

115TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 4288

To enhance the security of Taiwan and bolster its participation in the international community, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NOVEMBER 7, 2017

Mr. McCAUL (for himself and Mr. PITTENGER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To enhance the security of Taiwan and bolster its participation in the international community, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Taiwan Security Act
5 of 2017”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

1 (1) Since 1949, the close relationship between
2 the United States and Taiwan has been of enormous
3 benefit to both parties.

4 (2) The security of Taiwan and its democracy
5 are key elements for the continued peace and sta-
6 bility of the greater Asia-Pacific region, and the in-
7 definite continuation of that security is in the vital
8 national security interests of the United States.

9 (3) Taiwan and its diplomatic partners continue
10 to face sustained pressure and coercion from the
11 People's Republic of China to isolate Taiwan from
12 the international community.

13 (4) The military balance of power along the
14 Taiwan Strait continues to shift in favor of the Peo-
15 ple's Republic of China, which is currently engaged
16 in a comprehensive military modernization campaign
17 to enhance the power-projection capabilities of the
18 People's Liberation Army.

19 (5) Since the United States discontinued annual
20 arms sales talks in 2001, defense article transfers to
21 Taiwan have ceased to occur in a routine manner.

22 (6) Recent delays, denials, and reductions of
23 arms sales do not optimize the ability of Taiwan to
24 defend its democracy against potential aggression
25 from the People's Republic of China.

1 **SEC. 3. MILITARY EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE UNITED**
2 **STATES AND TAIWAN.**

3 (a) **MILITARY EXCHANGES BETWEEN SENIOR OFFI-**
4 **CERS AND OFFICIALS OF THE UNITED STATES AND TAI-**
5 **WAN.**—The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a pro-
6 gram of exchanges of senior military officers and senior
7 officials between the United States and Taiwan designed
8 to improve military to military relations between the
9 United States and Taiwan.

10 (b) **EXCHANGES DESCRIBED.**—For the purposes of
11 this section, an exchange is an activity, exercise, event,
12 or observation opportunity between members of the Armed
13 Forces and officials of the Department of Defense, on the
14 one hand, and armed forces personnel and officials of Tai-
15 wan, on the other hand.

16 (c) **FOCUS OF EXCHANGES.**—The exchanges under
17 the program required by subsection (a) should include ex-
18 changes focused on the following:

- 19 (1) Threat analysis.
- 20 (2) Military doctrine.
- 21 (3) Force planning.
- 22 (4) Logistical support.
- 23 (5) Intelligence collection and analysis.
- 24 (6) Operational tactics, techniques, and proce-
25 dures.
- 26 (7) Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

1 (d) CIVIL-MILITARY AFFAIRS.—The exchanges under
2 the program required by subsection (a) should include ac-
3 tivities and exercises focused on civil-military relations, in-
4 cluding relations between the military and parliament.

5 (e) LOCATIONS OF EXCHANGES.—The exchanges
6 under the program required by subsection (a) should be
7 conducted in both the United States and Taiwan.

8 (f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

9 (1) The term “senior military officer”, with re-
10 spect to the Armed Forces, means a general or flag
11 officer of the Armed Forces on active duty.

12 (2) The term “senior official”, with respect to
13 the Department of Defense, means a civilian official
14 of the Department of Defense at the level of Assist-
15 ant Secretary of Defense or above.

16 **SEC. 4. ENHANCED DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS WITH TAIWAN.**

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense and the
18 Secretary of State are authorized and encouraged, to the
19 extent consistent with law, to send to Taiwan for visits
20 officials of the Department of Defense and the Depart-
21 ment of State, as applicable, at the Assistant Secretary
22 level or above.

23 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
24 gress that the high-level visits authorized by subsection (a)
25 will improve bilateral and multilateral policy coordination

1 between the United States and Taiwan, and enhance dia-
2 logue between the United States and Taiwan, to promote
3 peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

4 **SEC. 5. ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.**

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States shall conduct
6 regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan in order
7 to support the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate
8 asymmetric capabilities, including undersea warfare and
9 air defense capabilities, into its military forces.

10 (b) ANNUAL STRATEGIC DIALOGUE ON SALES.—

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—The United States Govern-
12 ment shall host senior officials of the Taiwan Min-
13 istry of National Defense for an annual strategic
14 dialogue between the United States and Taiwan on
15 arms sales in order to ensure the regular transfer of
16 defense articles as described in subsection (a).

17 (2) ELEMENT ON FINAL DECISION ON RE-
18 QUESTED TRANSFERS IN ANNUAL DIALOGUE.—Each
19 strategic dialogue between the United States and
20 Taiwan pursuant to this subsection shall include a
21 presentation by United States officials to the Taiwan
22 delegation of final decisions by the United States re-
23 garding the transfer of any defense articles re-
24 quested by Taiwan within the last fiscal year, wheth-

1 er pursuant to the Foreign Military Sales program
2 or the Direct Commercial Sales program.

3 **SEC. 6. INVITATION OF TAIWAN MILITARY FORCES TO PAR-**
4 **TICIPATE IN CERTAIN JOINT MILITARY EXER-**
5 **CISES.**

6 The Secretary of Defense shall invite the military
7 forces of Taiwan to participate in each of the following:

8 (1) The 2018 Rim of the Pacific Exercise
9 (RIMPAC).

10 (2) One of the military exercises known as the
11 “Red Flag” exercise, conducted at Eielson Air Force
12 Base, Alaska, and Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada,
13 that is conducted during the one-year period begin-
14 ning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

15 **SEC. 7. NAVAL PORT OF CALL EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE**
16 **UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN.**

17 The Secretary of Defense shall—

18 (1) reestablish regular ports of call by the
19 United States Navy in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, or in any
20 other suitable port or ports on the island of Taiwan;
21 and

22 (2) permit the United States Pacific Command
23 to receive ports of call by the navy of the Republic
24 of China in Hawaii, Guam, or other appropriate lo-
25 cations.

1 **SEC. 8. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DEFENSE SPENDING BY**
2 **TAIWAN.**

3 Congress supports the plan of Taiwan to increase its
4 defense spending to 3 percent of gross domestic product
5 as a necessary and prudent means for Taiwan to enhance
6 its military readiness and to more effectively provide for
7 the defense of its citizens.

8 **SEC. 9. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TAIWAN AND NORTH**
9 **KOREA.**

10 Congress supports the continued efforts of Taiwan to
11 suspend all economic ties with North Korea, as well as
12 the cooperation of Taiwan with the United States to
13 achieve the peaceful denuclearization of North Korea.

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