

113TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# H. R. 5103

To impose sanctions on Chinese state-owned enterprises and any person who is a member of the board of directors, an executive officer, or a senior official of a Chinese state-owned enterprise for benefitting from cyber and economic espionage against the United States.

---

## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 14, 2014

Mr. ROHRABACHER (for himself and Mr. RYAN of Ohio) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary and Financial Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

---

## A BILL

To impose sanctions on Chinese state-owned enterprises and any person who is a member of the board of directors, an executive officer, or a senior official of a Chinese state-owned enterprise for benefitting from cyber and economic espionage against the United States.

1       *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2       *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3       **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4       This Act may be cited as the “Chinese Communist  
5       Economic Espionage Sanctions Act”.

1   **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2       Congress finds the following:

3           (1) The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has  
4       made it its policy to engage in economic warfare  
5       against the United States.

6           (2) The CCP uses the resources of the People's  
7       Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese State to  
8       drain the United States of economic might, includ-  
9       ing by means of economic espionage and cyber espio-  
10      nage, unfair trade practices, unfair labor practices,  
11      and currency manipulation.

12       (3) Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE) and  
13      the PLA are the main beneficiary of the CCP's cam-  
14      paign of theft against the United States.

15       (4) Although many SOEs are listed on stock ex-  
16      changes or officially privatized, the Chinese govern-  
17      ment retains at least one-half of equity in those  
18      companies.

19       (5) SOEs come under the control of the min-  
20      isterial-level State-owned Assets Supervision and Ad-  
21      ministration Commission.

22       (6) Members of the boards of directors and sen-  
23      ior management of SOEs are appointed by the  
24      State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration  
25      Commission in consultation with the Communist  
26      Party's Department of Organization.

1                   (7) More than two-thirds of board members and  
2                   three-quarters of senior executives of SOEs are ei-  
3                   ther Communist Party members or officials.

4                   (8) Corruption within the CCP is widespread  
5                   and endemic.

6                   (9) CCP officials use their positions of control  
7                   and influence within and over SOE's to enrich them-  
8                   selves and their families.

9                   (10) The vast majority of the Chinese people do  
10                  not benefit from the corruption of the CCP.

11                  (11) On May 19, 2014, the United States De-  
12                  partment of Justice announced charges against five  
13                  members of the PLA, accusing them of stealing  
14                  trade secrets from United States companies and  
15                  marking the first time the United States has  
16                  charged foreign government employees with eco-  
17                  nomic espionage.

18                  (12) The indictment charged that members of  
19                  the PLA worked to “steal information” from United  
20                  States companies “that would be useful to their  
21                  competitors in China, including state-owned enter-  
22                  prises”.

23                  (13) Chinese SOEs are reported to have bene-  
24                  fitted directly from their actions, including the State  
25                  Nuclear Power Technology Corporation, the Baosteel

1       Group, and the Aluminum Corporation of China  
2       (Chinalco).

3                 (14) The chairman of the board and the major-  
4       ity of the boards for the State Nuclear Power Tech-  
5       nology Corporation, the Baosteel Group, and the  
6       Aluminum Corporation of China (Chinalco) are  
7       members of the CCP.

8                 (15) On May 21, 2014, Assistant Attorney  
9       General John Carlin said that criminal charges can  
10      justify economic sanctions.

11                 (16) The indictment named members of Unit  
12       61398 which is publicly identified as a Shanghai-  
13       based cyber unit of the PLA also known as APT1.

14                 (17) Unit 61398 is part of the 2nd Bureau of  
15       the PLA, 3rd Department of the General Staff.

16                 (18) Unit 61398 was first publically identified  
17       in 2013 as APT1 by Mandiant, a United States  
18       cyber security firm and leader in cyber incident re-  
19       sponse industry.

20                 (19) Mandiant exposed a timeline of Unit  
21       61398's economic espionage conducted since 2006  
22       against 141 victims across multiple industries.

23                 (20) Mandiant's conclusions have been sup-  
24       ported by CrowdStrike, another cyber security com-  
25       pany, which publicly revealed the existence of Unit

1       61486, a related PLA unit dedicated to cyber espionage.  
2

3                     (21) George Kurts, the co-founder of  
4 CrowdStrike, stated that “If you look at all the  
5 groups that we track in China, the indictments are  
6 just the very tip of the iceberg.”.

7                     (22) Units 61398 and 61486 are only two of at  
8 least 20 cyber threat groups in Communist China  
9 and are considered by multiple experts to have stolen  
10 vast amounts of valuable information from the  
11 United States.

12                    (23) The 2011 annual report to Congress from  
13 the Office of the Secretary of Defense, titled “Mili-  
14 tary and Security Developments Involving the Peo-  
15 ple’s Republic of China”, states, “The PRC also uti-  
16 lizes a large, well-organized network of enterprises,  
17 defense factories, affiliated research institutes, and  
18 computer network operations to facilitate the collec-  
19 tion of sensitive information and export-controlled  
20 technology, as well as basic research and science  
21 that supports U.S. defense system modernization.”.

22                   (24) A 2011 report by the Office of the Na-  
23 tional Counterintelligence Executive found that  
24 “Chinese actors are the world’s most active and per-  
25 sistent perpetrators of economic espionage.”.

(25) The 2012 annual report to Congress from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, titled “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China”, found that “Chinese attempts to collect U.S. technological and economic information will continue at a high level and will represent a growing and persistent threat to U.S. economic security.”.

(27) Retired General Michael Hayden, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and Director of the National Security Agency, stated, “The intensity of Chinese espionage is certainly greater than that what we saw between the U.S. and the Soviets during the Cold War. The problem is China’s view is that industrial espionage by the state against relatively vulnerable private enterprise is a commonly accepted state practice.”

(28) The annual report by the congressional  
United States–China Economic and Security Review

1       Commission stated in 2013, “strong evidence  
2       emerged that the Chinese government is directing  
3       and executing a large-scale cyber espionage cam-  
4       paign against the United States”.

5                     (29) Retired Lieutenant General Ronald Bur-  
6       gess, Jr., former Director of the Defense Intelligence  
7       Agency, stated, “China has used its intelligence  
8       services to gather information via a significant net-  
9       work of agents and contacts using a variety of meth-  
10      ods . . . In recent years, multiple cases of economic  
11      espionage and theft of dual-use and military tech-  
12      nology have uncovered pervasive Chinese collection  
13      efforts.”.

14                    (30) Congressman Mike Rogers, Chairman of  
15       the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of  
16       the House of Representatives, stated, “China’s eco-  
17       nomic espionage has reached an intolerable level and  
18       I believe that the United States and our allies in Eu-  
19       rope and Asia have an obligation to confront Beijing  
20       and demand that they put a stop to this piracy. Bei-  
21       jing is waging a massive trade war on us all, and we  
22       should band together to pressure them to stop. Com-  
23       bined, the United States and our allies in Europe  
24       and Asia have significant diplomatic and economic

1 leverage over China, and we should use this to our  
2 advantage to put an end to this scourge,”.

3 (31) The threat of Chinese espionage is so large  
4 that Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, D-Rhode Island,  
5 who chaired the Cyber Task Force of the Select  
6 Committee on Intelligence, proclaimed it to be part  
7 of “the biggest transfer of wealth through theft and  
8 piracy in the history of mankind”.

9 (32) Massive cyber and economic espionage or-  
10 ganized, directed, and carried out by the CCP and  
11 the PLA has contributed to creating a  
12 \$318,000,000,000 United States trade deficit with  
13 Communist China in 2013, which equals 1.89 per-  
14 cent of total United States gross domestic product  
15 (GDP).

### 16 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

17 It is the sense of Congress that the Chinese Com-  
18 munist Party and the Government of the People’s Repub-  
19 lic of China should be condemned for sponsoring, plan-  
20 ning, ordering, conducting, and benefitting from cyber and  
21 economic espionage against the United States.

### 22 **SEC. 4. FINANCIAL MEASURES.**

23 (a) FREEZING OF ASSETS.—The President shall ex-  
24 ercise all powers granted by the International Emergency  
25 Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except

1 that the requirements of section 202 of such Act (50  
2 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent necessary to  
3 block and prohibit all transactions in all property and in-  
4 terests in property of a covered Chinese state-owned enter-  
5 prise or a person who is a member of the board of direc-  
6 tors, an executive officer, or a senior official of a covered  
7 Chinese state-owned enterprise if such property and inter-  
8 ests in property are in the United States, come within the  
9 United States, or are or come within the possession or  
10 control of a United States person.

11 (b) ENFORCEMENT.—

12 (1) PENALTIES.—A covered Chinese state-  
13 owned enterprise or a person who is a member of  
14 the board of directors, an executive officer, or a sen-  
15 ior official of a covered Chinese state-owned enter-  
16 prise shall be subject to the penalties set forth in  
17 subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the Inter-  
18 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50  
19 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that  
20 commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a)  
21 of such section.

22 (2) REQUIREMENTS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITU-  
23 TIONS.—Not later than 120 days after the date of  
24 the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the  
25 Treasury shall prescribe or amend regulations as

1       needed to require each financial institution that is a  
2       United States person and has within its possession  
3       or control assets that are property or interests in  
4       property of a covered Chinese state-owned enterprise  
5       or a person who is a member of the board of direc-  
6       tors, an executive officer, or a senior official of a  
7       covered Chinese state-owned enterprise if such prop-  
8       erty and interests in property are in the United  
9       States to certify to the Secretary that, to the best  
10      of the knowledge of the financial institution, the fi-  
11      nancial institution has frozen all assets within the  
12      possession or control of the financial institution that  
13      are required to be frozen pursuant to subsection (a).

14      (c) REGULATORY AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of the  
15      Treasury shall issue such regulations, licenses, and orders  
16      as are necessary to carry out this section.

17      (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

18           (1) COVERED CHINESE STATE-OWNED ENTER-  
19           PRISE.—The term “covered Chinese state-owned en-  
20           terprise” means an enterprise that—

21               (A) is organized under the laws of the Peo-  
22               ple’s Republic of China, including a foreign  
23               branch of such enterprise; and

(B) is owned or controlled by the Government of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party.

### 13 SEC. 5. INADMISSIBILITY OF CERTAIN ALIENS.

14       (a) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS.—An alien is ineligible  
15 to receive a visa to enter the United States and ineligible  
16 to be admitted to the United States if the alien is a person  
17 who is a member of the board of directors, an executive  
18 officer, or a senior official of a covered Chinese state-  
19 owned enterprise.

20       (b) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—The Secretary of  
21 State shall revoke, in accordance with section 221(i) of  
22 the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)),  
23 the visa or other documentation of any alien who would  
24 be ineligible to receive such a visa or documentation under  
25 subsection (a) of this section.

1       (c) REGULATORY AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of  
2 State shall prescribe such regulations as are necessary to  
3 carry out this section.

4 **SEC. 6. REPORT TO CONGRESS.**

5       (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the  
6 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter,  
7 the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury  
8 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees  
9 a report on—

10             (1) the actions taken to carry out this Act, in-  
11 cluding the number of covered Chinese state-owned  
12 enterprises and persons who are members of the  
13 board of directors, executive officers, or senior offi-  
14 cials of covered Chinese state-owned enterprises  
15 sanctioned during the year preceding the report; and

16             (2) efforts by the executive branch to encourage  
17 the governments of other countries to impose sanc-  
18 tions that are similar to the sanctions imposed under  
19 this Act.

20       (b) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)  
21 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain  
22 a classified annex.

23       (c) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term “appro-  
24 priate congressional committees” means—

- 1                   (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Per-  
2 manent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the  
3 Committee on Ways and Means of the House of  
4 Representatives; and  
5                   (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the  
6 Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on  
7 Finance, and the Committee on Banking, Housing,  
8 and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

○