

116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 7085

To amend the Revised Statutes to remove the defense of qualified immunity in the case of any action under section 1979, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 4, 2020

Mr. AMASH (for himself, Ms. PRESSLEY, Ms. OMAR, Ms. DEGETTE, Mr. GARCÍA of Illinois, Mr. BLUMENAUER, Mr. MCGOVERN, Ms. PINGREE, Ms. OCASIO-CORTEZ, Mr. ESPAILLAT, Mr. MEEKS, Ms. VELÁZQUEZ, Ms. NORTON, Ms. LEE of California, Mr. TAKANO, Mr. CARSON of Indiana, Mrs. CAROLYN B. MALONEY of New York, and Mr. KENNEDY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

To amend the Revised Statutes to remove the defense of qualified immunity in the case of any action under section 1979, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Ending Qualified Im-
5 munity Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 The Congress finds as follows:

1 (1) In 1871, Congress passed the Ku Klux
2 Klan Act to combat rampant violations of civil and
3 constitutionally secured rights across the Nation,
4 particularly in the post-Civil War South.

5 (2) Included in the act was a provision, now
6 codified at section 1983 of title 42, United States
7 Code, which provides a cause of action for individ-
8 uals to file lawsuits against State and local officials
9 who violate their legal and constitutionally secured
10 rights.

11 (3) Section 1983 has never included a defense
12 or immunity for government officials who act in
13 good faith when violating rights, nor has it ever had
14 a defense or immunity based on whether the right
15 was “clearly established” at the time of the viola-
16 tion.

17 (4) From the law’s beginning in 1871, through
18 the 1960s, government actors were not afforded
19 qualified immunity for violating rights.

20 (5) In 1967, the Supreme Court in *Pierson v.*
21 *Ray*, 386 U.S. 547, suddenly found that government
22 actors had a good faith defense for making arrests
23 under unconstitutional statutes based on a common
24 law defense for the tort of false arrest.

1 (6) The Court later extended this beyond false
2 arrests, turning it into a general good faith defense
3 for government officials.

4 (7) Finally, in *Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S.
5 800 (1982), the Court found the subjective search
6 for good faith in the government actor unnecessary,
7 and replaced it with an “objective reasonableness”
8 standard that requires that the right be “clearly es-
9 tablished” at the time of the violation for the de-
10 fendant to be liable.

11 (8) This doctrine of qualified immunity has se-
12 verely limited the ability of many plaintiffs to re-
13 cover damages under section 1983 when their rights
14 have been violated by State and local officials. As a
15 result, the intent of Congress in passing the law has
16 been frustrated, and Americans’ rights secured by
17 the Constitution have not been appropriately pro-
18 tected.

19 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.**

20 It is the sense of the Congress that we must correct
21 the erroneous interpretation of section 1983 which pro-
22 vides for qualified immunity, and reiterate the standard
23 found on the face of the statute, which does not limit li-
24 ability on the basis of the defendant’s good faith beliefs

1 or on the basis that the right was not “clearly established”
2 at the time of the violation.

3 **SEC. 4. REMOVAL OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.**

4 Section 1979 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C.
5 1983) is amended by adding at the end the following: “It
6 shall not be a defense or immunity to any action brought
7 under this section that the defendant was acting in good
8 faith, or that the defendant believed, reasonably or other-
9 wise, that his or her conduct was lawful at the time when
10 it was committed. Nor shall it be a defense or immunity
11 that the rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
12 Constitution or laws were not clearly established at the
13 time of their deprivation by the defendant, or that the
14 state of the law was otherwise such that the defendant
15 could not reasonably have been expected to know whether
16 his or her conduct was lawful.”.

○