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To require an unclassified interagency report on the political influence operations of the Government of China and the Communist Party of China with respect to the United States, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 28, 2018

Mr. RUBIO (for himself, Ms. CORTEZ MASTO, Mr. CORNYN, Mr. CRUZ, Mr. COTTON, Mr. GARDNER, and Mr. MARKEY) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To require an unclassified interagency report on the political influence operations of the Government of China and the Communist Party of China with respect to the United States, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Countering the Chinese
5 Government and Communist Party’s Political Influence
6 Operations Act”.

7 **SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.**

8 In this Act:

1 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
2 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
3 mittees” means—

4 (A) the Committee on Appropriations of
5 the Senate;

6 (B) the Committee on Armed Services of
7 the Senate;

8 (C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
9 the Senate;

10 (D) the Committee on Health, Education,
11 Labor, and Pensions of the Senate;

12 (E) the Committee on the Judiciary of the
13 Senate;

14 (F) the Select Committee on Intelligence of
15 the Senate;

16 (G) the Committee on Banking, Housing,
17 and Urban Affairs of the Senate;

18 (H) the Committee on Appropriations of
19 the House of Representatives;

20 (I) the Committee on Armed Services of
21 the House of Representatives;

22 (J) the Committee on Education and the
23 Workforce of the House of Representatives;

24 (K) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
25 the House of Representatives;

1 (L) the Committee on the Judiciary of the
2 House of Representatives;

3 (M) the Permanent Select Committee on
4 Intelligence of the House of Representatives;
5 and

6 (N) the Committee on Financial Services
7 of the House of Representatives.

8 (2) POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.—The
9 term “political influence operations” means the co-
10 ordinated and often concealed application of
11 disinformation, press manipulation, economic coer-
12 cion, targeted investments, corruption, or academic
13 censorship. Such efforts are often intended—

14 (A) to coerce and corrupt United States in-
15 terests, institutions, or individuals; and

16 (B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions,
17 or outcomes in the United States that support
18 the interests of the Government of the People’s
19 Republic of China or the Communist Party of
20 China.

21 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

22 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

23 (1) The Government of China and the Com-
24 munist Party of China employ a wide range of polit-
25 ical, informational, and economic measures to influ-

1 ence, coerce, intimidate, or undermine the United
2 States interests or the interests of United States
3 partners and allies.

4 (2) The December 2017 National Security
5 Strategy of the United States of America states,
6 “Although the United States seeks to continue to co-
7 operate with China, China is using economic induce-
8 ments and penalties, influence operations, and im-
9 plied military threats to persuade other states to
10 heed its political and security agenda.”

11 (3) The political influence operations efforts of
12 the Government of China and the Communist Party
13 of China have received less scrutiny than the efforts
14 of the Government of the Russian Federation, but
15 given China’s economic strength and the growing ap-
16 paratus being used to spread its influence globally,
17 efforts to promote its authoritarian ideal pose sig-
18 nificant and consequential long-term challenges to
19 United States interests and values.

20 (4) The Government of China and the Com-
21 munist Party of China use both overt and covert
22 means to target the political and economic elite, the
23 media and public opinion, civil society and academia,
24 and members of the Chinese diaspora.

1 (5) The Government of China and the Com-
2 munist Party of China employ an array of govern-
3 ment entities, friendship and exchange organiza-
4 tions, and government-funded foundations, think
5 tanks, educational and other projects to carry out
6 political influence operations, which is often referred
7 to as united front work.

8 (6) These political influence operations violate
9 national sovereignty, and as such, are fundamentally
10 different from traditional efforts by states to shape
11 international policy debates and improve their public
12 image through public diplomacy and strategic com-
13 munications campaigns.

14 (7) The aims of the political influence oper-
15 ations of the Government of China and the Com-
16 munist Party of China are—

17 (A) to secure the political stability of the
18 regime within China; and

19 (B) to globally promote the idea that the
20 Chinese political and economic model is supe-
21 rior to the governments of Western democ-
22 racies.

23 (8) The political influence operations of the
24 Government of China and the Communist Party of

1 China take advantage of the open and democratic
2 nature of the United States, including—

3 (A) constitutional protections for free
4 speech and a free press; and

5 (B) the desire of some individuals or insti-
6 tutions to attract Chinese investment, gain ac-
7 cess to Chinese markets, or attain greater glob-
8 al influence.

9 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
10 gress that—

11 (1) the political influence operations of the Gov-
12 ernment of China and the Communist Party of
13 China are not “soft power” intended to persuade,
14 but “sharp power” intended—

15 (A) to penetrate or corrupt democratic
16 countries;

17 (B) to foster attitudes, behavior, laws, and
18 policies favorable to the Government of China’s
19 interest through disinformation, coercion, and
20 other means;

21 (C) to widen the scope of Chinese authori-
22 tarian influence around the world, including to
23 suppress political dissent and internationally
24 recognized human and civil rights of their citi-
25 zens in nations around the world; and

1 (D) to undermine the strength of American
2 alliances around the world; and

3 (2) the American people need reliable and cur-
4 rent information—

5 (A) to understand the malign goals of
6 these political influence operations;

7 (B) to identify the key institutions, individ-
8 uals, entities, and ministries that carry out such
9 operations; and

10 (C) to distinguish the entities referred to
11 in subparagraph (B) from the cultural, edu-
12 cational, and people-to-people exchanges that
13 benefit the United States and China.

14 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
15 United States—

16 (1) to clearly differentiate between the Chinese
17 people and culture and the Government of China
18 and the Communist Party of China in official state-
19 ments, media, and messaging;

20 (2) to clearly differentiate between legal, inter-
21 nationally accepted public diplomacy and strategic
22 communications campaigns and illicit activities to
23 undermine democratic institutions or freedoms;

24 (3) to ensure that efforts to curtail the political
25 influence operations of the Government of China and

1 the Communist Party of China do not lead to the
2 targeting of Chinese Americans or members of the
3 Chinese diaspora, who are often the victims and pri-
4 mary targets of such political influence operations;

5 (4) to take steps to ensure that Chinese nation-
6 als who are legally studying, living, or working tem-
7 porarily in the United States know that intimidation
8 or surveillance by the Government of China and the
9 Communist Party of China is an unacceptable inva-
10 sion of their rights while they reside in the United
11 States;

12 (5) to enhance cooperation and coordination
13 with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Taiwan
14 (officially known as the “Republic of China”), whose
15 governments and institutions have faced acute pres-
16 sure from the political influence operations of the
17 Government of China and the Communist Party of
18 China, and with other allies throughout the world—

19 (A) to counter such political influence op-
20 erations;

21 (B) to curtail the advancement of authori-
22 tarian ideals that challenge democratic values
23 and international human rights norms;

24 (C) to create strategies to ensure that
25 countries in Africa, the Western Hemisphere,

1 Southeast Asia, and elsewhere are aware of
2 China’s “sharp power”; and

3 (D) to work collaboratively to counter coer-
4 cive, covert, and corrupting elements;

5 (6) to develop a strategic assessment and long-
6 term strategy to counter the political influence oper-
7 ations of the Government of China and the Com-
8 munist Party of China that—

9 (A) undermine democratic institutions;

10 (B) target United States citizens or na-
11 tionals or intimidates their families in China;
12 and

13 (C) use economic tools, market access,
14 cyberattacks, or other capabilities to undermine
15 the freedoms of speech, expression, the press,
16 association, assembly, religion, or academic
17 thought;

18 (7) to implement more advanced transparency
19 requirements concerning collaboration with Chinese
20 actors for media agencies, universities, think tanks,
21 and government officials;

22 (8) to use various forums to raise awareness
23 about—

1 (A) the goals and methods of the political
2 influence operations of the Government of
3 China and the Communist Party of China; and

4 (B) common patterns and approaches used
5 by Chinese intelligence agencies or related ac-
6 tors;

7 (9) to require greater transparency for Confu-
8 cius Institutes, think tanks, academic programs, and
9 nongovernmental organizations funded primarily by
10 the Government of China or by individuals or public
11 or private organizations with a demonstrable affili-
12 ation with the Government of China that are oper-
13 ating in the United States to register through the
14 Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C.
15 612) or a comparable mechanism;

16 (10) to seek ways to increase Chinese language
17 proficiency among mid-career professionals;

18 (11) to ensure that existing tools are suffi-
19 ciently screening for the risk of Chinese influence
20 operations; and

21 (12) to create more flexible tools, as needed,
22 with the goals of—

23 (A) screening investments from the Gov-
24 ernment of China or sources backed by the
25 Government of China to protect against the

1 takeover of United States companies by Chinese
2 state-owned or state-driven entities; and

3 (B) protecting institutions or business sec-
4 tors critically important to United States na-
5 tional security and the viability of democratic
6 institutions.

7 **SEC. 4. REPORT ON THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPER-**
8 **ATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA AND**
9 **THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA.**

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 270 days after the
11 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
12 in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence,
13 and in consultation with the heads of relevant Federal de-
14 partments and agencies, shall submit an unclassified re-
15 port to the appropriate congressional committees that de-
16 scribes the political influence operations of the Govern-
17 ment of China and the Communist Party of China affect-
18 ing the United States and not more than 5 allies and part-
19 ners most impacted by the Government of China’s influ-
20 ence operations in their countries, as defined by the Direc-
21 tor of National Intelligence, including efforts—

22 (1) to exert undue influence over United States
23 governmental or nongovernmental institutions or in-
24 dividuals, or government officials among United
25 States allies and partners;

1 (2) to coerce or threaten United States citizens
2 or legal permanent residents or their families or rel-
3 atives living in China;

4 (3) to undermine democratic institutions and
5 the freedoms of speech, expression, the press, asso-
6 ciation, assembly, religion, or academic thought;

7 (4) to otherwise suppress information in public
8 fora, in the United States and abroad; or

9 (5) to develop or obtain property, facilities, in-
10 frastructure, business entities, or other assets for
11 use in facilitating the activities described in para-
12 graphs (1) through (4).

13 (b) CONTENTS.—The report required under sub-
14 section (a) shall also include recommendations for the
15 President and Congress relating to—

16 (1) the need for additional resources or authori-
17 ties to counter political influence operations in the
18 United States directed by the Government of China
19 or the Communist Party of China, including oper-
20 ations carried out in concert with allies;

21 (2) ways to use existing resources to develop
22 core competencies among Federal agencies and the
23 Armed Forces in the subject area of Chinese polit-
24 ical influence operations;

1 (3) whether a permanent office to monitor and
2 respond to political influence operations of the Gov-
3 ernment of China and the Communist Party of
4 China should be established within the Department
5 of State or the Office of the Director of National In-
6 telligence; and

7 (4) whether regular public reports on the polit-
8 ical influence operations of the Government of China
9 and the Communist Party of China are needed to in-
10 form Congress and the American people of the scale
11 and scope of such operations.

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