### 110TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION

# S. 433

To state United States policy for Iraq, and for other purposes.

### IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

January 30, 2007

Mr. Obama introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

## A BILL

To state United States policy for Iraq, and for other purposes.

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
- 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
- 4 This Act may be cited as the "Iraq War De-Esca-
- 5 lation Act of 2007".
- 6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
- 7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
- 8 ings:
- 9 (1) Congress and the Nation honor the courage,
- sacrifices, and efforts of the members of the Armed
- 11 Forces of the United States and their families.

- 1 (2) In his speech to the Nation on January 10, 2 2007, President George W. Bush said that "I've 3 made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other 4 leaders that America's commitment is not open-5 ended. If the Iraqi government does not follow 6 through on its promises, it will lose the support of 7 the American people. . . The Prime Minister under-8 stands this".
  - (3) In that speech, President George W. Bush also told the Nation that "America will hold the Iraqi government to the benchmarks it has announced. . . [T]o take responsibility for security in all of Iraq's provinces by November. To give every Iraqi citizen a stake in the country's economy, Iraq will pass legislation to share oil revenues among all Iragis. To show that it is committed to delivering a better life,  $_{
    m the}$ Iraqi government will spend \$10,000,000,000 of its own money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects that will create new jobs. To empower local leaders, Iraqis plan to hold provincial elections later this year. And to allow more Iraqis to re-enter their nation's political life, the government will reform de-Baathification laws, and establish a fair process for considering amendments to Iraq's constitution".

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- (4) In that speech, President George W. Bush also told the Nation that "only Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and secure their people".
  - (5) On December 18, 2006, former Secretary of State Colin Powell stated: "[s]o we have tried this surge of troops over the summer. I am not persuaded that another surge of troops in Baghdad for the purpose of suppressing this communitarian violence, this civil war, will work".
  - (6) On November 15, 2006, General John Abizaid, Commander of the United States Central Command, stated before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that "I met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the corps commander, General Dempsey. We all talked together. And I said, in your professional opinion, if we were to bring in more American troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq? And they all said no. And the reason is, because we want the Iraqis to do more. It's easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own future".

- 1 (7) In testimony before the Committee on For2 eign Relations of the Senate on January 11, 2007,
  3 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that un4 less the Government of Iraq has met certain bench5 marks and reestablishes the confidence of the Iraqi
  6 people over the next several months, "this plan is
  7 not going to work".
  - (8) In a statement on January 11, 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated "[a]nd we will probably have a better view a couple of months from now in terms of whether we are making headway in terms of getting better control of Baghdad, with the Iraqis in the lead and with the Iraqis beginning to make better progress on the reconciliation process".
  - (9) The bipartisan Iraq Study Group headed by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Representative Lee Hamilton reached a bipartisan consensus on 79 separate recommendations for a new approach in Iraq. Among those recommendations were calling for a new diplomatic offensive in the region and conditioning American economic assistance to Iraq on specific benchmarks, with the expectation that "by the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation"

- on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq".
- 3 (10) In reaction to the speech of President George W. Bush of January 10, 2007, former Sec-5 retary of State Baker and former Representative 6 Hamilton wrote that "[t]he President did not sug-7 gest the possibility of a transition that could enable 8 U.S. combat forces to begin to leave Iraq. The Presi-9 dent did not state that political, military, or eco-10 nomic support for Iraq would be conditional on the 11 Iraq government's ability to meet benchmarks. With-12 in the region, the President did not announce an 13 international support group for Iraq including all of 14 Iraq's neighbors. . .".
- 15 (b) Purposes.—The purposes of this Act are as follows:
  - (1) To formulate and provide for the implementation of an effective United States policy towards Iraq and the Middle East region that employs military, political, diplomatic, and economic assets to promote and protect the national security interests of the United States.
  - (2) To provide for the implementation of a responsible, phased redeployment of the Armed Forces of the United States from Iraq in a substantial and

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- gradual manner that places the highest priority on protecting the lives of members of the Armed Forces and civilian personnel of the United States and on promoting the national security interests of the United States in the Middle East region.
  - (3) To urge the political parties and leaders of Iraq to reach the political solution necessary to promote stability in Iraq and enhance the safety of innocent Iraqi civilians.
  - (4) To condition future economic assistance to the Government of Iraq on significant progress toward the achievement of political and economic measures to be taken by the Government of Iraq.
  - (5) To provide for the initiation of a wider and sustained diplomatic strategy aimed at promoting a political settlement in Iraq, thereby ending the civil war in Iraq, preventing a humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq, and preventing a wider regional conflict.
  - (6) To provide, through sections 4 through 7, for the implementation of key recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, a bipartisan panel of experts co-chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Representative Lee Hamilton.

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### SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE FORCE LEVELS FOR UNITED STATES 2 MILITARY FORCES IN IRAQ. 3 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the levels of the Armed Forces of the United States in Iraq after 4 5 the date of the enactment of this Act shall not exceed the levels of such forces in Iraq as of January 10, 2007, with-7 out specific authority in statute enacted by Congress after the date of the enactment of this Act. 9 SEC. 4. REDEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES MILITARY 10 FORCES FROM IRAQ. 11 (a) Redeployment.— 12 (1) Deadline for commencement of rede-13 PLOYMENT.—Except as otherwise provided in this 14 section, the phased redeployment of the Armed 15 Forces of the United States from Iraq shall com-16 mence not later than May 1, 2007. 17 (2) Scope and manner of redeployment.— 18 The redeployment of the Armed Forces under this 19 section shall be substantial, shall occur in a gradual 20 manner, and shall be executed at a pace to achieve 21 the goal of the complete redeployment of all United 22 States combat brigades from Iraq by March 31, 23 2008, consistent with the expectation of the Iraq 24 Study Group, if all the matters set forth in subsection (b)(1)(B) are not met by such date, subject 25

to the exceptions for retention of forces for force

- protection, counter-terrorism operations, training of Iraqi forces, and other purposes as contemplated by subsection (g).
  - (3) FORMULATION OF PLAN WITH MILITARY COMMANDERS.—The redeployment of the Armed Forces under this section should be conducted pursuant to a plan formulated by United States military commanders that is developed, if practicable, in consultation with the Government of Iraq.
    - (4) PROTECTION OF UNITED STATES FORCES AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL.—In carrying out the redeployment of the Armed Forces under this section, the highest priority shall be afforded to the safety of members of the Armed Forces and civilian personnel of the United States in Iraq.

#### (b) Suspension of Redeployment.—

- (1) IN GENERAL.—The President may suspend, on a temporary basis as provided in paragraph (2), the redeployment of the Armed Forces under this section if the President certifies to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives that—
- 23 (A) doing so is in the national security in-24 terests of the United States; and
- 25 (B) the Government of Iraq—

1	(i) has lifted all restrictions con-
2	cerning non-interference in operations of
3	the Armed Forces of the United States in
4	Iraq and does so on a continuing basis;
5	(ii) is making significant progress in
6	reducing sectarian violence in Iraq and in
7	reducing the size and operational effective-
8	ness of sectarian militias in Iraq;
9	(iii) is making significant progress to-
10	wards removing militia elements from the
11	Iraqi Army, National Police, Facilities
12	Protection Services, and other security
13	forces of the Government of Iraq;
14	(iv) has enacted legislation or estab-
15	lished other binding mechanisms to ensure
16	the sharing of all Iraqi oil revenues among
17	all segments of Iraqi society in an equi-
18	table manner;
19	(v) is making significant progress to-
20	wards making available not less than
21	\$10,000,000,000 for reconstruction, job
22	creation, and economic development in
23	Iraq, with safeguards to prevent corrup-
24	tion, by January 10, 2008;

1	(vi) has deployed at least 18 Iraq
2	Army and National Police brigades to
3	Baghdad and is effectively ensuring that
4	such units are performing their security
5	and police functions in all Baghdad neigh-
6	borhoods, regardless of their sectarian
7	composition;
8	(vii) has enacted legislation or estab-
9	lished other binding mechanisms to revise
10	its de-Baathification laws to encourage the
11	employment in the Government of Iraq of
12	qualified Iraqi professionals, irrespective of
13	ethnic or political affiliation, including ex-
14	Baathists who were not leading figures of
15	the Saddam Hussein regime;
16	(viii) has established a fair process for
17	considering amendments to the constitu-
18	tion of Iraq that promote lasting national
19	reconciliation in Iraq;
20	(ix) is making significant progress to-
21	wards assuming full responsibility for secu-
22	rity in all the provinces of Iraq by Novem-
23	ber 30, 2007;
24	(x) is making significant progress to-
25	wards holding free and fair provincial elec-

1	tions in Iraq at the earliest date prac-
2	ticable, but not later than December 31,
3	2007;
4	(xi) is making substantial progress to-
5	wards increasing the size and effectiveness
6	of Ministry of Defense forces as described
7	on page 11 of "Highlights of the Iraq
8	Strategy Review' published by the Na-
9	tional Security Council in January 2007;
10	(xii) is making significant progress in
11	reforming and strengthening the civilian
12	ministries and other government institu-
13	tions that support the Iraqi Army and Na-
14	tional Police; and
15	(xiii) is making significant progress
16	towards reforming its civilian ministries to
17	ensure that they are not administered on a
18	sectarian basis and that government serv-
19	ices are delivered in an even-handed and
20	non-sectarian manner.
21	(2) Period of Suspension.—A suspension of
22	the redeployment of the Armed Forces under this
23	subsection, including any renewal of the suspension
24	under paragraph (3), shall be for a period not to ex-
25	ceed 90 days.

(3) Renewal.—A suspension of the redeployment of the Armed Forces under this subsection may be renewed. Any such renewal shall include a certification to the officers referred to in paragraph (1) on the matters set forth in clauses (i) through (xiii) of subparagraph (B) of that paragraph.

### (c) DISAPPROVAL OF SUSPENSION.—

- (1) DISAPPROVAL.—If Congress enacts a joint resolution disapproving the suspension of the redeployment of the Armed Forces under subsection (b), or any renewal of the suspension, the suspension shall be discontinued, and the redeployment of the Armed Forces from Iraq under this section shall resume.
- (2) Procedures for consideration of Joint resolutions.—
  - (A) Joint Resolution Defined.—For purposes of this subsection, the term "joint resolution" means only a joint resolution introduced not later than 10 days after the date on which a certification of the President under subsection (b) is received by Congress, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That Congress disapproves the certification of the President submitted to Congress

1	under section 4(b) of the Iraq War De-Esca-
2	lation Act of 2007, on", the
3	blank space being filled in with the appropriate
4	date.
5	(B) Procedures.—A joint resolution de-
6	scribed in paragraph (1) shall be considered in
7	a House of Congress in accordance with the
8	procedures applicable to joint resolutions under
9	paragraphs (3) through (8) of section 8066(e)
10	of the Department of Defense Appropriations
11	Act, 1985 (as enacted by section 101(h) of
12	Public Law 98–473; 98 Stat. 1936).
13	(d) Reports to Congress.—
14	(1) In general.—Not later than 90 days after
15	the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90
16	days thereafter, the President shall submit to the
17	President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speak-
18	er of the House of Representatives a report describ-
19	ing and assessing—
20	(A) the progress made by the Government
21	of Iraq on each of the matters set forth in sub-
22	section (b)(1)(B); and
23	(B) the progress of the redeployment re-
24	quired by subsection (a).

1	(2) FORM.—Each report under this subsection
2	shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in-
3	clude a classified annex.
4	(e) Sense of Congress on Location of Rede-
5	PLOYMENT.—It is the sense of Congress that, in rede-
6	ploying the Armed Forces from Iraq under this section,
7	appropriate units of the Armed Forces should be rede-
8	ployed—
9	(1) to the United States;
10	(2) to Afghanistan, in order to enhance United
11	States military operations in that country;
12	(3) elsewhere in the region, to serve as an over-
13	the-horizon force to prevent the conflict in Iraq from
14	becoming a wider war, to reassure allies of the
15	United States of the commitment of the United
16	States to remain engaged in the region, and to posi-
17	tion troops to strike directly at al-Qaeda; and
18	(4) elsewhere, to meet urgent United States se-
19	curity needs.
20	(f) POLITICAL SOLUTION IN IRAQ.—The United
21	States should use the redeployment of the Armed Forces
22	under this section, and the possible suspension of such re-
23	deployment if the benchmarks set forth in subsection (b)

24 are met, as a tool to press the Iraqi leaders to promote

1	national reconciliation among ethnic and religious groups
2	in Iraq in order to establish stability in Iraq.
3	(g) RETENTION OF CERTAIN FORCES IN IRAQ.—
4	(1) In General.—Notwithstanding the re-
5	quirement for the redeployment of the Armed Forces
6	under subsection (a) and subject to the provisions of
7	this subsection, personnel of the Armed Forces of
8	the United States may be in Iraq after the comple-
9	tion of the redeployment of the Armed Forces under
10	this section for the following purposes:
11	(A) To protect United States personnel
12	and facilities in Iraq.
13	(B) To conduct targeted counter-terrorism
14	operations.
15	(C) To provide training for Iraqi security
16	forces.
17	(D) To conduct the routine functions of
18	the Office of Defense Attache.
19	(2) Certification.—Personnel of the Armed
20	Forces may not be retained in Iraq under this sub-
21	section unless the President certifies to the Presi-
22	dent pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of
23	the House of Representatives that—

- 1 (A) the retention of the Armed Forces in 2 Iraq is necessary for one or more of the pur-3 poses set forth in paragraph (1); and
  - (B) the utilization of Armed Forces positioned outside Iraq could not result in the effective achievement of such purpose or purposes.
  - (3) DISAPPROVAL OF RETENTION.—If Congress enacts a joint resolution disapproving the retention of personnel of the Armed Forces in Iraq under this subsection, or any renewal of the retention, the retention of such personnel in Iraq shall be discontinued, and such personnel shall be redeployed from Iraq.
  - (4) Procedures for consideration of Joint resolutions.—
    - (A) Joint Resolution Defined.—For purposes of paragraph (3), the term "joint resolution" means only a joint resolution introduced not later than 10 days after the date on which a certification of the President under paragraph (2) is received by Congress, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That Congress disapproves the certification of the President submitted to Congress under section 4(g)(2) of the Iraq War De-Esca-

1	lation Act of 2007, on", the
2	blank space being filled in with the appropriate
3	date.
4	(B) Procedures.—A joint resolution de-
5	scribed in subparagraph (A) shall be considered
6	in a House of Congress in accordance with the
7	procedures applicable to joint resolutions under
8	paragraphs (3) through (8) of section 8066(c)
9	of the Department of Defense Appropriations
10	Act, 1985 (as enacted by section 101(h) of
11	Public Law 98–473; 98 Stat. 1936).
12	(h) No Permanent Bases.—Congress hereby reaf-
13	firms section 1519 of the John Warner National Defense
14	Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109–
15	364; 120 Stat. 2444), and related provisions of law, that
16	prohibit the establishment of military installations or
17	bases for the purpose of providing for the permanent sta-
18	tioning of United States Armed Forces in Iraq.
19	SEC. 5. INTENSIFICATION OF TRAINING OF IRAQI SECU-
20	RITY FORCES.
21	It shall be the policy of the United States to imme-
22	diately formulate and implement a plan that—
23	(1) with the Government of Iraq—

1	(A) removes militia elements from the
2	Iraqi Army, National Police, and other security
3	forces of the Government of Iraq; and
4	(B) puts such forces in charge of maintain-
5	ing security in Iraq;
6	(2) focuses and intensifies United States efforts
7	on training such forces; and
8	(3) presses the Government of Iraq to reform
9	the civilian ministries and other government institu-
10	tions that support the Iraqi Army, National Police,
11	local police, and judicial system.
12	SEC. 6. AVAILABILITY OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR
13	IRAQ.
13 14	IRAQ.  (a) LIMITATION.—Except as provided in subsection
14	(a) Limitation.—Except as provided in subsection
14 15	(a) LIMITATION.—Except as provided in subsection (b), after May 1, 2007, economic assistance may be fur-
14 15 16 17	(a) Limitation.—Except as provided in subsection (b), after May 1, 2007, economic assistance may be furnished to the Government of Iraq only if the President
14 15 16 17	(a) LIMITATION.—Except as provided in subsection (b), after May 1, 2007, economic assistance may be furnished to the Government of Iraq only if the President submits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and
14 15 16 17	(a) Limitation.—Except as provided in subsection (b), after May 1, 2007, economic assistance may be furnished to the Government of Iraq only if the President submits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives a certifi-
114 115 116 117 118	(a) Limitation.—Except as provided in subsection (b), after May 1, 2007, economic assistance may be furnished to the Government of Iraq only if the President submits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives a certification that the Government of Iraq—
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	(a) Limitation.—Except as provided in subsection (b), after May 1, 2007, economic assistance may be furnished to the Government of Iraq only if the President submits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives a certification that the Government of Iraq—  (1) is making measurable progress toward pro-
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	(a) Limitation.—Except as provided in subsection (b), after May 1, 2007, economic assistance may be furnished to the Government of Iraq only if the President submits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives a certification that the Government of Iraq—  (1) is making measurable progress toward providing not less than \$10,000,000,000 of Iraqi funds

- 1 (2) is making progress toward meeting the con-
- 2 ditions set forth in the International Compact for
- 3 Iraq and in the stand-by agreement with the Inter-
- 4 national Monetary Fund; and
- 5 (3) is making progress toward reducing sec-
- 6 tarian violence and promoting national reconcili-
- 7 ation.
- 8 (b) Exceptions.—The limitation in subsection (a)
- 9 shall not apply to assistance for Iraq as follows:
- 10 (1) Humanitarian assistance.
- 11 (2) Assistance to address urgent security and
- employment needs.
- 13 (c) Assessment of Progress.—Not later than 90
- 14 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every
- 15 90 days thereafter, the Special Inspector General for Iraq
- 16 Reconstruction shall submit to Congress a report describ-
- 17 ing the progress of the Government of Iraq on each matter
- 18 set forth in subsection (a).
- 19 SEC. 7. REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES ON IRAQ.
- 20 (a) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.—It shall be the
- 21 policy of the United States to undertake comprehensive
- 22 regional and international initiatives, involving key na-
- 23 tions, that will assist the Government of Iraq in achieving
- 24 the purposes of this Act, including promoting a political
- 25 settlement among the Iraqi people, ending the civil war

- 1 in Iraq, preventing a humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq,
- 2 and preventing a regional conflict.
- 3 (b) Special Envoy.—The President should, not
- 4 later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this
- 5 Act, appoint a special envoy for Iraq to carry out the pol-
- 6 icy set forth in subsection (a).
- 7 (c) Strategy on Preventing Wider Regional
- 8 War.—
- 9 (1) Strategy.—Not later than 90 days after
- the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
- shall submit to the President pro tempore of the
- 12 Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representa-
- tives a report setting forth a strategy for preventing
- the conflict in Iraq from becoming a wider regional
- 15 war.
- 16 (2) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1)
- shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in-
- 18 clude a classified annex.

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