

119TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 3356

To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United States, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

DECEMBER 4, 2025

Mr. MARKEY (for himself and Mr. MERKLEY) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United States, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Hastening Arms Limi-
5 tations Talks Act of 2025” or the “HALT Act of 2025”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

8 (1) The use of nuclear weapons poses an exis-
9 tential threat to humanity, a fact that led President
10 Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorba-

1 chev to declare in a joint statement in 1987 that a
2 “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be
3 fought”, a sentiment affirmed by the People’s Re-
4 public of China, France, the Russian Federation, the
5 United Kingdom, and the United States in January
6 2022.

7 (2) On June 12, 1982, an estimated 1,000,000
8 people attended the largest peace rally in United
9 States history, in support of a movement to freeze
10 and reverse the nuclear arms race, a movement that
11 helped to create the political will necessary for the
12 negotiation of several bilateral arms control treaties
13 between the United States and former Soviet Union,
14 and then the Russian Federation. Those treaties
15 contributed to strategic stability through mutual and
16 verifiable reciprocal nuclear weapons reductions.

17 (3) Since the advent of nuclear weapons in
18 1945, millions of people around the world have stood
19 up to demand meaningful, immediate international
20 action to halt, reduce, and eliminate the threats
21 posed by nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons testing,
22 and nuclear war, to humankind and the planet.

23 (4) In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
24 tion of Nuclear Weapons done at Washington, Lon-
25 don, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483) (com-

1 monly referred to as the “Nuclear Non-Proliferation
2 Treaty” or the “NPT”), entered into force, which
3 includes a binding obligation on the 5 nuclear-weap-
4 on states (commonly referred to as the “P5”),
5 among other things, “to pursue negotiations in good
6 faith on effective measures relating to the cessation
7 of the nuclear arms race . . . and to nuclear disar-
8 mament”.

9 (5) Bipartisan United States global leadership
10 has curbed the growth in the number of countries
11 possessing nuclear weapons and has slowed overall
12 vertical proliferation among countries already pos-
13 sessing nuclear weapons, as is highlighted by a more
14 than 90 percent reduction in the United States nu-
15 clear weapons stockpile from its Cold War height of
16 31,255 in 1967.

17 (6) The United States testing of nuclear weap-
18 ons is no longer necessary as a result of the fol-
19 lowing major technical developments since the Sen-
20 ate’s consideration of the Comprehensive Nuclear-
21 Test-Ban Treaty (commonly referred to as the
22 “CTBT”) in 1999:

23 (A) The verification architecture of the
24 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Orga-

nization (commonly referred to as the “CTBTO”)—

(i) has made significant advancements, as seen through its network of 300 International Monitoring Stations and its International Data Centre, which together provide for the near instantaneous detection of nuclear explosives tests, including all 6 such tests conducted by North Korea between 2006 and 2017; and

(ii) is operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

(B) Since the United States signed the CTBT, confidence has grown in the science-based Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan of the Department of Energy, which forms the basis of annual certifications to the President regarding the continual safety, security, and effectiveness of the United States nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing, leading former Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz to remark in 2015 that “lab directors today now state that they certainly understand much more about how nuclear weapons work than during the period of nuclear testing”.

1 (7) Despite the progress made to reduce the
2 number and role of, and risks posed by, nuclear
3 weapons, and to halt the Cold War-era nuclear arms
4 race, tensions between countries that possess nuclear
5 weapons are on the rise, key nuclear risk reduction
6 treaties are under threat, significant stockpiles of
7 weapons-usable fissile material remain, and a quali-
8 tative global nuclear arms race is now underway
9 with each of the countries that possess nuclear
10 weapons spending tens of billions of dollars each
11 year to maintain and improve their arsenals.

12 (8) The Russian Federation is pursuing the de-
13 velopment of destabilizing types of nuclear weapons
14 that are not presently covered under any existing
15 arms control treaty or agreement and the People's
16 Republic of China, India, Pakistan, and the Demo-
17 cratic People's Republic of Korea have each taken
18 concerning steps to diversify their more modest
19 sized, but nonetheless very deadly, nuclear arsenals.

20 (9) The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review was
21 right to label the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise
22 missile as “no longer necessary”, as that missile, if
23 deployed, would have the effect of lowering the
24 threshold for nuclear weapons use.

1 (10) On February 3, 2021, President Joseph R.
2 Biden preserved binding and verifiable limits on the
3 deployed and non-deployed strategic forces of the
4 largest two nuclear weapons powers through the
5 five-year extension of the Treaty between the United
6 States of America and the Russian Federation on
7 Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation
8 of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010,
9 and entered into force February 5, 2011 (commonly
10 referred to as the “New START Treaty”).

11 (11) In 2013, the report on a nuclear weapons
12 employment strategy of the United States submitted
13 under section 492 of title 10, United States Code,
14 determined that it is possible to ensure the security
15 of the United States and allies and partners of the
16 United States and maintain a strong and credible
17 strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a $\frac{1}{3}$
18 reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level
19 established in the New START Treaty.

20 (12) On January 12, 2017, then-Vice President
21 Biden stated, “[G]iven our non-nuclear capabilities
22 and the nature of today’s threats—it’s hard to envi-
23 sion a plausible scenario in which the first use of nu-
24 clear weapons by the United States would be nec-
25 essary. Or make sense.”.

1 (13) On September 23, 2025, President Trump
2 stated in front of the United Nations General As-
3 sembly, “We want to have a cessation of the devel-
4 opment of nuclear weapons. . . . If we ever use them,
5 the world literally might come to an end.”.

6 (14) In light of moves by the United States and
7 other countries to increase their reliance on nuclear
8 weapons, a global nuclear freeze would seek to halt
9 the new nuclear arms race by seeking conclusion of
10 a comprehensive and verifiable freeze on the testing,
11 deployment, and production of nuclear weapons and
12 delivery vehicles for such weapons.

13 (15) The reckless and repeated nuclear threats
14 by Russian President Vladimir Putin since the Feb-
15 ruary 2022 invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Fed-
16 eration underscore the need for a global nuclear
17 freeze.

18 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

19 The following is the policy of the United States:

20 (1) The United States should build upon its
21 decades long, bipartisan efforts to reduce the num-
22 ber and salience of nuclear weapons by leading inter-
23 national negotiations on specific arms-reduction
24 measures as part of a 21st century global nuclear
25 freeze movement.

(2) Building on the 2021 extension of the New START Treaty, the United States should engage with all other countries that possess nuclear weapons to seek to negotiate and conclude future multilateral arms control, disarmament, and risk reduction agreements, which should contain some or all of the following provisions:

(A) An agreement by the United States and the Russian Federation on a resumption of on-site inspections and verification measures per the New START Treaty and a follow-on treaty or agreement to the New START Treaty that may lower the central limits of the Treaty and cover new kinds of strategic delivery vehicles or non-strategic nuclear weapons.

(B) An agreement on a verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and further deployment of all nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for such weapons.

(C) An agreement that establishes a verifiable numerical ceiling on the deployed shorter-range and intermediate-range and strategic delivery systems (as defined by the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the

1 Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and
2 Shorter-Range Missiles signed at Washington
3 December 8, 1987, and entered into force June
4 1, 1988 (commonly referred to as the “Inter-
5 mediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty”), and
6 the New START Treaty, respectively) and the
7 nuclear warheads associated with such systems
8 belonging to the P5, and to the extent possible,
9 all countries that possess nuclear weapons, at
10 August 2, 2019, levels.

11 (D) An agreement by each country to
12 adopt a policy of no first use of nuclear weap-
13 ons or provide transparency into its nuclear de-
14 claratory policy.

15 (E) An agreement on a proactive United
16 Nations Security Council resolution that ex-
17 pands access by the International Atomic En-
18 ergy Agency to any country found by the Board
19 of Governors of that Agency to be noncompliant
20 with its obligations under the NPT.

21 (F) An agreement to refrain from config-
22 uring nuclear forces in a “launch on warning”
23 or “launch under warning” nuclear posture,
24 which may prompt a nuclear armed country to
25 launch a ballistic missile attack in response to

1 detection by an early-warning satellite or sensor
2 of a suspected incoming ballistic missile.

3 (G) An agreement not to target or inter-
4 fere in the nuclear command, control, and com-
5 munications (commonly referred to as “NC3”)
6 infrastructure of another country through a ki-
7 netic attack or a cyberattack.

8 (H) An agreement on transparency meas-
9 ures or verifiable limits, or both, on hypersonic
10 cruise missiles and glide vehicles that are fired
11 from sea-based, ground, and air platforms.

12 (I) An agreement to provide a baseline and
13 continuous exchanges detailing the aggregate
14 number of active nuclear weapons and associ-
15 ated systems possessed by each country.

16 (3) The United States should rejuvenate efforts
17 in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament
18 toward the negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Mate-
19 rial Treaty or Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, or
20 move negotiations to another international body or
21 fora, such as a meeting of the P5. Successful conclu-
22 sion of such a treaty would verifiably prevent any
23 country’s production of highly enriched uranium and
24 plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.

1 (4) The United States should convene a series
2 of head-of-state level summits on nuclear disarmament modeled on the Nuclear Security Summits
3 process, which saw the elimination of the equivalent
4 of 3,000 nuclear weapons.
5

6 (5) The President should seek ratification by
7 the Senate of the CTBT and mobilize all countries
8 covered by Annex 2 of the CTBT to pursue similar
9 action to hasten entry into force of the CTBT. The
10 entry into force of the CTBT, for which ratification
11 by the United States will provide critical momentum,
12 will activate the CTBT's onsite inspection provision
13 to investigate allegations that any country that is a
14 party to the CTBT has conducted a nuclear test of
15 any yield.

16 (6) The United States should—

17 (A) refrain from developing any new designs for nuclear warheads or bombs, but especially designs that could add a level of technical
18 uncertainty into the United States stockpile and
19 thus renew calls to resume nuclear explosive
20 testing in order to test that new design; and
21

22 (B) seek reciprocal commitments from
23 other countries that possess nuclear weapons.
24

1 **SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR NUCLEAR**
2 **TEST EXPLOSIONS.**

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—None of the funds authorized to
4 be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year
5 2026 or any fiscal year thereafter, or authorized to be ap-
6 propriated or otherwise made available for any fiscal year
7 before fiscal year 2026 and available for obligation as of
8 the date of the enactment of this Act, may be obligated
9 or expended to conduct or make preparations for any ex-
10 plosive nuclear weapons test that produces any yield until
11 such time as—

12 (1) the President submits to Congress an ad-
13 dendum to the report required by section 4205 of
14 the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2525)
15 that details any change to the condition of the
16 United States nuclear weapons stockpile from the
17 report submitted under that section in the preceding
18 year; and

19 (2) there is enacted into law a joint resolution
20 of Congress that approves the test.

21 (b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Subsection (a) does
22 not limit nuclear stockpile stewardship activities that are
23 consistent with the zero-yield standard and other require-
24 ments under law.

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