### 112TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION

# H. R. 1750

To strengthen the strategic force posture of the United States by implementing and supplementing certain provisions of the New START Treaty and the Resolution of Ratification, and for other purposes.

## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

May 5, 2011

Mr. Turner (for himself and Mr. McKeon) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

# A BILL

To strengthen the strategic force posture of the United States by implementing and supplementing certain provisions of the New START Treaty and the Resolution of Ratification, and for other purposes.

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
- 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
- 4 (a) Short Title.—This Act may be cited as the
- 5 "New START Treaty Implementation Act".
- 6 (b) Table of Contents.—The table of contents for
- 7 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Definitions.
- Sec. 3. Use of funds on the modernization of nuclear weapons.
- Sec. 4. Limitation on nuclear force reductions.
- Sec. 5. Nuclear employment strategy.
- Sec. 6. Force analysis and assessment of the capabilities of the nuclear forces of the United States.
- Sec. 7. Annual assessment and report on the delivery platforms for nuclear weapons and the nuclear command and control system.
- Sec. 8. Missile defense.
- Sec. 9. Annual report on the plan for the modernization of the nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons complex, and delivery platforms.
- Sec. 10. Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement nuclear facility and Uranium Processing Facility.
- Sec. 11. Policy on non-nuclear weapons systems.
- Sec. 12. Non-strategic nuclear weapon reductions and extended deterrence policy.

#### 1 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

- 2 In this Act:
- 3 (1) The term "congressional defense commit-
- 4 tees" has the meaning given that term in section
- 5 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.
- 6 (2) The term "covered nuclear systems" means
- 7 the following:
- 8 (A) B-52H or B2 bomber aircraft and nu-
- 9 clear air-launched cruise missiles.
- 10 (B) Trident ballistic missile submarines,
- launch tubes, and Trident D-5 submarine-
- launched ballistic missiles.
- 13 (C) Minuteman III intercontinental bal-
- 14 listic missiles and associated silos.
- 15 (D) Nuclear warheads or gravity bombs
- that can be delivered by the systems specified
- in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).

1	(E) Nuclear weapons delivered by means
2	other than the systems specified in subpara-
3	graph (A), (B), or (C).
4	(3) The term "New START Treaty" means the
5	Treaty between the United States of America and
6	the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further
7	Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
8	Arms, signed on April 8, 2010.
9	SEC. 3. USE OF FUNDS ON THE MODERNIZATION OF NU-
10	CLEAR WEAPONS.
11	(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
12	(1) The President of the United States, in a
13	letter dated December 18, 2010, declared that, "I
14	recognize that nuclear modernization requires invest-
15	ment for the long-term, in addition to this one-year
16	budget increase. That is my commitment to the Con-
17	gress that my Administration will pursue these pro-
18	grams and capabilities for as long as I am Presi-
19	dent. In future years, we will provide annual updates
20	to the [report required under section 1251 of the
21	National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
22	2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549)].".
23	(2) Article 5, Section 1 of the New START
24	Treaty declares that, "Subject to the provisions of

- this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.".
- 3 (3) The Secretary of Defense declared on Octo-4 ber 28, 2008, that, "To be blunt, there is absolutely 5 no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and re-6 duce the number of weapons in our stockpile without 7 either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing 8 a modernization program.".
  - (4) The November 2010 update to the report required under section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549) said that, "Notably, stockpile requirements to fully implement the [Nuclear Posture Review] and the New START Treaty have been refined . . . Based on this additional work, and the development of new information and insights, the President is prepared to seek additional resources for the Weapons Activities account, over and above the FY2011 FYNSP, for the FY 2012 budget and for the remainder of the FYNSP period (FY2013 to FY 2016). Specifically, the President plans to request \$7.6 billion for FY 2012 (an increase of \$0.6 billion over the planned FY 2012 funding level . . .). Given the extremely tight budget environment facing the Federal Government, these

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- requests to the Congress demonstrate the priority the [Administration] places on maintaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of the deterrent.".
  - (5) The Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan for Fiscal Year 2011, dated May 2010, said that, "The Laboratory Directors will be expected to provide findings associated with the full range of [life extension program] approaches, and to make a set of recommendations based solely on their best technical assessments of the ability of each [life extension program] approach to meet critical stockpile management goals (weapons system safety, security, and effectiveness)."

## (b) Sense of Congress.—

- (1) In General.—It is the sense of Congress that the life extension program deadlines described in paragraph (2) represent important deadlines that must be met to sustain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear stockpile and credible deterrent.
- (2) Deadlines described in this paragraph are the deadlines identified in the November 2010 update to the report required under section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

1	Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549) as
2	follows:
3	(A) Completion of the W76 build in fiscal
4	year 2018.
5	(B) Completion of the first production unit
6	of the B–61 in fiscal year 2017.
7	(C) Beginning of the study of life exten-
8	sion options for the W78 in fiscal year 2012.
9	(D) Beginning of the study of a common
10	warhead for the W78 and the W88 in fiscal
11	year 2012.
12	(E) Beginning of the development of an
13	Arming, Fuzing, and Firing system for the
14	W88 in fiscal year 2012.
15	(c) Policy.—It is the policy of the United States—
16	(1) to accomplish the modernization and re-
17	placement of the nuclear triad;
18	(2) to sustain a robust stockpile stewardship
19	program and to maintain and modernize the nuclear
20	weapons production capabilities and capacities that
21	will both—
22	(A) ensure the safety, reliability, and per-
23	formance of the nuclear weapons of the United
24	States at the New START Treaty levels: and

- 1 (B) meet requirements for hedging against
  2 possible international developments or technical
  3 problems, in conformance with the policies of
  4 the United States and in support of nuclear de5 terrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and
  6 defense;
  - (3) to maintain the nuclear weapons laboratories of the United States and preserve the core nuclear weapons competencies of such laboratories;
  - (4) that the President should not take any action to retire or dismantle (or to prepare to retire or dismantle) any of the covered nuclear systems unless modernization or replacement is occurring as proposed in the plans under the report required by section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549), the November 2010 update to such report, and the reports required under section 495 of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 9; and
  - (5) that if the modernization plan is not funded consistent with the annual report required under such section 495, such failure would jeopardize the supreme interests of the United States and is potential grounds for the withdrawal of the United States

- 1 from the New START Treaty in accordance with
- 2 Article XIV of such Treaty.
- 3 (d) Authorization of Appropriations.—Funds
- 4 are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Depart-
- 5 ment of Energy for fiscal year 2012 for the activities of
- 6 the National Nuclear Security Administration in carrying
- 7 out programs necessary for national security in the
- 8 amount of \$11,782,930,000, of which \$7,629,716,000
- 9 shall be for weapons activities of the National Nuclear Se-
- 10 curity Administration.

### 11 SEC. 4. LIMITATION ON NUCLEAR FORCE REDUCTIONS.

- 12 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
- 13 (1) As of September 30, 2009, the stockpile of
- 14 nuclear weapons of the United States has been re-
- duced by 84 percent from its maximum level in 1967
- and by more than 75 percent from its level when the
- 17 Berlin Wall fell in November 1989.
- 18 (2) The number of non-strategic nuclear weap-
- ons of the United States has declined by approxi-
- 20 mately 90 percent from September 30, 1991, to Sep-
- 21 tember 30, 2009.
- 22 (3) On March 29, 2011, the Assistant to the
- 23 President for National Security Affairs stated, "As
- 24 we implement New START, we're making prepara-
- 25 tions for the next round of nuclear reductions.

Under the President's direction, the Department of Defense will review our strategic requirements and develop options for further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile, which stands at approximately 5,000 warheads, including both deployed and reserve warheads. To develop these options for further re-ductions, we need to consider several factors, such as potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures that are required for effective deter-rence.".

# (b) IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW START TREATY.—

# (1) Limitation.—

(A) Except as provided by paragraph (2), the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy may not obligate or expend amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy for any of fiscal years 2011 through 2017 to retire any covered nuclear system of the United States as required by the New START Treaty.

(B) Nothing in subparagraph (A) shall be construed to limit any action (including verification) required by the New START Trea-

1	ty other than retiring any covered nuclear sys-
2	tem of the United States.
3	(2) WAIVER.—The Secretary of Defense and
4	the Secretary of Energy may jointly waive the limi-
5	tation under paragraph (1)(A) for a covered nuclear
6	system if—
7	(A) the Secretaries submit to the congres-
8	sional defense committees written notice of the
9	status of carrying out the modernization plan
10	described in the most recent report required by
11	section 495 of title 10, United States Code, as
12	added by section 9; and
13	(B) with respect to such notice—
14	(i) if the notice describes that such
15	plan is being carried out, a period of 30
16	days has elapsed following the date on
17	which the President submits to the con-
18	gressional defense committees such report
19	that includes written notice of the pro-
20	posed retirement of such nuclear system,
21	as required by subsection $(a)(1)(D)$ of such
22	section 495; or
23	(ii) if the notice describes that such
24	plan is not being carried out, a period of
25	180 days has elapsed following the date on

1	which the President submits to the con-
2	gressional defense committees the report
3	described in clause (i).
4	(3) Retire Defined.—In this subsection, the
5	term "retire", with respect to a covered nuclear sys-
6	tem, includes retiring, dismantling, eliminating or
7	preparing to retire, dismantle, or eliminate.
8	(c) Prohibition on Reduction of Stockpile
9	HEDGE.—The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
10	Energy may not obligate or expend amounts appropriated
11	or otherwise made available to the Department of Defense
12	or the Department of Energy to retire, dismantle, or elimi-
13	nate, or prepare to retire, dismantle, or eliminate, any
14	nondeployed strategic or non-strategic nuclear weapon
15	until the date that is 90 days after the date on which the
16	Secretary of Energy submits to the congressional defense
17	committees written certification that—
18	(1) the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Re-
19	placement nuclear facility (in this subsection re-
20	ferred to as the "nuclear facility") and the Uranium
21	Processing Facility (in this subsection referred to as
22	the "processing facility" are fully operational;
23	(2) the nuclear facility and the Plutonium Fa-
24	cility-4 are together able to deliver to the nuclear

1	weapons stockpile not less than a total of 80 pits per
2	year; and
3	(3) the processing facility is able to deliver to
4	the nuclear weapons stockpile not less than 80 refur-
5	bished or new canned subassemblies per year.
6	(d) Prohibition on Unilateral Reduction of
7	NUCLEAR WEAPONS.—
8	(1) In general.—Part I of subtitle A of title
9	10, United States Code, is amended by adding at
10	the end the following new chapter:
11	"CHAPTER 24—NUCLEAR POSTURE AND
12	MISSILE DEFENSE
	"Sec. "491. Prohibition on unilateral reduction of nuclear weapons.
13	"§ 491. Prohibition on unilateral reduction of nuclear
14	weapons
15	"The President may not retire, dismantle, or elimi-
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	nate, or prepare to retire, dismantle, or eliminate, any nu-
17	nate, or prepare to retire, dismantle, or eliminate, any nuclear weapon of the United States (including such de-
	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
17	clear weapon of the United States (including such de-
17 18	clear weapon of the United States (including such deployed weapons and nondeployed weapons and warheads
17 18 19	clear weapon of the United States (including such de- ployed weapons and nondeployed weapons and warheads in the nuclear weapons stockpile) if such action would re-
17 18 19 20	clear weapon of the United States (including such de- ployed weapons and nondeployed weapons and warheads in the nuclear weapons stockpile) if such action would re- duce the number of such weapons to a number that is
17 18 19 20 21	clear weapon of the United States (including such deployed weapons and nondeployed weapons and warheads in the nuclear weapons stockpile) if such action would reduce the number of such weapons to a number that is less than the level described in the New START Treaty

1	sent of the Senate pursuant to Article II, section 2,
2	clause 2 of the Constitution; or
3	"(2) specifically authorized by an Act of Con-
4	gress.".
5	(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.—The table of
6	chapters at the beginning of subtitle A of title 10,
7	United States Code, and at the beginning of part I
8	of such subtitle, are each amended by inserting after
9	the item relating to chapter 23 the following new
10	item:
	"24. Nuclear posture and missile defense
11	SEC. 5. NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY.
12	(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
13	(1) Section 1057 of H.R. 5136, as passed by
14	the House of Representatives during the 111th Con-
14 15	the House of Representatives during the 111th Congress, included a requirement that any future reduc-
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15	gress, included a requirement that any future reduc-
15 16	gress, included a requirement that any future reduc- tions of the nuclear forces of the United States
15 16 17	gress, included a requirement that any future reduc- tions of the nuclear forces of the United States below the level described in the New START Treaty
15 16 17 18	gress, included a requirement that any future reduc- tions of the nuclear forces of the United States below the level described in the New START Treaty be contingent on the certification by the Secretary of
15 16 17 18	gress, included a requirement that any future reduc- tions of the nuclear forces of the United States below the level described in the New START Treaty be contingent on the certification by the Secretary of Defense that "such reduction does not require a
115 116 117 118 119 220	gress, included a requirement that any future reduc- tions of the nuclear forces of the United States below the level described in the New START Treaty be contingent on the certification by the Secretary of Defense that "such reduction does not require a change in targeting strategy from counterforce tar-
115 116 117 118 119 220 221	gress, included a requirement that any future reductions of the nuclear forces of the United States below the level described in the New START Treaty be contingent on the certification by the Secretary of Defense that "such reduction does not require a change in targeting strategy from counterforce targeting to countervalue targeting".
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	gress, included a requirement that any future reductions of the nuclear forces of the United States below the level described in the New START Treaty be contingent on the certification by the Secretary of Defense that "such reduction does not require a change in targeting strategy from counterforce targeting to countervalue targeting".  (2) On March 29, 2011, the Assistant to the

1 Under the President's direction, the Department of 2 Defense will review our strategic requirements and 3 develop options for further reductions in our current 4 nuclear stockpile, which stands at approximately 5 5,000 warheads, including both deployed and reserve 6 warheads. To develop these options for further reductions, we need to consider several factors, such 7 8 as potential changes in targeting requirements and 9 alert postures that are required for effective deter-10 rence.". 11 (b) Changes to Strategy.—Chapter 24 of title 10, 12 United States Code, as added by section 4, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: 13 14 "§ 492. Nuclear employment strategy 15 "The President may not make any changes to the nuclear employment strategy of the United States unless— 16 17 "(1) the President submits to the congressional 18 defense committees a report on such proposed 19 changes, including— "(A) the implication of such changes on 20 21 the flexibility and resilience of the strategic 22 forces of the United States and the ability of 23 such forces to support the goals of the United 24 States with respect to nuclear deterrence, ex-25 tended deterrence, assurance, and defense; and

1	"(B) certification that such proposed
2	changes do not require a change in targeting
3	strategy from counterforce targeting to counter-
4	value targeting: and

- 5 "(2) a period of 90 days has elapsed after the 6 date on which such report under paragraph (1) is 7 submitted.".
- 8 (c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections
  9 at the beginning of such chapter is amended by inserting
  10 after the item relating to section 491 the following new

"492. Nuclear employment strategy.".

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item:

#### 12 SEC. 6. FORCE ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE CAPA-

- 13 BILITIES OF THE NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE
- 14 UNITED STATES.
- 15 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March 1, 2012, the
- 16 Secretary of Defense shall conduct a force analysis and
- 17 net assessment of the current and proposed nuclear forces
- 18 of the United States to determine whether such forces are
- 19 capable of meeting the nuclear deterrence, extended deter-
- 20 rence, assurance, and defense objectives of the United
- 21 States in the context of the current and anticipated nu-
- 22 clear and non-nuclear forces of the Russian Federation
- 23 and other countries.
- 24 (b) Elements.—The force analysis and net assess-
- 25 ment under subsection (a) shall include the following:

- 1 (1) Specific metrics to define and measure the 2 strategic sufficiency of the nuclear forces of the 3 United States and the sufficiency of forces necessary 4 to meet the nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, 5 assurance, and defense requirements of the United 6 States.
  - (2) An identification and assessment of the nuclear strategies of the United States, and the role of nuclear weapons in those strategies, as of the date of the force analysis and net assessment, including—
    - (A) how the United States is prepared to limit damage to the United States and its allies if deterrence fails; and
    - (B) if the United States requires such capabilities, an assessment of such capabilities.
  - (3) An identification of the nuclear force posture of the United States required to fulfill the nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and defense strategies of the United States, including the planning assumptions on which such posture is based.
  - (4) Force-on-force exchange modeling analyses to determine the vulnerability, survivability, and effectiveness of current and proposed nuclear capabilities of the United States in various scenarios (in-

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- cluding a surprise attack and an electromagnetic pulse attack by potential adversaries, including Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, or terrorists armed with nuclear weapons) and taking into account various nuclear postures (including day-to-day alert and generated alert).
  - (5) An assessment of the implications of disparities between the strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons of the United States and the strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons of other countries with respect to deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and defense.
  - (6) An assessment of the implications that various force levels of the nuclear forces of the United States have on nuclear proliferation, and the effect that such lower force levels have on the motivation or inclination of other countries to increase their nuclear capabilities, and the contingency plans of the United States to respond to such an increase.
  - (7) An assessment of the effect of the conventional prompt global strike capabilities of the United States and other countries on the ability of the United States to meet its deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and defense requirements.

- 1 (8) An assessment of the effect of the ballistic 2 missile defense capabilities of the United States and 3 other countries on the strategic balance and on the 4 nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, 5 and defense strategies of the United States. 6 (9) An assessment of the flexibility and resilience of the nuclear forces of the United States, in
  - ience of the nuclear forces of the United States, including the potential to upload nondeployed warheads and to modify weapons and warheads to meet unexpected challenges.
- 11 (10) Such other matters as the Secretary of 12 Defense considers appropriate regarding the capa-13 bilities of the nuclear forces of the United States.
- 14 (c) Participation of Other Departments and 15 Agencies.—In conducting the force analysis and net as16 sessment under subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense 17 shall provide for the appropriate participation of the fol18 lowing:
- 19 (1) The Director of National Intelligence.
- 20 (2) The Joint Staff.

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- 21 (3) The Missile Defense Agency.
- 22 (4) The United States Strategic Command.
- 23 (5) Such other elements or components of the 24 Department of Defense as the Secretary of Defense 25 considers appropriate.

- 1 (6) Such other departments and agencies of the 2 Federal Government as the Secretary of Defense 3 and the heads of such departments and agencies 4 jointly consider appropriate.
- 5 (7) The national security laboratories (as defined in section 3281 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2471)).

# 8 (d) Report.—

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- (1) Report required.—Not later than September 1, 2012, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the force analysis and net assessment.
- (2) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form (including as much detail as possible), but may include a classified annex.

# (e) Independent Review.—

- (1) Review.—The Secretary of Defense shall provide for the review by one or more federally funded research and development centers of the force analysis and net assessment conducted under subsection (a).
- 23 (2) Participants.—The review under para-24 graph (1) shall also include the participation of the 25 following:

1	(A) Such additional individuals as the Sec-
2	retary considers appropriate with expertise in
3	matters relating to—
4	(i) force analysis and net assessment;
5	and
6	(ii) the relationship between the force
7	posture of the United States and the nu-
8	clear deterrence, extended deterrence, as-
9	surance, and defense goals of the United
10	States.
11	(B) A separate individual (who may be a
12	Member of Congress) appointed by each of the
13	following:
14	(i) The Chairman of the Committee
15	on Armed Services of the Senate.
16	(ii) The Ranking Member of the Com-
17	mittee on Armed Services of the Senate.
18	(iii) The Chairman of the Committee
19	on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
20	(iv) The Ranking Member of the
21	Committee on Foreign Relations of the
22	Senate.
23	(v) The Majority Leader of the Sen-
24	ate.

1	(vi) The Minority Leader of the Sen-
2	ate.
3	(vii) The Chairman of the Committee
4	on Armed Services of the House of Rep-
5	resentatives.
6	(viii) The Ranking Member of the
7	Committee on Armed Services of the
8	House of Representatives.
9	(ix) The Chairman of the Committee
10	on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
11	resentatives.
12	(x) The Ranking Member of the Com-
13	mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
14	Representatives.
15	(xi) The Speaker of the House of
16	Representatives.
17	(xii) The Minority Leader of the
18	House of Representatives.
19	(3) Report.—Not later than 90 days after the
20	date of the submittal to Congress of the report
21	under subsection $(d)(1)$ , the federally funded re-
22	search and development center conducting a review
23	under paragraph (1) shall submit to the appropriate
24	committees of Congress a report on the results of
25	the review

1	(f) Appropriate Committees of Congress De
2	FINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate commit
3	tees of Congress' means—
4	(1) the Committee on Armed Services and the
5	Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
6	(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the
7	Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
8	House of Representatives.
9	SEC. 7. ANNUAL ASSESSMENT AND REPORT ON THE DELIV
10	ERY PLATFORMS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS
11	AND THE NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL
12	SYSTEM.
13	(a) In General.—Chapter 24 of title 10, United
14	States Code, as added by section 4, is further amended
15	by adding at the end the following new section:
16	"§ 493. Annual assessment and report on the delivery
17	platforms for nuclear weapons and the
18	nuclear command and control system
19	"(a) Annual Assessments.—(1) Each covered offi
20	cial shall annually assess the safety, security, reliability
21	sustainability, performance, and military effectiveness of
22	the systems described in paragraph (2) for which such of
23	ficial has responsibility.
24	"(2) The systems described in this paragraph are the
25	following:

1 "(A) Each type of delivery platform for nuclear 2 weapons. 3 "(B) The nuclear command and control system. "(b) Annual Report.—(1) Not later than Decem-4 ber 1 of each year, beginning in 2011, each covered official shall submit to the Secretary of Defense and the Nuclear 6 Weapons Council established by section 179 of this title 8 a report on the assessments conducted under subsection 9 (a). 10 "(2) Each report under paragraph (1) shall include 11 the following: 12 "(A) The results of the assessment. 13 "(B) An identification and discussion of any ca-14 pability gaps or shortfalls with respect to the sys-15 tems described in subsection (a)(2) covered under 16 the assessment. 17 "(C) An identification and discussion of any 18 risks with respect to meeting mission or capability 19 requirements. 20 "(D) In the case of an assessment by the Com-21 mander of the United States Strategic Command, if 22 the Commander identifies any deficiency with re-23 spect to a nuclear weapons delivery platform covered 24 under the assessment, a discussion of the relative

merits of any other nuclear weapons delivery plat-

- form type or compensatory measure that would accomplish the mission of such nuclear weapons delivery platform.

  "(E) An identification and discussion of any
  matter having an adverse effect on the capability of
- the covered official to accurately determine the matters covered by the assessment.
- 8 "(c) Report to President and Congress.—(1)
- 9 Not later than March 1 of each year, beginning in 2012,
- 10 the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the President a
- 11 report containing—
- 12 "(A) each report under subsection (b) sub-13 mitted during the previous year, as originally sub-14 mitted to the Secretary;
- 15 "(B) any comments that the Secretary con-16 siders appropriate with respect to each such report;
- "(C) any conclusions that the Secretary considers appropriate with respect to the safety, security, reliability, sustainability, performance, or military effectiveness of the systems described in sub-
- 21 section (a)(2); and
- 22 "(D) any other information that the Secretary 23 considers appropriate.
- 24 "(2) Not later than March 15 of each year, beginning 25 in 2012, the President shall transmit to the congressional

- 1 defense committees the report submitted to the President
- 2 under paragraph (1), including any comments the Presi-
- 3 dent considers appropriate.
- 4 "(3) Each report under this subsection may be in
- 5 classified form if the Secretary of Defense determines it
- 6 necessary.
- 7 "(d) Covered Official Defined.—In this section,
- 8 the term 'covered official' means—
- 9 "(1) the Commander of the United States Stra-
- tegic Command;
- 11 "(2) the Director of the Strategic Systems Pro-
- gram of the Navy; and
- "(3) the Commander of the Global Strike Com-
- mand of the Air Force.".
- 15 (b) Clerical Amendment.—The table of sections
- 16 at the beginning of such chapter is amended by inserting
- 17 after the item relating to section 492 the following new
- 18 item:

"493. Annual assessment and report on the delivery platforms for nuclear weapons and the nuclear command and control system.".

#### 19 SEC. 8. MISSILE DEFENSE.

- 20 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that the President, in
- 21 a letter dated December 18, 2010, pledged the following:
- 22 (1) "The New START Treaty places no limita-
- 23 tions on the development or deployment of our mis-
- sile defense programs.".

- 1 (2) "Starting in 2011, we will begin deploying 2 the first phase of the [European phased, adaptive 3 approach to missile defense, to protect large parts 4 of southern Europe from short- and medium-range 5 ballistic missile threats. In subsequent phases, we 6 will deploy longer-range and more effective landbased standard missile-3 interceptors in Romania 7 8 and Poland to protect Europe against medium- and 9 intermediate-range ballistic missiles. In the final 10 phase, planed for the end of the decade, further up-11 grades of the SM-3 interceptor will provide an as-12 cent-phase intercept capability to augment our de-13 fense of NATO European territory, as well as that 14 of the United States, against future threats of 15 ICBMs launched from Iran.".
  - (3) "Regardless of Russia's actions in this regard, as long as I am President, and as long as the Congress provides the necessary funding, the United States will continue to develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect the United States, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners. My Administration plans to deploy all four phases of the [European phased, adaptive approach to missile defense].".
- 25 (b) Policy.—It is the policy of the United States—

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- (1) that defenses against ballistic missiles are essential for nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and defense strategies;
  - (2) that any further limitations on the missile defense capabilities of the United States are not in the national security interests of the United States;
  - (3) that policies based on mutual assured destruction or intentional vulnerability to strategic attack can be contrary to the safety and security of both the United States and the Russian Federation, and both countries share a common interest in defensive capabilities that help both to move cooperatively as soon as possible away from a strategic relationship based on mutual vulnerability;
  - (4) that the United States will welcome steps by Russia to also adopt a fundamentally defensive strategic posture that no longer views robust strategic defensive capabilities as undermining the overall strategic balance;
  - (5) to improve the strategic defensive capabilities of the United States both quantitatively and qualitatively during the period that the New START treaty is in effect, and such improvements are consistent with the Treaty;

1	(6) that no future agreement with Russia on
2	cooperative missile defense, non-strategic nuclear
3	weapons, further strategic weapons reductions, or
4	any other matter shall include any restrictions on
5	the missile defense options of the United States in
6	Europe or elsewhere; and
7	(7) to defend the United States and its allies in
8	the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from all
9	missile threats, including from short-range ballistic
10	missiles.
11	(c) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Con-
12	gress that, given congressional concern about missile de-
13	fense issues, the President should offer both Houses of
14	Congress regular briefings, not less than twice each year,
15	to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Serv-
16	ices of the Senate, and the Committees on Foreign Affairs
17	and Armed Services of the House, on all missile defense
18	issues related to the New START Treaty and on the
19	progress of United States-Russia dialogue and cooperation
20	regarding missile defense.
21	(d) Limitations on Missile Defense.—
22	(1) In general.—Chapter 24 of title 10,
23	United States Code, as added by section 4, is fur-
24	ther amended by adding at the end the following

new section:

# 1 "§ 494. Certain limitations on missile defense

2	"(a) In General.—Any agreement with a country
3	or international organization or amendment to the New
4	START Treaty (including an agreement made by the Bi-
5	lateral Consultative Commission established by the New
6	START Treaty) concerning the limitation of the missile
7	defense capabilities of the United States shall not be bind-
8	ing on the United States, and shall not enter into force
9	with respect to the United States, unless after the date
10	of the enactment of this section, such agreement or
11	amendment is—
12	"(1) specifically approved with the advice and
13	consent of the Senate pursuant to Article II, section
14	2, clause 2 of the Constitution; or
15	"(2) specifically authorized by an Act of Con-
16	gress.
17	"(b) Annual Notification.—Not later than Janu-
18	ary 31 of each year, beginning in 2012, the President shall
19	submit to the congressional defense committees a notifica-
20	tion of—
21	"(1) whether the Russian Federation has recog-
22	nized during the previous year the sovereign right of
23	the United States to pursue quantitative and quali-
24	tative improvements in missile defense capabilities;
25	and

"(2) whether during any treaty negotiations or 1 2 other Government-to-Government contacts between the United States and the Russian Federation (in-3 4 cluding under the auspices of the Bilateral Consult-5 ative Commission established by the New START 6 Treaty) during the previous year a representative of 7 the Russian Federation suggested that a treaty or 8 other international agreement include, with respect 9 to the United States— "(A) restricting missile defense capabili-10 11 ties, military capabilities in space, or conven-12 tional prompt global strike capabilities; or 13 "(B) reducing the number of non-strategic 14 nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. 15 "(c) NEW START TREATY DEFINED.—In this section, the term 'New START Treaty' means the Treaty be-16 17 tween the United States of America and the Russian Fed-18 eration on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed on April 8, 19 20 2010.". 21 (2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sec-22 tions at the beginning of such chapter is amended 23 by inserting after the item relating to section 493 24 the following new item:

<sup>&</sup>quot;494. Certain limitations on missile defense.".

1	(e) RESTRICTION OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN TREATY
2	NEGOTIATIONS.—
3	(1) Restriction.—No funds available to the
4	Department of State or any other Federal depart-
5	ment or agency may be obligated or expended during
6	fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal year thereafter for
7	travel expenses related to treaty negotiations con-
8	cerning the possible reduction of covered nuclear
9	systems of the United States until the date on which
10	the certification under paragraph (2) is transmitted
11	to Congress.
12	(2) Certification.—Not later than 30 days
13	after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
14	President shall transmit to Congress written notifi-
15	cation that negotiations described in paragraph (1)
16	will not include restricting the missile defense capa-
17	bilities of the United States.
18	SEC. 9. ANNUAL REPORT ON THE PLAN FOR THE MOD-
19	ERNIZATION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
20	STOCKPILE, NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX,
21	AND DELIVERY PLATFORMS.
22	(a) Annual Report.—Chapter 24 of title 10,
23	United States Code, as added by section 4, is further
24	amended by adding at the end the following new section:

1	"§ 495. Annual report on the plan for the moderniza-
2	tion of the nuclear weapons stockpile, nu-
3	clear weapons complex, and delivery
4	platforms
5	"(a) Report on the Plan for the Nuclear
6	Weapons Stockpile, Nuclear Weapons Complex,
7	AND DELIVERY PLATFORMS.—(1) Together with the
8	budget of the President submitted to Congress under sec-
9	tion 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, the Presi-
10	dent, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and
11	the Secretary of Energy, shall transmit to the congres-
12	sional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign Re-
13	lations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Af-
14	fairs of the House of Representatives a detailed report on
15	the plan to—
16	"(A) enhance the safety, security, and reliability
17	of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United
18	States;
19	"(B) modernize the nuclear weapons complex;
20	"(C) maintain, modernize, or replace the deliv-
21	ery platforms for nuclear weapons; and
22	"(D) retire, dismantle, or eliminate any covered
23	nuclear system.
24	"(2) Each report required under paragraph (1) shall
25	include the following:

- 1 "(A) A detailed description of the plan to en-2 hance the safety, security, and reliability of the nu-3 clear weapons stockpile of the United States.
  - "(B) A detailed description of the plan to modernize the nuclear weapons complex, including improving the safety of facilities, modernizing the infrastructure, and maintaining the key capabilities and competencies of the nuclear weapons workforce, including designers and technicians.
    - "(C) A detailed description of the plan to maintain, modernize, and replace delivery platforms for nuclear weapons.
      - "(D) A detailed estimate of budget requirements, including the costs associated with the plans outlined under subparagraphs (A) through (C), over the 10-year period following the date of the report.
- 17 "(E) A detailed description of the steps taken 18 to implement the plan submitted in the previous 19 year.
- 20 "(b) Advice of Directors of Nuclear Facili-
- 21 TIES AND LABORATORIES.—Together with the budget of
- 22 the President submitted to Congress under section
- 23 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, during each fiscal
- 24 year in which a report is transmitted under subsection (a),
- 25 the directors of the nuclear facilities and laboratories shall

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1	each submit to the congressional defense committees, the
2	Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Com-
3	mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
4	the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Energy ar
5	independent report on the implementation of and the
6	funding for the plans outlined under subparagraphs (A)
7	and (B) of subsection (a)(2).
8	"(c) FORM.—The reports required by this section
9	shall be submitted in unclassified form (including as much
10	detail as possible), but may include a classified annex.
11	"(d) Definitions.—In this section:
12	"(1) The term 'covered nuclear systems' means
13	the following:
14	"(A) B-52H or B2 bomber aircraft and
15	nuclear air-launched cruise missiles.
16	"(B) Trident ballistic missile submarines
17	launch tubes, and Trident D-5 submarine-
18	launched ballistic missiles.
19	"(C) Minuteman III intercontinental bal-
20	listic missiles and associated silos.
21	"(D) Nuclear warheads or gravity bombs
22	that can be delivered by the systems specified
23	in subparagraph (A) (B) or (C)

1	"(E) Nuclear weapons delivered by means
2	other than the systems specified in subpara-
3	graph (A), (B), or (C).
4	"(2) The term 'nuclear facilities and labora-
5	tories' means the following:
6	"(A) Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los
7	Alamos, New Mexico.
8	"(B) Sandia National Laboratories, Albu-
9	querque, New Mexico.
10	"(C) Lawrence Livermore National Lab-
11	oratory, Livermore, California.
12	"(D) The Kansas City Plant, Kansas City,
13	Missouri.
14	"(E) The Nevada National Security Site,
15	Nevada.
16	"(F) The Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas.
17	"(G) The Savannah River Site, Aiken,
18	South Carolina.
19	"(H) The Y–12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Ten-
20	nessee.".
21	(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections
22	at the beginning of such chapter is amended by inserting
23	after the item relating to section 494 the following new
24	item:

<sup>&</sup>quot;495. Annual report on the plan for the modernization of the nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons complex, and delivery platforms.".

1	SEC. 10. CHEMISTRY AND METALLURGY RESEARCH RE-
2	PLACEMENT NUCLEAR FACILITY AND URA-
3	NIUM PROCESSING FACILITY.
4	(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
5	(1) The Stockpile Stewardship Management
6	Plan for Fiscal Year 2011, dated May 2010, said
7	that the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Re-
8	placement building and the Uranium Processing Fa-
9	cility are "the highest physical infrastructure prior-
10	ities" for the nuclear enterprise.
11	(2) The November 2010 update to the report
12	required under section 1251 of the National Defense
13	Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law
14	111-84; 123 Stat. 2549) said that, "The Adminis-
15	tration is committed to fully fund the construction
16	of the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) and the
17	Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement
18	(CMRR).".
19	(3) A Department of Energy briefing book re-
20	garding the fiscal year 2012 budget stated that, with
21	respect to the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
22	Replacement nuclear facility, "The increased fund-
23	ing level in the FY 2012–FY 2016 period is needed
24	to support the required schedule of construction
25	completion in FY 2020 and a ramp-up to full oper-
26	ations by FY 2023.".

1	(4) The briefing book also stated that, with re-
2	spect to the Uranium Processing Facility, "The in-
3	creased funding level in the FY 2012–FY 2016 pe-
4	riod is needed to support the NNSA's priority to
5	phase out operations in Building 9212 and move re-
6	quired chemical processing activities from Building
7	9212 into UPF in FY 2020, with a ramp-up to full
8	operations in UPF by FY 2024.".
9	(b) CMRR AND UPF.—Of amounts authorized to be
10	appropriated for weapons activities of the National Nu-
11	clear Security Administration, the Secretary of Energy
12	shall—
13	(1) accelerate, to the extent possible, the design
14	and engineering phase of the Chemistry and Metal-
15	lurgy Research Replacement nuclear facility (in this
16	section referred to as the "nuclear facility") and the
17	Uranium Processing Facility (in this section referred
18	to as the "processing facility") in order for—
19	(A) the construction of both facilities to be
20	completed by not later than 2020;
21	(B) both the nuclear facility and the proc-
22	essing facility to begin nuclear operations by
23	not later than 2020; and

1	(C) both the nuclear facility and the proc-
2	essing facility to be fully operational by not
3	later than 2023 and 2024, respectively; and
4	(2) together with the budget of the President
5	submitted to Congress under section 1105(a) of title
6	31, United States Code, for fiscal years 2013
7	through 2024, submit to the congressional defense
8	committees a report including—
9	(A) certification of the acceleration de-
10	scribed in paragraph (1); and
11	(B) identification of the funding amounts
12	necessary, including on a multiyear basis as ap-
13	propriate, for the nuclear facility and the proc-
14	essing facility upon completion of the design
15	and engineering phase of such facilities.
16	SEC. 11. POLICY ON NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS.
17	It is the policy of the United States that convention-
18	ally armed, strategic-range weapons systems not co-lo-
19	cated with nuclear armed systems do not affect strategic
20	stability between the United States and the Russian Fed-
21	eration.
22	SEC. 12. NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPON REDUCTIONS
23	AND EXTENDED DETERRENCE POLICY.
24	(a) Policy on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weap-
25	ONS.—It is the policy of the United States—

1	(1) to pursue negotiations with the Russian
2	Federation aimed at the reduction of Russian de-
3	ployed and non-deployed non-strategic nuclear
4	forces;
5	(2) that non-strategic nuclear weapons should
6	be considered when weighing the balance of the nu-
7	clear forces of the United States and Russia; and
8	(3) that any geographical relocation or storage
9	of non-strategic nuclear weapons by Russia does not
10	constitute a reduction or elimination of such weap-
11	ons.
12	(b) Policy on Extended Deterrence Commit-
13	MENT TO EUROPE.—It is the policy of the United States
14	that—
15	(1) it maintain its commitment to extended de-
16	terrence, specifically the nuclear alliance of the
17	North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as an impor-
18	tant component of ensuring and linking the national
19	security interests of the United States and the secu-
20	rity of its European allies;
21	(2) forward-deployed nuclear forces of the
22	United States shall remain based in Europe in sup-
23	port of the nuclear policy and posture of NATO; and
24	(3) the presence of nuclear weapons of the

United States in Europe—combined with NATO's

1	unique nuclear sharing arrangements under which
2	non-nuclear members participate in nuclear planning
3	and possess specially configured aircraft capable of
4	delivering nuclear weapons—contributes to the cohe-
5	sion of NATO and provides reassurance to allies and
6	partners who feel exposed to regional threats.
7	(c) Limitation on Reduction, Consolidation, or
8	WITHDRAWAL OF NUCLEAR FORCES BASED IN EU-
9	ROPE.—In light of the policy expressed in subsections (a)
10	and (b), no action may be taken to effect or implement
11	the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of nuclear
12	forces of the United States that are based in Europe un-
13	less—
14	(1) the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal
15	of such nuclear forces is requested by the govern-
16	ment of the host nation in the manner provided in
17	the agreement between the United States and the
18	host nation regarding the forces; or
19	(2) the President certifies that—
20	(A) NATO member states have considered
21	the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal in
22	the High Level Group and NATO has decided
	the High Bover Group and 1911 o has decided
23	to support such reduction, consolidation, or

1 (B) each NATO member state has sepa2 rately concurred that the remaining nuclear
3 forces of the United States that are based in
4 Europe after such reduction, consolidation, or
5 withdrawal would provide a commensurate or
6 better level of assurance and credibility as be7 fore such reduction, consolidation, or with8 drawal.

- 9 (d) NOTIFICATION.—Upon any decision to reduce, 10 consolidate, or withdraw the nuclear forces of the United 11 States that are based in Europe, the President shall sub-12 mit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate 13 and House of Representatives a notification containing— 14 (1) the certification required by subsection 15 (c)(2);
  - (2) justification for such reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal; and
- 18 (3) an assessment of how NATO member 19 states, in light of such reduction, consolidation, or 20 withdrawal, assess the credibility of the deterrence 21 capability of the United States in support of its com-22 mitments undertaken pursuant to article 5 of the 23 North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington, Dis-24 trict of Columbia, on April 4, 1949, and entered into

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- 1 force on August 24, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS
- 2 1964).
- 3 (e) Notice and Wait Requirement.—The Presi-
- 4 dent may not commence a reduction, consolidation, or
- 5 withdrawal of the nuclear forces of the United States that
- 6 are based in Europe for which the certification required
- 7 by subsection (c)(2) is made until the expiration of a 180-
- 8 day period beginning on the date on which the President
- 9 submits the report under subsection (d) containing the
- 10 certification.

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