110TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION

H. RES. 799

Impeaching Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NOVEMBER 6, 2007

Mr. Kucinich submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

RESOLUTION

Impeaching Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors.

- 1 Resolved, That Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of
- 2 the United States, is impeached for high crimes and mis-
- 3 demeanors, and that the following articles of impeachment
- 4 be exhibited to the United States Senate:
- 5 Articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of
- 6 Representatives of the United States of America in the
- 7 name of itself and of the people of the United States of
- 8 America, against Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the
- 9 United States of America, in maintenance and support of

its impeachment against him for high crimes and mis-2 demeanors. 3 Article I 4 In his conduct while Vice President of the United 5 States, Richard B. Cheney, in violation of his constitutional oath to faithfully execute the office of Vice President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, 8 preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty 10 to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has purposely manipulated the intelligence process to deceive the 12 citizens and Congress of the United States by fabricating a threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction to justify the use of the United States Armed Forces against the 14 15 nation of Iraq in a manner damaging to our national security interests, to wit: 16 17 (1) Despite all evidence to the contrary, the 18 Vice President actively and systematically sought to 19 deceive the citizens and Congress of the United 20 States about an alleged threat of Iraqi weapons of 21 mass destruction: 22 (A) "We know they have biological and 23 chemical weapons." March 17, 2002, Press 24 Conference by Vice President Dick Cheney and

His Highness Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa,

- 1 Crown Prince of Bahrain at Shaikh Hamad 2 Palace. (B) ". . . and we know they are pursuing 3 nuclear weapons." March 19, 2002, Press 4 5 Briefing by Vice President Dick Cheney and 6 Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in Jeru-7 salem. 8 (C) "And he is actively pursuing nuclear 9 weapons at this time . . ." March 24, 2002, 10 CNN Late Edition interview with Vice Presi-11 dent Cheney. 12 (D) "We know he's got chemicals and bio-13 logical and we know he's working on nuclear." 14 May 19, 2002, NBC Meet the Press interview 15 with Vice President Cheney. 16 (E) "But we now know that Saddam has 17
 - (E) "But we now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons . . . Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us." August 26, 2002, Speech of Vice President Cheney at VFW 103rd National Convention.

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- (F) "Based on intelligence that's becoming available, some of it has been made public, more of it hopefully will be, that he has indeed stepped up his capacity to produce and deliver biological weapons, that he has reconstituted his nuclear program to develop a nuclear weap-on, that there are efforts under way inside Iraq to significantly expand his capability." Sep-tember 8, 2002, NBC Meet the Press interview with Vice President Cheney.
 - (G) "He is, in fact, actively and aggressively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons." September 8, 2002, NBC Meet the Press interview with Vice President Cheney.
 - (H) "And we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons." March 16, 2003, NBC Meet the Press interview with Vice President Cheney.
 - (2) Preceding the March 2003 invasion of Iraq the Vice President was fully informed that no legitimate evidence existed of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The Vice President pressured the intelligence community to change their findings to enable the deception of the citizens and Congress of the United States.

- 1 (A) Vice President Cheney and his Chief of
 2 Staff, Lewis Libby, made multiple trips to the
 3 CIA in 2002 to question analysts studying
 4 Iraq's weapons programs and alleged links to al
 5 Qaeda, creating an environment in which ana6 lysts felt they were being pressured to make
 7 their assessments fit with the Bush administra8 tion's policy objectives accounts.
 - (B) Vice President Cheney sought out unverified and ultimately inaccurate raw intelligence to prove his preconceived beliefs. This strategy of cherry picking was employed to influence the interpretation of the intelligence.
 - (3) The Vice President's actions corrupted or attempted to corrupt the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, an intelligence document issued on October 1, 2002, and carefully considered by Congress prior to the October 10, 2002, vote to authorize the use of force. The Vice President's actions prevented the necessary reconciliation of facts for the National Intelligence Estimate which resulted in a high number of dissenting opinions from technical experts in two Federal agencies.
 - (A) The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research dissenting view in the

October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate stated "Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has launched a coherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program INR is unwilling to speculate that such an effort began soon after the departure of UN inspectors or to project a timeline for the completion of activities it does not now see happening. As a result INR is unable to predict that Iraq could acquire a nuclear device or weapon.".

- (B) The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research dissenting view in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate also stated that "Finally, the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious.".
- (C) The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research dissenting view in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate references a Department of Energy opinion by stating that "INR accepts the judgment of technical experts at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the tubes Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges to be used for uranium

1	enrichment and finds unpersuasive the argu-
2	ments advanced by others to make the case that
3	they are intended for that purpose.".
4	The Vice President subverted the national security
5	interests of the United States by setting the stage for the
6	loss of more than 3,800 United States service members
7	the loss of more than 1 million innocent Iraqi citizens
8	since the United States invasion; the loss of approximately
9	\$500 billion in war costs which has increased our Federal
10	debt; the loss of military readiness within the United
11	States Armed Services due to overextension, lack of train-
12	ing and lack of equipment; the loss of United States credi-
13	bility in world affairs; and the decades of likely blowback
14	created by the invasion of Iraq.
15	In all of this, Vice President Richard B. Cheney has
16	acted in a manner contrary to his trust as Vice President
17	and subversive of constitutional government, to the preju-
18	dice of the cause of law and justice and the manifest injury
19	of the people of the United States. Wherefore, Vice Presi-
20	dent Richard B. Cheney, by such conduct, is guilty of an
21	impeachable offense warranting removal from office.
22	Article II
23	In his conduct while Vice President of the United
24	States, Richard B. Cheney, in violation of his constitu-
25	tional oath to faithfully execute the office of Vice Presi-

- 1 dent of the United States and, to the best of his ability,
- 2 preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the
- 3 United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty
- 4 to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, purposely
- 5 manipulated the intelligence process to deceive the citizens
- 6 and Congress of the United States about an alleged rela-
- 7 tionship between Iraq and al Qaeda in order to justify the
- 8 use of the United States Armed Forces against the nation
- 9 of Iraq in a manner damaging to our national security
- 10 interests, to wit:
- 11 (1) Despite all evidence to the contrary, the
- 12 Vice President actively and systematically sought to
- deceive the citizens and the Congress of the United
- 14 States about an alleged relationship between Iraq
- and al Qaeda:
- 16 (A) "His regime has had high-level con-
- 17 tacts with Al Qaeda going back a decade and
- has provided training to Al Qaeda terrorists."
- 19 December 2, 2002, Speech of Vice President
- 20 Cheney at the Air National Guard Senior Lead-
- 21 ership Conference.
- 22 (B) "His regime aids and protects terror-
- ists, including members of Al Qaeda. He could
- 24 decide secretly to provide weapons of mass de-
- 25 struction to terrorists for use against us." Jan-

- uary 30, 2003, Speech of Vice President Cheney to 30th Political Action Conference in Arlington, Virginia.
 - (C) "We know he's out trying once again to produce nuclear weapons and we know that he has a long-standing relationship with various terrorist groups, including the Al Qaeda organization." March 16, 2003, NBC Meet the Press interview with Vice President Cheney.
 - (D) "We learned more and more that there was a relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda that stretched back through most of the decade of the '90s, that it involved training, for example, on biological weapons and chemical weapons . . ." September 14, 2003, NBC Meet the Press interview with Vice President Cheney.
 - (E) "Al Qaeda had a base of operation there up in Northeastern Iraq where they ran a large poisons factory for attacks against Europeans and U.S. forces." October 3, 2003, Speech of Vice President Cheney at Bush-Cheney '04 Fundraiser in Iowa.
 - (F) "He also had an established relationship with Al Qaeda providing training to Al

- Qaeda members in areas of poisons, gases, and conventional bombs." October 10, 2003, Speech of Vice President Cheney to the Heritage Foundation.
 - (G) "Al Qaeda and the Iraqi intelligence services have worked together on a number of occasions." January 9, 2004, Rocky Mountain News interview with Vice President Cheney.
 - (H) "I think there's overwhelming evidence that there was a connection between Al Qaeda and the Iraqi Government." January 22, 2004, NPR: Morning Edition interview with Vice President Cheney.
 - (I) "First of all, on the question of—of whether or not there was any kind of relationship, there clearly was a relationship. It's been testified to; the evidence is overwhelming."

 June 17, 2004, CNBC: Capital Report interview with Vice President Cheney.
 - (2) Preceding the March 2003 invasion of Iraq the Vice President was fully informed that no credible evidence existed of a working relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, a fact articulated in several official documents, including:

- (A) A classified Presidential Daily Briefing ten days after the September 11, 2001, attacks indicating that the United States intelligence community had no evidence linking Saddam Hussein to the September 11th attacks and that there was "scant credible evidence that Iraq had any significant collaborative ties with Al Qaeda".
 - (B) Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary No. 044–02, issued in February 2002 by the United States Defense Intelligence Agency, which challenged the credibility of information gleaned from captured al Qaeda leader al-Libi. The DIA report also cast significant doubt on the possibility of a Saddam Hussein-al-Qaeda conspiracy: "Saddam's regime is intensely secular and is wary of Islamic revolutionary movements. Moreover, Baghdad is unlikely to provide assistance to a group it cannot control.".
 - (C) A January 2003 British intelligence classified report on Iraq that concluded that "there are no current links between the Iraqi regime and the al-Qaeda network".

The Vice President subverted the national security interests of the United States by setting the stage for the

- 1 loss of more than 3,800 United States service members;
- 2 the loss of more than 1 million innocent Iraqi citizens
- 3 since the United States invasion; the loss of approximately
- 4 \$500 billion in war costs which has increased our Federal
- 5 debt; the loss of military readiness within the United
- 6 States Armed Services due to overextension, lack of train-
- 7 ing and lack of equipment; the loss of United States credi-
- 8 bility in world affairs; and the decades of likely blowback
- 9 created by the invasion of Iraq.
- 10 In all of this, Vice President Richard B. Cheney has
- 11 acted in a manner contrary to his trust as Vice President,
- 12 and subversive of constitutional government, to the preju-
- 13 dice of the cause of law and justice and the manifest injury
- 14 of the people of the United States.
- Wherefore, Vice President Richard B. Cheney, by
- 16 such conduct, is guilty of an impeachable offense war-
- 17 ranting removal from office.

18 Article III

- In his conduct while Vice President of the United
- 20 States, Richard B. Cheney, in violation of his constitu-
- 21 tional oath to faithfully execute the office of Vice Presi-
- 22 dent of the United States and, to the best of his ability,
- 23 preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the
- 24 United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty
- 25 to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has open-

- 1 ly threatened aggression against the Republic of Iran ab-
- 2 sent any real threat to the United States, and done so
- 3 with the United States proven capability to carry out such
- 4 threats, thus undermining the national security of the
- 5 United States, to wit:

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- (1) Despite no evidence that Iran has the intention or the capability of attacking the United States
 and despite the turmoil created by United States invasion of Iraq, the Vice President has openly threatened aggression against Iran as evidenced by the following:
 - (A) "For our part, the United States is keeping all options on the table in addressing the irresponsible conduct of the regime. And we join other nations in sending that regime a clear message: We will not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon." March 7, 2006, Speech of Vice President Cheney to American Israel Public Affairs Committee 2006 Policy Conference.
 - (B) "But we've also made it clear that all options are on the table." January 24, 2007, CNN Situation Room interview with Vice President Cheney.
- 24 (C) "When we—as the President did, for example, recently—deploy another aircraft car-

rier task force to the Gulf, that sends a very strong signal to everybody in the region that the United States is here to stay, that we clear-ly have significant capabilities, and that we are working with friends and allies as well as the international organizations to deal with the Iranian threat." January 29, 2007, Newsweek interview with Vice President Cheney.

- (D) "But I've also made the point and the President has made the point that all options are still on the table." February 24, 2007, Vice President Cheney at Press Briefing with Australian Prime Minister in Sydney, Australia.
- (2) The Vice President, who repeatedly and falsely claimed to have had specific, detailed knowledge of Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction capabilities, is no doubt fully aware of evidence that demonstrates Iran poses no real threat to the United States as evidenced by the following:
 - (A) "I know that what we see in Iran right now is not the industrial capacity you can [use to develop a] bomb." Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of International Atomic Energy Agency, February 19, 2007.

1	(B) Iran indicated its "full readiness and
2	willingness to negotiate on the modality for the
3	resolution of the outstanding issues with the
4	IAEA, subject to the assurances for dealing
5	with the issues in the framework of the Agency,
6	without the interference of the United Nations
7	Security Council". IAEA Board Report, Feb-
8	ruary 22, 2007.
9	(C) " so whatever they have, what we
10	have seen today, is not the kind of capacity that
11	would enable them to make bombs." Mohamed
12	ElBaradei, Director General of International
13	Atomic Energy Agency, February 19, 2007.
14	(3) The Vice President is fully aware of the ac-
15	tions taken by the United States towards Iran that
16	are further destabilizing the world as evidenced by
17	the following:
18	(A) The United States has refused to en-
19	gage in meaningful diplomatic relations with
20	Iran since 2002, rebuffing both bilateral and
21	multilateral offers to dialogue.
22	(B) The United States is currently en-
23	gaged in a military buildup in the Middle East
24	that includes the increased presence of the

United States Navy in the waters near Iran,

1	significant United States Armed Forces in two
2	nations neighboring to Iran, and the installa-
3	tion of anti-missile technology in the region.
4	(C) News accounts have indicated that
5	military planners have considered the B61–11,
6	a tactical nuclear weapon, as one of the options
7	to strike underground bunkers in Iran.
8	(D) The United States has been linked to
9	anti-Iranian organizations that are attempting
10	to destabilize the Iranian Government, in par-
11	ticular the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK), even
12	though the State Department has branded it a
13	terrorist organization.
14	(E) News accounts indicate that United
15	States troops have been ordered into Iran to
16	collect data and establish contact with anti-gov-
17	ernment groups.
18	(4) In the last three years the Vice President
19	has repeatedly threatened Iran. However, the Vice
20	President is legally bound by the U.S. Constitution's
21	adherence to international law that prohibits threats
22	of use of force.
23	(A) Article VI of the United States Con-
24	stitution states, "This Constitution, and the
25	Laws of the United States which shall be made

in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Any provision of an international treaty ratified by the United States becomes the law of the United States.

- (B) The United States is a signatory to the United Nations Charter, a treaty among the nations of the world. Article II, section 4 of the United Nations Charter states, "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." The threat of force is illegal.
- (C) Article 51 lays out the only exception, "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." Iran has not attacked the United States; there-

- fore any threat against Iran by the United
- 2 States is illegal.
- The Vice President's deception upon the citizens and
- 4 Congress of the United States that enabled the failed
- 5 United States invasion of Iraq forcibly altered the rules
- 6 of diplomacy such that the Vice President's recent bellig-
- 7 erent actions towards Iran are destabilizing and counter-
- 8 productive to the national security of the United States.
- 9 In all of this, Vice President Richard B. Cheney has
- 10 acted in a manner contrary to his trust as Vice President,
- 11 and subversive of constitutional government, to the preju-
- 12 dice of the cause of law and justice and the manifest injury
- 13 of the people of the United States.
- Wherefore Richard B. Cheney, by such conduct, war-
- 15 rants impeachment and trial, and removal from office.

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