#### 111TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION

## S. 3049

To give shareholders a vote on executive pay, to hold executives accountable for failure or fraud, to structure executive pay to encourage the long-term viability of companies, and for other purposes.

### IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

February 26, 2010

Mr. Menendez introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

### A BILL

To give shareholders a vote on executive pay, to hold executives accountable for failure or fraud, to structure executive pay to encourage the long-term viability of companies, and for other purposes.

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
- 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
- 4 This Act may be cited as the "Corporate Executive
- 5 Accountability Act of 2010".
- 6 SEC. 2. SHAREHOLDER VOTES ON EXECUTIVE PAY.
- 7 (a) Shareholder Votes on Executive Pay.—
- 8 Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15

- 1 U.S.C. 78n) is amended by adding at the end the following
- 2 new subsection:
- 3 "(i) Annual Shareholder Approval of Execu-
- 4 TIVE COMPENSATION.—
- 5 "(1) Annual vote.—Any proxy or consent or 6 authorization (the solicitation of which is subject to 7 the rules of the Commission pursuant to subsection 8 (a)) for an annual meeting of the shareholders to 9 elect directors (or a special meeting in lieu of such 10 meeting) where proxies are solicited in respect of 11 any security registered under section 12 occurring 12 on or after the date that is 6 months after the date 13 on which final rules are issued under paragraph (4), 14 shall provide for a separate shareholder vote to ap-15 prove the compensation of executives as disclosed 16 pursuant to the Commission's compensation disclo-17 sure rules for named executive officers (which disclo-18 sure shall include the compensation committee re-19 port, the compensation discussion and analysis, the 20 compensation tables, and any related materials, to 21 the extent required by such rules). The shareholder 22 vote shall not be binding on the issuer or the board 23 of directors and shall not be construed as overruling 24 a decision by such board, nor to create or imply any 25 additional fiduciary duty by such board, nor shall

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

such vote be construed to restrict or limit the ability of shareholders to make proposals for inclusion in such proxy materials related to executive compensation.

# "(2) Shareholder approval of golden parachute compensation.—

"(A) DISCLOSURE.—In any proxy or consent solicitation material (the solicitation of which is subject to the rules of the Commission pursuant to subsection (a)) for a meeting of the shareholders occurring on or after the date that is 6 months after the date on which final rules are issued under paragraph (4), at which shareholders are asked to approve an acquisition, merger, consolidation, or proposed sale or other disposition of all or substantially all the assets of an issuer, the person making such solicitation shall disclose in the proxy or consent solicitation material, in a clear and simple form in accordance with regulations to be promulgated by the Commission, any agreements or understandings that such person has with any named executive officers of such issuer (or of the acquiring issuer, if such issuer is not the acquiring issuer) concerning any type of compensation

2

3

4

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

(whether present, deferred, or contingent) that is based on or otherwise relates to the acquisition, merger, consolidation, sale, or other disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of the issuer and the aggregate total of all such compensation that may (and the conditions upon which it may) be paid or become payable to or on behalf of such executive officer.

"(B) SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL.—Any proxy or consent or authorization relating to the proxy or consent solicitation material containing the disclosure required by subparagraph (A) shall provide for a separate shareholder vote to approve such agreements or understandings and compensation as disclosed, unless such agreements or understandings have been subject to a shareholder vote under paragraph (1). A vote by the shareholders shall not be binding on the issuer or the board of directors of the issuer or the person making the solicitation and shall not be construed as overruling a decision by any such person or issuer, nor to create or imply any additional fiduciary duty by any such person or issuer.

- "(3) DISCLOSURE OF VOTES.—Every institutional investment manager subject to section 13(f)
  shall report at least annually how it voted on any
  shareholder vote pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of
  this section, unless such vote is otherwise required to
  be reported publicly by rule or regulation of the
  Commission.
  - "(4) RULEMAKING.—Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall issue final rules to implement this subsection.".

### (b) Disclosure Requirements.—

- (1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission shall amend section 229.402 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, to require each issuer to disclose in any filing of the issuer described in section 229.10(a) of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations (or any successor thereto)—
  - (A) the median of the annual total compensation of all employees of the issuer, except the chief executive officer (or any equivalent position) of the issuer;
- (B) the annual total compensation of the chief executive officer (or any equivalent position) of the issuer; and

1	(C) the ratio of the amount described in
2	paragraph (1) to the amount described in para-
3	graph (2).
4	(2) Total compensation.—For purposes of
5	this subsection, the total compensation of an em-
6	ployee of an issuer shall be determined in accordance
7	with section $229.402(c)(2)(x)$ of title 17, Code of
8	Federal Regulations, as in effect on the day before
9	the date of enactment of this Act.
10	SEC. 3. EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR FAILURE OR
11	FRAUD.
12	(a) Clawback.—
13	(1) SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934.—Sec-
14	tion 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
15	U.S.C. 78p) is amended by adding at the end the
16	following:
17	"(h) CLAWBACK POLICY.—
18	"(1) Listing standards.—The Commission
19	shall, by rule, direct the national securities ex-
20	changes and national securities associations to pro-
21	hibit the listing of any security of an issuer that
22	does not comply with the requirements of this sub-
23	section.
24	"(2) RECOVERY OF FUNDS.—The rules of the
25	Commission under paragraph (1) shall require each

1	issuer to develop and implement a policy providing
2	that, in the event that the issuer is required to pre-
3	pare an accounting restatement due to the material
4	noncompliance of the issuer with any financial re-
5	porting requirement under the securities laws, the
6	issuer shall—
7	"(A) recover from any current or former
8	employee of the issuer who received incentive-
9	based compensation (including stock options
10	awarded as compensation) based on the erro-
11	neous data, an amount equal to the difference
12	between the amount actually paid to the em-
13	ployee and the amount that would have been
14	paid to the employee under the accounting re-
15	statement; and
16	"(B) disclose, together with the accounting
17	restatement—
18	"(i) a list of any bonuses or stock
19	sales by the employees of the issuer that
20	are affected by the accounting restatement,
21	including the amounts of such bonuses or
22	stock sales; and
23	"(ii) the extent to which the employ-
24	ees of the issuer have repaid any amounts
25	under subparagraph (A).".

1	(2) SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002.—Section
2	304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C.
3	7243) is amended—
4	(A) in subsection (a)—
5	(i) in the matter preceding paragraph
6	(1), by striking ", as a result of mis-
7	conduct,";
8	(ii) in paragraph (1), by striking "12-
9	month" and inserting "2-year"; and
10	(iii) in paragraph (2), by striking "12-
11	month" and inserting "2-year"; and
12	(B) by adding at the end the following:
13	"(c) Commencement of Action by Commission.—
14	If the chief executive officer or the chief financial officer
15	of the issuer has not made a reimbursement required
16	under this section before the expiration of the 90-day pe-
17	riod beginning on the date on which the accounting re-
18	statement occurs, the Commission may commence an ac-
19	tion on behalf of the issuer to recover any funds that the
20	chief executive officer or the chief financial officer is re-
21	quired to reimburse under subsection (a).
22	"(d) Action by Shareholders.—
23	"(1) IN GENERAL.—A shareholder of an issuer
24	may commence an action on behalf of the issuer in
25	any district court of the United States to recover

- any funds the chief executive officer or the chief financial officer is required to reimburse under subsection (a), if—
  - "(A) the Commission does not commence an action under subsection (c) before the expiration of the 120-day period following the date on which the accounting restatement occurs; and
    - "(B) the chief executive officer or the chief financial officer of the issuer has not made a reimbursement required under this section as of the date on which the action is commenced.
    - "(2) STAY OF ACTIONS.—If more than 1 shareholder of an issuer commences an action under this subsection with respect to the same accounting restatement, a district court shall stay all actions commenced by the shareholders, except for the action commenced by the shareholder that owns the greatest number of shares of the issuer.".
- 20 (b) SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL OF SEVERANCE
  21 AGREEMENTS.—The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15)
  22 U.S.C. 78a et seq.) is amended by inserting after section
  23 10A the following:

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

1	"SEC. 10B. SEVERANCE AGREEMENTS TIED TO PERFORM-
2	ANCE.
3	"(a) Commission Rules.—
4	"(1) In general.—Not later than 270 days
5	after the date of enactment of this subsection, the
6	Commission shall, by rule, direct each national secu-
7	rities exchange and national securities association to
8	prohibit the listing of any security of an issuer that
9	is not in compliance with the requirements of any
10	portion of subsection (b).
11	"(2) Opportunity to cure.—The rules issued
12	under paragraph (1) shall provide for appropriate
13	procedures for an issuer to have an opportunity to
14	cure any defects that would be the basis for such a
15	prohibition before the imposition of such prohibition.
16	"(3) Considerations.—The rules issued
17	under paragraph (1) shall be implemented with due
18	regard for contracts in existence on the date of en-
19	actment of this subsection.
20	"(b) Severance Agreements Tied to Perform-
21	ANCE.—The board of directors of an issuer, or a com-
22	mittee of such board of directors, may not enter into an
23	agreement providing for severance payments to a senior
24	executive officer who is terminated for cause, as deter-

25 mined by the board of directors.

1	"(c) TERMINATION FOR CAUSE.—For purposes of
2	this section, the term 'for cause', when used with respect
3	to the termination of a senior executive officer of an
4	issuer, means termination due to—
5	"(1) the willful and continued failure of the
6	senior executive officer to perform substantially the
7	duties of the senior executive officer with respect to
8	the issuer, unless such failure is due to incapacity
9	resulting from a physical or mental illness of the
10	senior executive officer;
11	"(2) the willful unapproved absenteeism of the
12	senior executive officer, unless such absenteeism is
13	due to a temporary or permanent disability of the
14	senior executive officer;
15	"(3) the senior executive officer willfully engage
16	ing in misconduct that the board of directors of the
17	issuer reasonably believes does or may materially ad-
18	versely affect the business or operations of the
19	issuer;
20	"(4) a material breach of an employment agree-
21	ment by the senior executive officer;
22	"(5) misconduct by the senior executive officer
23	that is of such a serious or substantial nature that
24	a reasonable likelihood exists that the missenduct

would materially injure the reputation of the issuer

- or a subsidiary of the issuer if the senior executive officer were to remain employed by the issuer; "(6) harassment or discrimination by the senior
  - "(6) harassment or discrimination by the senior executive officer against the employees, customers, or vendors of the issuer, in violation of the policies of the issuer;
  - "(7) the misappropriation of funds or assets of the issuer by the senior executive officer for personal use;
    - "(8) the willful violation of the policies or standards of business conduct of the issuer, as determined in good faith by the board of directors of the issuer;
    - "(9) the disclosure of confidential information by the senior executive officer in violation of the written policies of the issuer that is demonstrably injurious to the issuer;
    - "(10) the conviction of the senior executive officer for, or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere made by the senior executive officer to, a charge of commission of a felony; or
  - "(11) any other action that the board of directors of the issuer determines is detrimental or injurious to the issuer or the shareholders of the issuer.".

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1	SEC. 4. LIMITATIONS ON EQUITY COMPENSATION OF EXEC-
2	UTIVE OFFICERS.
3	Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
4	(15 U.S.C. 78p) is amended by adding at the end the fol-
5	lowing:
6	"(j) Equity Compensation of Executive Offi-
7	CERS.—
8	"(1) Definitions.—For purposes of this sub-
9	section—
10	"(A) the term 'award of equity compensa-
11	tion' means an award of share-based compensa-
12	tion; and
13	"(B) the term 'executive officer' has the
14	same meaning as in section 240.3b-7 of title
15	17, Code of Federal Regulations, or any suc-
16	cessor thereto.
17	"(2) Listing standards.—The Commission
18	shall, by rule, direct each national securities ex-
19	change and registered securities association to pro-
20	hibit the listing of any security of an issuer that
21	does not comply with the requirements of this sub-
22	section.
23	"(3) Limitations on equity compensation
24	OF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS.—The rules of the Com-
25	mission under paragraph (2) shall prohibit an execu-
26	tive officer or member of the board of directors of

1	an issuer who receives an award of equity compensa-
2	tion from selling more than—
3	"(A) 20 percent of the shares that the ex-
4	ecutive officer or member of the board of direc-
5	tors is entitled to receive during the first year
6	following the vesting of the award;
7	"(B) 40 percent of the shares that the ex-
8	ecutive officer or member of the board of direc-
9	tors is entitled to receive during the second year
10	following the vesting of the award, less any
11	shares sold under subparagraph (A);
12	"(C) 60 percent of the shares that the ex-
13	ecutive officer or member of the board of direc-
14	tors is entitled to receive during the third year
15	following the vesting of the award, less any
16	shares sold under subparagraphs (A) and (B);
17	and
18	"(D) 80 percent of the shares that the ex-
19	ecutive officer or member of the board of direc-
20	tors is entitled to receive during the fourth year
21	following the vesting of the award, less any
22	shares sold under subparagraphs (A) through
23	(C).
24	"(4) Vesting.—For purposes of this sub-
25	section, an award of equity compensation yests on

the date on which the right of the individual who receives the award to receive or retain shares under the award is no longer contingent on satisfaction of a condition relating to the service or performance of the individual.".

 $\bigcirc$