

115TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 2658

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

DECEMBER 11, 2017

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

AN ACT

To provide humanitarian assistance for the Venezuelan people, to defend democratic governance and combat widespread public corruption in Venezuela, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

2 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
 3 “Venezuela Humanitarian Assistance and Defense of
 4 Democratic Governance Act of 2017”.

5 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
 6 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Findings.
- Sec. 3. Sense of Congress.
- Sec. 4. Requirement for strategy to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Venezuela.
- Sec. 5. Requirement for strategy to coordinate international humanitarian assistance.
- Sec. 6. Support for efforts at the United Nations on the humanitarian and political crisis in Venezuela.
- Sec. 7. Support for Organization of American States Inter-American Democratic Charter.
- Sec. 8. Concerns and report on the involvement of Venezuelan officials in corruption and illicit narcotics trafficking.
- Sec. 9. Sanctions on persons responsible for public corruption and undermining democratic governance in Venezuela.
- Sec. 10. Concerns over PDVSA transactions with Rosneft.
- Sec. 11. Report on activities of certain governments in Venezuela.

7 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

8 Congress makes the following findings:

9 (1) The deterioration of democratic governance
 10 and the economic crisis in Venezuela have led to an
 11 unprecedented humanitarian situation in which peo-
 12 ple are suffering from severe shortages of essential
 13 medicines and basic food products.

14 (2) According to the World Health Organiza-
 15 tion, Venezuela had a shortage of necessary medica-
 16 tions and medical supplies of—

17 (A) 55 percent in 2014;

1 (B) 67 percent in 2015; and

2 (C) 75 percent in 2016.

3 (3) According to a Human Rights Watch 2016
4 report, it is increasingly difficult for many Ven-
5 ezuelans, particularly those in lower- or middle-in-
6 come families, to obtain adequate nutrition and
7 there are reports of symptoms of malnutrition, par-
8 ticularly in children.

9 (4) Maternal deaths in Venezuela increased by
10 66 percent from 2015 to 2016 while infant deaths
11 increased by 30 percent.

12 (5) There were 240,000 confirmed malaria
13 cases in Venezuela in 2016—a 76 percent increase
14 over 2015.

15 (6) A survey—conducted jointly by the Central
16 University of Venezuela, the Andrés Bello Catholic
17 University, and the Simón Bolívar University—
18 found that almost 75 percent of Venezuelans lost an
19 average of at least 19 pounds in 2016 as a result
20 of a lack of proper nutrition amidst the country’s
21 economic crisis.

22 (7) Despite massive shortages of basic food-
23 stuffs and essential medicines, Nicolás Maduro has
24 rejected repeated requests from the Venezuelan Na-

1 tional Assembly and civil society organizations to
2 bring humanitarian aid into the country.

3 (8) The International Monetary Fund has esti-
4 mated that in Venezuela in 2016 the country's gross
5 domestic product contracted by 12 percent and infla-
6 tion rate reached 720 percent, and has stated that
7 Venezuela had the worst growth and inflation per-
8 formance in the world.

9 (9) The International Monetary Fund has not
10 convened an Article IV Executive Board consultation
11 for Venezuela since September 13, 2004, which
12 greatly limits the extent of information available to
13 the international community about the severity of
14 the Venezuelan economic crisis.

15 (10) Venezuela's political, economic, and hu-
16 manitarian crisis is fueling social tensions that are
17 resulting in growing incidents of public unrest,
18 looting, violence among citizens, and an exodus of
19 Venezuelans abroad.

20 (11) These social distortions are taking place
21 amidst an alarming climate of criminal violence. Ac-
22 cording to the United Nations Office on Drug and
23 Crime, Caracas, Venezuela had the highest per cap-
24 ita homicide rate of any capital city in the world in
25 2015 at 120 murders per 100,000 citizens.

1 (12) In 2016, 18,155 Venezuelans submitted
2 asylum requests in the United States, which was the
3 greatest number of requests by any nationality, ac-
4 cording to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Serv-
5 ices.

6 (13) International and domestic human rights
7 groups, such as Foro Penal Venezolano, recognize
8 more than 600 political prisoners in Venezuela, in-
9 cluding opposition leader and former Chacao mayor
10 Leopoldo López, Judge María Lourdes Afiuni, Cara-
11 cas Mayor Antonio José Ledezma Díaz, National
12 Assembly Deputy Gilber Caro, and former San Cris-
13 tobal mayor Daniel Ceballos.

14 (14) According to media accounts, over 125
15 people lost their lives as the result of public dem-
16 onstrations and protests in Venezuela since April
17 2017.

18 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

19 It is the sense of Congress that—

20 (1) Nicolás Maduro should permit the delivery
21 of international humanitarian assistance to address
22 the widespread and deeply concerning shortages of
23 essential medicines and basic food products faced by
24 the people of Venezuela;

1 (2) it is in the best interest of the Venezuelan
2 people for the Government of Venezuela to engage
3 with multilateral institutions to ameliorate the ef-
4 fects of the country's ongoing economic, social, and
5 humanitarian crisis;

6 (3) Nicolás Maduro should immediately release
7 all political prisoners and respect internationally rec-
8 ognized human rights in order to facilitate the con-
9 ditions for political negotiations and dialogue in
10 Venezuela;

11 (4) Nicolás Maduro and the Supreme Tribunal
12 of Justice of Venezuela should take steps to rein-
13 state the full powers and authorities of the National
14 Assembly of Venezuela in accordance with the Con-
15 stitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela;

16 (5) Venezuela's National Electoral Council
17 should establish a specific timeline to hold national,
18 regional, and municipal elections in accordance with
19 the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Ven-
20 ezuela and allow supervision of credible international
21 electoral observers; and

22 (6) the United States should support meaning-
23 ful efforts towards a substantive dialogue through
24 which all parties uphold their commitments and
25 agree to specific deadlines to restore respect for Ven-

1 ezuela’s constitutional mechanisms and resolve the
2 country’s political, economic, and humanitarian cri-
3 sis.

4 **SEC. 4. REQUIREMENT FOR STRATEGY TO PROVIDE HU-**
5 **MANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE**
6 **OF VENEZUELA.**

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
8 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
9 in coordination with the Administrator of the United
10 States Agency for International Development, shall submit
11 to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
12 resentatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
13 Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
14 Representatives and the Committee on Appropriations of
15 the Senate a strategy to provide humanitarian assistance
16 to the people of Venezuela through credible and inde-
17 pendent nongovernmental organizations operating in Ven-
18 ezuela or in neighboring countries to alleviate the suffering
19 of the Venezuelan people.

20 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy re-
21 quired under subsection (a) shall include the following:

22 (1) A description of how and to what extent the
23 following assistance will be provided:

24 (A) Public health commodities for Ven-
25 ezuelan health facilities and services, including

1 medicines on the World Health Organization's
2 List of Essential Medicines and basic medical
3 supplies and equipment.

4 (B) Basic food commodities and nutritional
5 supplements needed to address growing mal-
6 nutrition and improve food security for the peo-
7 ple of Venezuela, with a specific emphasis on
8 the most vulnerable populations.

9 (C) Technical assistance to ensure health
10 and food commodities are appropriately se-
11 lected, procured, and distributed, predominantly
12 through local nongovernmental organizations.

13 (2) An identification of United States Agency
14 for International Development best practices in de-
15 livering humanitarian assistance and how such best
16 practices are being utilized in providing humani-
17 tarian assistance to Venezuela.

18 **SEC. 5. REQUIREMENT FOR STRATEGY TO COORDINATE**
19 **INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSIST-**
20 **ANCE.**

21 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
22 gress that the appropriate United Nations humanitarian
23 agencies should conduct and publish an independent as-
24 sessment on—

1 (1) the extent and impact of the shortages of
2 food and medicine in Venezuela; and

3 (2) the efforts needed to resolve such shortages.

4 (b) STRATEGY.—Not later than 90 days after the
5 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
6 in consultation with the Administrator of the United
7 States Agency for International Development, shall submit
8 a multi-year strategy to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
9 tions of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
10 of the House of Representatives that—

11 (1) describes how the United States will secure
12 support from international donors, including re-
13 gional partners in Latin America and the Caribbean,
14 for the provision of humanitarian assistance to the
15 people of Venezuela; and

16 (2) identifies governments that are willing to
17 provide financial and technical assistance for the
18 provision of such humanitarian assistance to the
19 people of Venezuela and a description of such assist-
20 ance.

21 **SEC. 6. SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS**
22 **ON THE HUMANITARIAN AND POLITICAL CRI-**
23 **SIS IN VENEZUELA.**

24 (a) INITIAL EFFORTS.—The President shall instruct
25 the Permanent Representative of the United States to the

1 United Nations to use the voice and vote of the United
2 States to secure the necessary votes—

3 (1) to place the humanitarian and political cri-
4 sis in Venezuela on the agenda at the United Na-
5 tions; and

6 (2) to secure a Presidential Statement from the
7 United Nations urging the Government of Venezuela
8 to allow the delivery of humanitarian relief and to
9 lift bureaucratic impediments or any other obstacles
10 so that independent nongovernmental organizations
11 can provide the proper assistance to the people of
12 Venezuela without any interference by such govern-
13 ment.

14 (b) ADDITIONAL EFFORTS.—

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—If the Government of Ven-
16 ezuela refuses to allow the delivery of humanitarian
17 relief and lift bureaucratic impediments and any
18 other obstacles described in subsection (a)(2), then
19 beginning not later than 30 days after the conclu-
20 sion of the efforts of the United Nations described
21 in such subsection, the President shall instruct the
22 Permanent Representative of the United States to
23 the United Nations to use the voice and vote of the
24 United States to secure the adoption of a resolution
25 described in paragraph (2).

1 (2) RESOLUTION DESCRIBED.—The resolution
2 of the United Nations described in paragraph (1) is
3 a resolution—

4 (A) directing the Government of Venezuela
5 to promptly allow safe and unhindered access
6 for humanitarian agencies and their imple-
7 menting partners, including possible support
8 from neighboring countries; and

9 (B) calling on the Government of Ven-
10 ezuela to—

11 (i) allow the delivery of food and med-
12 icine;

13 (ii) end human rights violations;

14 (iii) agree to free, fair and trans-
15 parent elections with credible international
16 observers;

17 (iv) cease violence; and

18 (v) release all political prisoners.

19 **SEC. 7. SUPPORT FOR ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN**
20 **STATES INTER-AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC**
21 **CHARTER.**

22 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
23 ings:

24 (1) Article 1 of the Inter-American Democratic
25 Charter, adopted by the Organization of American

1 States in Lima on September 11, 2001, affirms,
2 “The peoples of the Americas have a right to democ-
3 racy and their governments have an obligation to
4 promote and defend it.”.

5 (2) Article 19 of the Inter-American Demo-
6 cratic Charter states “an unconstitutional interrup-
7 tion of the democratic order or an unconstitutional
8 alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously
9 impairs the democratic order in a member state,
10 constitutes, while it persists, an insurmountable ob-
11 stacle to its government’s participation in sessions of
12 the General Assembly . . . and other bodies of the
13 Organization.”.

14 (3) Article 20 of the Inter-American Demo-
15 cratic Charter provides—

16 (A) “In the event of an unconstitutional al-
17 teration of the constitutional regime that seri-
18 ously impairs the democratic order in a member
19 state, any member state or the Secretary Gen-
20 eral may request the immediate convocation of
21 the Permanent Council to undertake a collective
22 assessment of the situation and to take such de-
23 cisions as it deems appropriate.”; and

24 (B) “The Permanent Council, depending
25 on the situation, may undertake the necessary

1 diplomatic initiatives, including good offices, to
2 foster the restoration of democracy.”.

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that—

5 (1) Nicolás Maduro, the National Electoral
6 Council of Venezuela, and the Supreme Tribunal of
7 Justice of Venezuela have carried out systematic ef-
8 forts to undermine, block, and circumvent the au-
9 thorities and responsibilities of the Venezuelan Na-
10 tional Assembly as mandated in the Constitution of
11 the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela;

12 (2) such efforts by Nicolás Maduro and the Su-
13 preme Tribunal of Justice of Venezuela amount to
14 an unconstitutional alternation of the constitutional
15 regime that seriously impairs the democratic order
16 in Venezuela; and

17 (3) the Secretary of State, working through the
18 United States Permanent Mission to the Organiza-
19 tion of American States, should take additional steps
20 to support ongoing efforts by the Secretary General
21 of the Organization of American States—

22 (A) to invoke the Inter-American Demo-
23 cratic Charter;

24 (B) to advance a collective assessment of
25 the situation in Venezuela; and

1 (C) to promote diplomatic initiatives to
2 foster the restoration of Venezuelan democracy.

3 **SEC. 8. CONCERNS AND REPORT ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF**
4 **VENEZUELAN OFFICIALS IN CORRUPTION**
5 **AND ILLICIT NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING.**

6 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
7 ings:

8 (1) The deterioration of governance in Ven-
9 ezuela has been exacerbated by the involvement of
10 senior officials of the Government of Venezuela, in-
11 cluding members of the National Electoral Council,
12 the judicial system, and the Venezuelan security
13 forces, in acts of corruption and illicit narcotics traf-
14 ficking and related money laundering.

15 (2) In March 2015, the Department of the
16 Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
17 determined that approximately \$2,000,000,000 had
18 been siphoned from Venezuela's public oil company,
19 Petróleos de Venezuela S.A., in conjunction with its
20 designation of the Banca Privada d'Andorra as a
21 Foreign Financial Institution of Primary Money
22 Laundering Concern.

23 (3) On August 1, 2016, General Nestor
24 Reverol, Venezuela's current Minister of Interior and
25 former National Guard commander, was indicted in

1 a United States district court for participating in an
2 international cocaine trafficking conspiracy.

3 (4) On November 18, 2016, Franqui Francisco
4 Flores de Freitas and Efrain Antonio Campo Flores,
5 nephews of Nicolás Maduro and Venezuelan First
6 Lady Cilia Flores, were convicted in a United States
7 district court on charges of conspiring to import co-
8 caine into the United States.

9 (5) On February 13, 2017, the Department of
10 the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control des-
11 ignated Tareck Zaidan El Aissami Maddah for his
12 involvement in illicit narcotics trafficking, pursuant
13 to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act
14 (21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.; title VIII of Public Law
15 106–120).

16 (6) The Department of the Treasury’s Office of
17 Foreign Assets Control has designated additional in-
18 dividuals and senior Venezuelan officials for their in-
19 volvement in illicit narcotics trafficking, pursuant to
20 such Act, including—

21 (A) Venezuelan national Samark Jose
22 Lopez Bello, who is the primary front man and
23 money launderer for Tareck Zaidan El Aissami
24 Maddah;

1 (B) Hugo Armando Carvajal Barrios, who
2 is the current National Assembly Deputy and
3 the former Director of Venezuela’s Military In-
4 telligence Directorate;

5 (C) Henry de Jesus Rangel Silva, who is
6 the current Governor of Trujillo State and the
7 former Director of Venezuela’s Directorate of
8 Intelligence and Prevention Services;

9 (D) Ramon Emilio Rodriguez Chacin, who
10 previously served as the Minister of Interior;
11 and

12 (E) Freddy Alirio Bernal Rosales, who pre-
13 viously served as the Mayor of the Libertador
14 municipality of Caracas.

15 (7) On September 12, 2017, Ambassador Wil-
16 liam Brownfield testified before the Senate Caucus
17 on International Narcotics Control that drug traf-
18 ficking organizations in Venezuela have “completely
19 penetrated virtually every security, law enforcement,
20 and justice-related institution” and that “there will
21 be no long-term, democratic, prosperous and secure
22 solution in Venezuela until there is a solution to the
23 drug trafficking organization presence”.

24 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

1 (1) CORRUPTION.—The term “corruption”
2 means the extent to which public power is exercised
3 for private gain, including by bribery, nepotism,
4 fraud, or embezzlement.

5 (2) GRAND CORRUPTION.—The term “grand
6 corruption” means corruption committed at a high
7 level of government that—

8 (A) distorts policies or the central func-
9 tioning of the country; and

10 (B) enables leaders to benefit at the ex-
11 pense of the public good.

12 (c) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
14 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
15 retary of State, acting through the Bureau of Intel-
16 ligence and Research, and in consultation with the
17 intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of
18 the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
19 3003(4))), shall submit a report to Congress that
20 describes the involvement of senior officials of the
21 Government of Venezuela, including members of the
22 National Electoral Council, the judicial system, and
23 the Venezuelan security forces, in acts of corruption
24 in Venezuela, with a specific emphasis on acts of
25 grand corruption.

1 (2) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The report sub-
2 mitted under paragraph (1) shall—

3 (A) describe how the acts of corruption de-
4 scribed in the report pose direct challenges for
5 United States national security and inter-
6 national security;

7 (B) identify individuals that frustrate the
8 ability of the United States to combat illicit
9 narcotics trafficking; and

10 (C) include input from the Drug Enforce-
11 ment Administration, the Office of Foreign As-
12 sets Control, and the Financial Crimes Enforce-
13 ment Network.

14 (3) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1)
15 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in-
16 clude a classified annex. The unclassified portion of
17 the report shall be made available to the public.

18 **SEC. 9. SANCTIONS ON PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR PUB-**
19 **LIC CORRUPTION AND UNDERMINING DEMO-**
20 **CRATIC GOVERNANCE IN VENEZUELA.**

21 (a) FINDING.—Executive Order 13692 (50 U.S.C.
22 1701 note), which was signed on March 8, 2015, estab-
23 lished sanctions against individuals responsible for under-
24 mining democratic processes and institutions and involved
25 in acts of public corruption that were not included in the

1 Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act
2 of 2014 (Public Law 113–278).

3 (b) SANCTIONS.—Section 5 of the Venezuela Defense
4 of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 (Public
5 Law 113–278) is amended—

6 (1) in subsection (a)—

7 (A) in paragraph (2), by striking “or” at
8 the end;

9 (B) by redesignating paragraph (3) as
10 paragraph (5);

11 (C) by inserting after paragraph (2) the
12 following:

13 “(3) is responsible for, or complicit in, ordering,
14 controlling, or otherwise directing, significant actions
15 or policies that undermine democratic processes or
16 institutions;

17 “(4) is a government official, or a senior asso-
18 ciate of such an official, that is responsible for, or
19 complicit in, ordering, controlling, or otherwise di-
20 recting, acts of significant corruption, including the
21 expropriation of private or public assets for personal
22 gain, corruption related to government contracts or
23 the extraction of natural resources, bribery, or the
24 facilitation or transfer of the proceeds of corruption
25 to foreign jurisdictions; or”; and

1 (D) in paragraph (5) (as redesignated), by
2 striking “paragraph (1) or (2)” and inserting
3 “paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4)”; and
4 (2) in subsection (e), by striking “December 31,
5 2019” and inserting “December 31, 2022”.

6 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
7 gress that the President and Secretary of State should
8 seek to encourage partner countries of the Organization
9 of American States, the European Union, and the United
10 Nations to impose sanctions with respect to Venezuelan
11 individuals that are similar to sanctions imposed by the
12 United States with respect to such Venezuelan individuals.

13 **SEC. 10. CONCERNS OVER PDVSA TRANSACTIONS WITH**
14 **ROSNEFT.**

15 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
16 ings:

17 (1) In late 2016, Venezuelan state-owned oil
18 company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (referred to in
19 this section as “PDVSA”), through a no-compete
20 transaction, secured a loan from Russian govern-
21 ment-controlled oil company Rosneft, using 49.9 per-
22 cent of PDVSA’s American subsidiary, CITGO Pe-
23 troleum Corporation, including its assets in the
24 United States, as collateral. As a result of this

1 transaction, 100 percent of CITGO is held as collat-
2 eral by PDVSA's creditors.

3 (2) CITGO, a wholly owned subsidiary of
4 PDVSA, is engaged in interstate commerce and
5 owns and controls critical energy infrastructure in
6 19 States in the United States, including an exten-
7 sive network of pipelines, 48 terminals, and 3 refin-
8 eries, with a combined oil refining capacity of
9 749,000 barrels per day. CITGO's refinery in Lake
10 Charles, Louisiana is the sixth largest refinery in the
11 United States.

12 (3) The Department of the Treasury imposed
13 sanctions on Rosneft, which is controlled by the Rus-
14 sian Government, and its Executive Chairman, Igor
15 Sechin, following Russia's military invasion of
16 Ukraine and its illegal annexation of Crimea in
17 2014.

18 (4) The Department of Homeland Security has
19 designated the energy sector as critical to United
20 States infrastructure.

21 (5) The growing economic crisis in Venezuela
22 raises the probability that the Government of Ven-
23 ezuela and PDVSA will default on their inter-
24 national debt obligations, resulting in a scenario in

1 which Rosneft could come into control of CITGO's
2 United States energy infrastructure holdings.

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that—

5 (1) control of critical United States energy in-
6 frastructure by Rosneft, a Russian government-con-
7 trolled entity currently under United States sanc-
8 tions, would pose a significant risk to United States
9 national security and energy security;

10 (2) the President should take all necessary
11 steps to prevent Rosneft from gaining control of
12 critical United States interstate energy infrastruc-
13 ture;

14 (3) a default by PDVSA on its loan from
15 Rosneft, resulting in Rosneft coming into possession
16 of PDVSA's United States CITGO assets, would
17 warrant careful consideration by the Committee on
18 Foreign Investment in the United States;

19 (4) if PDVSA defaults on its debt obligations,
20 the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign
21 Asset Control should review CITGO's transactions
22 with United States persons to assess and ensure
23 compliance with United States sanctions policies and
24 regulations; and

1 (5) the Department of Homeland Security
2 should conduct an assessment of the security risks
3 posed by foreign control of CITGO's United States
4 energy infrastructure holdings and keep the relevant
5 committees of Congress fully informed of its findings
6 and any subsequent strategy to address
7 vulnerabilities to United States energy security as a
8 result.

9 **SEC. 11. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN GOVERN-**
10 **MENTS IN VENEZUELA.**

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
12 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
13 acting through the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
14 of the Department of State and in consultation with the
15 intelligence community, shall submit to Congress a report
16 that describes the full extent of cooperation by the Govern-
17 ments of the Russian Federation, the People's Republic
18 of China, Cuba, and Iran with the Government of Ven-
19 ezuela and the Venezuelan armed forces.

20 (b) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be
21 submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classi-
22 fied annex. The unclassified portion of the report shall be
23 made available to the public.

24 (c) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term “intel-
25 ligence community” has the meaning given such term in

1 section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
2 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

Passed the House of Representatives December 7,
2017.

Attest:

KAREN L. HAAS,

Clerk.