

115TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 5540

To direct the Director of National Intelligence to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate on Hizballah, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 17, 2018

Mr. SUOZZI (for himself and Mr. KINZINGER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To direct the Director of National Intelligence to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate on Hizballah, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the “Disarm Hizballah
5 Act”.

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

7 Congress makes the following findings:

1 (1) The Department of State designated Hiz-
2 ballah as a terrorist organization in 1997.

3 (2) Hizballah constitutes a grave and present
4 danger to the United States and the interests and
5 allies of the United States by conducting armed in-
6 terference in multiple conflicts, most notably those
7 of Yemen, Iraq, and Syria.

8 (3) Hizballah has been sanctioned under the
9 Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act of
10 2015 and designated pursuant to multiple executive
11 orders and provisions of law to deter and prevent the
12 financing of Hizballah's operations. While impactful,
13 the diverse and deadly arsenal of Hizballah, its pro-
14 curement, and its continuous expansion have not
15 been addressed.

16 (4) The illegal transfer of weapons to Hizballah
17 constitutes an imminent danger to the Middle East
18 and the allies of the United States, as these weapons
19 foment instability in an already volatile region.

20 (5) According to an outgoing commander of the
21 Israel Air Force, Israel has attacked dozens of con-
22 voys bringing arms to Hizballah and other groups on
23 several Israeli fronts, including from Syria, over the
24 past 5 years.

1 (6) Pursuant to United Nations Security Coun-
2 cil Resolution 1701, the United Nations Interim
3 Force in Lebanon (hereinafter referred to as
4 “UNIFIL”) has a responsibility to assist the Leba-
5 nese Armed Forces in taking steps towards the es-
6 tablishment of an area free of armed personnel, as-
7 sets, and weapons other than those of the Lebanese
8 government and of UNIFIL.

9 (7) Pursuant to United Nations Security Coun-
10 cil Resolutions 1701 (2006), 2373 (2017), and 1559
11 (2004), all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias
12 should disband and disarm, and the borders of Leb-
13 anon must be secured with a full deployment of the
14 Lebanese Armed Forces as the only armed rep-
15 resentative of the State.

16 (8) As noted in numerous reports discussing
17 the implementation of United Nations Security
18 Council Resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006)
19 no disarmament of Hezbollah has occurred, and the
20 borders of Lebanon, particularly in southern Leb-
21 anon, are not secure.

22 (9) Pursuant to United Nations Security Coun-
23 cil Resolution 1701 (2006) the sale or supply to any
24 entity or individual within Lebanon of arms and re-
25 lated material shall be prevented.

1 (10) In September 2017, the mandate of
2 UNIFIL was expanded to allow it to take all nec-
3 essary action to stop its area of operations from
4 being used for hostile activities and to step up its
5 patrols and inspections to disrupt Hizballah's illicit
6 activities.

7 (11) Pursuant to United Nations Security
8 Council Resolution 2231, without proper authoriza-
9 tion from the United Nations Security Council, it is
10 forbidden to import, export, or re-export to, into, or
11 from Iran, whether directly or indirectly, any signifi-
12 cant arms or arms-related material.

13 **SEC. 3. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING**
14 **UNIFIL AND HIZBALLAH.**

15 It is the policy of the United States to—

16 (1) strengthen UNIFIL efforts to demilitarize
17 southern Lebanon and neutralize the missile capa-
18 bilities of Hizballah;

19 (2) use all available diplomatic, legislative, and
20 economic means to detect and deter the illegal trans-
21 fer of weapons from Iran to Hizballah, both region-
22 ally and internationally;

23 (3) implement the weapons embargo established
24 in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231
25 and to implement United Nations Security Council

1 Resolution 1701 and the Taif accords, among other
2 international resolutions; and

3 (4) work with the Government of Lebanon,
4 UNIFIL, and regional partners to develop a mile-
5 stone timeline to implement a strategy towards the
6 disarmament of Hizballah.

7 **SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING INTERNATIONAL**
8 **COOPERATION IN NEUTRALIZING HIZBAL-**
9 **LAH.**

10 It is the Sense of Congress that the United States
11 should—

12 (1) cooperate closely with the Government of
13 Israel in working to neutralize the capabilities of
14 Hizballah and definitively halting the illegal transfer
15 of weapons to and procurement of weapons for
16 Hizballah; and

17 (2) engage the Government of Lebanon to
18 tactically secure its borders and disarm all militias
19 operating in Lebanon.

20 **SEC. 5. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON HIZBAL-**
21 **LAH.**

22 Not later than 90 days after enactment of this Act,
23 the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with
24 the Secretary of State, shall commission and produce a
25 National Intelligence Estimate on Hizballah. Such Na-

1 tional Intelligence Estimate shall include each of the fol-
2 lowing:

3 (1) A full accounting of the entirety of
4 Hizballah's rocket arsenal.

5 (2) An evaluation of the success of the UNIFIL
6 mandate.

7 (3) An evaluation of the tactical capabilities of
8 Hizballah, including such capabilities related to de-
9 fense.

10 (4) A detailed description of the supply routes
11 used in the illegal procurement of weapons for
12 Hizballah.

13 (5) An estimate on the international operations
14 that support Hizballah's network.

15 (6) An accounting of the effects of the inter-
16 ference of Hizballah in conflicts through the Middle
17 East region.

18 (7) An assessment of how Hizballah raises,
19 holds, and spends funds in territories where
20 UNIFIL operates.

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