

113TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 4434

To require the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan to move United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) back to the continental United States, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 9, 2014

Mr. NUNES (for himself, Mr. KEATING, Mr. LoBIONDO, Mr. GERLACH, Mr. BOUSTANY, Mr. CALVERT, Mr. COOK, Mr. JONES, Mr. STIVERS, Mrs. BLACK, Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, Mr. BRADY of Texas, Mr. SHUSTER, Mr. COFFMAN, Mr. DIAZ-BALART, Mr. TIBERI, Mr. VALADAO, Mr. MARCHANT, Mr. LATHAM, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, Mr. KINZINGER of Illinois, Mr. COSTA, Mr. YOUNG of Indiana, Mr. DENHAM, Mr. ROHRABACHER, Mr. COLE, Mr. LaMALFA, Mr. DUNCAN of South Carolina, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. WESTMORELAND, Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois, Mr. THOMPSON of California, Mr. ISSA, Mr. FRANKS of Arizona, Mr. CHAFFETZ, Mr. LAMBORN, Ms. SEWELL of Alabama, Mr. CAMP, Mr. CRAWFORD, Mr. TERRY, and Mr. HOLDING) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services

A BILL

To require the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan to move United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) back to the continental United States, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Africa Counter Ter-
3 rorism Initiative Act”.

4 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

5 Congress finds the following:

6 (1) The proliferation of terrorist groups is
7 rampant in unstable countries in West and sub-Sa-
8 haran Africa. The biggest regional threats include
9 al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which has
10 known ties to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
11 (AQAP), Boko Haram, and al-Shabab. The oppor-
12 tunity to expand the strategic reach and force pro-
13 jection of the United States into the theater of oper-
14 ations of the United States Africa Command (in this
15 Act referred to as “AFRICOM”) is now. With the
16 United States strategic pivot to the Pacific now un-
17 derway, the need to ensure retention of a strong At-
18 lantic presence is a vital and delicate aspect of stra-
19 tegic re-positioning.

20 (2) The United States Central Command oper-
21 ates from its headquarters in Tampa, Florida, with
22 a forward operating location in Qatar. The United
23 States Southern Command operates from its head-
24 quarters in Miami, Florida, with forward operating
25 locations in Honduras and El Salvador. It is not un-
26 usual for United States military units and their

1 combatant command headquarters to operate in dif-
2 ferent time zones.

3 (3) Analyses conducted by the Government Ac-
4 countability Office found that the annual recurring
5 cost of maintaining a United States-based head-
6 quarters for AFRICOM would be \$60 million to \$70
7 million less than the cost of operating the
8 AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany.
9 The annual cost of providing AFRICOM personnel
10 with overseas housing and cost-of-living pay was \$81
11 million per year, compared with the \$19 million to
12 \$25 million these would cost if the personnel were
13 located in the United States. The break-even point
14 to recover one-time relocation costs to the United
15 States would be reached between 2 and 6 years after
16 relocation, depending on the costs to establish facili-
17 ties in the United States. Relocating AFRICOM to
18 the continental United States could create up to
19 4,300 additional jobs, with an annual impact on the
20 local economy ranging from \$350 million to \$450
21 million.

22 (4) After an internal cost assessment, the De-
23 partment of Defense decided to keep AFRICOM
24 headquarters in Stuttgart, without fully explaining
25 why the operational benefits of keeping the head-

1 quarters in Germany outweigh the benefit of poten-
2 tially saving millions of dollars per year and creating
3 thousands of jobs in the United States.

4 (5) A review by the Government Accountability
5 Office in 2013 of the Department's decision to keep
6 AFRICOM headquarters in Germany found that the
7 decision was not supported by comprehensive and
8 well-documented analysis that balanced the oper-
9 ational and cost benefits of the options available to
10 the Department.

11 (6) In April 2013, after the decision had been
12 made to maintain AFRICOM headquarters in Ger-
13 many, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel called on
14 the Department to challenge all past assumptions in
15 order to seek cost savings and efficiencies in “a time
16 of unprecedented shifts in the world order, new glob-
17 al challenges, and deep global fiscal uncertainty”, to
18 explore the full range of options for implementing
19 United States national security strategy, and to “put
20 everything on the table”. The Secretary stated that
21 the size and shape of the military forces should con-
22 stantly be reassessed. He stated that this reassess-
23 ment should include determining the most appro-
24 priate balance between forward-stationed, rotational-
25 ly deployed, and home-based forces.

1 (7) It is within the strategic and fiscal responsi-
2 bility of Congress to fully analyze and provide for
3 the implementation of any consolidation of military
4 installations. There are more than 110,000 troops
5 and civilians stationed and employed at 29 military
6 installations in Europe. Priority should be given to
7 consolidating bases that are in close proximity to
8 each other and that can achieve cost savings without
9 detriment to operational readiness, such as Royal
10 Air Force Station Mildenhall and Royal Air Force
11 Station Lakenheath, as well as Moron Air Base,
12 Spain, and Naval Station Rota, Spain.

13 (8) Of particular concern is the decision to de-
14 ploy assets to Moron Air Base, where the readiness
15 and effectiveness of deployed troops is hindered by
16 the lack of infrastructure to house, train, and equip
17 them. Specifically, Moron lacks the facilities to prop-
18 erly perform ground and naval training operations,
19 and only has limited ability to accomplish air train-
20 ing operations. By contrast, Lajes Field has imple-
21 mented more than \$150 million of major infrastruc-
22 ture upgrades over the past 12 years to improve the
23 quality of life, upgrade communication capabilities,
24 bolster security, and enhance military operations.
25 With a nearby port, sprawling fields, and unre-

1 stricted airspace, Lajes Field has the unique ability
2 to host extensive air, ground, and naval training op-
3 erations. Lajes' strategic location, infrastructure im-
4 provements, unrestricted air space, and outstanding
5 training environment for all forces make this an in-
6 dispensable asset and an ideal forward operating
7 base for AFRICOM, as opposed to spending hun-
8 dreds of millions of dollars to upgrade aging sites
9 such as Moron Air Base, Spain.

10 (9) It is in the national interest of the United
11 States to save millions of dollars per year and bring
12 thousands of jobs to the United States by moving
13 AFRICOM headquarters from Stuttgart, Germany,
14 to the continental United States.

15 **SEC. 3. REQUIREMENT FOR PLAN TO MOVE AFRICOM**
16 **HEADQUARTERS TO CONTINENTAL UNITED**
17 **STATES.**

18 (a) PLAN REQUIRED.—The Secretary of Defense
19 shall develop a plan in accordance with subsection (b) to
20 transfer the headquarters of AFRICOM from Stuttgart,
21 Germany, to a location in the continental United States.

22 (b) MATTERS COVERED.—

23 (1) ASSETS OF AFRICOM.—The plan required
24 under this section shall provide for—

1 (A) the 65th Air Base Wing to be an
2 AFRICOM asset;

3 (B) AFRICOM permanent assets (includ-
4 ing assets related to air, ground, special oper-
5 ations, and logistics) to be located at Lajes
6 Field, Azores, Portugal; and

7 (C) the transfer of United States assets at
8 Lajes Field from United States European Com-
9 mand to AFRICOM, for purposes of being the
10 forward operating location, logistical hub, and
11 location of assets of AFRICOM.

12 (2) RELOCATIONS TO LAJES FIELD.—The plan
13 required under this section shall also provide for the
14 relocation of the Special-Purpose Marine Air-Ground
15 Task Force Crisis Response (SP–MAGTF CR) from
16 Moron Air Base, Spain, to Lajes Field.

17 (c) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—The plan required
18 under this section shall be submitted to Congress not later
19 than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act.

20 (d) IMPLEMENTATION OF PLAN.—The Secretary of
21 Defense shall implement the plan required by this section
22 within 6 months after submission of the plan to Congress
23 under subsection (c), and in no event later than 1 year
24 after the date of the enactment of this Act.

1 **SEC. 4. REQUIREMENT FOR REVIEW OF AGREEMENT ON**
2 **COOPERATION AND DEFENSE BETWEEN THE**
3 **UNITED STATES AND PORTUGAL.**

4 The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a review of
5 the Agreement on Cooperation and Defense Between the
6 United States and Portugal, signed at Lisbon June 1,
7 1995, to ensure that such Agreement accurately reflects
8 and accounts for the plan required under section 3.

9 **SEC. 5. CONTINUED OPERATION OF LAJES FIELD.**

10 Effective until at least the date of completion of the
11 2018 quadrennial defense review, Lajes Field shall con-
12 tinue operating 24 hours a day, at or above its 2012 levels
13 of readiness.

○