

## Calendar No. 325

119<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS  
2<sup>D</sup> SESSION**S. 2722**

To promote the energy security of Taiwan, and for other purposes.

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## IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

SEPTEMBER 4, 2025

Mr. RICKETTS (for himself, Mr. COONS, Mr. BUDD, Mr. HICKENLOOPER, and Mr. HOEVEN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

FEBRUARY 10, 2026

Reported by Mr. RISCH, with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]

**A BILL**

To promote the energy security of Taiwan, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Taiwan Energy Secu-  
5 rity and Anti-Embargo Act of 2025”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

1           (1) Taiwan is a vital democratic partner the en-  
2           ergy security of which is critical to the strategic in-  
3           terests of the United States in the Indo-Pacific re-  
4           gion.

5           (2) Enhancing Taiwan's energy resilience  
6           through diversified and reliable sources reduces vul-  
7           nerability to coercion, disruption, or attack by au-  
8           thoritarian regimes.

9           (3) The United States possesses abundant sup-  
10          plies of liquefied natural gas and other energy re-  
11          sources that support economic growth, job creation,  
12          and the national security interests of the United  
13          States.

14          (4) Promoting United States energy exports to  
15          and partnerships with Taiwan aligns with United  
16          States energy diplomacy objectives, strengthens bi-  
17          lateral economic and security ties, and contributes to  
18          regional stability.

19          (5) The Alaska Liquefied Natural Gas Project,  
20          which has received pledged support from Taiwan's  
21          state energy firm CPC Corp, would enhance the abil-  
22          ity of the United States to supply Taiwan and other  
23          allies and partners of the United States in the Indo-  
24          Pacific with a cost-effective, reliable supply of en-  
25          ergy.

1           (6) Taiwan’s energy infrastructure, including  
 2           electric grid systems and liquefied natural gas im-  
 3           port facilities, is vulnerable to asymmetric and ki-  
 4           netic threats from the People’s Republic of China.

5           (7) Supporting Taiwan’s efforts to improve the  
 6           resilience and security of its energy infrastructure  
 7           advances deterrence and promotes continuity of gov-  
 8           ernment operations in the event of a crisis.

9   **SEC. 3. PROMOTION OF LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS EXPORTS**  
 10                           **AND ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE**  
 11                           **FOR TAIWAN.**

12           The Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (22 U.S.C.  
 13   3351 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the fol-  
 14   lowing:

15   **“PART 8—PROMOTION OF LIQUEFIED NATURAL**  
 16           **GAS EXPORTS AND ENERGY INFRASTRUC-**  
 17           **TURE RESILIENCE FOR TAIWAN**

18   **“SEC. 5540A. DEFINITIONS.**

19           “In this part:

20                   “(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-  
 21           TEES.—The term ‘appropriate congressional com-  
 22           mittees’ means—

23                           “(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,  
 24                           the Committee on Commerce, Science, and

1           Transportation, and the Committee on Energy  
2           and Natural Resources of the Senate; and

3           “~~(B)~~ the Committee on Foreign Affairs,  
4           the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and  
5           the Committee on Natural Resources of the  
6           House of Representatives.

7           “~~(2)~~ ASYMMETRIC THREAT.—The term ‘asym-  
8           metric threat’ means a threat posed by unconven-  
9           tional means, including a cyberattack, sabotage, or  
10          economic coercion, designed to undermine or disrupt  
11          the operation of critical infrastructure.

12   **“SEC. 5540B. PROMOTION OF LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS EX-**  
13                           **PORTS TO TAIWAN.**

14          “~~(a)~~ IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in co-  
15          ordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the Sec-  
16          retary of Energy, shall prioritize efforts to support and  
17          facilitate increased exportation to Taiwan of liquefied nat-  
18          ural gas produced in the United States.

19          “~~(b)~~ REQUIRED ACTIVITIES.—In carrying out sub-  
20          section ~~(a)~~, the Secretaries shall—

21                 “~~(1)~~ engage with United States liquefied nat-  
22                 ural gas producers, exporters, and infrastructure en-  
23                 tities to identify and address barriers to liquefied  
24                 natural gas exports and storage projects intended  
25                 for the market of Taiwan;

1           “(2) facilitate coordination between United  
2 States private sector entities and relevant govern-  
3 ment and private sector stakeholders in Taiwan;

4           “(3) provide diplomatic and technical support  
5 to streamline regulatory processes and expedite per-  
6 mitting for liquefied natural gas export and storage  
7 infrastructure projects linked to Taiwan;

8           “(4) consult with the Government of Taiwan to  
9 assess and strengthen liquefied natural gas import  
10 and storage capabilities; and

11           “(5) coordinate interagency efforts to ensure  
12 cohesive and sustained United States support for liq-  
13 uedified natural gas exports to Taiwan.

14 **“SEC. 5540C. ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE CA-**  
15 **PACITY BUILDING.**

16           “(a) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 days after  
17 the date of the enactment of the Taiwan Energy Security  
18 and Anti-Embargo Act of 2025, the Secretary of State,  
19 in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Sec-  
20 retary of Energy, shall seek to engage with appropriate  
21 officials of Taiwan for the purpose of cooperating with the  
22 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior,  
23 the Ministry of Defense, and the head of any other appli-  
24 cable ministry of Taiwan for capacity building to enhance

1 energy infrastructure resilience, including defensive mili-  
2 tary cybersecurity activities.

3 “(b) IDENTIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES.—In carrying  
4 out subsection (a), the Secretary of State may identify co-  
5 operative activities—

6 “(1) to enhance cybersecurity programs to pro-  
7 tect grid operating systems, liquefied natural gas  
8 terminals, and supervisory control and data acquisi-  
9 tion systems;

10 “(2) to support physical security improvements,  
11 operational redundancy, and continuity-of-operations  
12 planning;

13 “(3) to engage in joint training exercises and  
14 scenario-based planning with relevant agencies in  
15 Taiwan; and

16 “(4) to support workforce development, emer-  
17 gency response planning, and institutional mod-  
18 ernization of energy sector operators.

19 “(c) UNITED STATES-TAIWAN ENERGY SECURITY  
20 CENTER.—The Secretary of State may establish a joint  
21 United States-Taiwan Energy Security Center in the  
22 United States, leveraging the expertise of institutions of  
23 higher education and private sector entities to foster dia-  
24 logue and collaboration for academic cooperation in energy  
25 security and resilience.

1       “(d) AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE.—The Sec-  
2 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of De-  
3 fense and the Secretary of Energy, may provide technical  
4 assistance to support the activities described in subsection  
5 (b) or the center described in subsection (c).

6       “(e) IMPLEMENTATION.—

7           “(1) IN GENERAL.—Assistance under this sec-  
8 tion shall be provided through the American Insti-  
9 tute in Taiwan and in consultation with relevant au-  
10 thorities in Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Re-  
11 lations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.).

12           “(2) NOTIFICATION.—Any assistance provided  
13 by the Department of State pursuant this section  
14 shall be subject to the regular notification require-  
15 ments of section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act  
16 of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1).

17       “(f) BRIEFINGS.—Not later than 180 days after the  
18 date of the enactment of the Taiwan Energy Security and  
19 Anti-Embargo Act of 2025, the Secretary of State, in co-  
20 ordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Sec-  
21 retary of Energy, shall provide to the appropriate congres-  
22 sional committees a briefing on the implementation of this  
23 section.

1 **“SEC. 5540D. ANNUAL REPORT.**

2       “(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after  
3 the date of the enactment of the Taiwan Energy Security  
4 and Anti-Embargo Act of 2025, and annually thereafter  
5 for 3 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with  
6 the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Energy, and  
7 the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate  
8 congressional committees a report that—

9               “(1) describes actions taken under this part;

10              “(2) identifies barriers to—

11                      “(A) increased exportation of liquefied nat-  
12 ural gas to Taiwan; and

13                      “(B) energy infrastructure security co-  
14 operation;

15              “(3) evaluates the effectiveness of capacity  
16 building and technical assistance activities carried  
17 out under section 5540C; and

18              “(4) provides recommendations to expand and  
19 improve future bilateral energy cooperation between  
20 the United States and Taiwan.

21       “(b) FORM.—Each report required by subsection (a)  
22 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include  
23 a classified annex.”.

1 **SEC. 4. TRAINING TO IMPROVE TAIWAN'S CRITICAL EN-**  
 2 **ERGY INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION.**

3 Section 5504(a)(3) of the Taiwan Enhanced Resil-  
 4 ience Act (22 U.S.C. 3353(a)(3)) is amended by inserting  
 5 after “capabilities” the following: “and critical energy in-  
 6 frastructure protection”.

7 **SEC. 5. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING**  
 8 **TAIWAN'S USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY.**

9 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-  
 10 ings:

11 (1) According to the International Atomic En-  
 12 ergy Agency, nuclear energy—

13 (A) is the second safest source of energy;

14 (B) is one of only 2 clean energies that  
 15 offer non-stop baseload power required for sus-  
 16 tainable economic growth and improved human  
 17 welfare; and

18 (C) when compared with other sources of  
 19 electricity from cradle to grave, has the lowest  
 20 carbon footprint, uses fewer materials, and  
 21 takes up less land.

22 (2) A nuclear fuel assembly lasts up to 6 years,  
 23 making supply more resistant to maritime disrup-  
 24 tion.

1           (3) Taiwan has built a robust civilian nuclear  
2           capability over previous decades that has shown the  
3           potential to provide clean, reliable power to Taiwan.

4           (4) On May 17, 2025, the Maanshan-2, Tai-  
5           wan's last operating nuclear power plant, was shut  
6           down after its 40-year operating license expired.

7           (5) There are compelling economic and security  
8           reasons to evaluate placing existing infrastructure  
9           back in service to ensure Taiwan has clean, reliable  
10          power that is more resilient in a contingency.

11          (6) As a result of Taiwan's substantial use of  
12          energy in industrial manufacturing and production,  
13          and emerging energy requirements for electrification,  
14          artificial intelligence, and data center support, there  
15          is considerable benefit for Taiwan to evaluate new  
16          small modular reactors technology to augment its  
17          energy capacity and resilience.

18          (7) As Taiwan modernizes its military, the  
19          power demand from command-and-control systems,  
20          intelligence platforms, drone operations, and joint  
21          battlespace integration will continue to increase.

22          (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
23          gress that—

1           (1) it is in the interests of both the United  
2 States and Taiwan for the Government of Taiwan to  
3 consider—

4           (A) maintaining nuclear power as an en-  
5 ergy source; and

6           (B) utilizing new nuclear technologies, in-  
7 cluding Gen III+ nuclear reactors and small  
8 modular reactor technology; and

9           (2) the United States should prioritize assist-  
10 ance and cooperation with Taiwan on nuclear energy  
11 to improve technology exports and job creation in  
12 the United States and energy security and resilience  
13 in Taiwan.

14 **SEC. 6. INSURANCE FOR VESSELS TRANSPORTING VITAL**  
15 **GOODS TO STRATEGIC PARTNERS.**

16           Section 53902 of title 46, United States Code, is  
17 amended by adding at the end the following:

18           “(d) VESSELS TRANSPORTING VITAL GOODS TO  
19 STRATEGIC PARTNERS.—

20           “(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Transpor-  
21 tation may provide insurance and reinsurance under  
22 this chapter for any vessel engaged in commerce  
23 transporting critical energy, humanitarian, or other  
24 goods to Taiwan or another strategic partner of the  
25 United States that is facing coercive maritime

1 threats if the Secretary determines, in consultation  
2 with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of  
3 State, and the Director of National Intelligence, that  
4 providing such insurance or reinsurance is necessary  
5 to support vital strategic commerce or to deter coer-  
6 cive maritime behavior that undermines regional se-  
7 curity.

8 “(2) NONAPPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN CONDI-  
9 TION.—The condition under section 53902(e) shall  
10 not apply with respect to a vessel described in para-  
11 graph (1).”

12 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

13 *This Act may be cited as the “Taiwan Energy Security*  
14 *and Anti-Embargo Act of 2026”.*

15 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

16 *Congress makes the following findings:*

17 (1) *Taiwan is a vital democratic partner the en-*  
18 *ergy security of which is critical to the strategic inter-*  
19 *ests of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region.*

20 (2) *Enhancing Taiwan’s energy resilience*  
21 *through diversified and reliable sources reduces vul-*  
22 *nerability to coercion, disruption, or attack by au-*  
23 *thoritarian regimes.*

24 (3) *The United States possesses abundant sup-*  
25 *plies of energy resources, technologies, and expertise*

1        *that support economic growth, job creation, and the*  
2        *national security interests of the United States.*

3            *(4) Promoting United States energy exports to*  
4        *and partnerships with Taiwan aligns with United*  
5        *States energy diplomacy objectives, strengthens bilat-*  
6        *eral economic and security ties, and contributes to re-*  
7        *gional stability.*

8            *(5) Taiwan's energy infrastructure, including*  
9        *electric grid systems and liquefied natural gas import*  
10       *facilities, is vulnerable to asymmetric and kinetic*  
11       *threats from the People's Republic of China.*

12           *(6) Supporting Taiwan's efforts to improve the*  
13       *resilience and security of its energy infrastructure ad-*  
14       *vances deterrence and promotes continuity of govern-*  
15       *ment operations in the event of a crisis.*

16           *(7) In 2024, the United States exported*  
17       *212,837,000,000 cubic feet of liquefied natural gas to*  
18       *the People's Republic of China and 118,162,000,000*  
19       *cubic feet of liquefied natural gas to Taiwan. That ex-*  
20       *port imbalance indicates that the United States could*  
21       *help meet Taiwan's needs for liquefied natural gas by*  
22       *redirecting a portion of exports of liquefied natural*  
23       *gas currently destined for the People's Republic of*  
24       *China to Taiwan, assuming sufficient import and*  
25       *storage capacity in Taiwan.*

1 **SEC. 3. PROMOTION OF UNITED STATES ENERGY EXPORTS**  
 2 **AND ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE**  
 3 **FOR TAIWAN.**

4 *The Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (22 U.S.C. 3351*  
 5 *et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:*

6 **“PART 8—PROMOTION OF UNITED STATES EN-**  
 7 **ERGY EXPORTS AND ENERGY INFRASTRUC-**  
 8 **TURE RESILIENCE FOR TAIWAN**

9 **“SEC. 5540A. DEFINITIONS.**

10 *“In this part:*

11 *“(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-*  
 12 *TEES.—The term ‘appropriate congressional commit-*  
 13 *tees’ means—*

14 *“(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,*  
 15 *the Committee on Commerce, Science, and*  
 16 *Transportation, and the Committee on Energy*  
 17 *and Natural Resources of the Senate; and*

18 *“(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the*  
 19 *Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the*  
 20 *Committee on Natural Resources of the House of*  
 21 *Representatives.*

22 *“(2) ASYMMETRIC THREAT.—The term ‘asym-*  
 23 *metric threat’ means a threat posed by unconven-*  
 24 *tional means, including a cyberattack, sabotage, or*  
 25 *economic coercion, designed to undermine or disrupt*  
 26 *the operation of critical infrastructure.*

1 **“SEC. 5540B. PROMOTION OF UNITED STATES ENERGY EX-**  
2 **PORTS TO TAIWAN.**

3 *“(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-*  
4 *nation with the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary*  
5 *of Energy, may prioritize efforts to support and facilitate—*

6 *“(1) United States energy exports to Taiwan;*  
7 *and*

8 *“(2) the development of energy projects that di-*  
9 *versify Taiwan’s energy sources.*

10 *“(b) ACTIVITIES.—In carrying out subsection (a), the*  
11 *Secretaries may—*

12 *“(1) engage with United States liquefied natural*  
13 *gas producers, exporters, and infrastructure entities to*  
14 *identify and address barriers to liquefied natural gas*  
15 *exports and storage projects intended for the market*  
16 *of Taiwan;*

17 *“(2) facilitate coordination between United*  
18 *States private sector entities, relevant governing au-*  
19 *thorities, and private sector stakeholders in Taiwan,*  
20 *including to promote investment in energy projects in*  
21 *Taiwan and the export of United States technologies*  
22 *to Taiwan;*

23 *“(3) provide diplomatic and technical support*  
24 *for liquefied natural gas exports, exports of other*  
25 *United States energy resources and technologies, and*

1        *storage and related infrastructure for any relevant en-*  
2        *ergy projects linked to Taiwan;*

3            *“(4) consult with Taiwan to assess and strength-*  
4        *en liquefied natural gas import and storage capabili-*  
5        *ties; and*

6            *“(5) coordinate interagency efforts to ensure co-*  
7        *hesive and sustained United States support for Tai-*  
8        *wan’s energy security.*

9            *“(c) ASSESSMENT REQUIRED.—Not later than one*  
10       *year after the date of the enactment of the Taiwan Energy*  
11       *Security and Anti-Embargo Act of 2026, the National*  
12       *Academy of Sciences shall submit to the appropriate con-*  
13       *gressional committees an assessment of—*

14            *“(1) potential opportunities for boosting exports*  
15       *of liquefied natural gas produced in the United States*  
16       *to Taiwan, including by redirecting exports of such*  
17       *gas that flow to the People’s Republic of China as of*  
18       *such date of enactment;*

19            *“(2) potential ways the United States could shift*  
20       *the flow of such exports toward Taiwan; and*

21            *“(3) potential ways the United States could sup-*  
22       *port efforts to redirect such exports to Taiwan.*

1 **“SEC. 5540C. ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE CA-**  
2 **PACITY BUILDING.**

3       “(a) *REQUIREMENT.*—Not later than 180 days after  
4 the date of the enactment of the Taiwan Energy Security  
5 and Anti-Embargo Act of 2026, the Secretary of State, in  
6 coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Sec-  
7 retary of Energy, may seek to engage with appropriate offi-  
8 cials of Taiwan for the purpose of cooperating with the  
9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior,  
10 the Ministry of Defense, and the head of any other applica-  
11 ble ministry of Taiwan for capacity building to enhance  
12 energy infrastructure resilience, including defensive mili-  
13 tary cybersecurity activities.

14       “(b) *IDENTIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES.*—In carrying out  
15 subsection (a), the Secretary of State may identify coopera-  
16 tive activities—

17               “(1) to enhance cybersecurity programs to pro-  
18 tect grid operating systems, liquefied natural gas and  
19 other energy storage terminals, and supervisory con-  
20 trol and data acquisition systems;

21               “(2) to support physical security improvements,  
22 operational redundancy, and continuity-of-operations  
23 planning;

24               “(3) to engage in joint training exercises and  
25 scenario-based planning with relevant agencies in  
26 Taiwan; and

1           “(4) to support workforce development, emer-  
2           gency response planning, and institutional mod-  
3           ernization of energy sector operators.

4           “(c) *UNITED STATES-TAIWAN ENERGY SECURITY CEN-*  
5           *TER.*—*The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Sec-*  
6           *retary of Energy, may establish a joint United States-Tai-*  
7           *wan Energy Security Center in the United States,*  
8           *leveraging the expertise of institutions of higher education*  
9           *and private sector entities to foster dialogue and collabora-*  
10          *tion for academic cooperation in energy security and resil-*  
11          *ience.*

12          “(d) *AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE.*—*The Secretary*  
13          *of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and*  
14          *the Secretary of Energy, may provide technical assistance*  
15          *to support the activities described in subsection (b) or the*  
16          *center described in subsection (c).*

17          “(e) *IMPLEMENTATION.*—

18                 “(1) *IN GENERAL.*—*Assistance under this section*  
19                 *shall be provided through the American Institute in*  
20                 *Taiwan and in consultation with relevant authorities*  
21                 *in Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act*  
22                 *(22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.).*

23                 “(2) *NOTIFICATION.*—*Any assistance provided by*  
24                 *the Department of State pursuant this section shall be*  
25                 *subject to the regular notification requirements of sec-*

1        *tion 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22*  
2        *U.S.C. 2394–1).*

3        “(f) *BRIEFINGS.—Not later than 180 days after the*  
4        *date of the enactment of the Taiwan Energy Security and*  
5        *Anti-Embargo Act of 2026, the Secretary of State, in co-*  
6        *ordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary*  
7        *of Energy, shall provide to the appropriate congressional*  
8        *committees a briefing on the implementation of this section.*

9        **“SEC. 5540D. ANNUAL REPORT.**

10        “(a) *IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the*  
11        *date of the enactment of the Taiwan Energy Security and*  
12        *Anti-Embargo Act of 2026, and annually thereafter for 3*  
13        *years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Sec-*  
14        *retary of Commerce, the Secretary of Energy, and the Sec-*  
15        *retary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congres-*  
16        *sional committees a report that—*

17                “(1) *describes actions taken under this part;*

18                “(2) *identifies barriers to—*

19                        “(A) *increased United States energy exports*  
20                        *to Taiwan;*

21                        “(B) *increased investment in Taiwan’s en-*  
22                        *ergy sector that would strengthen Taiwan’s en-*  
23                        *ergy resilience;*

24                        “(C) *energy infrastructure security coopera-*  
25                        *tion; and*



1           (A) is the second safest source of energy;

2           (B) is one of only 2 clean energies that offer  
3 non-stop baseload power required for sustainable  
4 economic growth and improved human welfare;  
5 and

6           (C) when compared with other sources of  
7 electricity from cradle to grave, has the lowest  
8 carbon footprint, uses fewer materials, and takes  
9 up less land.

10          (2) A nuclear fuel assembly lasts up to 6 years,  
11 making supply more resistant to maritime disrup-  
12 tion.

13          (3) Taiwan has built a robust civilian nuclear  
14 capability over previous decades that has shown the  
15 potential to provide clean, reliable power to Taiwan.

16          (4) On May 17, 2025, the Maanshan-2, Taiwan's  
17 last operating nuclear power plant, was shut down  
18 after its 40-year operating license expired.

19          (5) There are compelling economic and security  
20 reasons to evaluate placing existing infrastructure  
21 back in service to ensure Taiwan has clean, reliable  
22 power that is more resilient in a contingency.

23          (6) As a result of Taiwan's substantial use of en-  
24 ergy in industrial manufacturing and production,  
25 and emerging energy requirements for electrification,

1        *artificial intelligence, and data center support, there*  
2        *is considerable benefit for Taiwan to evaluate new*  
3        *small modular reactors technology to augment its en-*  
4        *ergy capacity and resilience.*

5                *(7) As Taiwan modernizes its military, the*  
6        *power demand from command-and-control systems,*  
7        *intelligence platforms, drone operations, and joint*  
8        *battlespace integration will continue to increase.*

9        *(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*  
10        *that—*

11                *(1) it is in the interests of both the United States*  
12        *and Taiwan for Taiwan—*

13                        *(A) to maintain nuclear power as an en-*  
14        *ergy source; and*

15                        *(B) to utilize new nuclear technologies, in-*  
16        *cluding Gen III+ nuclear reactors and small*  
17        *modular reactor technology; and*

18                *(2) the United States should prioritize assistance*  
19        *and cooperation with Taiwan on nuclear energy to*  
20        *improve technology exports and job creation in the*  
21        *United States and energy security and resilience in*  
22        *Taiwan.*

1 **SEC. 6. INSURANCE FOR VESSELS TRANSPORTING VITAL**  
2 **GOODS TO STRATEGIC PARTNERS.**

3 *Section 53902 of title 46, United States Code, is*  
4 *amended by adding at the end the following:*

5 “(d) *VESSELS TRANSPORTING VITAL GOODS TO STRA-*  
6 *TEGIC PARTNERS.—*

7 “(1) *IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Transpor-*  
8 *tation may provide insurance and reinsurance under*  
9 *this chapter for any vessel engaged in commerce*  
10 *transporting critical energy, humanitarian, or other*  
11 *goods to Taiwan or another strategic partner of the*  
12 *United States that is facing coercive maritime threats*  
13 *if the Secretary determines, in consultation with the*  
14 *Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the*  
15 *Director of National Intelligence, that providing such*  
16 *insurance or reinsurance is necessary to support vital*  
17 *strategic commerce or to deter coercive maritime be-*  
18 *havior that undermines regional security.*

19 “(2) *NONAPPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN CONDI-*  
20 *TION.—The condition under section 53902(c) shall not*  
21 *apply with respect to a vessel described in paragraph*  
22 *(1).”.*

1 **SEC. 7. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION REGARDING CONTINUED**  
2 **UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN**  
3 **AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S RE-**  
4 **PUBLIC OF CHINA.**

5 *Nothing in this Act may be construed as a change to*  
6 *the One China Policy of the United States, which is guided*  
7 *by the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), the*  
8 *three United States-People's Republic of China Joint*  
9 *Communiqués, and the Six Assurances.*



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119<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS  
2<sup>D</sup> SESSION

**S. 2722**

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**A BILL**

To promote the energy security of Taiwan, and for  
other purposes.

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FEBRUARY 10, 2026

Reported with an amendment