## S. 2813

To increase corporate responsibility, and for other purposes.

## IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

NOVEMBER 20, 2009

Mr. Menendez introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

## A BILL

To increase corporate responsibility, and for other purposes.

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
- 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
- 4 This Act may be cited as the "Investors Rights and
- 5 Corporate Accountability Act of 2009".
- 6 SEC. 2. FIDUCIARY STANDARD FOR BROKER-DEALERS.
- 7 Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
- 8 (15 U.S.C. 780) is amended—
- 9 (1) by redesignating subsection (i), as added by
- section 303(f) of the Commodity Futures Moderniza-
- 11 tion Act of 2000 (114 Stat. 2763A-455), and as en-

1 acted into law by section 1(a)(5) of Public Law 106– 2 554, as subsection (j); and 3 (2) by adding at the end the following: 4 "(k) STANDARD OF CARE.—Notwithstanding any 5 other provision of this title or the Investment Advisers Act 6 of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-1 et seq.), the Commission shall promulgate rules, not later than 1 year after the date of 8 enactment of this subsection, to provide that the standard of care for all brokers and dealers in providing investment 10 advice to retail customers or clients (and any other customers or clients as the Commission may by rule provide) 12 shall be the fiduciary duty established under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-1 et seq.), including the duty to act solely in the best interest of the 14 15 customer or client, without regard to the financial or other interest of the broker or dealer providing the advice.". 16 SEC. 3. CLAWBACK OF INCENTIVE COMPENSATION AND BO-18 NUSES. 19 (a) Securities Exchange Act of 1934.—Section 20 21D(f)(2)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 21 U.S.C. 78u-4(f)(2)(A) is amended— 22 (1) by striking "Joint and Several Liabil-23 ITY.—Any" and inserting the following: "KNOWING 24 VIOLATIONS.—

1	"(i) Joint and several liabil-
2	ITY.—Any"; and
3	(2) by adding at the end the following:
4	"(ii) Incentive compensation and
5	BONUSES.—If the trier of fact specifically
6	determines that a covered person know-
7	ingly committed a violation of the securi-
8	ties laws, the covered person shall be or-
9	dered to reimburse an issuer for—
10	"(I) any bonus or other incen-
11	tive-based or equity-based compensa-
12	tion received by the covered person
13	from the issuer during the period of
14	the violation of the securities laws;
15	and
16	"(II) any profits realized by the
17	covered person from the sale of securi-
18	ties of the issuer during the period of
19	the violation of the securities laws.".
20	(b) Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.—Section 304 of
21	the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7243) is
22	amended—
23	(1) in subsection (a)—
24	(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1),
25	by striking ", as a result of misconduct,";

1	(B) in paragraph (1), by striking "or filing
2	with the Commission (whichever first occurs)";
3	and
4	(C) in paragraph (2), by striking "during
5	that 12-month period"; and
6	(2) by adding at the end the following:
7	"(c) COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION.—A shareholder of
8	an issuer may commence an action on behalf of the issuer
9	under this section if the chief executive officer or the chief
10	financial officer of the issuer has not made a reimburse-
11	ment required under this section before the expiration of
12	the 90-day period beginning on the date on which the ac-
13	counting restatement occurs.".
14	SEC. 4. PROTECTING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF WHISTLE-
15	BLOWERS.
16	Section 21D(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of
17	1934 (15 U.S.C. 78u–4(b)(2)) is amended—
1 ()	
18	(1) by striking "In any private action" and in-
18	(1) by striking "In any private action" and inserting the following:
19	serting the following:
19 20	serting the following:  "(A) IN GENERAL.—In any private ac-
19 20 21	serting the following:  "(A) IN GENERAL.—In any private action"; and
19 20 21 22	serting the following:  "(A) IN GENERAL.—In any private action"; and  (2) by adding at the end the following:

give rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind, if the source is described in the complaint with sufficient particularity to support the probability that a person in the
situation of the source would possess the
information alleged.

"(ii) Considerations—The weight

- "(ii) Considerations.—The weight accorded allegations by a confidential source shall depend on the level of detail provided by the source, the corroborative nature of the other facts alleged (including from other sources), the coherence and plausibility of the allegations, the number of sources, the reliability of the sources, and similar indicia.
- "(iii) Protection.—A confidential source described in a complaint shall be accorded the same protection received by a confidential source who provides comparable information to the Commission.
- "(iv) Nondisclosure requirements.—Upon motion, a court shall enter an order reasonably limiting the scope of nondisclosure required by a post-employ-

1	ment agreement. An order under this
2	clause may not impair a legitimate interest
3	of a former employer in the confidentiality
4	of documents and information subject to
5	the order.".
6	SEC. 5. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN VOTING BY BROKERS.
7	Section 6(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
8	(15 U.S.C. 78f(b)) is amended by adding at the end the
9	following:
10	"(10) The rules of the exchange prohibit any
11	member from granting any proxy to vote any secu-
12	rity in connection with an election for membership
13	to the board of directors or analogous governing
14	body of any issuer of a listed security, in the absence
15	of instructions from the beneficial owner of the secu-
16	rity regarding the specific election.".
17	SEC. 6. INDEPENDENCE OF COMPENSATION ADVISERS.
18	Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
19	(15 U.S.C. 78p) is amended by adding at the end the fol-
20	lowing:
21	"(h) Independent Compensation Advisers.—
22	Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this
23	subsection, the Commission shall, by rule—
24	"(1) require any adviser retained by the board
25	of directors or a committee of the board of directors

- 1 of an issuer in conjunction with the negotiation of 2 an employment contract or a compensation agreement with an executive of the issuer— 3 "(A) to be independent of the issuer and the executives and directors of the issuer; and 6 "(B) to report solely to the board of direc-7 tors or the committee of the board of directors 8 responsible for executive compensation; and "(2) prohibit an issuer from agreeing to indem-9 10 nify or limit the liability of an adviser described in 11 paragraph (1).". 12 SEC. 7. AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY. 13 (a) Securities Exchange Act of 1934.—Section 14 21D of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 15 78u-4) is amended by adding at the end the following: "(g) Persons That Aid or Abet Violations.— 16 Any person that provides substantial assistance to another
- 19 assistance is in violation of this title, or of any rule or 20 regulation issued under this title, shall be liable in a pri-21 vate action brought under this title, to the same extent

person, with reckless disregard for whether the substantial

- 22 as the person to whom the substantial assistance is pro-
- 23 vided.".

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1	(b) Investment Advisers Act.—Section 209 of the
2	Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b–9) is
3	amended by adding at the end the following:
4	"(f) Aiding and Abetting.—For purposes of any
5	action brought by the Commission under subsection (e),
6	any person that provides substantial assistance to another
7	person, with reckless disregard for whether the substantial
8	assistance is in violation of this Act, or of any rule, regula-
9	tion, or order issued under this Act, shall be liable, to the
10	same extent as the person to whom the substantial assist-
11	ance is provided.".
12	SEC. 8. SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL OF GOLDEN PARACHUTE
13	COMPENSATION.
14	Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
14 15	Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78p), as amended by this Act, is amended by
15	(15 U.S.C. 78p), as amended by this Act, is amended by
15 16 17	(15 U.S.C. 78p), as amended by this Act, is amended by adding at the end the following:
15 16 17	(15 U.S.C. 78p), as amended by this Act, is amended by adding at the end the following:  "(i) SEVERANCE AGREEMENTS TIED TO PERFORM-
15 16 17 18	(15 U.S.C. 78p), as amended by this Act, is amended by adding at the end the following:  "(i) SEVERANCE AGREEMENTS TIED TO PERFORMANCE.—
15 16 17 18 19	(15 U.S.C. 78p), as amended by this Act, is amended by adding at the end the following:  "(i) SEVERANCE AGREEMENTS TIED TO PERFORMANCE.—  "(1) COMMISSION RULES.—
15 16 17 18 19 20	(15 U.S.C. 78p), as amended by this Act, is amended by adding at the end the following:  "(i) SEVERANCE AGREEMENTS TIED TO PERFORMANCE.—  "(1) COMMISSION RULES.—  "(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 270
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	(15 U.S.C. 78p), as amended by this Act, is amended by adding at the end the following:  "(i) SEVERANCE AGREEMENTS TIED TO PERFORMANCE.—  "(1) COMMISSION RULES.—  "(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 270 days after the date of enactment of this sub-
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	(15 U.S.C. 78p), as amended by this Act, is amended by adding at the end the following:  "(i) SEVERANCE AGREEMENTS TIED TO PERFORMANCE.—  "(1) COMMISSION RULES.—  "(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 270 days after the date of enactment of this subsection, the Commission shall, by rule, direct

ance with the requirements of any portion of paragraph (2).

- "(B) OPPORTUNITY TO CURE.—The rules issued under subparagraph (A) shall provide for appropriate procedures for an issuer to have an opportunity to cure any defects that would be the basis for such a prohibition before the imposition of such prohibition.
- "(C) Considerations.—The rules issued under subparagraph (A) shall be implemented with due regard for contracts in existence on the date of enactment of this subsection.
- "(2) SEVERANCE AGREEMENTS TIED TO PER-FORMANCE.—The board of directors of an issuer, or a committee of such board of directors, may not enter into an agreement providing for severance payments to a senior executive officer who is terminated because of poor performance as an executive, as determined by the board of directors. To the extent that an issuer is able to terminate a senior executive officer for cause, poor performance by the executive, as determined by the board of directors, shall be considered as one such cause.".

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