

119TH CONGRESS
2^D SESSION

H. R. 7873

To promote the energy security of Taiwan, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 9, 2026

Mr. HARRIGAN (for himself, Mr. OLSZEWSKI, and Mr. LAWLER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To promote the energy security of Taiwan, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Taiwan Energy Secu-
5 rity and Anti-Embargo Act of 2026”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

8 (1) Taiwan is a vital democratic partner the en-
9 ergy security of which is critical to the strategic in-

1 terests of the United States in the Indo-Pacific re-
2 gion.

3 (2) Enhancing Taiwan’s energy resilience
4 through diversified and reliable sources reduces vul-
5 nerability to coercion, disruption, or attack by au-
6 thoritarian regimes.

7 (3) The United States possesses abundant sup-
8 plies of energy resources, technologies, and expertise
9 that support economic growth, job creation, and the
10 national security interests of the United States.

11 (4) Promoting United States energy exports to
12 and partnerships with Taiwan aligns with United
13 States energy diplomacy objectives, strengthens bi-
14 lateral economic and security ties, and contributes to
15 regional stability.

16 (5) Taiwan’s energy infrastructure, including
17 electric grid systems and liquefied natural gas im-
18 port facilities, is vulnerable to asymmetric and ki-
19 netic threats from the People’s Republic of China.

20 (6) Supporting Taiwan’s efforts to improve the
21 resilience and security of its energy infrastructure
22 advances deterrence and promotes continuity of gov-
23 ernment operations in the event of a crisis.

24 (7) In 2024, the United States exported
25 212,837,000,000 cubic feet of liquefied natural gas

1 to the People’s Republic of China and
2 118,162,000,000 cubic feet of liquefied natural gas
3 to Taiwan. That export imbalance indicates that the
4 United States could help meet Taiwan’s needs for
5 liquefied natural gas by redirecting a portion of ex-
6 ports of liquefied natural gas currently destined for
7 the People’s Republic of China to Taiwan, assuming
8 sufficient import and storage capacity in Taiwan.

9 **SEC. 3. PROMOTION OF UNITED STATES ENERGY EXPORTS**
10 **AND ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE**
11 **FOR TAIWAN.**

12 The Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (22 U.S.C.
13 3351 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the fol-
14 lowing:

15 **“PART 8—PROMOTION OF UNITED STATES EN-**
16 **ERGY EXPORTS AND ENERGY INFRASTRUC-**
17 **TURE RESILIENCE FOR TAIWAN**

18 **“SEC. 5540A. DEFINITIONS.**

19 “In this part:

20 “(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
21 TEES.—The term ‘appropriate congressional com-
22 mittees’ means—

23 “(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
24 the Committee on Commerce, Science, and

1 Transportation, and the Committee on Energy
2 and Natural Resources of the Senate; and

3 “(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
4 the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and
5 the Committee on Natural Resources of the
6 House of Representatives.

7 “(2) ASYMMETRIC THREAT.—The term ‘asym-
8 metric threat’ means a threat posed by unconven-
9 tional means, including a cyberattack, sabotage, or
10 economic coercion, designed to undermine or disrupt
11 the operation of critical infrastructure.

12 **“SEC. 5540B. PROMOTION OF UNITED STATES ENERGY EX-**
13 **PORTS TO TAIWAN.**

14 “(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in co-
15 ordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the Sec-
16 retary of Energy, may prioritize efforts to support and fa-
17 cilitate—

18 “(1) United States energy exports to Taiwan;
19 and

20 “(2) the development of energy projects that di-
21 versify Taiwan’s energy sources.

22 “(b) ACTIVITIES.—In carrying out subsection (a), the
23 Secretaries may—

24 “(1) engage with United States liquefied nat-
25 ural gas producers, exporters, and infrastructure en-

1 tities to identify and address barriers to liquefied
2 natural gas exports and storage projects intended
3 for the market of Taiwan;

4 “(2) facilitate coordination between United
5 States private sector entities, relevant governing au-
6 thorities, and private sector stakeholders in Taiwan,
7 including to promote investment in energy projects
8 in Taiwan and the export of United States tech-
9 nologies to Taiwan;

10 “(3) provide diplomatic and technical support
11 for liquefied natural gas exports, exports of other
12 United States energy resources and technologies,
13 and storage and related infrastructure for any rel-
14 evant energy projects linked to Taiwan;

15 “(4) consult with Taiwan to assess and
16 strengthen liquefied natural gas import and storage
17 capabilities; and

18 “(5) coordinate interagency efforts to ensure
19 cohesive and sustained United States support for
20 Taiwan’s energy security.

21 “(c) ASSESSMENT REQUIRED.—Not later than one
22 year after the date of the enactment of the Taiwan Energy
23 Security and Anti-Embargo Act of 2026, the National
24 Academy of Sciences shall submit to the appropriate con-
25 gressional committees an assessment of—

1 “(1) potential opportunities for boosting exports
2 of liquefied natural gas produced in the United
3 States to Taiwan, including by redirecting exports of
4 such gas that flow to the People’s Republic of China
5 as of such date of enactment;

6 “(2) potential ways the United States could
7 shift the flow of such exports toward Taiwan; and

8 “(3) potential ways the United States could
9 support efforts to redirect such exports to Taiwan.

10 **“SEC. 5540C. ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE CA-**
11 **PACITY BUILDING.**

12 “(a) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 days after
13 the date of the enactment of the Taiwan Energy Security
14 and Anti-Embargo Act of 2026, the Secretary of State,
15 in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Sec-
16 retary of Energy, may seek to engage with appropriate
17 officials of Taiwan for the purpose of cooperating with the
18 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior,
19 the Ministry of Defense, and the head of any other appli-
20 cable ministry of Taiwan for capacity building to enhance
21 energy infrastructure resilience, including defensive mili-
22 tary cybersecurity activities.

23 “(b) IDENTIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES.—In carrying
24 out subsection (a), the Secretary of State may identify co-
25 operative activities—

1 “(1) to enhance cybersecurity programs to pro-
2 tect grid operating systems, liquefied natural gas
3 and other energy storage terminals, and supervisory
4 control and data acquisition systems;

5 “(2) to support physical security improvements,
6 operational redundancy, and continuity-of-operations
7 planning;

8 “(3) to engage in joint training exercises and
9 scenario-based planning with relevant agencies in
10 Taiwan; and

11 “(4) to support workforce development, emer-
12 gency response planning, and institutional mod-
13 ernization of energy sector operators.

14 “(c) UNITED STATES-TAIWAN ENERGY SECURITY
15 CENTER.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with
16 the Secretary of Energy, may establish a joint United
17 States-Taiwan Energy Security Center in the United
18 States, leveraging the expertise of institutions of higher
19 education and private sector entities to foster dialogue and
20 collaboration for academic cooperation in energy security
21 and resilience.

22 “(d) AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE.—The Sec-
23 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of De-
24 fense and the Secretary of Energy, may provide technical

1 assistance to support the activities described in subsection
2 (b) or the center described in subsection (c).

3 “(e) IMPLEMENTATION.—

4 “(1) IN GENERAL.—Assistance under this sec-
5 tion shall be provided through the American Insti-
6 tute in Taiwan and in consultation with relevant au-
7 thorities in Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Re-
8 lations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.).

9 “(2) NOTIFICATION.—Any assistance provided
10 by the Department of State pursuant this section
11 shall be subject to the regular notification require-
12 ments of section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act
13 of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394–1).

14 “(f) BRIEFINGS.—Not later than 180 days after the
15 date of the enactment of the Taiwan Energy Security and
16 Anti-Embargo Act of 2026, the Secretary of State, in co-
17 ordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Sec-
18 retary of Energy, shall provide to the appropriate congres-
19 sional committees a briefing on the implementation of this
20 section.

21 **“SEC. 5540D. ANNUAL REPORT.**

22 “(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after
23 the date of the enactment of the Taiwan Energy Security
24 and Anti-Embargo Act of 2026, and annually thereafter
25 for 3 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with

1 the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Energy, and
2 the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate
3 congressional committees a report that—

4 “(1) describes actions taken under this part;

5 “(2) identifies barriers to—

6 “(A) increased United States energy ex-
7 ports to Taiwan;

8 “(B) increased investment in Taiwan’s en-
9 ergy sector that would strengthen Taiwan’s en-
10 ergy resilience;

11 “(C) energy infrastructure security co-
12 operation; and

13 “(D) enhancing the resilience of Taiwan’s
14 energy supply against economic coercion and
15 supply chain disruptions, with due consideration
16 for national security implications;

17 “(3) evaluates the effectiveness of capacity
18 building and technical assistance activities carried
19 out under section 5540C; and

20 “(4) provides recommendations to expand and
21 diversify Taiwan’s energy sources and improve fu-
22 ture bilateral energy cooperation between the United
23 States and Taiwan.

1 “(b) FORM.—Each report required by subsection (a)
2 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include
3 a classified annex.”.

4 **SEC. 4. TRAINING TO IMPROVE TAIWAN’S CRITICAL EN-**
5 **ERGY INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION.**

6 Section 5504(a)(3) of the Taiwan Enhanced Resil-
7 ience Act (22 U.S.C. 3353(a)(3)) is amended by inserting
8 after “capabilities” the following: “and critical energy in-
9 frastructure protection”.

10 **SEC. 5. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING**
11 **TAIWAN’S USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY.**

12 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
13 ings:

14 (1) According to the International Atomic En-
15 ergy Agency, nuclear energy—

16 (A) is the second safest source of energy;

17 (B) is one of only 2 clean energies that
18 offer non-stop baseload power required for sus-
19 tainable economic growth and improved human
20 welfare; and

21 (C) when compared with other sources of
22 electricity from cradle to grave, has the lowest
23 carbon footprint, uses fewer materials, and
24 takes up less land.

1 (2) A nuclear fuel assembly lasts up to 6 years,
2 making supply more resistant to maritime disrup-
3 tion.

4 (3) Taiwan has built a robust civilian nuclear
5 capability over previous decades that has shown the
6 potential to provide clean, reliable power to Taiwan.

7 (4) On May 17, 2025, the Maanshan-2, Tai-
8 wan’s last operating nuclear power plant, was shut
9 down after its 40-year operating license expired.

10 (5) There are compelling economic and security
11 reasons to evaluate placing existing infrastructure
12 back in service to ensure Taiwan has clean, reliable
13 power that is more resilient in a contingency.

14 (6) As a result of Taiwan’s substantial use of
15 energy in industrial manufacturing and production,
16 and emerging energy requirements for electrification,
17 artificial intelligence, and data center support, there
18 is considerable benefit for Taiwan to evaluate new
19 small modular reactors technology to augment its
20 energy capacity and resilience.

21 (7) As Taiwan modernizes its military, the
22 power demand from command-and-control systems,
23 intelligence platforms, drone operations, and joint
24 battlespace integration will continue to increase.

1 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
2 gress that—

3 (1) it is in the interests of both the United
4 States and Taiwan for Taiwan—

5 (A) to maintain nuclear power as an en-
6 ergy source; and

7 (B) to utilize new nuclear technologies, in-
8 cluding Gen III+ nuclear reactors and small
9 modular reactor technology; and

10 (2) the United States should prioritize assist-
11 ance and cooperation with Taiwan on nuclear energy
12 to improve technology exports and job creation in
13 the United States and energy security and resilience
14 in Taiwan.

15 **SEC. 6. INSURANCE FOR VESSELS TRANSPORTING VITAL**
16 **GOODS TO STRATEGIC PARTNERS.**

17 Section 53902 of title 46, United States Code, is
18 amended by adding at the end the following:

19 “(d) VESSELS TRANSPORTING VITAL GOODS TO
20 STRATEGIC PARTNERS.—

21 “(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Transpor-
22 tation may provide insurance and reinsurance under
23 this chapter for any vessel engaged in commerce
24 transporting critical energy, humanitarian, or other
25 goods to Taiwan or another strategic partner of the

1 United States that is facing coercive maritime
2 threats if the Secretary determines, in consultation
3 with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
4 State, and the Director of National Intelligence, that
5 providing such insurance or reinsurance is necessary
6 to support vital strategic commerce or to deter coer-
7 cive maritime behavior that undermines regional se-
8 curity.

9 “(2) NONAPPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN CONDI-
10 TION.—The condition under section 53902(c) shall
11 not apply with respect to a vessel described in para-
12 graph (1).”.

13 **SEC. 7. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION REGARDING CONTINUED**
14 **UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN**
15 **AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S**
16 **REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

17 Nothing in this Act may be construed as a change
18 to the One China Policy of the United States, which is
19 guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et
20 seq.), the three United States-People’s Republic of China
21 Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances.

○