

119TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 3291

To require a declassification review for intelligence relating to the COVID–19 pandemic, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

DECEMBER 1, 2025

Mr. YOUNG introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence

A BILL

To require a declassification review for intelligence relating to the COVID–19 pandemic, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Enhanced COVID-19
5 Transparency Act of 2025”.

6 **SEC. 2. DECLASSIFICATION OF INTELLIGENCE AND ADDI-**
7 **TIONAL TRANSPARENCY MEASURES RELAT-**
8 **ING TO THE COVID–19 PANDEMIC.**

9 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section, the terms “con-
10 gressional intelligence committees” and “intelligence com-

1 munity” have the meanings given such terms in section
2 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

3 (b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
4 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
5 Intelligence and each head of an element of the intel-
6 ligence community shall jointly—

7 (1) perform a declassification review of intel-
8 ligence products relating to the origins of the
9 Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19), including—

10 (A) research conducted at the Wuhan In-
11 stitute of Virology or any other medical or sci-
12 entific research center within the People’s Re-
13 public of China;

14 (B) information relating to Gain of Func-
15 tion research and the intention of this research;
16 and

17 (C) information relating to sources of
18 funding or direction for research on
19 coronaviruses, including both sources within the
20 People’s Republic of China and foreign sources;

21 (2) perform a declassification review of intel-
22 ligence products relating to efforts by government
23 officials of entities of the People’s Republic of
24 China—

1 (A) to disrupt or obstruct information
2 sharing or investigations into the origins of the
3 coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pan-
4 demic;

5 (B) to disrupt the sharing of medically sig-
6 nificant information relating to the trans-
7 missibility and potential harm of SARS-CoV-2
8 to humans, including—

9 (i) efforts to limit the sharing of in-
10 formation with the United States Govern-
11 ment;

12 (ii) efforts to limit the sharing of in-
13 formation with the governments of allies
14 and partners of the United States; and

15 (iii) efforts to limit the sharing of in-
16 formation with the United Nations and
17 World Health Organization;

18 (C) to obstruct or otherwise limit the shar-
19 ing of information between national, provincial,
20 and city governments within the People's Re-
21 public of China and between subnational enti-
22 ties within the People's Republic of China and
23 external researchers;

24 (D) to deny the sharing of information
25 with the United States, allies and partners of

1 the United States, or multilateral organizations,
2 including the United Nations and the World
3 Health Organization;

4 (E) to pressure or lobby foreign govern-
5 ments, journalists, medical researchers, officials
6 of the United States Government, or officials of
7 multilateral organizations (including the United
8 Nations and the World Health Organization)
9 with respect to the source, scientific origins,
10 transmissibility, or other attributes of the
11 SARS-CoV-2 virus or the COVID-19 pan-
12 demic;

13 (F) to disrupt government or private-sector
14 efforts to conduct research and development of
15 medical interventions or countermeasures for
16 the COVID-19 pandemic, including vaccines;
17 and

18 (G) to promote alternative narratives re-
19 garding the origins of COVID-19 as well as the
20 domestic Chinese and international response to
21 the COVID-19 pandemic;

22 (3) make available to the public appropriately
23 declassified intelligence products described under
24 paragraphs (1) and (2), including such redactions as
25 the Director, with the concurrence of the head of the

1 originating element of the intelligence community,
2 determines necessary to protect sources and methods
3 and information concerning United States persons;
4 and

5 (4) submit to the congressional intelligence
6 committees an unredacted version of the declassified
7 intelligence products described in paragraph (3).

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