

116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 7484

To direct the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a report on efforts by the People’s Republic of China to exploit the COVID–19 pandemic to advance the national security and foreign policy interests of China.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 2, 2020

Ms. KENDRA S. HORN of Oklahoma (for herself, Mrs. MURPHY of Florida, Mr. ROSE of New York, Mr. O’HALLERAN, Mr. CASE, Mr. MCADAMS, Mr. CORREA, Mr. GOLDEN, Mr. BRINDISI, Mr. CRIST, and Mr. CUNNINGHAM) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

A BILL

To direct the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a report on efforts by the People’s Republic of China to exploit the COVID–19 pandemic to advance the national security and foreign policy interests of China.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Preventing China from
5 Exploiting COVID–19 Act”.

1 **SEC. 2. REPORT ON EFFORTS BY CHINA TO EXPLOIT**
2 **COVID-19 PANDEMIC TO ADVANCE NATIONAL**
3 **SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS**
4 **OF CHINA.**

5 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date
6 of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National In-
7 telligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the
8 Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Se-
9 curity, shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
10 mittees, and make publicly available on the internet
11 website of the Director, a report on efforts by the People’s
12 Republic of China to exploit the COVID-19 pandemic to
13 advance the national security and foreign policy interests
14 of China in ways that undermine the interests of the
15 United States, allies and partners of the United States,
16 and the rules-based international order.

17 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report under subsection (a)
18 shall include the following:

19 (1) An assessment of—

20 (A) the tactics and techniques used by
21 China to obstruct or retaliate against countries,
22 such as Australia, that have sought a full and
23 fair inquiry into the role of China in the emer-
24 gence and spread of COVID-19; and

25 (B) the motivations of China for under-
26 taking such obstruction or retaliation.

1 (2) A description of activities undertaken by
2 China, including with respect to cyber-theft, in-
3 tended to licitly or illicitly acquire information and
4 intellectual property in the possession of non-Chi-
5 nese governments and businesses relating to
6 COVID–19 testing, treatment, and vaccines.

7 (3) An assessment of whether the activities de-
8 scribed under paragraph (2) violate the commitment
9 of China under the cybersecurity agreement entered
10 into by China and the United States in 2015 to re-
11 frain from conducting or supporting cyber-enabled
12 economic espionage.

13 (4) An assessment of the manner by which
14 China seeks to advance the foreign policy interests
15 of China by providing economic aid or medical
16 equipment to countries adversely affected by
17 COVID–19 and a discussion of the degree to which
18 such aid renders recipient countries more likely to
19 adopt positions favorable to the interests of China or
20 detrimental to the interests of the United States.

21 (5) An assessment of—

22 (A) the effects of the pledged economic
23 support by China to international organizations,
24 such as the World Health Organization; and

1 (B) whether, and in what manner, China
2 uses such support to induce such organizations
3 to take actions favorable to the interests of
4 China or detrimental to the interests of the
5 United States.

6 (6) An identification of the different ways in
7 which China is using, or may be planning to use, the
8 global disruption and distraction associated with the
9 COVID–19 pandemic as an opportunity to more ag-
10 gressively pursue longstanding domestic and foreign
11 policy objectives, including the objectives of China
12 with respect to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and
13 territorial disputes.

14 (7) An assessment of—

15 (A) the means and methods by which
16 China disseminates misinformation, whether
17 overtly or covertly, about COVID–19, including
18 on United States-based social media platforms
19 or through other English language-based media;
20 and

21 (B) the motivations of China for dissemi-
22 nating such misinformation and a description of
23 how the departments and agencies of the Fed-
24 eral Government are collaborating to track,
25 analyze, and respond to such dissemination.

1 (8) An overarching assessment of—

2 (A) how the activities of China described in
3 this subsection collectively further the national
4 interests of China; and

5 (B) the extent to which such activities con-
6 stitute a continuation of the longstanding prac-
7 tices of China or are an evolution of the foreign
8 policy behavior of China.

9 (c) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be
10 submitted in unclassified form without any designation re-
11 lating to dissemination control, but the report submitted
12 to the appropriate congressional committees may include
13 a classified annex.

14 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
15 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
16 gressional committees” means the following:

17 (1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Com-
18 mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on For-
19 eign Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security,
20 and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
21 of the House of Representatives; and

22 (6) the Committee on Appropriations, the Com-
23 mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on For-
24 eign Relations, the Committee on Homeland Secu-

- 1 rity and Governmental Affairs, and the Select Com-
- 2 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate.

