

115TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 2496

To prohibit assessed or voluntary contributions to the United Nations, and
for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 17, 2017

Mr. FRANKS of Arizona introduced the following bill; which was referred to
the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To prohibit assessed or voluntary contributions to the United
Nations, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Defunding the Corrupt
5 and Incompetent United Nations Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Congress finds the following:

8 (1) The United States pays far more than any
9 other nation for United Nations operations, which
10 are divided into three program baskets: regular

1 budget, peacekeeping budget, and specialized pro-
2 grams such as developmental and disaster assist-
3 ance.

4 (2) Despite the United States paying an overly
5 large share of the budget, United Nations treaties
6 are often in opposition to the interests of the United
7 States, so the United States is effectively paying
8 others to undermine our foreign policy.

9 (3) There also is a global lack of accountability
10 coupled with incompetence at the United Nations,
11 with terrible crimes and genocides happening under
12 the watch of the United Nations.

13 (4) Finally, a constant and disproportionate use
14 of United Nations time and money is dedicated to
15 persecuting Israel, the only democracy in the Middle
16 East.

17 (5) For the reasons specified in paragraphs (1)
18 through (4), which are further detailed in sub-
19 sections (b) through (e), the United States will no
20 longer provide funds to this corrupt and incompetent
21 body unless very significant changes are made imme-
22 diately.

23 (b) UNFAIR BUDGET BURDEN AND
24 UNACCOUNTABILITY.—Congress finds the following:

1 (1) The United States was assessed for con-
2 tributions to the regular United Nations budget and
3 the United Nations peacekeeping budget totaling ap-
4 proximately \$3,000,000,000 of an approximately
5 \$11,000,000,000 combined United Nations budget
6 for those purposes in 2016.

7 (2) At under five percent of the world popu-
8 lation, 22 percent of the world nominal Gross Do-
9 mestic Product (GDP) but 16.1 percent of world
10 GDP by purchasing power parity, the United States
11 was assessed to contribute 22 percent of the regular
12 United Nations budget in 2016.

13 (3) This is a higher regular assessment than
14 the 176 least assessed United Nations member
15 states combined.

16 (4) A majority of United Nations member
17 states will be assessed total contributions of less
18 than \$1,000,000 a year for the United Nations reg-
19 ular and peacekeeping budgets combined. The least
20 assessed member states historically pay a net several
21 thousand dollars to the United Nations after col-
22 lecting lavish travel subsidies from the United Na-
23 tions.

24 (5) The 113 members of the Non-Aligned
25 Movement, which frequently votes against United

1 States and democratic proposals and interests, were
2 collectively assessed approximately \$559,000,000 of
3 United Nations regular and peacekeeping budgets in
4 2016.

5 (6) The 56 countries of the Organization of Is-
6 lamic Cooperation (OIC), including 10 of the world's
7 top 20 oil producing countries, together were as-
8 sessed approximately \$406,000,000 to the regular
9 and peacekeeping budgets of the United Nations in
10 2016. These countries also frequently vote against
11 United States and democratic proposals and inter-
12 ests.

13 (7) The other four permanent members of the
14 United Nations Security Council—the Russian Fed-
15 eration, the People's Republic of China, the United
16 Kingdom, and France—were assessed a combined
17 \$2,734,000,000 in 2016 to the United Nations, com-
18 pared to the United States \$2,959,000,000 assess-
19 ment for the United Nations regular budget and
20 United Nations peacekeeping budget.

21 (8) The United Nations requires two-thirds of
22 member states to approve the United Nations reg-
23 ular budget but does not have a commonsense rule
24 to require that budgets be approved by member
25 states that contribute two-thirds of the money. This

1 means member states that make minimal contribu-
2 tions can approve the regular budget over the objec-
3 tion of the United States and other major contribu-
4 tors.

5 (9) However, the United States also is assessed
6 28.4691 percent of the United Nations peacekeeping
7 budget for 2017 despite the bipartisan Foreign Rela-
8 tions Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and
9 1995 (Public Law 103–236; enacted April 30,
10 1994), which prohibits the United States from mak-
11 ing contributions that exceed 25 percent of the
12 peacekeeping budget. Currently, the difference be-
13 tween 25 percent and the 28.4691 percent assessed
14 levels amounts to \$275,000,000.

15 (10) This is a higher peacekeeping budget as-
16 sessment than the 185 least assessed United Na-
17 tions member states combined.

18 (11) In addition, the United States Government
19 separately contributes more than \$5,000,000,000
20 per year for other United Nations programs. There
21 is no comprehensive report to Congress about these
22 United Nations agency requirements. The last com-
23 prehensive report was for fiscal year 2010.

1 (c) UNITED NATIONS TREATIES THAT ARE AGAINST
2 UNITED STATES INTERESTS.—Congress finds the fol-
3 lowing:

4 (1) Ratification of the United Nations Conven-
5 tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) would sub-
6 ject the United States to internationally based envi-
7 ronmental mandates and place new financial man-
8 dates on United States businesses, and therefore is
9 not in the interests of the United States.

10 (2) The recent effort under the auspices of the
11 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
12 Change (UNFCCC) to reestablish an international
13 regulation regime to end global warming, which
14 would heavily target fossil fuels, is against United
15 States interests.

16 (3) Ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty,
17 which would closely regulate global arms trade ex-
18 ports and impose regulations on United States gun
19 manufacturers, is not in the interests of the United
20 States.

21 (d) GLOBAL LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND INCOM-
22 PETENCE.—Congress finds the following:

23 (1) In the civil war in Sri Lanka from 1983 to
24 2009, the United Nations did not investigate claims
25 of war crimes and made no attempt to protect the

1 civilian population, resulting in 6,500 individuals
2 being murdered inside supposed United Nations
3 “safe zones”.

4 (2) The United Nations did not acknowledge
5 the replacement government of Cambodia after Pol
6 Pot and the Khmer Rouge until 1994, after Paul
7 Pot’s communist authorities murdered more than
8 2,500,000 Cambodians, or 33 percent of the popu-
9 lation.

10 (3) In 1994, after 10 Belgian peacekeepers
11 were murdered in Rwanda, United Nations troops
12 directly abandoned hundreds of Tutsis who were
13 murdered by Hutus, and in the process abandoned
14 the country to a genocide that left approximately
15 1,000,000 individuals dead, or nearly 20 percent of
16 the population.

17 (4) After several United States and Pakistani
18 troops were killed in 1993, the United Nations with-
19 drew all peacekeeping troops from Somalia in 1995.

20 (5) In 1995, United Nations peacekeepers in
21 northeastern Bosnia failed to prevent Serbs from
22 murdering 8,000 men and boys in Srebrenica.

23 (6) From 2003 to 2005 the United Nations did
24 not enter Sudan despite organized attacks on popu-

1 lated villages by Janjaweed militant groups. In 2010
2 an estimated 300,000 Sudanese civilians were killed.

3 (7) United Nations peacekeeping audits have
4 revealed mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in
5 procurement.

6 (8) United Nations peacekeepers were the
7 source of the cholera outbreak in Haiti beginning in
8 2010 that left more than 8,000 individuals dead and
9 600,000 seriously sickened.

10 (9) United Nations agencies are in the bottom
11 half of effectiveness among bilateral, multilateral,
12 and United Nations aid agencies based on trans-
13 parency, specialization, selectivity, ineffective aid
14 channels, and overhead cost (“Rhetoric versus Re-
15 ality: The Best and Worst of Aid Agency Practices”,
16 William Easterly and Claudia R. Williamson).

17 (10) The United Nations Security Council at-
18 tempted to invoke sanctions under chapter VII of
19 the Charter of the United Nations to prevent geno-
20 cide in the recent civil war in Syria, but the Russian
21 Federation and the People’s Republic of China pre-
22 vented action by the United Nations, resulting in
23 more than 60,000 civilian deaths and thousands of
24 other civilians displaced.

1 (11) A United Nations study found that United
2 Nations peacekeeping missions routinely avoid using
3 force to protect civilians who are under attack, inter-
4 vening in only 20 percent of cases despite being au-
5 thorized to do so by the United Nations Security
6 Council (“United Nations General Assembly, Eval-
7 uation of the Implementation and Results of Protec-
8 tion of Civilians Mandates in United Nations Peace-
9 keeping Operations, No. A/68/787”, Reuters, May 7,
10 2014).

11 (12) United Nations peacekeepers continue to
12 abuse the unprotected populations they are supposed
13 to be helping (Code Blue, “A Practical Plan to End
14 Impunity for Peacekeeper Sexual Abuse”, October
15 13, 2016).

16 (13) United Nations peacekeepers in South
17 Sudan in 2016 failed to protect civilians from mur-
18 der and rape even within sight of United Nations
19 soldiers or inside supposedly protected safe zones.

20 (e) CONSTANT AND DISPROPORTIONATE USE OF
21 UNITED NATIONS TIME AND MONEY TO HARASS
22 ISRAEL.—Congress finds the following:

23 (1) The United Nations is hostile to our closest
24 ally in the Middle East, Israel, which is also the
25 most developed democracy in that region.

1 (2) The United Nations Security Council passed
2 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2324 on
3 December 23, 2016, to condemn Israeli settlements,
4 while the Obama administration backstabbed Israel
5 by abstaining instead of vetoing this dangerous reso-
6 lution. As Senator Charles Schumer said, “Whatever
7 one’s views are on settlements, anyone who cares
8 about the future of Israel and peace in the region
9 knows that the United Nations, with its one-sided-
10 ness, is exactly the wrong forum to bring about
11 peace.”.

12 (3) The United Nations voted in 2012 to grant
13 the Palestinian Authority “non-member state” per-
14 manent observer status.

15 (4) United Nations Human Rights Council
16 (UNHRC) also acts contrary to United States inter-
17 ests. For example, in the ten years of June 2006
18 through June 2016, when the UNHRC acts to con-
19 demn a specific country, most of the time it con-
20 demns Israel. That is to say, the UNHRC singles
21 Israel out for solitary condemnation more than all
22 the other countries of the world put together.

23 (5) The UNHRC has 10 permanent agenda
24 items, one of which (Agenda Item 7, “Human

1 Rights Situation in Palestine and Other Occupied
2 Arab Territories”) is criticism of Israel.

3 (6) The United Nations Relief and Works
4 Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East
5 (UNRWA), contrary to the practice of the United
6 Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, defines
7 Palestinian “refugee” status as a hereditary entitle-
8 ment over generations. It also failed to stop Hamas
9 from stockpiling missiles in schools, and did not im-
10 mediately report this violation of civilian rights and
11 standard of conflict to the United Nations Security
12 Council.

13 (7) The United Nations Durban Declaration of
14 the World Conference Against Racism in 2001 sin-
15 gled out only Israel for condemnation for racist poli-
16 cies, of all the countries in the world.

17 (8) Twenty Arab countries use the United Na-
18 tions to vote against United States interests most of
19 the time but collect annual foreign assistance from
20 the United States. For example, in 2017 Egypt is
21 slated to receive \$1,500,000,000 in assistance, Jor-
22 dan \$1,000,000,000 and Iraq \$500,000,000. These
23 figures do not include all amounts of United States
24 military assistance given in direct funding, in-kind
25 grants, and excess defense equipment.

1 (9) The Palestinian Authority also receives over
2 \$350,000,000 per year from the United States in
3 humanitarian assistance that the Palestinian Au-
4 thority routinely uses to inspire hate in schools,
5 among other purposes.

6 (10) All this United Nations anti-Israel activity
7 goes on despite Israel being the only democracy in
8 the Middle East, giving citizenship to many Arab
9 citizens, holding open elections and an independent
10 judiciary, sponsoring a vibrant civil society, and al-
11 lowing freedom for press, women, religious beliefs,
12 nongovernmental organizations, and gay lifestyles.

13 (11) Israel also has traded land for peace but
14 Hamas continues to be dedicated to the destruction
15 of Israel. When Israel withdrew from Gaza, the ter-
16 ritory fell under the control of Hamas, which
17 launched regular rocket and terror attacks on Israel
18 from Gaza.

19 **SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON ASSESSED AND VOLUNTARY CON-**
20 **TRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS.**

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—No funds may be obligated or ex-
22 pended to provide assessed or voluntary contributions to
23 the United Nations, the United Nations system, or United
24 Nations-affiliated agencies during the period beginning on
25 the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on the

1 date on which the President certifies to Congress that the
2 requirements and criteria described in subsection (b) are
3 met.

4 (b) REQUIREMENTS AND CRITERIA DESCRIBED.—
5 The requirements and criteria described in this subsection
6 are the following:

7 (1) The United Nations adopts a rule providing
8 that for the United Nations regular budget to be ap-
9 proved, not only must the currently required two-
10 thirds of member states approve, but also a com-
11 bination of member states whose assessed contribu-
12 tions make up at least 67 percent of the regular
13 budget must approve.

14 (2) The Director of the Office of Management
15 and Budget submits to Congress a report on all
16 United States assessed and voluntary contributions
17 to the United Nations system.

18 (3) The Secretary of State submits to Congress
19 a report providing a comprehensive analysis of
20 United States interests supported by United States
21 memberships in international organizations, United
22 States contributions to these organizations, and
23 whether these interests could be achieved by other
24 means. This report additionally shall assess which
25 United Nations organizations contain good or poor

1 value for their money, and recommending which if
2 any of such organization merits United States sup-
3 port, and which do not merit United States support.

4 (4) The Office of Inspector General of the De-
5 partment of State establishes an office responsible
6 for inspecting and auditing the use of United States
7 contributions to international organizations.

8 (5) The Secretary-General of the United Na-
9 tions and the heads of other international organiza-
10 tions described in paragraph (4) provide assurances
11 to the United States Government that such organi-
12 zations will cooperate with the Department of State
13 office established pursuant to paragraph (4).

14 (6) The Secretary of State submits to Congress
15 an evaluation of long-running United Nations peace-
16 keeping missions to ascertain which such missions
17 are needed and which such missions and participants
18 are advancing United States and democratic ideals
19 and interests.

20 (7) The United Nations revises its pay struc-
21 ture so that salaries do not exceed equivalent United
22 States civil service salaries.

23 (8) The United Nations reinstates and conducts
24 ongoing, annual, robust reviews of its own mandates

1 to determine which such mandates are outmoded
2 and should be eliminated or terminated.

3 (9) The United Nations reinstates its Procure-
4 ment Task Force that successfully reviewed large
5 scale fraud in the \$600,000,000 Iraqi oil for food
6 program but was subsequently shut down.

7 (10) The United Nations adopts reforms to
8 make the United Nations Office of Internal Over-
9 sight Services (OIOS) and ethics office truly inde-
10 pendent, and strengthens whistleblower protections.

11 (11) The United Nations demonstrates its
12 peacekeepers are proactively protecting civilians, and
13 adopts changes to insure that troop contributing
14 countries investigate and punish those found to have
15 not followed their duties and/or to have committed
16 crimes.

17 **SEC. 4. FURTHER LIMITATION ON ASSESSED AND PEACE-**
18 **KEEPING CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED**
19 **NATIONS.**

20 Beginning on the day after the date on which the
21 President certifies to Congress that the requirements and
22 criteria described in section 3(b) are met—

23 (1) funds obligated or expended to provide as-
24 sessed contributions to the United Nations regular

1 budget may not exceed 18 percent of the total as-
2 sessed contributions to such budget; and

3 (2) funds obligated or expended to provide as-
4 sessed contributions to the United Nations peace-
5 keeping budget may not exceed 25 percent of the
6 total contributions to such budget.

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