

115TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. 3169

To establish as United States policy that, pending confirmation of the Russian Federation's continued compliance with New START, the United States should extend New START through 2026.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 28, 2018

Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself, Mr. WARNER, and Mr. REED) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To establish as United States policy that, pending confirmation of the Russian Federation's continued compliance with New START, the United States should extend New START through 2026.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “New START Policy
5 Act of 2018”.

6 **SEC. 2. NEW START DEFINED.**

7 In this Act, the term “New START” means the
8 Treaty between the United States of America and the

1 Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduc-
2 tion and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed
3 April 8, 2010, and entered into force February 5, 2011
4 (commonly known as the “New START Treaty”).

5 **SEC. 3. FINDINGS.**

6 Congress makes the following findings:

7 (1) Since the end of World War II, the United
8 States has relied on a robust and effective nuclear
9 deterrent as part of our national defense, particu-
10 larly against the Soviet Union and its successor
11 state, the Russian Federation.

12 (2) In tandem with our nuclear deterrent, the
13 United States pursued a number of arms control,
14 disarmament, and nonproliferation agreements with
15 the Soviet Union as a means of ensuring strategic
16 stability and United States defense of the homeland,
17 such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and
18 the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

19 (3) The Nuclear Posture Review issued in Feb-
20 ruary 2018 states that arms control agreements dur-
21 ing the Cold War “increased transparency, mod-
22 erated competition, codified rough parity in strategic
23 nuclear areas, and closed off areas of competition”.

24 (4) In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet
25 Union, the United States continues to rely on a com-

1 bination of nuclear deterrence and strategic arms
2 control to protect the United States from nuclear at-
3 tack.

4 (5) On April 8, 2010, the United States and
5 the Russian Federation signed the New Strategic
6 Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).

7 (6) In an op-ed to the Washington Post dated
8 December 2, 2010, former Secretaries of State
9 Henry A. Kissinger, George P. Shultz, James A.
10 Baker III, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, and Colin L.
11 Powell all urged the Senate to ratify New START,
12 stating that it was in “the national interest to rat-
13 ify”.

14 (7) During the ratification process, New
15 START garnered bipartisan support, and the United
16 States Senate approved New START on December
17 22, 2010, by a 71–26 vote.

18 (8) New START entered into force on Feb-
19 ruary 5, 2011, placing limitations on United States
20 and Russian strategic systems, including interconti-
21 nental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic
22 missiles, and heavy bombers, as well as warheads
23 that threatened the United States.

1 (9) On February 5, 2018, the central limits on
2 United States and Russia strategic nuclear arsenals
3 took effect.

4 (10) In March 2018, the United States and the
5 Russian Federation exchanged data on their respec-
6 tive strategic nuclear arsenals in accordance with the
7 Treaty.

8 (11) Through the Treaty’s verification regime,
9 which includes short-notice, on-site inspections at
10 military bases and facilities, the United States is
11 able to verify the data provided by the Russian Fed-
12 eration regarding its strategic nuclear arsenal. The
13 verification regime provides both countries insight
14 into each other’s strategic nuclear delivery systems,
15 warheads, and facilities, as well as data exchanges to
16 track the status and makeup of nuclear weapons
17 systems.

18 (12) During a March 2017 hearing of the Com-
19 mittee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-
20 resentatives on nuclear deterrence requirements,
21 Commander of the United States Strategic Com-
22 mand (STRATCOM) and Air Force General John
23 Hyten voiced his enthusiastic support for the Treaty,
24 saying he was “a big supporter” and stating “when
25 it comes to nuclear weapons and nuclear capabilities,

1 that bilateral, verifiable arms control agreements are
2 essential to our ability to provide an effective deter-
3 rent”.

4 (13) In the same hearing, Air Force General
5 Paul Selva, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
6 of Staff, also endorsed the treaty, saying New
7 START is “a bilateral, verifiable agreement that
8 gives us some degree of predictability on what our
9 potential adversaries look like”.

10 (14) Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein, the
11 Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deter-
12 rence and Nuclear Integration, asserted that New
13 START was of “huge value” to United States secu-
14 rity.

15 (15) The Nuclear Posture Review states that
16 arms control agreements can “foster transparency,
17 understanding, and predictability in adversary rela-
18 tions, thereby reducing the risk of misunderstanding
19 and miscalculation”.

20 (16) New START strengthens United States
21 nuclear security and strategic stability by reducing
22 the number of strategic systems in Russia’s nuclear
23 arsenal and provides the United States with the in-
24 spection and monitoring tools necessary to con-

1 fidently verify Russian compliance with New
2 START.

3 (17) New START does not restrict United
4 States nuclear modernization programs or limit
5 United States missile defense efforts.

6 **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

7 Unless the President determines and so informs Con-
8 gress that Russia is not in material compliance with New
9 START, it is the policy of the United States to extend
10 New START from its initial termination date in February
11 2021 to February 2026, as allowed in the Treaty.

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