

115TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 6888

To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 25, 2018

Mr. MCCARTHY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services, Intelligence (Permanent Select), Ways and Means, the Judiciary, Financial Services, and Transportation and Infrastructure, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
5 “Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018”.

6 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
7 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Findings.

TITLE I—UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

- Sec. 101. Policy.
- Sec. 102. Diplomatic strategy.

TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

- Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
- Sec. 202. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region.
- Sec. 203. United States-China relationship.
- Sec. 204. United States-India strategic partnership.
- Sec. 205. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership.
- Sec. 206. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security partnership.
- Sec. 207. Quadrilateral security dialogue.
- Sec. 208. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia.
- Sec. 209. Commitment to Taiwan.
- Sec. 210. North Korea strategy.
- Sec. 211. New Zealand.
- Sec. 212. The Pacific Islands.
- Sec. 213. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of international law.
- Sec. 214. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia.
- Sec. 215. Cybersecurity cooperation.
- Sec. 216. Nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific region.

TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

- Sec. 301. Findings; sense of Congress.
- Sec. 302. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional economic summits.
- Sec. 303. United States-ASEAN economic partnership.
- Sec. 304. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation.
- Sec. 305. Intellectual property protection.
- Sec. 306. Energy programs and initiatives.
- Sec. 307. Lower Mekong initiative.
- Sec. 308. Sense of Congress on economic growth and natural resource conservation.

TITLE IV—PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO- PACIFIC REGION

- Sec. 401. Findings.
- Sec. 402. Trafficking-in-persons.
- Sec. 403. Freedom of the press.
- Sec. 404. Democracy, human rights, and labor personnel.
- Sec. 405. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people engagement.
- Sec. 406. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Human Rights Strategy.
- Sec. 407. Freedom of information to North Korea.
- Sec. 408. Sense of Congress on imposition of sanctions and suspension of United States assistance.
- Sec. 409. Authorization of appropriations.

Sec. 410. Indo-Pacific human rights and environmental defenders.
Sec. 411. Young leaders people-to-people initiatives.
Sec. 412. No authorization of additional appropriations.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress makes the following findings:

3 (1) The Indo-Pacific region—

4 (A) represents nearly 50 percent of the
5 global population;

6 (B) is home to some of the most dynamic
7 economies in the world; and

8 (C) poses security challenges that threaten
9 to undermine United States national security
10 interests, regional peace, and global stability.

11 (2) The core tenets of the United States-backed
12 international system are being challenged, including
13 by—

14 (A) China’s illegal construction and mili-
15 tarization of artificial features in the South
16 China Sea and coercive economic practices;

17 (B) North Korea’s acceleration of its nu-
18 clear and ballistic missile capabilities; and

19 (C) the increased presence throughout
20 Southeast Asia of the Islamic State (referred to
21 in this Act as “ISIS”) and other international
22 terrorist organizations that threaten the United
23 States.

1 (3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific re-
2 gion continues to transform, presenting opportuni-
3 ties and challenges to United States economic inter-
4 ests.

5 (4) The United States has a fundamental inter-
6 est in defending human rights and promoting the
7 rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region. Although
8 many countries in the region have improved the
9 treatment of their citizens, several Indo-Pacific gov-
10 ernments continue to commit human rights abuses
11 and place restrictions on basic human rights and po-
12 litical and civil liberties.

13 (5) Without strong leadership from the United
14 States, the international system, fundamentally root-
15 ed in the rule of law, may wither, to the detriment
16 of United States, regional, and global interests. It is
17 imperative that the United States continue to play
18 a leading role in the Indo-Pacific region by—

19 (A) defending peace and security;
20 (B) advancing economic prosperity; and
21 (C) promoting respect for fundamental
22 human rights.

23 (6) The United States National Security Strat-
24 egy (referred to in this Act as the “National Secu-

1 rity Strategy’”), which was released in December
2 2017, states—

3 (A) “A geopolitical competition between
4 free and repressive visions of world order is tak-
5 ing place in the Indo-Pacific region. The region,
6 which stretches from the west coast of India to
7 the western shores of the United States, rep-
8 represents the most populous and economically dy-
9 namic part of the world. The United States in-
10 terest in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends
11 back to the earliest days of our republic.”; and

12 (B) “Our vision for the Indo-Pacific ex-
13 cludes no nation. We will redouble our commit-
14 ment to established alliances and partnerships,
15 while expanding and deepening relationships
16 with new partners that share respect for sov-
17 ereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and the rule
18 of law. We will reinforce our commitment to
19 freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution
20 of territorial and maritime disputes in accord-
21 ance with international law. We will work with
22 allies and partners to achieve complete,
23 verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization on
24 the Korean Peninsula and preserve the non-pro-
25 liferation regime in Northeast Asia.”.

1 **TITLE I—UNITED STATES POL-**
2 **ICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRAT-**
3 **EGY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC**
4 **REGION**

5 **SEC. 101. POLICY.**

6 It is the policy of the United States to develop and
7 commit to a long-term strategic vision and a comprehen-
8 sive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for
9 the Indo-Pacific region that—

10 (1) secures the vital national security interests
11 of the United States and our allies and partners;

12 (2) promotes American prosperity and economic
13 interests by advancing economic growth and develop-
14 ment of a rules-based Indo-Pacific economic commu-
15 nity;

16 (3) advances American influence by reflecting
17 the values of the American people and universal
18 human rights;

19 (4) supports functional problem-solving regional
20 architecture; and

21 (5) accords with and supports the rule of law
22 and international norms.

23 **SEC. 102. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.**

24 It is the diplomatic strategy of the United States—

25 (1) to work with United States allies—

- 1 (A) to confront common challenges;
- 2 (B) to improve information sharing;
- 3 (C) to increase defense investment and
- 4 trade;
- 5 (D) to ensure interoperability; and
- 6 (E) to strengthen shared capabilities;

7 (2) to strengthen relationships with partners
8 who—

- 9 (A) share mutual respect for the rule of
- 10 law;
- 11 (B) agree with fair and reciprocal trade;
- 12 and
- 13 (C) understand the importance of civil so-
- 14 ciety, the rule of law, and transparent govern-
- 15 ance;

16 (3) to support functional problem-solving re-

17 gional architecture, including through the Associa-

18 tion of Southeast Asian Nations, Asia-Pacific Eco-

19 nomic Cooperation, and the East Asia Summit;

20 (4) to emphasize the commitment of the United
21 States—

- 22 (A) to freedom of navigation under inter-
- 23 national law;
- 24 (B) to promote peaceful resolutions of
- 25 maritime and territorial disputes; and

1 (C) to expand security and defense co-
2 operation with allies and partners, as appro-
3 priate;

4 (5) to pursue diplomatic measures to achieve
5 complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization
6 of North Korea;

7 (6) to improve civil society, strengthen the rule
8 of law, and advocate for transparent governance;

9 (7) to develop and grow the economy through
10 private sector partnerships between the United
11 States and Indo-Pacific partners;

12 (8) to pursue multilateral and bilateral trade
13 agreements in a free, fair, and reciprocal manner
14 and build a network of partners in the Indo-Pacific
15 committed to free markets;

16 (9) to work with and encourage Indo-Pacific
17 countries—

18 (A) to pursue high-quality and transparent
19 infrastructure projects;

20 (B) to maintain unimpeded commerce,
21 open sea lines or air ways, and communication;
22 and

23 (C) to seek the peaceful resolution of dis-
24 putes; and

1 (10) to sustain a strong military presence in the
2 Indo-Pacific region and strengthen security relation-
3 ships with allies and partners throughout the region.

4 **TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED**
5 **STATES SECURITY INTERESTS**
6 **IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION**

7 **SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

8 (a) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term “ap-
9 propriate committees of Congress” means—

10 (1) the Committee on Appropriations of the
11 Senate;

12 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
13 Senate;

14 (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the
15 House of Representatives; and

16 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
17 House of Representatives.

18 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Out of
19 funds otherwise authorized for the Department of State,
20 the United States Agency for International Development,
21 and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense, and sub-
22 ject to the availability of appropriations, there are author-
23 ized to be appropriated for the Department of State, the
24 United States Agency for International Development, and,
25 as appropriate, the Department of Defense,

1 \$1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through
2 2023, which shall be used—

3 (1) to advance United States foreign policy in-
4 terests and objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in
5 recognition of the value of diplomatic initiatives and
6 programs in the furtherance of United States strat-
7 egy;

8 (2) to improve the defense capacity of partner
9 nations to resist coercion and deter and defend
10 against security threats, including through foreign
11 military financing and international military edu-
12 cation and training programs;

13 (3) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral
14 engagements, particularly with the United States
15 most highly capable allies and partners, to meet
16 strategic challenges, including—

17 (A) certain destabilizing activities of the
18 People's Republic of China; and

19 (B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear
20 and ballistic missile programs of the Demo-
21 cratic People's Republic of Korea;

22 (4) to build new counterterrorism partnership
23 programs in Southeast Asia to combat the growing
24 presence of ISIS and other terrorist organizations

1 that pose a significant threat to the United States,
2 its allies, and its citizens' interests abroad; and

3 (5) to increase maritime domain awareness pro-
4 grams in South Asia and Southeast Asia—

5 (A) by expanding the scope of naval and
6 coast guard training efforts with Southeast
7 Asian countries;

8 (B) by expanding cooperation with demo-
9 cratic partners in South Asia, including Ban-
10 gladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka;

11 (C) through intelligence sharing and other
12 information-sharing efforts; and

13 (D) through multilateral engagements, in-
14 cluding by involving Japan, Australia, and
15 India in such efforts.

16 (c) COUNTERING CHINA'S INFLUENCE TO UNDER-
17 MINE THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.—Amounts appro-
18 priated pursuant to subsection (b) shall be made available
19 for United States Government efforts to counter the stra-
20 tegic influence of the People's Republic of China, in ac-
21 cordance with the strategy required under section
22 7043(e)(3) of the Department of State, Foreign Oper-
23 ations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014
24 (division K of Public Law 113–76; 128 Stat. 536) and

1 in consultation with the appropriate committees of Con-
2 gress.

3 (d) BURMA.—None of the amounts appropriated pur-
4 suant to subsection (b) may be made available for Inter-
5 national Military Education and Training and Foreign
6 Military Financing Programs for the armed forces of the
7 Republic of the Union of Myanmar (historically known as
8 “Burma”).

9 (e) PHILIPPINES.—

10 (1) IN GENERAL.—None of the amounts appro-
11 priated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made
12 available for counternarcotics assistance for the Phil-
13 ippine National Police unless the Secretary of State
14 determines and reports to the appropriate commit-
15 tees of Congress that the Government of the Phil-
16 ippines has adopted and is implementing a counter-
17 narcotics strategy that is consistent with inter-
18 national human rights standards, including inves-
19 tigating and prosecuting individuals who are credibly
20 alleged to have ordered, committed, or covered up
21 extrajudicial killings and other gross violations of
22 human rights in the conduct of counternarcotics op-
23 erations.

24 (2) EXCEPTION.—The limitation under para-
25 graph (1) shall not apply to funds made available—

1 (A) for drug demand reduction, maritime
2 programs, or transnational interdiction pro-
3 grams; or

4 (B) to support for the development of such
5 counternarcotics strategy, after consultation
6 with the appropriate committees of Congress.

7 (f) CAMBODIA.—None of the amounts authorized to
8 be appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made
9 available for United States assistance programs that ben-
10 efit the Government of Cambodia unless the Secretary of
11 State certifies and reports to the appropriate congres-
12 sional committees that the requirements under section
13 7043(b)(1) of division K of the Consolidated Appropria-
14 tions Act, 2018 (Public Law 115–141) have been met.

15 **SEC. 202. TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC RE-**
16 **GION.**

17 (a) UNITED STATES-JAPAN ALLIANCE.—The United
18 States Government—

19 (1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Co-
20 operation and Security between the United States
21 and Japan, done at Washington, January 19, 1960,
22 and all related and subsequent bilateral security
23 agreements and arrangements concluded on or be-
24 fore the date of the enactment of this Act;

1 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be-
2 tween the United States and Japan in promoting
3 peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and

4 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening
5 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between
6 the United States and Japan.

7 (b) UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA ALLI-
8 ANCE.—The United States Government—

9 (1) is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty
10 Between the United States and the Republic of
11 Korea, done at Washington October 1, 1953, and all
12 related and subsequent bilateral security agreements
13 and arrangements concluded on or before the date of
14 the enactment of this Act;

15 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be-
16 tween the United States and South Korea in pro-
17 moting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region;
18 and

19 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening
20 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between
21 the United States and the Republic of Korea.

22 (c) UNITED STATES-AUSTRALIA ALLIANCE.—The
23 United States Government—

24 (1) is committed to the Security Treaty Be-
25 tween Australia and the United States of America,

1 done at San Francisco September 1, 1951, and all
2 related and subsequent bilateral security agreements
3 and arrangements concluded on or before the date of
4 the enactment of this Act;

5 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be-
6 tween the United States and Australia in promoting
7 peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and

8 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening
9 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between
10 the United States and Australia.

11 (d) UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINES ALLIANCE.—The
12 United States Government is committed to the Mutual
13 Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines
14 and the United States of America, done at Washington
15 August 30, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral
16 security agreements and arrangements concluded on or be-
17 fore the date of the enactment of this Act, including the
18 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at Ma-
19 nila April 28, 2014.

20 (e) THAILAND.—The United States Government is
21 committed to—

22 (1) the Agreement Respecting Military Assist-
23 ance Between the Government of the United States
24 of America and the Government of Thailand, done
25 at Bangkok October 17, 1950;

1 (2) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Trea-
2 ty, done at Manila September 8, 1954; and

3 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral security
4 agreements and arrangements concluded on or be-
5 fore the date of the enactment of this Act, including
6 the Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-United
7 States Defense Alliance, issued in Bangkok Novem-
8 ber 15, 2012.

9 **SEC. 203. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONSHIP.**

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government—

11 (1) expresses grave concerns with Chinese ac-
12 tions that seek—

13 (A) to further constrain space for civil so-
14 ciety within China; and

15 (B) to undermine a rules-based order in
16 the Indo-Pacific region;

17 (2) encourages China to play a constructive role
18 in world affairs by demonstrating consistent respect
19 for the rule of law and international norms;

20 (3) seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and
21 comprehensive relationship with China—

22 (A) by expanding areas of cooperation; and

23 (B) by addressing areas of disagreement,
24 including over human rights, economic policies,
25 and maritime security; and

1 (4) is committed to working with China on
2 shared regional and global challenges, especially—

3 (A) upholding and strengthening the rules-
4 based international system; and

5 (B) the denuclearization of North Korea.

6 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
7 gress that the United States should—

8 (1) welcome a decision by China to change
9 course and pursue a responsible results-oriented re-
10 lationship with the United States and engagement
11 on global issues;

12 (2) encourage China to play a constructive role
13 in the Indo-Pacific region and globally; and

14 (3) continue to call out Chinese actions that un-
15 dermine the rules-based international system.

16 **SEC. 204. UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.**

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government—

18 (1) recognizes the vital role of the strategic
19 partnership between the United States and India in
20 promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific re-
21 gion;

22 (2) calls for the strengthening and broadening
23 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between
24 the United States and India; and

25 (3) is committed to—

1 (A) the New Framework for the United
2 States-India Defense Relationship, done at Ar-
3 lington, Virginia on June 28, 2005;

4 (B) the United States-India Defense Tech-
5 nology and Trade Initiative, launched in 2012;

6 (C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo-
7 Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, announced on
8 January 25, 2015;

9 (D) the United States-India Joint State-
10 ment on Prosperity Through Partnership,
11 issued on June 26, 2017; and

12 (E) all related and subsequent bilateral
13 and security agreements and arrangements con-
14 cluded as of the date of the enactment of this
15 Act.

16 (b) INDIA AS MAJOR DEFENSE PARTNER.—Congress
17 makes the following findings:

18 (1) Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National De-
19 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Pub-
20 lic Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751
21 note) requires the recognition of India as a major
22 defense partner.

23 (2) The designation of India as a major defense
24 partner, which is unique to India—

1 (A) institutionalizes the progress made to
2 facilitate defense trade and technology sharing
3 between the United States and India;

4 (B) elevates defense trade and technology
5 cooperation between the United States and
6 India to a level commensurate with the closest
7 allies and partners of the United States;

8 (C) facilitates technology sharing between
9 the United States and India, including license-
10 free access to a wide range of dual-use tech-
11 nologies, after taking into account national se-
12 curity concerns; and

13 (D) facilitates joint exercises, coordination
14 on defense strategy and policy, military ex-
15 changes, and port calls in support of defense
16 cooperation between the United States and
17 India.

18 **SEC. 205. UNITED STATES-ASEAN STRATEGIC PARTNER-**
19 **SHIP.**

20 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
21 gress that the United States should—

22 (1) support and reaffirm the elevation of the
23 United States-Association of Southeast Asian Na-
24 tions (referred to in this section as “ASEAN”) rela-
25 tionship to a strategic partnership;

1 (2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping
2 build a strong, stable, politically cohesive, economi-
3 cally integrated, and socially responsible community
4 of nations that has common rules, norms, proce-
5 dures, and standards which are consistent with
6 international law and the principles of a rules-based
7 Indo-Pacific community;

8 (3) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to fos-
9 ter greater integration among its members;

10 (4) recognize the value of—

11 (A) ASEAN engagement with economic,
12 political, and security partners within Asia and
13 elsewhere, including Australia, Canada, the Eu-
14 ropean Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Nor-
15 way, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan; and

16 (B) strategic economic initiatives, such as
17 the United States-ASEAN Connect, which dem-
18 onstrate a commitment to ASEAN and the
19 ASEAN Economic Community and build upon
20 economic relationships in the Indo-Pacific re-
21 gion;

22 (5) support efforts by the nations comprising
23 ASEAN—

24 (A) to address maritime and territorial dis-
25 putes in a constructive manner; and

1 (B) to pursue claims through peaceful, dip-
2 lomatic, and legitimate regional and inter-
3 national arbitration mechanisms, consistent
4 with international law, including through the
5 adoption of a code of conduct in the South
6 China Sea to further promote peace and sta-
7 bility in the Indo-Pacific region;

8 (6) support efforts by United States partners
9 and allies in ASEAN—

10 (A) to enhance maritime capability and
11 maritime domain awareness;

12 (B) to protect unhindered access to, and
13 use of, international waterways in the Asia-Pa-
14 cific region that are critical to ensuring the se-
15 curity and free flow of commerce;

16 (C) to counter piracy;

17 (D) to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking
18 activities such as the trafficking of persons,
19 goods, and drugs; and

20 (E) to enhance the maritime capabilities of
21 countries or regional organizations to respond
22 to emerging threats to maritime security in the
23 Asia-Pacific region; and

24 (7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a
25 common approach to reaffirm the decision of the

1 Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling with respect
2 to the case between the Republic of the Philippines
3 and the People’s Republic of China.

4 (b) REPORT ON STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR EN-
5 GAGEMENT WITH ASEAN.—

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
7 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-
8 nually thereafter for 7 years, the Secretary of State
9 shall submit a report to the appropriate congres-
10 sional committees on a strategic framework to ad-
11 minister programs, projects, and activities of the
12 United States to support diplomatic and economic
13 engagement between the United States and ASEAN
14 member countries for the 10-year period beginning
15 on the date of the enactment of this Act.

16 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under
17 paragraph (1) shall address the following elements
18 of United States strategy:

19 (A) Promoting commercial engagement be-
20 tween the United States and member countries
21 of ASEAN.

22 (B) Helping member countries of ASEAN
23 use sustainable, efficient, and innovative tech-
24 nologies in their respective energy sectors.

1 (C) Supporting economic conditions in
2 member countries of ASEAN that promote in-
3 novation, the creation of new businesses, sus-
4 tainable growth, and the education of the re-
5 gion's future innovators, entrepreneurs, and
6 business leaders.

7 (D) Working with member countries of
8 ASEAN to improve the policy and regulatory
9 environment for growth, trade, innovation, and
10 investment.

11 (E) Supporting the regional integration ob-
12 jectives of member countries of ASEAN under
13 the ASEAN Economic Community.

14 (F) Partnership opportunities with the
15 governments of other countries friendly to the
16 United States that have committed to a high
17 set of standards for investment and develop-
18 ment with ASEAN, as determined by the Sec-
19 retary of State.

20 **SEC. 206. UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA-JAPAN TRI-**
21 **LATERAL SECURITY PARTNERSHIP.**

22 It is the sense of Congress that the President should
23 develop a strategy to deepen the trilateral security co-
24 operation between the United States, South Korea, and

1 Japan, including missile defense, intelligence-sharing, and
2 other defense-related initiatives.

3 **SEC. 207. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE.**

4 It is the sense of Congress that—

5 (1) the security dialogue between the United
6 States, Australia, India, and Japan is vital to ad-
7 dress pressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific
8 region in order to promote—

9 (A) a rules-based order;

10 (B) respect for international law; and

11 (C) a free and open Indo-Pacific; and

12 (2) such a dialogue is intended to augment,
13 rather than to replace, current mechanisms.

14 **SEC. 208. ENHANCED SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTH-**
15 **EAST ASIA.**

16 (a) INDONESIA.—The United States Government is
17 committed to—

18 (1) the United States-Indonesia Comprehensive
19 Partnership, done in Washington November 9, 2010;

20 (2) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive De-
21 fense Cooperation, done in Washington October 26,
22 2015; and

23 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-
24 curity agreements and arrangements between the

1 United States and Indonesia concluded on or before
2 the date of the enactment of this Act.

3 (b) MALAYSIA.—The United States Government is
4 committed to—

5 (1) the United States-Malaysia Comprehensive
6 Partnership, done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014;

7 (2) the Joint Statement for Enhancing the
8 Comprehensive Partnership between the United
9 States of America and Malaysia, done in Wash-
10 ington September 13, 2017; and

11 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-
12 curity agreements and arrangements between the
13 United States and Malaysia concluded on or before
14 the date of the enactment of this Act.

15 (c) SINGAPORE.—The United States Government is
16 committed to—

17 (1) the Strategic Framework Agreement Be-
18 tween the United States of America and the Repub-
19 lic of Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partner-
20 ship in Defense and Security, done at Washington
21 July 12, 2005;

22 (2) the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agree-
23 ment, done at Arlington, Virginia December 7,
24 2015; and

1 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-
2 curity agreements and arrangements between the
3 United States and Singapore concluded on or before
4 the date of the enactment of this Act.

5 (d) VIETNAM.—The United States Government is
6 committed to—

7 (1) the United States-Vietnam Comprehensive
8 Partnership, done at Washington December 16,
9 2013;

10 (2) the United States-Vietnam Joint Vision
11 Statement on Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on
12 June 1, 2015;

13 (3) the United States-Vietnam Joint Vision
14 Statement, done at Washington May 31, 2017; and

15 (4) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-
16 curity agreements and arrangements between the
17 United States and Vietnam concluded on or before
18 the date of the enactment of this Act.

19 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
20 gress that the United States should deepen diplomatic,
21 economic, and security cooperation, especially in the areas
22 of maritime security and counterterrorism, with Indonesia,
23 Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam.

1 **SEC. 209. COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.**

2 (a) UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.—It
3 is the policy of the United States—

4 (1) to support the close economic, political, and
5 security relationship between Taiwan and the United
6 States;

7 (2) to faithfully enforce all existing United
8 States Government commitments to Taiwan, con-
9 sistent with the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Pub-
10 lic Law 96–8), the 3 joint communiques, and the Six
11 Assurances agreed to by President Ronald Reagan
12 in July 1982; and

13 (3) to counter efforts to change the status quo
14 and to support peaceful resolution acceptable to both
15 sides of the Taiwan Strait.

16 (b) ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.—The President should
17 conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan
18 that are tailored to meet the existing and likely future
19 threats from the People’s Republic of China, including
20 supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate
21 asymmetric capabilities, as appropriate, including under-
22 sea warfare and air defense capabilities, into its military
23 forces.

24 (c) TRAVEL.—The President should encourage the
25 travel of high-level United States officials to Taiwan, in

1 accordance with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–
2 135).

3 **SEC. 210. NORTH KOREA STRATEGY.**

4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
5 ings:

6 (1) The Government of the Democratic People’s
7 Republic of Korea has flagrantly defied the inter-
8 national community by illicitly developing its nuclear
9 and ballistic missile programs, in violation of United
10 Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006),
11 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270
12 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017),
13 and 2397 (2017).

14 (2) The Government of the Democratic People’s
15 Republic of Korea engages in gross human rights
16 abuses against its own people and citizens of other
17 countries, including the United States, the Republic
18 of Korea, and Japan.

19 (3) The United States is committed to pursuing
20 a peaceful denuclearization of the Democratic Peo-
21 ple’s Republic of Korea through a policy of max-
22 imum pressure and engagement, in close concert
23 with its partners.

1 (b) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT
2 TO SANCTIONS AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S RE-
3 PUBLIC OF KOREA.—

4 (1) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of
5 the United States to continue to impose sanctions
6 with respect to activities of the Government of the
7 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, persons act-
8 ing for or on behalf of such government, or other
9 persons in accordance with Executive Order 13687
10 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to imposing addi-
11 tional sanctions with respect to North Korea), Exec-
12 utive Order 13694 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to
13 blocking the property of certain persons engaging in
14 significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), Exec-
15 utive Order 13722 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to
16 blocking the property of the Government of North
17 Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea, and prohib-
18 iting certain transactions with respect to North
19 Korea), and Executive Order 13810 (82 Fed. Reg.
20 44705; relating to imposing additional sanctions
21 with respect to North Korea), as such Executive or-
22 ders are in effect on the day before the date of the
23 enactment of this Act, until the Democratic People's
24 Republic of Korea is no longer engaged in the illicit
25 activities described in such Executive orders, includ-

1 ing actions in violation of the United Nations Secu-
2 rity Council resolutions referred to in subsection
3 (a)(1).

4 (2) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after ter-
5 minating any sanction with respect to the activities
6 of the Government of the Democratic People’s Re-
7 public of Korea, a person acting for or on behalf of
8 such government, or any other person provided for
9 in an Executive order listed in subsection (a), the
10 Secretary of State shall submit a report to the ap-
11 propriate congressional committees justifying the
12 termination of the sanction and explaining the rela-
13 tionship between such termination and the cessation
14 of any illicit activity that violates any of the United
15 Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in
16 subsection (a)(1) by such Government or person.

17 (3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this
18 subsection shall be construed to limit the authority
19 of the President pursuant to the International
20 Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
21 et seq.).

22 (c) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT
23 TO NEGOTIATION ON THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S RE-
24 PUBLIC OF KOREA’S NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE
25 PROGRAMS.—It is the policy of the United States that the

1 objective of negotiations with respect to the nuclear and
2 ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People's Re-
3 public of Korea be the complete, verifiable, and irreversible
4 dismantlement of such programs.

5 (d) REPORT ON A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS THE
6 THREATS POSED BY, AND THE CAPABILITIES OF, THE
7 DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
9 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180
10 days thereafter for 7 years, the Secretary of State,
11 or a designee of the Secretary, shall submit a report
12 to the appropriate congressional committees that de-
13 scribes actions taken by the United States to ad-
14 dress the threats posed by, and the capabilities of,
15 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

16 (2) ELEMENTS.—Each report required under
17 paragraph (1) shall include—

18 (A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the
19 United States to identify strategies and policies,
20 including an assessment of the strengths and
21 weaknesses of such strategies and policies—

22 (i) to achieve peaceful denucleariza-
23 tion of the Democratic People's Republic
24 of Korea; and

1 (ii) to eliminate the threat posed by
2 the ballistic missile program of the Demo-
3 cratic People’s Republic of Korea;

4 (B) an assessment of—

5 (i) potential road maps toward peace-
6 ful denuclearization of the Democratic
7 People’s Republic of Korea and the elimi-
8 nation of the nuclear and ballistic missile
9 threats posed by the Democratic People’s
10 Republic of Korea; and

11 (ii) specific actions that the Demo-
12 cratic People’s Republic of Korea would
13 need to take for each such roadmap to be-
14 come viable;

15 (C) a summary of the United States strat-
16 egy to increase international coordination and
17 cooperation, whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or
18 multilaterally, including sanctions enforcement
19 and interdiction, to address the threat posed by
20 the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the
21 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which
22 shall include—

23 (i) a description of the actions taken
24 by the Secretary of State, or designees of
25 the Secretary, to consult with governments

1 around the world, with the purpose of in-
2 ducing such governments to fully imple-
3 ment the United Nations Security Council
4 resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1);

5 (ii) a description of the actions taken
6 by such governments to fully implement
7 United Nations Security Council resolu-
8 tions related to the Democratic People's
9 Republic of Korea;

10 (iii) a list of countries with govern-
11 ments that the Secretary has determined
12 are noncooperative with respect to imple-
13 menting the United Nations Security
14 Council resolutions referred to in sub-
15 section (a)(1); and

16 (iv) a plan of action to engage, and
17 increase cooperation with respect to the
18 Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
19 with the governments of the countries on
20 the list described in clause (iii);

21 (D) an assessment of the adequacy of the
22 national export control regimes of countries
23 that are members of the United Nations, and
24 multilateral export control regimes, that are
25 necessary to enforce sanctions imposed with re-

1 spect to the Democratic People’s Republic of
2 Korea pursuant to the United Nations Security
3 Council resolutions referred to in subsection
4 (a)(1); and

5 (E) an action plan to encourage and assist
6 countries in adopting and using authorities nec-
7 essary to enforce export controls required by
8 United Nations Security Council resolutions.

9 (3) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required
10 under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassi-
11 fied form, but may include a classified annex.

12 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
13 gress that—

14 (1) representatives of the United States shall
15 use the voice and vote of the United States in all
16 international organizations, as appropriate, to advo-
17 cate for the expulsion of the Democratic People’s
18 Republic of Korea from such organizations, until
19 such time as the Democratic People’s Republic of
20 Korea meets its commitments under the United Na-
21 tions Security Council resolutions referred to in sub-
22 section (a)(1); and

23 (2) the Secretary of State should work to in-
24 duce countries to meet their commitments under the
25 United Nations Security Council resolutions referred

1 to in subsection (a)(1), including by considering ap-
2 propriate adjustments to the diplomatic posture and
3 foreign assistance of the United States with govern-
4 ments that the Secretary has determined are non-
5 cooperative with respect to implementing the United
6 Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in
7 subsection (a)(1).

8 **SEC. 211. NEW ZEALAND.**

9 The United States Government is committed to—

10 (1) the Wellington Declaration, signed on No-
11 vember 5, 2010, which reaffirmed close ties and out-
12 lined future practical cooperation between the
13 United States and New Zealand;

14 (2) the Washington Declaration, signed on
15 June 19, 2012, which strengthened the defense rela-
16 tionship by providing a framework and strategic
17 guidance for security cooperation and defense dia-
18 logues; and

19 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se-
20 curity agreements and arrangements between the
21 United States and New Zealand concluded on or be-
22 fore the date of enactment of this Act.

23 **SEC. 212. THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.**

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of Congress that
25 the United States should—

1 (1) support strong United States engagement
2 with the nations of the South Pacific, including Fiji,
3 Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States
4 of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea,
5 Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and
6 Vanuatu;

7 (2) deepen its cooperation with the nations of
8 the South Pacific in areas of mutual interest, includ-
9 ing—

10 (A) fisheries and marine resource con-
11 servation;

12 (B) environmental challenges and resil-
13 ience;

14 (C) global health;

15 (D) development and trade; and

16 (E) people-to-people ties; and

17 (3) continue to provide assistance to the Pacific
18 Islands, as appropriate, to support the rule of law,
19 good governance, and economic development.

20 (b) UNITED STATES-COMPACTS OF FREE ASSOCIA-
21 TION.—It is the sense of Congress that the Compacts of
22 Free Association entered between the United States and
23 the Freely Associated States (Republic of Marshall Is-
24 lands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Repub-
25 lic of Palau)—

1 (1) enhance the strategic posture of the United
2 States in the Western Pacific;

3 (2) reinforce United States regional commit-
4 ment;

5 (3) preempt potential adversaries from estab-
6 lishing positional advantage; and

7 (4) further self-governance, economic develop-
8 ment, and self-sufficiency of the Freely Associated
9 States.

10 **SEC. 213. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT;**

11 **PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.**

12 (a) **FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION.**—It is the policy of
13 the United States—

14 (1) to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of
15 Navigation Program, regular freedom of navigation,
16 and overflight operations in the Indo-Pacific region,
17 in accordance with applicable international law; and

18 (2) to promote genuine multilateral negotiations
19 to peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South
20 China Sea, in accordance with applicable inter-
21 national law.

22 (b) **JOINT INDO-PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.**—

23 It is the sense of Congress that the President should de-
24 velop a diplomatic strategy that includes working with
25 United States allies and partners to conduct joint mari-

1 time training and freedom of navigation operations in the
2 Indo-Pacific region, including the East China Sea and the
3 South China Sea, in support of a rules-based international
4 system benefitting all countries.

5 **SEC. 214. COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.**

6 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

7 (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON-
8 GRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Con-
9 gress” means—

10 (A) the Committee on Armed Services of
11 the Senate;

12 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
13 the Senate;

14 (C) the Committee on Armed Services of
15 the House of Representatives; and

16 (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
17 the House of Representatives.

18 (2) ISIS.—The term “ISIS” means the Islamic
19 State of Iraq and Syria.

20 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date
21 of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National In-
22 telligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the
23 Secretary of Defense, and other appropriate Federal offi-
24 cials, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees
25 of Congress that contains an assessment of the current

1 and future capabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, al-
2 Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist groups in South-
3 east Asia that pose a significant threat to the United
4 States, its allies, and its citizens interests abroad.

5 (c) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub-
6 section (b) shall include—

7 (1) the current number of ISIS-linked, al-
8 Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-af-
9 filiated fighters in Southeast Asia;

10 (2) an estimate of the number of ISIS-linked,
11 al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-
12 affiliated fighters expected to return to Southeast
13 Asia from fighting in the Middle East;

14 (3) an analysis of the amounts and sources of
15 ISIS-linked, al Qaeda-linked, and other various ex-
16 tremist group affiliated-fighters in Southeast Asia;

17 (4) the current resources available to combat
18 the threat of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other
19 violent extremist group-affiliated fighters in South-
20 east Asia, and the additional resources required to
21 combat such threat;

22 (5) a detailed assessment of the capabilities of
23 ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent ex-
24 tremist group-affiliated fighters to operate effectively

1 in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Philippines,
2 Indonesia, and Malaysia;

3 (6) a description of the capabilities and re-
4 sources of governments in Southeast Asia to counter
5 violent extremist groups; and

6 (7) a list of additional United States resources
7 and capabilities that the Department of Defense and
8 the Department of State recommend providing to
9 governments in Southeast Asia to combat violent ex-
10 tremist groups.

11 **SEC. 215. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION.**

12 It is the sense of Congress that there should be ro-
13 bust cybersecurity cooperation between the United States
14 and nations in the Indo-Pacific region—

15 (1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity
16 threats, including state-sponsored threats;

17 (2) to share best practices to combat such
18 threats;

19 (3) to strengthen resilience against misinforma-
20 tion and propaganda;

21 (4) to build capacity for responding to cyberse-
22 curity threats originating in the Indo-Pacific region;
23 and

1 (5) to enhance cooperation between the United
2 States and Indo-Pacific nations for combating such
3 threats.

4 **SEC. 216. NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE**
5 **INDO-PACIFIC REGION.**

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government—

7 (1) recognizes that the spread of nuclear and
8 other weapons of mass destruction, and their means
9 of delivery, constitutes a threat to international
10 peace and security;

11 (2) seeks to peacefully address the unique chal-
12 lenge posed to regional and global stability by the il-
13 licit use, and the proliferation to and from North
14 Korea, of sensitive nuclear and missile technologies,
15 and other weapons of mass destruction;

16 (3) notes efforts by China and Russia—

17 (A) to expand and modernize their respec-
18 tive nuclear arsenals, including through signifi-
19 cant research and development resources in
20 hypersonic glide vehicles and other advanced
21 technologies; and

22 (B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear
23 technologies; and

1 (4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many
2 countries in the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear en-
3 ergy for a variety of peaceful applications.

4 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
5 gress that the United States Government should under-
6 take all reasonable and appropriate efforts to pursue effec-
7 tive arms control and nonproliferation policies in the Indo-
8 Pacific region to limit the further spread of weapons of
9 mass destruction and their means of delivery.

10 **TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED**
11 **STATES ECONOMIC INTER-**
12 **ESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC**
13 **REGION**

14 **SEC. 301. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

15 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
16 ings:

17 (1) According to the United States Chamber of
18 Commerce, by 2030—

19 (A) 66 percent of the global middle class
20 population will be living in Asia; and

21 (B) 59 percent of middle class consump-
22 tion will take place in Asia.

23 (2) According to the Asian Development
24 Bank—

1 (A) Asian countries have signed 140 bilat-
2 eral or regional trade agreements; and

3 (B) 75 more trade agreements with Asian
4 countries are under negotiation or concluded
5 and awaiting entry into force.

6 (3) Free trade agreements between the United
7 States and 3 nations in the Indo-Pacific region
8 (Australia, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea)
9 have entered into force.

10 (4) The member states of the Association of
11 Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in this section
12 as “ASEAN”), as a group—

13 (A) represent the fifth largest economy in
14 the world; and

15 (B) have a combined gross domestic prod-
16 uct of \$2,400,000,000,000.

17 (5) The economy comprised of ASEAN member
18 states grew by 66 percent between 2006 and 2015,
19 and the total value of bilateral trade between the
20 United States and ASEAN member states has in-
21 creased by 78 percent since 2004.

22 (6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by
23 companies in ASEAN member states to consumers
24 in the United States was \$77,000,000,000, while the
25 United States 2015 trade surplus of services pro-

1 vided to consumers in ASEAN member states was
2 \$8,000,000,000.

3 (7) According to US-ASEAN Business Council,
4 goods and services exported from the United States
5 to ASEAN member states support 550,000 jobs in
6 the United States.

7 (8) According to the Business Roundtable—

8 (A) the United States, Australia, Brunei,
9 Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New
10 Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam were re-
11 sponsible for a combined 40 percent of global
12 gross domestic product in 2017; and

13 (B) United States bilateral trade with the
14 other nations referred to in subparagraph (A)
15 supports 15,600,000 jobs in the United States.

16 (9) According to the United States National Se-
17 curity Strategy—

18 (A) ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic
19 Cooperation “remain centerpieces of the Indo-
20 Pacific’s regional architecture and platforms for
21 promoting an order based on freedom”; and

22 (B) the United States will “work with
23 partners to build a network of states dedicated
24 to free markets and protected from forces that
25 would subvert their sovereignty.”.

1 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
2 gress that trade between the United States and the na-
3 tions in the Indo-Pacific region is vitally important to the
4 United States economy, United States exports, and jobs
5 in the United States.

6 **SEC. 302. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, MULTILATERAL AGREE-**
7 **MENTS, AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC SUMMITS.**

8 Congress supports—

9 (1) multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade
10 agreements that increase United States employment
11 and expand the economy;

12 (2) formal economic dialogues that include con-
13 crete, verifiable, and measured outcomes;

14 (3) high-standard bilateral investment treaties
15 between the United States and nations in the Indo-
16 Pacific region;

17 (4) negotiations of the Trade in Services Agree-
18 ment and the Environmental Goods Agreement that
19 include several major Asian economies; and

20 (5) the proactive, strategic, and continuing
21 high-level use of the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-
22 tion forum, the East Asia Summit, and the Group
23 of 20 to pursue United States economic objectives in
24 the Indo-Pacific region.

1 **SEC. 303. UNITED STATES-ASEAN ECONOMIC PARTNER-**
2 **SHIP.**

3 The President is authorized to negotiate a com-
4 prehensive economic engagement framework with the As-
5 sociation of Southeast Asian Nations.

6 **SEC. 304. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRADE FACILI-**
7 **TATION.**

8 The President is encouraged to produce a robust and
9 comprehensive trade capacity building and trade facilita-
10 tion strategy for the Indo-Pacific region.

11 **SEC. 305. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION.**

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President is encouraged to
13 make enforcement of United States intellectual property
14 laws a top priority, including taking all appropriate action
15 to deter and punish commercial cyber-enabled theft of in-
16 tellectual property.

17 (b) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after
18 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually there-
19 after for 7 years, the President shall submit a report to
20 Congress that—

21 (1) describes the efforts of the United States
22 Government to combat intellectual property viola-
23 tions and commercial cyber-enabled theft in the
24 Indo-Pacific region, particularly the People’s Repub-
25 lic of China; and

1 (2) includes a country-by-country assessment of
2 priority areas for United States engagement and ca-
3 pacity building assistance.

4 **SEC. 306. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES.**

5 (a) INDO-PACIFIC ENERGY STRATEGY.—Not later
6 than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
7 and annually thereafter for 7 years, the President shall
8 establish a comprehensive, integrated, multiyear strategy
9 to encourage the efforts of Indo-Pacific countries to imple-
10 ment national power strategies and cooperation with
11 United States energy companies to develop an appropriate
12 mix of power solutions to provide access to sufficient, reli-
13 able, and affordable power in order to reduce poverty and
14 drive economic growth and job creation.

15 (b) RELIABLE ENERGY PARTNERSHIPS.—It is the
16 sense of Congress that—

17 (1) the President should establish bilateral and
18 regional initiatives to increase energy security in the
19 Indo-Pacific region;

20 (2) the United States should reaffirm support
21 for liquefied natural gas exports to the nations in
22 the Indo-Pacific region;

23 (3) the United States should seek to establish
24 partnership between Department of Energy national
25 laboratories and Indo-Pacific countries to provide

1 technical assistance on electrical grid development
2 and for the development and deployment of new and
3 advanced energy technologies; and

4 (4) the United States should explore opportuni-
5 ties to partner with the private sector and multilat-
6 eral institutions, such as the World Bank and the
7 Asian Development Bank, to promote universal ac-
8 cess to reliable electricity in Myanmar (historically
9 known as “Burma”).

10 **SEC. 307. LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE.**

11 The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Ad-
12 ministrator of the United States Agency for International
13 Development, should increase regional engagement in the
14 areas of environment, health, education, and infrastruc-
15 ture development with the Lower Mekong countries, in-
16 cluding—

17 (1) assisting in the development of programs
18 that focus on forecasting environmental challenges
19 and resilience;

20 (2) assisting with transnational cooperation on
21 sustainable uses of forest and water resources with
22 the goal of preserving the biodiversity of the Mekong
23 Basin and access to safe drinking water;

1 (3) assisting with education enrollment and
2 broadband internet connectivity, particularly English
3 training and connectivity in rural communities; and

4 (4) improving global health in the Lower
5 Mekong countries, including—

6 (A) reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate;

7 and

8 (B) helping regional partners to track and
9 treat malaria and tuberculosis.

10 **SEC. 308. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH**
11 **AND NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION.**

12 It is the sense of Congress that the President should
13 encourage the governments of countries in the Indo-Pa-
14 cific region and United States private sector interests with
15 operations and investments in the region to deploy agri-
16 culture practices that—

17 (1) conserve natural resources; and

18 (2) preserve culturally and ecological valuable
19 lands and water bodies.

20 **TITLE IV—PROMOTING UNITED**
21 **STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-**
22 **PACIFIC REGION**

23 **SEC. 401. FINDINGS.**

24 Congress makes the following findings:

1 (1) The promotion of human rights and respect
2 for democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in
3 the United States national security interest.

4 (2) Continued support for human rights, demo-
5 cratic values, and good governance is critical to a
6 successful United States diplomatic strategy in the
7 Indo-Pacific.

8 (3) Strong support for human rights and de-
9 mocracy in the Indo-Pacific region is critical to ef-
10 forts to reduce poverty, build rule of law, combat
11 corruption, reduce the allure of extremism, and pro-
12 mote economic growth.

13 (4) There are serious concerns with the rule of
14 law and civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North
15 Korea, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all
16 been identified by Freedom House as “Not Free”.

17 (5) There have been unacceptable human rights
18 developments in—

19 (A) Burma (Myanmar), which has been
20 identified by Freedom House as “Partly Free”,
21 according to the Department of State, and the
22 Department of State has declared that the vio-
23 lence against the Rohingya constitutes ethnic
24 cleansing;

1 (B) the Philippines, which has been identi-
2 fied by Freedom House as “Partly Free”, and
3 where there are continued disturbing reports of
4 extra-judicial killings; and

5 (C) China, where forced disappearances,
6 extralegal detentions, and lack of due process in
7 judicial proceedings remain troublesome.

8 (6) according to the National Security Strategy,
9 the United States—

10 (A) will “support, with our words and ac-
11 tions, those who live under oppressive regimes
12 and who seek freedom, individual dignity, and
13 the rule of law”;

14 (B) “may use diplomacy, sanctions, and
15 other tools to isolate states and leaders who
16 threaten our interests and whose actions run
17 contrary to our values”; and

18 (C) “will support efforts to advance wom-
19 en’s equality, protect the rights of women and
20 girls, and promote women and youth empower-
21 ment programs”.

22 **SEC. 402. TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS.**

23 The President is encouraged to pursue additional ef-
24 forts to combat trafficking in persons and human slavery
25 in the Indo-Pacific region.

1 **SEC. 403. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS.**

2 It is the sense of Congress that—

3 (1) United States Government officials should
4 lead by example—

5 (A) by continuing to advocate for freedom
6 of the press in the Indo-Pacific region; and

7 (B) by engaging with the press corps at
8 every appropriate opportunity; and

9 (2) the United States should advocate and sup-
10 port a Ministerial to Advance Press Freedom in the
11 Indo-Pacific to convene government and civil society,
12 including journalists, to discuss and address the
13 challenges facing press freedom in the Indo-Pacific
14 region.

15 **SEC. 404. DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR PER-**
16 **SONNEL.**

17 It is the sense of Congress that—

18 (1) United States embassies and consulates in
19 the Indo-Pacific region should have personnel, as ap-
20 propriate, who are dedicated to reporting on and ad-
21 vancing United States democracy, human rights,
22 labor, anti-corruption, and good governance policy
23 interests; and

24 (2) appropriate resources should be made avail-
25 able to carry out such activities.

1 **SEC. 405. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL DIALOGUES; PEOPLE-**
2 **TO-PEOPLE ENGAGEMENT.**

3 The Secretary of State should, as appropriate—

4 (1) establish high-level bilateral and regional
5 dialogues with nations in the Indo-Pacific region re-
6 garding human rights and religious freedom viola-
7 tions;

8 (2) establish or support robust, people-to-people
9 exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region, par-
10 ticularly programs engaging young leaders; and

11 (3) establish educational exchanges and capac-
12 ity-building programs emphasizing civil society devel-
13 opment.

14 **SEC. 406. ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS**
15 **HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY.**

16 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
17 gress that the United States should continue to work with
18 ASEAN to improve the capacity of ASEAN to address
19 human rights, democracy, and good governance issues in
20 Southeast Asia.

21 (b) STRATEGY.—Not later than 90 days after the
22 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
23 shall submit a strategy to the appropriate congressional
24 committees to increase cooperation with ASEAN to pro-
25 mote human rights, democracy, and good governance in
26 Southeast Asia.

1 (c) CONTENTS.—The strategy submitted under sub-
2 section (b) should include—

3 (1) an assessment of the types of United States
4 Government resources available to support increased
5 cooperation; and

6 (2) an assessment to identify entities within
7 ASEAN that the United States could potentially
8 support or partner with to promote human rights,
9 democracy, and good governance in Southeast Asia.

10 **SEC. 407. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TO NORTH KOREA.**

11 The President is encouraged to continue efforts to en-
12 hance freedom of information access with regard to North
13 Korea.

14 **SEC. 408. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPOSITION OF SANC-**
15 **TIONS AND SUSPENSION OF UNITED STATES**
16 **ASSISTANCE.**

17 (a) SANCTIONS.—It is the sense of Congress that the
18 President should impose sanctions, in accordance with ap-
19 plicable law and other relevant authorities, including tar-
20 geted financial penalties and visa bans, on any individual
21 or entity that—

22 (1) violates human rights or religious freedoms;

23 or

24 (2) engages in censorship activities.

1 (b) SUSPENSION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—It is
2 the sense of Congress that the President should, in accord-
3 ance with applicable law, terminate, suspend, or otherwise
4 alter United States economic assistance to any country
5 that has engaged in serious violations of human rights or
6 religious freedoms.

7 **SEC. 409. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

8 (a) PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN THE INDO-PA-
9 CIFIC REGION.—

10 (1) IN GENERAL.—Out of funds otherwise au-
11 thorized for the Democracy Fund and National En-
12 dowment for Democracy, and subject to the avail-
13 ability of appropriations, there is authorized to be
14 appropriated \$210,000,000, for each of the fiscal
15 years 2019 through 2023, to promote democracy,
16 strengthen civil society, human rights, rule of law,
17 transparency, and accountability in the Indo-Pacific
18 region, including for universities, civil society, and
19 multilateral institutions that are focusing on edu-
20 cation awareness, training, and capacity building.

21 (2) DEMOCRACY IN CHINA.—Amounts appro-
22 priated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made
23 available for United States Government efforts, led
24 by the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy,
25 Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy,

1 the rule of law, and human rights in the People's
2 Republic of China.

3 (3) TIBET.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to
4 paragraph (1) shall be made available for non-
5 governmental organizations to support activities pre-
6 serving cultural traditions and promoting sustainable
7 development, education, and environmental conserva-
8 tion in Tibetan communities in the Tibet Autono-
9 mous Region and in other Tibetan communities in
10 China, India, and Nepal.

11 **SEC. 410. INDO-PACIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRON-**
12 **MENTAL DEFENDERS.**

13 (a) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term
14 “human rights and environmental defenders” means indi-
15 viduals, working alone or in groups, who nonviolently ad-
16 vocate for the promotion and protection of universally rec-
17 ognized human rights, fundamental freedoms, land issues,
18 or the conservation of local ecosystems if the advocacy of
19 such issues may result in the risk of safety or life.

20 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
21 gress that human rights and environmental defenders in
22 the Indo-Pacific region have been facing increased difficul-
23 ties with the rise of unprecedented crackdowns and con-
24 flicts.

1 **SEC. 411. YOUNG LEADERS PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE INITIA-**
2 **TIVES.**

3 There are authorized to be appropriated such
4 amounts as may be necessary, for fiscal years 2019
5 through 2025, to support Indo-Pacific young leaders ini-
6 tiatives, including the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Ini-
7 tiative, the ASEAN Youth Volunteers Program, and other
8 people-to-people exchange programs that focus on building
9 the capacity of democracy, human rights, and good gov-
10 ernance activists in the Indo-Pacific region.

11 **SEC. 412. NO AUTHORIZATION OF ADDITIONAL APPROPRIA-**
12 **TIONS.**

13 No additional funds are authorized to be appro-
14 priated to carry out this Act or the amendments made
15 by this Act, and this Act and such amendments shall be
16 carried out using amounts otherwise available for such
17 purpose.

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