

110TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 787

To state United States policy for Iraq, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 31, 2007

Mr. THOMPSON of California (for himself and Mr. PATRICK J. MURPHY of Pennsylvania) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To state United States policy for Iraq, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Iraq War De-Escala-
5 tion Act of 2007”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.**

7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
8 ings:

1 (1) Congress and the Nation honor the courage,
2 sacrifices, and efforts of the members of the Armed
3 Forces of the United States and their families.

12 (3) In that speech, President George W. Bush
13 also told the Nation that “America will hold the
14 Iraqi government to the benchmarks it has an-
15 nounced. . . . [T]o take responsibility for security in
16 all of Iraq’s provinces by November. To give every
17 Iraqi citizen a stake in the country’s economy, Iraq
18 will pass legislation to share oil revenues among all
19 Iraqis. To show that it is committed to delivering a
20 better life, the Iraqi government will spend
21 \$10,000,000,000 of its own money on reconstruction
22 and infrastructure projects that will create new jobs.
23 To empower local leaders, Iraqis plan to hold provin-
24 cial elections later this year. And to allow more
25 Iraqis to re-enter their nation’s political life, the gov-

1 ernment will reform de-Baathification laws, and es-
2 tablish a fair process for considering amendments to
3 Iraq's constitution".

4 (4) In that speech, President George W. Bush
5 also told the Nation that "only Iraqis can end the
6 sectarian violence and secure their people".

7 (5) On December 18, 2006, former Secretary of
8 State Colin Powell stated: "[s]o we have tried this
9 surge of troops over the summer. I am not per-
10 suaded that another surge of troops in Baghdad for
11 the purpose of suppressing this communitarian vio-
12 lence, this civil war, will work".

13 (6) On November 15, 2006, General John
14 Abizaid, Commander of the United States Central
15 Command, stated before the Committee on Armed
16 Services of the Senate that "I met with every divi-
17 sional commander, General Casey, the corps com-
18 mander, General Dempsey. We all talked together.
19 And I said, in your professional opinion, if we were
20 to bring in more American troops now, does it add
21 considerably to our ability to achieve success in
22 Iraq? And they all said no. And the reason is, be-
23 cause we want the Iraqis to do more. It's easy for
24 the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe
25 that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from

1 doing more, from taking more responsibility for their
2 own future”.

3 (7) In testimony before the Committee on For-
4 eign Relations of the Senate on January 11, 2007,
5 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that un-
6 less the Government of Iraq has met certain bench-
7 marks and reestablishes the confidence of the Iraqi
8 people over the next several months, “this plan is
9 not going to work”.

10 (8) In a statement on January 11, 2007, Sec-
11 etary of Defense Robert Gates stated “[a]nd we will
12 probably have a better view a couple of months from
13 now in terms of whether we are making headway in
14 terms of getting better control of Baghdad, with the
15 Iraqis in the lead and with the Iraqis beginning to
16 make better progress on the reconciliation process”.

17 (9) The bipartisan Iraq Study Group headed by
18 former Secretary of State James Baker and former
19 Representative Lee Hamilton reached a bipartisan
20 consensus on 79 separate recommendations for a
21 new approach in Iraq. Among those recommenda-
22 tions were calling for a new diplomatic offensive in
23 the region and conditioning American economic as-
24 sistance to Iraq on specific benchmarks, with the ex-
25 pectation that “by the first quarter of 2008, subject

1 to unexpected developments in the security situation
2 on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for
3 force protection could be out of Iraq”.

4 (10) In reaction to the speech of President
5 George W. Bush of January 10, 2007, former Sec-
6 retary of State Baker and former Representative
7 Hamilton wrote that “[t]he President did not sug-
8 gest the possibility of a transition that could enable
9 U.S. combat forces to begin to leave Iraq. The Presi-
10 dent did not state that political, military, or eco-
11 nomic support for Iraq would be conditional on the
12 Iraq government’s ability to meet benchmarks. With-
13 in the region, the President did not announce an
14 international support group for Iraq including all of
15 Iraq’s neighbors. . .”.

16 (b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this Act are as fol-
17 lows:

18 (1) To formulate and provide for the implemen-
19 tation of an effective United States policy towards
20 Iraq and the Middle East region that employs mili-
21 tary, political, diplomatic, and economic assets to
22 promote and protect the national security interests
23 of the United States.

24 (2) To provide for the implementation of a re-
25 responsible, phased redeployment of the Armed Forces

1 of the United States from Iraq in a substantial and
2 gradual manner that places the highest priority on
3 protecting the lives of members of the Armed Forces
4 and civilian personnel of the United States and on
5 promoting the national security interests of the
6 United States in the Middle East region.

7 (3) To urge the political parties and leaders of
8 Iraq to reach the political solution necessary to pro-
9 mote stability in Iraq and enhance the safety of in-
10 nocent Iraqi civilians.

11 (4) To condition future economic assistance to
12 the Government of Iraq on significant progress to-
13 ward the achievement of political and economic
14 measures to be taken by the Government of Iraq.

15 (5) To provide for the initiation of a wider and
16 sustained diplomatic strategy aimed at promoting a
17 political settlement in Iraq, thereby ending the civil
18 war in Iraq, preventing a humanitarian catastrophe
19 in Iraq, and preventing a wider regional conflict.

20 (6) To provide, through sections 4 through 7,
21 for the implementation of key recommendations of
22 the Iraq Study Group, a bipartisan panel of experts
23 co-chaired by former Secretary of State James
24 Baker and former Representative Lee Hamilton.

1 **SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE FORCE LEVELS FOR UNITED STATES**2 **MILITARY FORCES IN IRAQ.**

3 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the levels
4 of the Armed Forces of the United States in Iraq after
5 the date of the enactment of this Act shall not exceed the
6 levels of such forces in Iraq as of January 10, 2007, with-
7 out specific authority in statute enacted by Congress after
8 the date of the enactment of this Act.

9 **SEC. 4. REDEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES MILITARY**10 **FORCES FROM IRAQ.**

11 (a) REDEPLOYMENT.—

12 (1) DEADLINE FOR COMMENCEMENT OF REDE-
13 PLOYMENT.—Except as otherwise provided in this
14 section, the phased redeployment of the Armed
15 Forces of the United States from Iraq shall com-
16 mence not later than May 1, 2007.

17 (2) SCOPE AND MANNER OF REDEPLOYMENT.—

18 The redeployment of the Armed Forces under this
19 section shall be substantial, shall occur in a gradual
20 manner, and shall be executed at a pace to achieve
21 the goal of the complete redeployment of all United
22 States combat brigades from Iraq by March 31,
23 2008, consistent with the expectation of the Iraq
24 Study Group, if all the matters set forth in sub-
25 section (b)(1)(B) are not met by such date, subject
26 to the exceptions for retention of forces for force

1 protection, counter-terrorism operations, training of
2 Iraqi forces, and other purposes as contemplated by
3 subsection (g).

4 (3) FORMULATION OF PLAN WITH MILITARY
5 COMMANDERS.—The redeployment of the Armed
6 Forces under this section should be conducted pur-
7 suant to a plan formulated by United States military
8 commanders that is developed, if practicable, in con-
9 sultation with the Government of Iraq.

10 (4) PROTECTION OF UNITED STATES FORCES
11 AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL.—In carrying out the re-
12 deployment of the Armed Forces under this section,
13 the highest priority shall be afforded to the safety of
14 members of the Armed Forces and civilian personnel
15 of the United States in Iraq.

16 (b) SUSPENSION OF REDEPLOYMENT.—

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President may suspend,
18 on a temporary basis as provided in paragraph (2),
19 the redeployment of the Armed Forces under this
20 section if the President certifies to the President pro
21 tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
22 of Representatives that—

23 (A) doing so is in the national security in-
24 terests of the United States; and

25 (B) the Government of Iraq—

(i) has lifted all restrictions concerning non-interference in operations of the Armed Forces of the United States in Iraq and does so on a continuing basis;

(ii) is making significant progress in reducing sectarian violence in Iraq and in reducing the size and operational effectiveness of sectarian militias in Iraq;

(iii) is making significant progress towards removing militia elements from the Iraqi Army, National Police, Facilities Protection Services, and other security forces of the Government of Iraq;

(iv) has enacted legislation or established other binding mechanisms to ensure the sharing of all Iraqi oil revenues among all segments of Iraqi society in an equitable manner;

(v) is making significant progress towards making available not less than \$10,000,000,000 for reconstruction, job creation, and economic development in Iraq, with safeguards to prevent corruption, by January 10, 2008;

1 (vi) has deployed at least 18 Iraqi
2 Army and National Police brigades to
3 Baghdad and is effectively ensuring that
4 such units are performing their security
5 and police functions in all Baghdad neigh-
6 borhoods, regardless of their sectarian
7 composition;

8 (vii) has enacted legislation or estab-
9 lished other binding mechanisms to revise
10 its de-Baathification laws to encourage the
11 employment in the Government of Iraq of
12 qualified Iraqi professionals, irrespective of
13 ethnic or political affiliation, including ex-
14 Baathists who were not leading figures of
15 the Saddam Hussein regime;

16 (viii) has established a fair process for
17 considering amendments to the constitu-
18 tion of Iraq that promote lasting national
19 reconciliation in Iraq;

20 (ix) is making significant progress to-
21 wards assuming full responsibility for secu-
22 rity in all the provinces of Iraq by Novem-
23 ber 30, 2007;

24 (x) is making significant progress to-
25 wards holding free and fair provincial elec-

4 (xi) is making substantial progress to-
5 wards increasing the size and effectiveness
6 of Ministry of Defense forces as described
7 on page 11 of “Highlights of the Iraq
8 Strategy Review” published by the Na-
9 tional Security Council in January 2007;

10 (xii) is making significant progress in
11 reforming and strengthening the civilian
12 ministries and other government institu-
13 tions that support the Iraqi Army and Na-
14 tional Police; and

15 (xiii) is making significant progress
16 towards reforming its civilian ministries to
17 ensure that they are not administered on a
18 sectarian basis and that government serv-
19 ices are delivered in an even-handed and
20 non-sectarian manner.

7 (c) DISAPPROVAL OF SUSPENSION.—

1 under section 4(b) of the Iraq War De-Escala-
2 tion Act of 2007, on _____.”, the
3 blank space being filled in with the appropriate
4 date.

5 (B) PROCEDURES.—A joint resolution de-
6 scribed in paragraph (1) shall be considered in
7 a House of Congress in accordance with the
8 procedures applicable to joint resolutions under
9 paragraphs (3) through (8) of section 8066(c)
10 of the Department of Defense Appropriations
11 Act, 1985 (as enacted by section 101(h) of
12 Public Law 98-473; 98 Stat. 1936).

13 (d) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
15 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90
16 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the
17 President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speak-
18 er of the House of Representatives a report describ-
19 ing and assessing—

20 (A) the progress made by the Government
21 of Iraq on each of the matters set forth in sub-
22 section (b)(1)(B); and

23 (B) the progress of the redeployment re-
24 quired by subsection (a).

4 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON LOCATION OF REDE-
5 PLEMENT.—It is the sense of Congress that, in rede-
6 ploying the Armed Forces from Iraq under this section,
7 appropriate units of the Armed Forces should be rede-
8 ployed—

9 (1) to the United States;

10 (2) to Afghanistan, in order to enhance United
11 States military operations in that country;

18 (4) elsewhere, to meet urgent United States se-
19 curity needs.

20 (f) POLITICAL SOLUTION IN IRAQ.—The United
21 States should use the redeployment of the Armed Forces
22 under this section, and the possible suspension of such re-
23 deployment if the benchmarks set forth in subsection (b)
24 are met, as a tool to press the Iraqi leaders to promote

- 1 national reconciliation among ethnic and religious groups
- 2 in Iraq in order to establish stability in Iraq.

3 (g) RETENTION OF CERTAIN FORCES IN IRAQ.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding the re-
5 quirement for the redeployment of the Armed Forces
6 under subsection (a) and subject to the provisions of
7 this subsection, personnel of the Armed Forces of
8 the United States may be in Iraq after the comple-
9 tion of the redeployment of the Armed Forces under
10 this section for the following purposes:

11 (A) To protect United States personnel
12 and facilities in Iraq.

13 (B) To conduct targeted counter-terrorism
14 operations.

15 (C) To provide training for Iraqi security
16 forces.

17 (D) To conduct the routine functions of
18 the Office of Defense Attaché.

19 (2) CERTIFICATION.—Personnel of the Armed
20 Forces may not be retained in Iraq under this sub-
21 section unless the President certifies to the Presi-
22 dent pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of
23 the House of Representatives that—

1 (A) the retention of the Armed Forces in
2 Iraq is necessary for one or more of the pur-
3 poses set forth in paragraph (1); and

4 (B) the utilization of Armed Forces positioned outside Iraq could not result in the effective achievement of such purpose or purposes.

14 (4) PROCEDURES FOR CONSIDERATION OF
15 JOINT RESOLUTIONS.—

16 (A) JOINT RESOLUTION DEFINED.—For
17 purposes of paragraph (3), the term “joint res-
18 olution” means only a joint resolution intro-
19 duced not later than 10 days after the date on
20 which a certification of the President under
21 paragraph (2) is received by Congress, the mat-
22 ter after the resolving clause of which is as fol-
23 lows: “That Congress disapproves the certifi-
24 cation of the President submitted to Congress
25 under section 4(g)(2) of the Iraq War De-Escala-

1 lation Act of 2007, on _____.”, the
2 blank space being filled in with the appropriate
3 date.

4 (B) PROCEDURES.—A joint resolution de-
5 scribed in subparagraph (A) shall be considered
6 in a House of Congress in accordance with the
7 procedures applicable to joint resolutions under
8 paragraphs (3) through (8) of section 8066(c)
9 of the Department of Defense Appropriations
10 Act, 1985 (as enacted by section 101(h) of
11 Public Law 98-473; 98 Stat. 1936).

12 (h) NO PERMANENT BASES.—Congress hereby reaffirms section 1519 of the John Warner National Defense
13 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-
14 364; 120 Stat. 2444), and related provisions of law, that
15 prohibit the establishment of military installations or
16 bases for the purpose of providing for the permanent sta-
17 tioning of United States Armed Forces in Iraq.

19 **SEC. 5. INTENSIFICATION OF TRAINING OF IRAQI SECU-
20 RITY FORCES.**

21 It shall be the policy of the United States to imme-
22 diately formulate and implement a plan that—
23 (1) with the Government of Iraq—

1 (A) removes militia elements from the
2 Iraqi Army, National Police, and other security
3 forces of the Government of Iraq; and

6 (2) focuses and intensifies United States efforts
7 on training such forces; and

12 SEC. 6. AVAILABILITY OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR
13 IRAQ.

14 (a) LIMITATION.—Except as provided in subsection
15 (b), after May 1, 2007, economic assistance may be fur-
16 nished to the Government of Iraq only if the President
17 submits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and
18 the Speaker of the House of Representatives a certifi-
19 cation that the Government of Iraq—

20 (1) is making measurable progress toward pro-
21 viding not less than \$10,000,000,000 of Iraqi funds
22 for reconstruction, job creation, and economic devel-
23 opment in Iraq, with safeguards to prevent corrup-
24 tion, by January 10, 2008;

5 (3) is making progress toward reducing sec-
6 tarian violence and promoting national reconcili-
7 ation.

8 (b) EXCEPTIONS.—The limitation in subsection (a)
9 shall not apply to assistance for Iraq as follows:

10 (1) Humanitarian assistance.

13 (c) ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS.—Not later than 90
14 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every
15 90 days thereafter, the Special Inspector General for Iraq
16 Reconstruction shall submit to Congress a report describ-
17 ing the progress of the Government of Iraq on each matter
18 set forth in subsection (a).

19 SEC. 7. REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES ON IRAQ.

(a) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.—It shall be the policy of the United States to undertake comprehensive regional and international initiatives, involving key nations, that will assist the Government of Iraq in achieving the purposes of this Act, including promoting a political settlement among the Iraqi people, ending the civil war

1 in Iraq, preventing a humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq,
2 and preventing a regional conflict.

3 (b) SPECIAL ENVOY.—The President should, not
4 later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this
5 Act, appoint a special envoy for Iraq to carry out the pol-
6 icy set forth in subsection (a).

7 (c) STRATEGY ON PREVENTING WIDER REGIONAL
8 WAR.—

9 (1) STRATEGY.—Not later than 90 days after
10 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
11 shall submit to the President pro tempore of the
12 Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representa-
13 tives a report setting forth a strategy for preventing
14 the conflict in Iraq from becoming a wider regional
15 war.

16 (2) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1)
17 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in-
18 clude a classified annex.

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