 America.

18 **SEC. 3. FINDINGS.**

19 Congress finds the following:

1 (1) Since the advent and proliferation of the
2 internet, the Chinese Communist Party has viewed
3 the global, cross-border, and open information envi-
4 ronment the internet created as an existential threat
5 to its legitimacy, its effective indoctrination and con-
6 trol of its citizens, and its authoritarian political sys-
7 tem.

8 (2) Despite brief periods of increased openness
9 in the internet ecosystem of the People’s Republic of
10 China during the early 2000s, the CCP has since ex-
11 pended billions of dollars to develop a digital infor-
12 mation control regime (commonly known as the
13 “Great Firewall of China”) that is a wholesale sub-
14 stitution of the global internet with compelling, near-
15 ly universally used domestic platforms with built-in
16 censorship and surveillance features as alternatives,
17 which has fundamentally reshaped its population’s
18 behavior.

19 (3) Through this system in the PRC, the
20 “Great Firewall” blocks foreign internet search pro-
21 viders, independent news and media websites, cir-
22 cumvention and secure messaging tools, and other
23 content deemed undesirable by the CCP.

24 (4) The PRC also engages in meta-level censor-
25 ship to obscure the possibility of circumvention and

1 surveillance evasion by criminalizing VPNs, blocking
 2 discussion of anti-censorship methods, widespread
 3 app removal from app stores, and related techniques.

4 (5) Chinese internet users must contend with
 5 expansive repressive digital surveillance that often
 6 results in real-world consequences and leads to sig-
 7 nificant self-censorship.

8 (6) Under the leadership of Chairman Xi
 9 Jinping, the CCP and government organs have
 10 prioritized—

11 (A) the censorship and surveillance of their
 12 citizens' online behavior; and

13 (B) the indoctrination of the CCP's—

14 (i) authoritarian worldview;

15 (ii) anti-American and anti-West
 16 propaganda; and

17 (iii) intent to undermine and redefine
 18 the United States-led global order.

19 (7) The PRC's internet censorship regime sys-
 20 tematically—

21 (A) amplifies the voices of nationalistic
 22 internet users;

23 (B) silences the voices of moderate or dis-
 24 senting voices;

1 (C) suppresses information that threatens
2 the credibility of the CCP, including reports of
3 corruption and of unexplained wealth held by
4 CCP and People's Liberation Army officials
5 and their families; and

6 (D) creates an echo chamber on the PRC
7 domestic internet that makes it challenging for
8 international observers to decipher—

9 (i) the prevailing beliefs, values, and
10 perspectives of different segments of PRC
11 society; and

12 (ii) their views on the domestic and
13 foreign policies of the PRC government.

14 (8) Concurrent with the increased sophistication
15 and refinement of the PRC's censored and restricted
16 information space, the CCP has expended billions of
17 dollars to build an asymmetric advantage by re-
18 engineering its population's online norms concurrent
19 with—

20 (A) exploiting the open and uncensored on-
21 line information environment in the United
22 States and many countries globally to advance
23 its pro-CCP and anti-United States propaganda
24 and disinformation; and

1 (B) highly restricting the United States
2 online and public diplomacy activities in the
3 PRC.

4 (9) The United States Ambassador to China,
5 Nicholas Burns, recently stated that the PRC's Min-
6 istry of State Security has interrupted and effec-
7 tively cancelled 61 public in-person and online events
8 organized by the United States mission in China
9 since November 2023.

10 (10) Despite a comprehensive censorship and
11 surveillance regime, the relentless indoctrination by
12 CCP and PRC government organs, and the highly
13 coordinated, systematized, and repressive structure
14 of the PRC censorship and propaganda apparatus,
15 PRC citizens have begun to demonstrate—

16 (A) a lack of confidence and satisfaction in
17 their government's policies, conduct, and the in-
18 formation available to them within the PRC's
19 censored and restrictive online information
20 space; and

21 (B) a growing willingness to express dis-
22 sent online, seek alternative sources of informa-
23 tion and engagement, and call for greater eco-
24 nomic and political freedoms.

1 (11) In a recent Stanford University study, re-
 2 searchers discovered that PRC university students
 3 who were exposed to foreign news and independent
 4 content changed their knowledge, beliefs, attitudes,
 5 and behaviors suggesting that demand for uncen-
 6 sored information can persist and may generate
 7 pressure on the PRC censorship apparatus.

8 (12) In 2021, during a period when the Club-
 9 house application was briefly uncensored in the Peo-
 10 ple’s Republic of China, downloads and engagement
 11 on Clubhouse rapidly increased and provided an op-
 12 portunity for PRC internet users to openly discuss
 13 sensitive topics, including—

14 (A) the reeducation camps in Xinjiang;
 15 (B) the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre;
 16 and
 17 (C) the future of Taiwan.

18 (13) One Clubhouse user penned a hashtag,
 19 which was viewed more than 50,000,000 times, call-
 20 ing the discussions the “Renaissance of China”.

21 (14) In 2022, during the multi-city “White
 22 Paper” protests in defiance of the Government of
 23 the PRC’s zero-COVID–19 policy, internet users in
 24 the PRC expressed solidarity and organized the pro-
 25 tests through a variety of online platforms.

1 (15) Information technology news outlet
2 Techopedia released a report and data indicating
3 that, despite being largely blocked and criminalized,
4 the usage of VPNs in the PRC doubled during
5 2023.

6 (16) In February 2024, after the United States
7 Embassy in Beijing posted information on China's
8 popular Weibo social media platform discussing sci-
9 entists' use of satellite data to track and monitor the
10 movement of giraffes, the platform was inundated
11 with comments from PRC internet users lamenting
12 the state of the PRC economy and recent turmoil in
13 its stock, bond, and real estate markets, with many
14 users expressing a desire for help from the United
15 States.

16 (17) The demand among PRC citizens for inde-
17 pendent and alternative sources of information is
18 growing, while the level of United States Govern-
19 ment funding to disseminate circumvention tools to
20 PRC citizens so they can access independent infor-
21 mation has remained at consistently low levels, espe-
22 cially compared to the billions of renminbi (Chinese
23 yuan) the PRC is spending to censor and monitor its
24 internet ecosystem.

1 (18) Publicly-funded VPNs supported through
2 the Open Technology Fund are used by millions of
3 monthly active users in China and have proven to be
4 resilient. Traditional circumvention tools, such as
5 VPNs, are necessary but are not sufficient to ad-
6 dress the unique challenge of China’s socio-techno-
7 logical information control system.

8 (19) Increasing access to independent informa-
9 tion for PRC citizens will aid broader United States
10 efforts—

11 (A) to engage PRC citizens;

12 (B) to provide credible and reliable alter-
13 native sources of information for PRC citizens
14 regarding events occurring within the PRC and
15 globally;

16 (C) to promote a balanced understanding
17 of the United States among PRC citizens; and

18 (D) to support PRC citizens in their ef-
19 forts to advance their individual freedoms and
20 human rights and hold their government ac-
21 countable.

22 **SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

23 It is the sense of Congress that the United States
24 Government should—

1 (1) prioritize the development of a vision and
2 strategy for engaging with PRC citizens through the
3 development and delivery of Mandarin Chinese-lan-
4 guage content that is timely, compelling, and perti-
5 nent to—

6 (A) the issues and challenges they face in
7 their daily lives;

8 (B) the domestic and foreign policy deci-
9 sions of the PRC government; and

10 (C) the governance failures and corruption
11 of the CCP, including unexplained wealth held
12 by CCP and PLA officials and their families;

13 (2) increase the level of coordination among
14 Federal agencies to develop and disseminate timely,
15 compelling, and pertinent Mandarin Chinese-lan-
16 guage content that is otherwise blocked by the PRC
17 government’s highly censored and restrictive internet
18 ecosystem;

19 (3) dually prioritize—

20 (A) access to independent information
21 through circumvention and other tools for PRC
22 citizens; and

23 (B) the secure sharing of such content in
24 the PRC’s highly censored internet ecosystem;

1 (4) optimize the impact of circumvention and
2 secure content sharing tools by more effectively pair-
3 ing such tools with timely, compelling, and pertinent
4 Mandarin Chinese-language content; and

5 (5) seek to counter the lack of reciprocity with
6 the PRC in the online information and public diplo-
7 macy space.

8 **SEC. 5. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

9 It is the policy of the United States—

10 (1) to make increasing access to independent
11 information for and engagement with the roughly
12 1,400,000,000 PRC citizens a national security pri-
13 ority of the United States that benefits broader
14 United States priorities to promote human rights,
15 the rule of law, and good governance in the PRC
16 and globally;

17 (2) to prioritize the expansion and improvement
18 of the development and dissemination of independent
19 information to PRC citizens inside and outside the
20 People’s Republic of China, including by more effec-
21 tively pairing independent information with the cir-
22 cumvention and other tools needed to access such
23 content;

24 (3) to prioritize and coordinate Mandarin Chi-
25 nese-language content development and content dis-

1 semination, and develop technical solutions to ad-
 2 dress the PRC's digital information controls; and

3 (4) to work with like-minded partners and al-
 4 lies—

5 (A) to develop coordinated and complemen-
 6 tary strategies for increasing access to inde-
 7 pendent information for PRC citizens; and

8 (B) to address the lack of reciprocity in
 9 the information and media environments be-
 10 tween the PRC and the United States and its
 11 partners and allies.

12 **SEC. 6. STRATEGY FOR INCREASING ACCESS TO INDE-**
 13 **PENDENT INFORMATION FOR CITIZENS OF**
 14 **THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

15 (a) **PRESIDENT'S STRATEGY.**—Not later than 1 year
 16 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
 17 shall submit a strategy to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
 18 tions of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
 19 of the House of Representatives for increasing access to
 20 independent information for citizens of the PRC who are
 21 within or outside the PRC.

22 (b) **STRATEGY ELEMENTS.**—The strategy required
 23 under subsection (a) shall include—

1 (1) a plan for increasing the accessibility and
2 adoption of circumvention and secure communica-
3 tions tools within the PRC, which may include—

4 (A) an assessment of the technical chal-
5 lenges of the PRC’s information control regime;
6 and

7 (B) an evaluation of research, techno-
8 logical, and other gaps that may affect strategy
9 implementation;

10 (2) an assessment of Mandarin Chinese-lan-
11 guage content creation and distribution capabilities
12 within the Department, across the interagency task
13 force established pursuant to section 8, and among
14 other Federal departments and agencies, as appro-
15 priate, including—

16 (A) whether United States Government-
17 produced, Mandarin Chinese-language content
18 is accessible either inside or outside the PRC;

19 (B) the uptake of, and engagement with,
20 various types of content among citizens of the
21 PRC within or outside the PRC;

22 (C) the use of survey tools and other data
23 sources to assess the areas of interest and con-
24 cern, whether domestic or international, among
25 different segments of PRC citizens; and

1 (D) where gaps or duplication of effort
2 exist in the efficacy of the Mandarin Chinese-
3 language content developed and disseminated
4 by the Department or the interagency task
5 force, and how such gaps or duplication will be
6 addressed through the strategy;

7 (3) a description of how the Department plans
8 to improve coordination between components of the
9 Department, and across the interagency task force,
10 in—

11 (A) developing and disseminating compel-
12 ling, accessible Mandarin Chinese-language con-
13 tent within and outside the PRC's information
14 control regime while avoiding duplication; and

15 (B) funding outside organizations to de-
16 velop circumvention and secure content sharing
17 tools;

18 (4) a description of how the Department plans
19 to promote greater convergence and pairing between
20 the development and dissemination of effective and
21 high quality content and the circumvention tools
22 used to access and share such content;

23 (5) a description of how the Department plans
24 to develop networks with known and emerging Man-
25 darin Chinese-language content developers and social

1 media influencers through initiatives such as media
2 and internet freedom programs based outside of the
3 PRC;

4 (6) an assessment of the current efficacy of
5 content generated by the Department that is dis-
6 seminated within the PRC, including by United
7 States embassies and consulates within the PRC,
8 and how Department plans to improve the efficacy
9 and use of content disseminated within the PRC;

10 (7) a plan for increasing digital engagement
11 with citizens of the PRC who are living or traveling
12 outside of the PRC by providing them with tem-
13 porary access to an uncensored internet environ-
14 ment; and

15 (8) a description of any additional resources, in-
16 cluding additional funding or authorities, needed to
17 further the objectives outlined in the strategy.

18 (c) CLASSIFICATION.—The strategy required under
19 subsection (a) shall be unclassified, but may include a
20 classified annex.

21 **SEC. 7. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GLOBAL NEWS SERVICE.**

22 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The United States Inter-
23 national Broadcasting Act of 1994 (title III of Public Law
24 103–236; 22 U.S.C. 6201 et seq.) is amended by inserting
25 after section 309A the following:

1 **“SEC. 309B. GLOBAL NEWS SERVICE.**

2 “(a) AUTHORITY.—

3 “(1) IN GENERAL.—Grants authorized under
4 section 305(a) shall be available to award annual
5 grants for the purpose of curating, translating, dis-
6 tributing, and making available content created or
7 disseminated by the Voice of America, Radio Free
8 Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, the Middle
9 East Broadcasting Networks, the Office of Cuba
10 Broadcasting, or any entity funded by or partnering
11 with the United States Agency for Global Media, in-
12 cluding news and information related to the People’s
13 Republic of China.

14 “(2) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established a
15 grantee entity, which—

16 “(A) shall be known as the ‘Global News
17 Service’; and

18 “(B) shall carry out the functions set forth
19 in subsection (b).

20 “(b) FUNCTIONS.—In furtherance of the mission de-
21 scribed in subsection (a)(1), the Global News Service—

22 “(1) shall seek to curate, translate, distribute,
23 and make available content about or related to the
24 People’s Republic of China and the People’s Repub-
25 lic of China’s malign activities globally, in coordina-

1 tion with Voice of America’s and Radio Free Asia’s
2 Mandarin Chinese language news service;

3 “(2) shall offer the content described in para-
4 graph (1) in Mandarin Chinese and in English for
5 the purpose of making fact-based, uncensored
6 China-related news available to news organizations,
7 independent journalists, and online content creators
8 around the world;

9 “(3) should prioritize making available the con-
10 tent described in paragraph (1) to media outlets in
11 countries that are influenced by Chinese Communist
12 Party controlled media;

13 “(4) shall ensure that—

14 “(A) its Mandarin Chinese-language news
15 service targets the Chinese diaspora abroad;
16 and

17 “(B) its English-language news service tar-
18 gets foreign media outlets seeking China-related
19 stories in English or other local languages; and

20 “(5) shall carry out any other effort consistent
21 with the purposes of this Act if such effort is re-
22 quested or approved by the United States Agency
23 for Global Media.

24 “(c) GRANT AGREEMENT.—

1 “(1) IN GENERAL.—Any grant agreement with,
2 or grants made to, the Global News Service under
3 this section shall be subject to the limitations and
4 restrictions set forth in paragraphs (2) through (7).

5 “(2) HEADQUARTERS.—The headquarters of
6 the Global News Service and its senior administra-
7 tive and managerial staff shall be in a location that
8 ensures economy, operational effectiveness, and ac-
9 countability to the United States Agency for Global
10 Media.

11 “(3) USE OF FUNDS.—Grant funds may only be
12 used for activities that are consistent with this sec-
13 tion. Failure to comply with such requirement shall
14 constitute a breach of contract and termination of
15 the grant without further fiscal obligation by the
16 United States.

17 “(4) ASSUMPTION OF OBLIGATIONS BY GRANT-
18 EE.—Any contract entered into by the Global News
19 Service shall specify that all obligations are assumed
20 by the grantee and not by the United States Govern-
21 ment.

22 “(5) LEASE AGREEMENTS.—Any lease agree-
23 ments entered into by the Global News Service shall
24 be, to the maximum extent possible, assignable to
25 the United States Government.

1 “(6) ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS.—Administrative
2 and managerial costs for operation of the Global
3 News Service should be kept to a minimum and, to
4 the maximum extent feasible, should not exceed the
5 costs that would have been incurred if the Global
6 News Service had been operated as a Federal entity.

7 “(7) LIMITATION.—Grant funds may not be
8 used for any activity the purpose of which is influ-
9 encing the passage or defeat of legislation considered
10 by Congress.

11 “(d) RELATIONSHIP TO THE UNITED STATES AGEN-
12 CY FOR GLOBAL MEDIA.—

13 “(1) IN GENERAL.—The Global News Service
14 shall be subject to the same oversight and govern-
15 ance by the United States Agency for Global Media
16 as other grantees in accordance with section 305.

17 “(2) ASSISTANCE.—The United States Agency
18 for Global Media, its broadcast entities, and the
19 Global News Service should render assistance to
20 each other to the extent necessary to carry out the
21 purposes of this section or any other provision of
22 this Act.

23 “(3) NOT A FEDERAL AGENCY OR INSTRUMEN-
24 TALITY.—Nothing in this section may be construed

1 to designate the Global News Service as an agency
2 or instrumentality of the Federal Government.

3 “(e) AUDIT AUTHORITIES.—

4 “(1) IN GENERAL.—Financial transactions of
5 the Global News Service relating to functions carried
6 out under this section may be audited by the Gov-
7 ernment Accountability Office in accordance with
8 such principles and procedures, and under such rules
9 and regulations, as may be prescribed by the Comp-
10 troller General of the United States. Any such audit
11 shall be conducted at the place or places at which
12 accounts of the Global News Service are normally re-
13 tained.

14 “(2) ACCESS BY THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNT-
15 ABILITY OFFICE.—The Government Accountability
16 Office shall have access to all books, accounts,
17 records, reports, files, papers, and property belong-
18 ing to or in use by the Global News Service per-
19 taining to financial transactions as may be necessary
20 to facilitate an audit. The Government Account-
21 ability Office shall be afforded full facilities for
22 verifying transactions with any assets held by de-
23 positories, fiscal agents, and custodians. All such
24 books, accounts, records, reports, files, papers, and
25 property of the Global News Service shall remain in

1 the possession and custody of the Global News Serv-
 2 ice.

3 “(3) EXERCISE OF AUTHORITIES.—Notwith-
 4 standing any other provision of law, the Inspector
 5 General of the Department of State and the Foreign
 6 Service is authorized to exercise the authorities set
 7 forth in chapter 4 of part I of title 5, United States
 8 Code (formerly known as the ‘Inspector General Act
 9 of 1978’) with respect to the Global News Service.”.

10 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—The United States
 11 International Broadcasting Act of 1994 (title III of Public
 12 Law 103–236; 22 U.S.C. 6201 et seq.) is amended—

13 (1) in section 304(d) (22 U.S.C. 6203(d)), by
 14 inserting “the Global News Service,” before “the
 15 Middle East Broadcasting Networks”;

16 (2) in section 305 (22 U.S.C. 6204)—

17 (A) by moving subsection (c) so that it ap-
 18 pears immediately after subsection (b); and

19 (B) in subsection (c), by inserting “the
 20 Global News Service,” before “or the Middle
 21 East Broadcasting Networks”; and

22 (3) in section 310(d) (22 U.S.C. 6209(d)), by
 23 inserting “the Global News Service,” before “and
 24 the Middle East Broadcasting Networks”.

1 **SEC. 8. INCREASING COORDINATION AND RESOURCES FOR**
 2 **CENSORSHIP CIRCUMVENTION, SECURE**
 3 **SHARING, AND CONTENT CREATION INITIA-**
 4 **TIVES.**

5 (a) ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERAGENCY TASK
 6 FORCE.—The President shall establish an interagency
 7 task force composed of representatives from the Depart-
 8 ment, National Security Council staff, and representatives
 9 from other Federal departments and agencies, as appro-
 10 priate, as designated by the President.

11 (b) TASK FORCE COORDINATOR.—

12 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The President shall ap-
 13 point a coordinator for the interagency task force es-
 14 tablished pursuant to subsection (a).

15 (2) DUTIES.—The Coordinator shall—

16 (A) convene and coordinate the work of the
 17 interagency task force established pursuant to
 18 subsection (a);

19 (B) oversee the development and execution
 20 of the strategy described in section 6; and

21 (C) oversee the efforts of the Department
 22 described in subsection (d), in consultation, as
 23 appropriate, with relevant Department officials,
 24 including officials reporting to—

25 (i) the Under Secretary of State for
 26 Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs;

- 1 (ii) the Assistant Secretary of State
- 2 for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor;
- 3 (iii) the Ambassador at Large for
- 4 Cyberspace and Digital Policy; and
- 5 (iv) the Assistant Secretary of State
- 6 for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

7 (c) FUNCTIONS.—The interagency task force shall—

8 (1) develop and execute the strategy described

9 in section 6(a); and

10 (2) increase the coordination, within the De-

11 partment and between relevant Federal departments

12 and agencies, as appropriate, of Mandarin Chinese-

13 language content development and dissemination,

14 internet circumvention, and secure content-sharing

15 tools specific to the PRC's censorship regime.

16 (d) DEPARTMENT OF STATE.—

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Department, in con-

18 sultation with relevant members of the interagency

19 task force, shall oversee the development of compel-

20 ling, timely, and relevant Mandarin Chinese-lan-

21 guage content for a variety of audiences within the

22 PRC and the dissemination of such content through

23 a variety of tools and platforms within and outside

24 the PRC.

1 (2) INTERNET CIRCUMVENTION AND SECURE
2 CONTENT SHARING.—The Department, in coordina-
3 tion with relevant entities, other Federal depart-
4 ments and agencies, and external experts, as appro-
5 priate, shall seek to increase funding for programs
6 and open source software that expand upon and de-
7 velop new tools for internet circumvention and se-
8 cure content sharing that are specifically tailored to
9 evade the PRC censorship apparatus, including with-
10 in the PRC, and improve immediate access to inde-
11 pendent information for the end users of such tools.

12 (3) MEDIA FREEDOM, INVESTIGATIVE JOUR-
13 NALISM, AND CONTENT DEVELOPMENT.—The De-
14 partment shall seek to increase funding for media
15 freedom, investigative journalism, and content devel-
16 opment initiatives, including by establishing and ex-
17 panding a network of individual and independent
18 journalists or media companies and social media
19 influencers that investigate and produce articles, re-
20 ports, and other content related to real-time social,
21 political, and economic events in the PRC—

22 (A) in which citizens of the PRC are di-
23 rectly interested; and

1 (B) which can be accessed and amplified
2 through a variety of tools and platforms within
3 and outside the PRC digital ecosystem.

4 (4) INCREASING MANDARIN CHINESE-LAN-
5 GUAGE CONTENT WITHIN THE GREAT FIREWALL
6 AND FOR CITIZENS OF THE PRC LIVING ABROAD.—
7 The Department shall seek to increase the volume
8 of—

9 (A) effective and high-quality Mandarin
10 Chinese-language content for dissemination
11 through Mission China’s social media and other
12 content sharing platforms;

13 (B) material that can be disseminated to
14 citizens of the PRC residing outside of the PRC
15 and the PRC censorship apparatus; and

16 (C) content that focuses on quality of life
17 issues in the United States that are directly re-
18 latable to issues in the PRC, including issues
19 related to food safety, environmental sustain-
20 ability, health care delivery, economic security
21 and the jobs market, the investment climate,
22 treatment of women, the treatment of
23 marginalized populations, and government
24 transparency.

1 (5) CONTENT DEVELOPMENT AND SUR-
2 VEYING.—The Department shall—

3 (A) increase and refine Mandarin Chinese-
4 language content directed towards citizens of
5 the PRC residing within or outside the PRC;
6 and

7 (B) work with external organizations, as
8 appropriate, to regularly conduct credible, peri-
9 odic surveys to gauge and assess issues of do-
10 mestic and international importance to citizens
11 of the PRC to inform the work of the inter-
12 agency task force established pursuant to sub-
13 section (a) and the ongoing iteration by the De-
14 partment of effective, high-quality Mandarin
15 Chinese-language content.

16 (e) UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR GLOBAL MEDIA.—

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—The USAGM and relevant
18 Federal and non-Federal entities shall—

19 (A) carry out the actions described in
20 paragraphs (2) through (5); and

21 (B) work with independent content cre-
22 ators, citizen journalists, and media organiza-
23 tions, as appropriate, to curate, disseminate,
24 and amplify the highest-impact Mandarin Chi-

nese-language content across USAGM entities
to citizens of the PRC.

(2) RADIO FREE ASIA.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Radio Free Asia, consistent with its congressional mandate, shall—

(i) deliver independent, uncensored, PRC-specific news and information in local languages to audiences in the PRC and in other countries; and

(ii) increase coverage and digital Mandarin Chinese-language programming on political, economic, and social issues in the PRC, including by—

(I) expanding RFA’s Mandarin Chinese-language platforms;

(II) prioritizing instances of PRC disinformation about PRC-internal topics directed towards Chinese citizens through its bilingual Asia Fact Check Lab; and

(III) providing insights to the interagency task force established pursuant to subsection (a) regarding—

(aa) content development strategies;

1 (bb) priority topic areas sa-
 2 lient to citizens of the PRC; and
 3 (cc) data about access to
 4 and engagement with Mandarin
 5 Chinese-language RFA content
 6 among citizens of the PRC.

7 (B) TOPICS.—Topic areas at RFA’s edi-
 8 torial discretion referred to in subparagraph
 9 (A)(ii)(III)(bb) should include—

10 (i) quality of life in the PRC; and
 11 (ii) human rights, the rule of law, and
 12 good governance issues in the PRC that
 13 are relevant and important to broad seg-
 14 ments of the population of the PRC.

15 (3) VOICE OF AMERICA.—Voice of America
 16 shall, to the extent appropriate—

17 (A) increase content of interest to citizens
 18 of the PRC; and

19 (B) provide insights to the interagency
 20 task force established pursuant to subsection

21 (a) regarding—

22 (i) content development strategies;

23 (ii) priority topic areas salient to citi-
 24 zens of the PRC; and

1 (iii) data about access to and engage-
2 ment with Mandarin Chinese-language
3 VOA content among citizens of the PRC.

4 (4) OPEN TECHNOLOGY FUND.—The Open
5 Technology Fund shall—

6 (A) support the development and adoption
7 of open source circumvention and secure com-
8 munications tools that are tailored for use in
9 the PRC;

10 (B) increase engagement with private sec-
11 tor technology companies, universities, and
12 other relevant stakeholders to develop the next
13 generation of internet circumvention and secure
14 content sharing tools that—

15 (i) are specifically tailored to the
16 PRC's censorship regime; and

17 (ii) can rapidly increase access to and
18 secure sharing of independent information;

19 (C) issue regular public solicitations for
20 students and other civil society groups in the
21 United States and in like-minded countries spe-
22 cializing in the cybersecurity and technology
23 fields to research and develop the next genera-
24 tion of internet circumvention and secure con-

1 tent sharing tools that directly target the PRC
2 censorship regime; and

3 (D) regularly consult with the interagency
4 task force established pursuant to subsection
5 (a) regarding matters related to the develop-
6 ment and adoption of circumvention and secure
7 content sharing tools among citizens of the
8 PRC, and inform about research and other
9 technical needs related to circumvention of the
10 PRC censorship regime and secure content
11 sharing.

12 (5) GLOBAL NEWS SERVICE.—The Global News
13 Service shall—

14 (A) seek to curate, translate, distribute,
15 and make available content about or related to
16 the People’s Republic of China and the People’s
17 Republic of China’s malign activities globally, in
18 coordination with Voice of America’s and Radio
19 Free Asia’s Mandarin Chinese language news
20 service;

21 (B) offer such content in Mandarin Chi-
22 nese and English for the purpose of making
23 fact-based, uncensored China-related news
24 available to news organizations, independent

1 journalists, and online content creators around
2 the world;

3 (C) prioritize making available such con-
4 tent to media outlets in the countries that are
5 influenced by CCP state media; and

6 (D) target the Chinese diaspora abroad,
7 through its Mandarin Chinese language news
8 service.

9 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

10 (1) DEPARTMENT OF STATE.—There is author-
11 ized to be appropriated to the Department, for each
12 of the fiscal years 2025 through 2029, \$25,000,000,
13 which—

14 (A) shall be expended for ongoing and new
15 programs in furtherance of the strategy re-
16 quired under section 6(a) and the functions and
17 objectives set forth in subsections (c) and (d);
18 and

19 (B) may be expended to contract with an
20 external organization with expertise in sur-
21 veying populations in the PRC and the broader
22 Indo-Pacific region.

23 (2) UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR GLOBAL
24 MEDIA.—There is authorized to be appropriated to
25 the USAGM, for each of the fiscal years 2025

1 through 2029, \$50,000,000, which shall be ex-
 2 pended—

3 (A) to carry out the functions of the Glob-
 4 al News Service, as set forth in section 309B
 5 of the United States International Broadcasting
 6 Act of 1994, as added in section 7(a); and

7 (B) for ongoing and new programs in pur-
 8 suing the objectives set forth in subsection (e).

9 **SEC. 9. ADDRESSING THE LACK OF RECIPROCITY BETWEEN**
 10 **THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE’S RE-**
 11 **PUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE INFORMATION**
 12 **SPACE.**

13 (a) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—In pursuing diplo-
 14 matic engagement with the PRC, the Secretary of State
 15 should prioritize addressing the lack of reciprocity in ac-
 16 cess to the PRC internet and broader information space
 17 for United States Government, private sector, and non-
 18 governmental stakeholders, particularly journalists, dip-
 19 lomats, researchers, academics, internet technology, and
 20 social media companies and nongovernmental organiza-
 21 tions within the PRC.

22 (b) AVAILABLE TOOLS.—The President, in consulta-
 23 tion with the Secretary of State, should consider all tools
 24 available to address the lack of reciprocity in access to
 25 the PRC internet and broader information space for

- 1 United States Government, private sector, and nongovern-
- 2 mental stakeholders.

