

110TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 744

To enhance congressional oversight of Operation Iraqi Freedom by requiring the President to transmit periodically to Congress a consolidated, comprehensive report to detail the terms of completion for Operation Iraqi Freedom and by requiring the President to seek to enter into a multilateral agreement to help provide for the completion of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 31, 2007

Ms. BORDALLO introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To enhance congressional oversight of Operation Iraqi Freedom by requiring the President to transmit periodically to Congress a consolidated, comprehensive report to detail the terms of completion for Operation Iraqi Freedom and by requiring the President to seek to enter into a multilateral agreement to help provide for the completion of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Iraq Policy Revitaliza-
3 tion and Congressional Oversight Enhancement Act”.

4 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

5 Congress finds the following:

6 (1) On October 31, 1998, the Iraq Liberation
7 Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–338) was enacted into
8 law.

9 (2) On October 16, 2002, the Authorization for
10 Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of
11 2002 (Public Law 107–243) was enacted into law.

12 (3) On March 19, 2003, the President, pursu-
13 ant to the authorities provided to the President by
14 Public Law 107–243, committed United States
15 Armed Forces to combat operations in Iraq.

16 (4) On April 9, 2003, Saddam Hussein’s
17 Ba’athist regime fell to Coalition Forces.

18 (5) On April 16, 2003, the Emergency Wartime
19 Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law
20 108–11) was enacted into law, which included
21 \$2,500,000,000 for the relief and reconstruction of
22 Iraq.

23 (6) On May 12, 2003, the Coalition Provisional
24 Authority (CPA) subsumed the Organization for Re-
25 construction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA),
26 and citing United Nations Security Council Resolu-

1 tion 1483 (2003) and the laws of war, vested itself
2 with executive, legislative, and judicial authority over
3 the Iraqi government until such time as the Iraqi
4 government gained its sovereignty.

5 (7) On November 6, 2003, the Emergency Sup-
6 plemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for
7 the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004
8 (Public Law 108–106) was enacted into law, which
9 included an additional \$18,400,000,000 for the relief
10 and reconstruction of Iraq.

11 (8) On June 8, 2004, the United Nations Secu-
12 rity Council adopted Resolution 1546 (2004), en-
13 dorsing the transition of sovereignty from the Coal-
14 ition Provisional Authority to the Interim Govern-
15 ment of Iraq, reaffirming the responsibilities of the
16 interim government, and detailing the duration and
17 legal status of Coalition Forces in Iraq, as well as
18 authorizing a Coalition component force to protect
19 United Nations personnel and facilities.

20 (9) On June 28, 2004, the new Iraqi govern-
21 ment gained its sovereignty.

22 (10) On January 30, 2005, the Iraqi people
23 successfully elected their first interim National As-
24 sembly, and 18 provincial and various local govern-
25 ment councils.

1 (11) On March 16, 2005, the 275-member in-
2 terim Iraqi National Assembly convened to appoint
3 an interim national government and to begin the
4 drafting of a constitution.

5 (12) On September 18, 2005, the interim Iraqi
6 National Assembly completed negotiations on the
7 draft constitution.

11 (14) On November 8, 2005, the United Nations
12 Security Council adopted Resolution 1637 (2005),
13 extending the Coalition Forces' military mandate,
14 pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolu-
15 tion 1546 (2004), in Iraq to December 31, 2006.

16 (15) On November 18, 2005, the House of Rep-
17 resentatives failed to agree to H. Res. 571, express-
18 ing the sense of the House of Representatives that
19 the deployment of United States forces in Iraq be
20 terminated immediately, by a vote of 3 to 403, with
21 six members voting present.

22 (16) On November 30, 2005, the President,
23 through the National Security Council, issued the
24 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.

5 (18) On March 16, 2006, the newly-elected Na-
6 tional Assembly convened for their first session.

12 (20) On June 7, 2006, Iraq's National Assem-
13 bly approved the individuals that the Iraqi Prime
14 Minister nominated for Minister of Defense, Min-
15 ister of Interior, and National Security Advisor,
16 completing the formation of Iraq's first permanent
17 democratic government.

1 States Agency for International Development, De-
2 partment of Justice, Department of Agriculture,
3 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and contract per-
4 sonnel.

5 (22) On June 16, 2006, the House of Rep-
6 resentatives agreed to H. Res. 861, declaring that
7 the United States will prevail in the Global War on
8 Terror, the struggle to protect freedom from the ter-
9 rorist adversary, by a vote of 256 to 153, with five
10 members voting present.

11 (23) On June 25, 2006, the Iraqi Prime Min-
12 ister released a 24-point plan for national reconcili-
13 ation.

14 (24) The Iraq Study Group was formed at the
15 urging of Congress, and the Emergency Supple-
16 mental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global
17 War On Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006
18 (Public Law 109–234), provided \$1,000,000 for Iraq
19 Study Group operations.

20 (25) Members of the Iraq Study Group were
21 appointed in March 2006 and were responsible for
22 providing a forward-looking, independent assessment
23 of the strategic environment in and around Iraq, the
24 security of Iraq and key challenges to enhancing se-
25 curity within the country, political developments

1 within Iraq following the elections and formation of
2 the new government, the economy and reconstruction,
3 and how the situation in Iraq affects the surrounding region as well as United States interests.

5 (26) On July 27, 2006, the Government of Iraq
6 and the United Nations, with the support of the
7 World Bank, announced the formal launch of a five-
8 year international compact with Iraq that, with the
9 participation of other multilateral organizations and
10 countries, including the United States, aims—

11 (A) to achieve a national vision for Iraq as
12 a united, federal, and democratic country;

13 (B) to consolidate peace and pursue political,
14 economic, and social development within
15 Iraq, including enhancing political inclusion and
16 consensus-building among its various demographic groups;

17 (C) to establish professional security forces
18 to serve the Iraqi people;

19 (D) to combat corruption within Iraq;

20 (E) to create a transparent and efficient
21 oil sector within Iraq;

22 (F) to develop a solid budgetary framework
23 for the Government of Iraq; and

1 (G) to improve governance by building and
2 consolidating effective national institutions for
3 Iraq.

4 (27) On December 6, 2006, the Iraq Study
5 Group released its report titled, "The Iraq Study
6 Group Report".

7 (28) On December 30, 2006, Saddam Hussein
8 was executed by the Government of Iraq.

12 SEC. 3. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

13 Congress makes the following statements of policy:

14 (1) Congress recognizes that Operation Iraqi
15 Freedom, the deteriorating situation within Iraq,
16 and the situation in the Middle East region in gen-
17 eral have become a significant test of, and strain on,
18 United States military, diplomatic, and financial ca-
19 pacities, and United States national interests and
20 prestige.

1 vilian personnel in Iraq and by personnel serving
2 world-wide in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

3 (3) Congress remains supportive of and inspired
4 by the service and sacrifice made by and dedication
5 and commitment to the establishment of a demo-
6 cratic, stable, and prosperous Iraq displayed by the
7 military and civilian personnel of Coalition countries
8 serving in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and
9 by Iraqi patriots working toward a better future for
10 their country and the children of Iraq.

11 (4) Congress recognizes the achievements to
12 date made by the United States Armed Forces, Coa-
13 lition Forces, Iraqi Security Forces, and civilian per-
14 sonnel toward the political, security, infrastructure,
15 and economic development of and governance capac-
16 ity development at and between the various levels of
17 government in Iraq.

18 (5) Congress recognizes the efforts on the part
19 of the United States, Coalition countries, and the
20 Government of Iraq toward the establishment and
21 maintenance of stable, peaceful, productive, and con-
22 ciliatory relations between Iraq and its neighboring
23 states, regional states, and the international commu-
24 nity.

7 (7) Congress recognizes that, in order to aid the
8 efforts of civilian, United States Armed Forces, and
9 Coalition Forces personnel to establish a democratic,
10 stable, and prosperous Iraq and to address the com-
11 plex and interdependent nature of the challenges as-
12 sociated with the political, security, infrastructure,
13 and economic development of and governance capac-
14 ity building at and between the various levels of gov-
15 ernment in Iraq, the civil-military Provincial Recon-
16 struction Teams were established in the various
17 provinces in Iraq to be the primary interface be-
18 tween United States and Coalition countries and
19 provincial governments throughout Iraq to assist
20 local Iraqi governing institutions, such as the provin-
21 cial councils, provincial governors, and local national
22 ministry representatives—

23 (A) to develop a transparent and sustained
24 capability to govern at the provincial level of
25 government in Iraq;

(B) to promote increased security and rule of law within Iraq's provinces;

3 (C) to promote political and economic de-
4 velopment at the provincial level of government
5 in Iraq; and

6 (D) to provide provincial-level government
7 and governance administration assistance nec-
8 essary to help meet the basic needs of a par-
9 ticular province.

10 (8) Congress supports the establishment and
11 maintenance of a democratic, pluralistic, federal,
12 and united Government of Iraq.

20 (10) Congress urges elected Iraqis to renew
21 their commitment to establishing, preserving, and
22 strengthening a national unity government for Iraq
23 and to govern in accordance with the principles of
24 a national unity government for Iraq.

1 (11) Congress is gravely concerned by the pros-
2 pect that the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq
3 may desire to declare independence from Iraq.

4 (12) Congress is gravely concerned that, as a
5 result of any declaration of independence from Iraq
6 made by the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq
7 (or any future regional government in Iraq), certain
8 neighboring states may react to such a declaration
9 of independence with military force against Iraq.

19 (14) Congress recognizes the importance that
20 implementing, in an unbiased, uniform, and equi-
21 table manner, the provisions contained in Article
22 140 of the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq has
23 toward the establishment and maintenance of—

24 (A) peace and reconciliation in Iraq;

(B) stable, peaceful, productive, and conciliatory relations between Iraq and certain neighboring states; and

4 (C) a stable and united Iraq.

20 (16) Congress is gravely concerned that contin-
21 ued violence in Iraq could, or the division of Iraq
22 along notional ethnic, religious, or sectarian lines
23 would, result in the heightened ethnic, religious, and
24 sectarian violence within that country, to include

1 incidences of ethnic-cleansing, and result in the fur-
2 ther destabilization of the Government of Iraq.

3 (17) Congress is gravely concerned by the possi-
4 bility that a divided or failed Iraqi state could form
5 the keystone of a geo-political bridge across the Mid-
6 dle East region, from which a heightened incidence
7 of acts of violence or acts of intimidation against al-
8 lies of the United States in the region can be con-
9 ducted, or otherwise financially or materially sup-
10 ported, by certain states within the region, violent
11 transnational entities, or partnerships between cer-
12 tain states within the region and violent
13 transnational entities.

14 (18) Congress is gravely concerned by the po-
15 tential detrimental impacts a geo-political bridge
16 formed by a failed or divided Iraqi state would have
17 across the Middle East region if such a bridge is ex-
18 ploited by certain states within the region, violent
19 transnational entities, or partnerships of certain
20 states within the region and violent transnational en-
21 tities, as evidenced by reports that indicate that
22 members of Jaish al-Mahdi trained with members of
23 Hezbollah in Lebanon and fought together against
24 Israeli Defense Forces in July and August 2006.

9 (A) disrupting the unimpeded access to
10 hydro-carbon resources essential to the func-
11 tioning of modern economies globally; and

12 (B) disrupting the unimpeded access to the
13 strategic lines of communication in the region
14 across and along which international commer-
15 cial activity is conducted.

16 (20) Congress is gravely concerned that a failed
17 or divided Iraq could provide a stronger base of op-
18 erations for terrorists who seek to act regionally or
19 internationally.

20 (21) Congress is concerned about the fractured
21 and factional domestic political environment present
22 today at and between the various levels of govern-
23 ment in Iraq.

24 (22) Congress finds that the fractured and fac-
25 tional domestic political environment present in Iraq

1 is the result, in part, of the conflicting policies, pri-
2 orities, and biases of the various prominent ethnic,
3 religious, and sectarian-oriented political parties and
4 elected and appointed leaders at and between the
5 various levels of government in Iraq.

6 (23) Congress is concerned that the develop-
7 ment of alternative, moderate political parties and
8 leaders in Iraq, that can represent broadly the inter-
9 ests of Iraqis from multiple demographic groups and
10 govern according to that broad perspective, is im-
11 peded by the dominant influences of the various eth-
12 nic, religious, and sectarian-oriented political parties
13 active in Iraq today.

14 (24) Congress affirms that the fractured and
15 factional domestic political environment present
16 today at and between the various levels of govern-
17 ment in Iraq—

18 (A) contributes to incidences of violence
19 against United States Armed Forces, Coalition
20 Forces, and Iraqi Security Forces;

21 (B) creates a significant political barrier to
22 the establishment and maintenance of peace
23 and reconciliation in Iraq, that is necessary for
24 the establishment and maintenance of a stable
25 and united Iraq; and

1 (C) impedes the completion of Operation
2 Iraqi Freedom.

10 (26) Congress is concerned by reports that indi-
11 cate that government offices, the national ministries
12 systems, and independent agencies are unable or un-
13 willing to resist dominance by, and are divided be-
14 tween, beholden to, and guided by the conflicting
15 priorities, policies, and biases of, the various promi-
16 nent ethnic, religious, or sectarian political parties in
17 Iraq.

18 (27) Congress is particularly concerned by re-
19 ports that indicate that elected and appointed Iraqi
20 Government officials, acting upon direction from,
21 and to benefit and promote, the various prominent
22 ethnic, religious, or sectarian political parties and af-
23 filiated entities in Iraq—

24 (A) may abuse the budget authority of the
25 various offices, ministries, and agencies, to in-

1 clude the direction of public funds to certain
2 political parties or certain individuals;

3 (B) may abuse personnel hiring practices
4 of the various offices, ministries, and agencies;
5 and

6 (C) may abuse the contracting practices of
7 the various offices, ministries, and agencies.

8 (28) Congress recognizes that the inability or
9 unwillingness of elected and appointed officials within
10 the various levels of government in Iraq to deliver
11 public sector goods and services to all Iraqis in a unbiased, uniform, and equitable manner—

13 (A) contributes to incidences of violence
14 against United States Armed Forces, Coalition
15 Forces, and Iraqi Security Forces;

16 (B) creates a significant political barrier to
17 the establishment and maintenance of peace
18 and reconciliation in Iraq, that is necessary for
19 the establishment and maintenance of a stable
20 and united Iraq; and

21 (C) impedes the completion of Operation
22 Iraqi Freedom.

23 (29) Congress is deeply concerned about the
24 continued and heightened incidence of violence and
25 threats of violence against United States Armed

1 Forces, Coalition Forces, Iraqi Security Forces, ci-
2 vilian personnel, and Iraqi civilians in Iraq.

3 (30) Congress is gravely concerned about the
4 increase in ethnic, religious, and sectarian violence
5 in Iraq following the February 22, 2006, bombing of
6 the Askariya mosque in Samarra, Iraq, and about
7 continued ethnic, religious, and sectarian tensions
8 across Iraq.

9 (31) Congress is gravely concerned about the
10 increasing power that unauthorized politically-
11 aligned militias wield in Iraq, their destabilizing ef-
12 fect on security in Iraq, and the challenges they
13 present to the development of professional Iraqi Se-
14 curity Forces.

15 (32) Congress is gravely concerned that the
16 various prominent ethnic, religious, and sectarian
17 political parties active in Iraq today, through unau-
18 thorized, politically-aligned militias, suborned or
19 sympathetic elements of Iraqi Security Forces, and
20 suborned or sympathetic vigilante or criminal
21 groups, fight for the control and dominance of the
22 various levels of government in Iraq and aim to, and
23 with the effect of, separate governorates, cities, and
24 neighborhoods along ethnic, religious, and sectarian
25 lines.

14 (34) Congress is concerned that the continued
15 and further violent, internal separation of Iraqi soci-
16 ety, pursued and effected by the various prominent
17 ethnic, religious, and sectarian political parties abets
18 and strengthens the extremist elements of each
19 party and destabilizes the security situation country-
20 wide.

21 (35) Congress considers that the various prominent ethnic, religious, and sectarian political parties
22 in Iraq are complicit in the operations of the various
23 politically-aligned militias operating in Iraq today,
24 and that the political parties have the power and in-

fluence necessary to, and the responsibility to, disarm, disband, and reintegrate such militias into Iraqi society.

4 (36) Congress recognizes the importance that
5 establishing a political and governance compromise
6 and reconciliation between the various prominent
7 ethnic, religious, and sectarian political parties ac-
8 tive in Iraq has toward—

12 (B) the effective administration of certain
13 national security oriented offices and ministries
14 systems; and

15 (C) the defeat of foreign terrorist organiza-
16 tions operating in Iraq.

17 (37) Congress is gravely concerned that the un-
18 even state of readiness, capability, and willingness of
19 Iraqi Security Forces, led by the national security
20 oriented offices and ministries systems, to provide
21 internal security for Iraq in an unbiased, uniform,
22 and equitable manner may require United States
23 Armed Forces and Coalition Forces personnel to re-
24 main in Iraq for an extended period of time to pro-
25 vide both extensive internal security training and as-

1 sistance and the minimum of unbiased internal secu-
2 rity within that country.

3 (38) Congress is gravely concerned that a pro-
4 longed commitment of United States Armed Forces
5 to Iraq may adversely affect the overall readiness of
6 United States Armed Forces and hamper its ability
7 to provide adequate resources to United States ef-
8 forts in Afghanistan and its ability to adequately re-
9 spond to other contingencies around the world.

10 (39) Congress affirms that the absence of a
11 lasting and meaningful political compromise reached
12 between the various prominent ethnic, religious, and
13 sectarian political parties in Iraq and the uneven
14 state of readiness, capability, and willingness of
15 Iraqi Security Forces, led by the national security
16 oriented offices and ministries systems, to provide
17 internal security services in Iraq in a unbiased, uni-
18 form, and equitable manner across that country—

19 (A) contributes to incidences of violence
20 against United States Armed Forces, Coalition
21 Forces, and Iraqi Security Forces;

22 (B) creates a significant political barrier to
23 the establishment and maintenance of peace
24 and reconciliation in Iraq, that is necessary for

1 the establishment and maintenance of a stable
2 and united Iraq; and

3 (C) impedes the completion of Operation
4 Iraqi Freedom.

5 (40) Congress recognizes reported macro-
6 economic improvement of Iraq's economy, but re-
7 mains gravely concerned by reports noting the prev-
8 alence of corruption in Iraq, the uneven distribution
9 of income, and high unemployment rates at and be-
10 tween the various levels of government in Iraq.

11 (41) Congress is gravely concerned by reports
12 that indicate that the various prominent ethnic, reli-
13 gious, and sectarian-oriented political parties active
14 in Iraq exercise significant control of Iraq's national
15 revenues and expenditures to benefit and promote
16 the conflicting priorities, policies, and biases of such
17 political parties.

18 (42) Congress is gravely concerned that the sig-
19 nificant control of Iraq's national revenues and ex-
20 penditures exercised by the various prominent eth-
21 nic, religious, and sectarian-oriented political parties
22 active in Iraq impedes general economic development
23 at and between the various levels of government in
24 Iraq, limits economic opportunities for the Iraqi peo-

1 ple, and forces Iraqis into increasingly apparent eth-
2 nic, religious, and sectarian divisions.

13 (44) Congress notes that the majority of United
14 States economic and infrastructure development as-
15 sistance for Iraq has been expended and has pro-
16 duced uneven economic results countrywide and an
17 uneven ability for the Government of Iraq to operate
18 and maintain both existing and newly constructed or
19 refurbished infrastructure.

20 (45) Congress further notes reports that indicate that the Government of Iraq requires significant and sustained, but not necessarily United States Government provided, economic development and infrastructure in order to achieve vital economic and infrastructure development.

1 (46) Congress urges the Government of Iraq to
2 pursue, in an unbiased, uniform, and equitable man-
3 ner, policies to promote the development of—

4 (A) a market-based economy in Iraq that
5 increases private-sector employment opportuni-
6 ties for Iraqi workers;

7 (B) private-sector investment opportunities
8 for domestic and international investors; and

9 (C) a government budget process that re-
10 flects an appropriate level of investment in the
11 development of and the continued operations
12 and maintenance for Iraq's national infrastruc-
13 ture and that provides for the delivery of public
14 goods and services to all Iraqis in a unbiased,
15 uniform, and equitable manner.

16 (47) Congress is gravely concerned that im-
17 peded general economic development in Iraq, limited
18 economic opportunities for the Iraqi people, and in-
19 creasingly apparent ethnic, religious, and sectarian
20 economic divisions within Iraq abets and strengthens
21 the extremist elements of each party and destabilizes
22 the security situation countrywide and—

23 (A) contributes to incidences of violence
24 against United States Armed Forces, Coalition
25 Forces, and Iraqi Security Forces;

1 (B) creates a significant political barrier to
2 the establishment and maintenance of peace
3 and reconciliation in Iraq, that is necessary for
4 the establishment and maintenance of a stable
5 and united Iraq; and

6 (C) impedes the completion of Operation
7 Iraqi Freedom.

8 (48) Congress recognizes the influence pos-
9 sessed by the governments of Iraq's neighboring
10 states, regional states, states among the inter-
11 national community, and regional and international
12 multilateral organizations, toward facilitating the es-
13 tablishment and maintenance of stable, peaceful,
14 productive, and conciliatory relations between Iraq
15 and its neighboring states, regional states, and the
16 international community as a whole.

14 (51) Congress notes the recent formation of the
15 International Compact for Iraq between the Govern-
16 ment of Iraq and the United Nations, with the sup-
17 port of the World Bank, and in which the United
18 States and Coalition countries participate, as evi-
19 dence of the need and importance of regionalizing
20 and internationalizing solutions for Iraq's continued
21 political, security, infrastructure, and economic de-
22 velopment of and governance capacity building at
23 and between the various levels of government in
24 Iraq.

(52) Congress notes that the vital measures and other benchmarks identified by the President as necessary and possible to achieve in order to complete Operation Iraqi Freedom pursuant to the reporting requirements of section 4 of this Act would establish a strong foundation for a multilateral agreement with Coalition countries, the Republic of Iraq, appropriate states in the Middle East region, and appropriate multilateral organizations to help establish and maintain stable, peaceful, productive, and conciliatory relations between Iraq and its neighboring states, regional states, and the international community as a whole and to help establish peace, reconciliation in, and to assure the stability of and unity of, Iraq.

16 (53) Congress finds that a prolonged absence of
17 a multilateral agreement with Coalition countries,
18 the Republic of Iraq, appropriate states in the Mid-
19 dle East region, and appropriate multilateral organi-
20 zations based on the vital measures and other bench-
21 marks identified by the President as necessary and
22 possible to achieve in order to complete Operation
23 Iraqi Freedom and pursuant to the findings of the
24 report required by section 4 of this Act and subject
25 to adjustment or other amendment, as provided for

1 by subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 4(b)(2) of
2 this Act—

3 (A) contributes to incidences of violence
4 against United States Armed Forces, Coalition
5 Forces, and Iraqi Security Forces;

6 (B) creates a significant political barrier to
7 the establishment and maintenance of peace
8 and reconciliation in Iraq, that is necessary for
9 the establishment and maintenance of a stable
10 and united Iraq; and

11 (C) impedes the completion of Operation
12 Iraqi Freedom.

13 (54) Congress is concerned that the United
14 States and Coalition countries will not be able to
15 achieve their goals of the establishment of a demo-
16 cratic, pluralistic, federal, and united Government of
17 Iraq that can provide security, good governance, and
18 improved economic opportunity for the people of
19 Iraq and maintain peaceful, productive, and concilia-
20 tory relations with neighboring states, regional
21 states, states among the international community,
22 and regional and international multilateral organiza-
23 tions without the United States and other countries
24 simultaneously working toward solving certain long-

1 standing and ongoing conflicts elsewhere in the Mid-
2 dle East region.

3 (55) Congress declares that the National Strat-
4 egy for Victory in Iraq as transmitted by the Presi-
5 dent to Congress on November 30, 2005, is not spe-
6 cific regarding the vital measures and other bench-
7 marks in Iraq's political, security, infrastructure,
8 and economic development and governance capacity
9 development at and between the various levels of
10 government in Iraq that need to be met to signal to
11 Congress and the American people that victory in
12 Iraq has been achieved and the majority of United
13 States Armed Forces currently deployed in Oper-
14 ation Iraqi Freedom can be redeployed to their
15 peacetime duty stations.

16 (56) Congress declares that the plan entitled
17 "The New Way Forward in Iraq", as presented to
18 the American people by the President on January
19 10, 2007, is not specific regarding the vital meas-
20 ures and other benchmarks in Iraq's political, secu-
21 rity, infrastructure, and economic development and
22 governance capacity development at and between the
23 various levels of government in Iraq that need to be
24 met to signal to Congress and the American people
25 that victory in Iraq has been achieved and the ma-

1 jority of the United States Armed Forces currently
2 deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom can be rede-
3 ployed to their peacetime duty stations.

4 (57) Congress notes the findings of the reports
5 submitted to Congress pursuant to the section enti-
6 tled “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq” of
7 the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee
8 of Conference accompanying Conference Report
9 109–72 of the bill, H.R. 1268 (the Emergency Sup-
10 plemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Glob-
11 al War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005; Public
12 Law 109–13), that identify security, economic, and
13 Iraqi Security Force training performance standards
14 and goals, accompanied by a notional timetable for
15 achieving these goals.

16 (58) Congress notes the findings of the report
17 submitted to Congress pursuant to the United
18 States Policy in Iraq Act (section 1227 of the Na-
19 tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
20 2006; Public Law 109–163), that identify the cur-
21 rent military mission and the diplomatic, political,
22 economic, and military measures that are being or
23 have been undertaken to successfully complete or
24 support that mission.

14 (60) Congress is concerned that the findings of
15 the reports described in paragraphs (57), (58), and
16 (59) do not provide sufficient content, information,
17 data, and analysis for Congress to comprehensively
18 evaluate the mission in Iraq.

19 (61) Congress notes the advantages of consolidating the reports described in paragraphs (57),
20 (58), and (59) into a single report to be transmitted
21 to Congress pursuant to section 4 of this Act.
22

23 (62) Congress urges that the reports trans-
24 mitted pursuant to section 4 of this Act be orga-
25 nized and written to provide content, information,

1 data, and analysis on the mission in Iraq as it per-
2 tains to the political, security, infrastructure, and
3 economic development of and governance capacity
4 building at and between the various levels of govern-
5 ment in Iraq.

6 (63) Congress further urges that the reports
7 transmitted pursuant to section 4 of this Act be or-
8 ganized and written to provide content, information,
9 data, and analysis on United States and Coalition
10 countries efforts to establish maintain, stabilize, and
11 conciliate relations between Iraq, neighboring states,
12 regional states, and the international community.

13 (64) Congress moreover urges that, if the Presi-
14 dent decides not to adopt and implement some or all
15 of the recommendations offered by the Iraq Study
16 Group in the Group's report, the reports transmitted
17 pursuant to section 4 of this Act should include con-
18 tent, information, data, and analysis to explain and
19 justify the rationale as to why such recomme-
20 dations were not adopted and implemented.

21 (65) It is the duty of Congress under Article I,
22 Section 8 of the United States Constitution to "raise
23 and support Armies," and that by requiring the
24 President to report to Congress on Operation Iraqi

1 Freedom, Congress is better able to carry out this
2 constitutional duty.

3 (66) Congress declares that satisfactory compli-
4 ance with the letter and spirit of the reports re-
5 quired to be transmitted pursuant to section 4 of
6 this Act, and compliance with the intended quality
7 of such reports, will provide Congress and the Amer-
8 ican people a firm basis for which to consider and
9 evaluate the utility of continuing current, or pro-
10 viding for future, economic, reconstruction, and
11 other assistance to, or for the benefit of, the Govern-
12 ment of Iraq.

13 **SEC. 4. REPORT.**

14 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date
15 of the enactment of this Act, the President shall, in ac-
16 cordance with, in support of, and to more clearly define
17 the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and the plan
18 entitled “The New Way Forward in Iraq”, transmit to
19 Congress a report that—

20 (1) consolidates the findings of the reports re-
21 quired by—

22 (A) the section entitled “Measuring Sta-
23 bility and Security in Iraq” of the Joint Ex-
24 planatory Statement of the Committee of Con-
25 ference accompanying Conference Report 109—

1 72 of the bill, H.R. 1268 (the Emergency Sup-
2 plemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the
3 Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief,
4 2005; Public Law 109-13);

5 (B) the United States Policy in Iraq Act
6 (section 1227 of the National Defense Author-
7 ization Act for Fiscal Year 2006; Public Law
8 109–163); and

9 (C) section 9010 of the Department of De-
10 fense Appropriations Act, 2007 (division A of
11 Public Law 109-289);

12 (2) identifies the specific or vital measures or
13 other benchmarks that define the terms of the of
14 completion of and conditions for victory for Oper-
15 ation Iraqi Freedom and their correlation with the
16 strategic objectives and lines of action outlined in
17 the appendix of the National Strategy for Victory in
18 Iraq and the information provided in the plan enti-
19 titled “The New Way Forward in Iraq”;

20 (3) describes the nature and substance of the
21 programs implemented to achieve such strategic ob-
22 jectives and lines of action; and

23 (4) analyzes using metrics the effectiveness of
24 such programs toward achieving the specific vital

1 measures or other benchmarks required to be identi-
2 fied by paragraph (2).

3 (b) UPDATE.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall transmit
5 to Congress an update of the report required by sub-
6 section (a) not less than once every 90 days after
7 the date on which the President transmits the report
8 required by such subsection until such time as Oper-
9 ation Iraqi Freedom has been completed.

10 (2) CONTENTS.—Each update of the report—

11 (A) may reflect adjustments to the specific
12 or vital measures or other benchmarks identi-
13 fied pursuant to subsection (a)(2), or to the na-
14 ture or substance of the programs described in
15 subsection (a)(3), as realties, circumstances,
16 and events in Iraq change or evolve;

17 (B) shall include detailed justifications as
18 to why adjustments to such specific or vital
19 measures or other benchmarks, or to the nature
20 or substance of such programs, were made; and

21 (C) shall include detailed information re-
22 garding the progress toward implementing the
23 multilateral agreement required by section 5 of
24 this Act.

1 (c) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS.—The report re-
2 quired by subsection (a) and updates of the report re-
3 quired by subsection (b)—

4 (1) shall be organized and written to provide
5 content, information, data, and analysis on the com-
6 plex interdependent nature of the challenges associ-
7 ated with the political, security, infrastructure, and
8 economic development of and governance capacity
9 building at and between the various levels of govern-
10 ment in Iraq, and to include efforts on the part of
11 the United States and Coalition countries to estab-
12 lish, maintain, stabilize, and conciliate relations be-
13 tween Iraq, neighboring states, regional states, and
14 the international community;

15 (2) shall be accompanied by a comprehensive
16 all-source intelligence analysis of Iraq that includes
17 information by and from the various levels of gov-
18 ernment in Iraq, and to include efforts on the part
19 of the United States and Coalition countries to es-
20 tablish, maintain, stabilize, and conciliate relations
21 between Iraq, neighboring states, regional states,
22 and the international community;

23 (3) shall be accompanied by an analysis of the
24 extent to which the process called for by the provi-
25 sions of Article 140 of the Constitution of the Re-

1 public of Iraq can be implemented by the Govern-
2 ment of Iraq in an unbiased, uniform, and equitable
3 manner during calendar year 2007, to include a de-
4 scription of, and justification for, actions needed to
5 be taken by the United States, Coalition countries,
6 the Government of Iraq, the Kurdish Regional Gov-
7 ernment in Iraq, and the provincial government of
8 Kirkuk, neighboring and regional governments, and
9 the international community to ensure that such
10 process proceeds in a unbiased, uniform, and equi-
11 table manner during calendar year 2007 or during
12 future years; and

13 (4) shall, if the President decides not to adopt
14 and implement some or all of the recommendations
15 offered by the Iraq Study Group in the Group's re-
16 port, include content, data, information, and anal-
17 ysis to explain and justify the rationale as to why
18 such recommendations were not adopted and imple-
19 mented.

20 (d) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)
21 and updates of the report required by subsection (b) shall
22 be transmitted in unclassified form but may contain a
23 classified annex.

1 **SEC. 5. MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT TO HELP PROVIDE**
2 **FOR THE COMPLETION OF OPERATION IRAQI**
3 **FREEDOM.**

4 (a) MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT.—Not later than 45
5 days after the date on which the report required by section
6 4(a) of this Act is transmitted to Congress pursuant to
7 such section, the President shall seek to enter into a multi-
8 lateral agreement with Coalition countries, the Republic
9 of Iraq, appropriate states in the Middle East region, and
10 appropriate multilateral organizations to help provide for
11 the completion of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

12 (b) TERMS.—It is the sense of Congress that, to the
13 maximum extent practicable, the terms of the multilateral
14 agreement referred to in subsection (a) should—

15 (1) be based upon the findings of the report re-
16 quired by section 4 of this Act; and
17 (2) be subject to adjustment or other amend-
18 ment, as provided for by subparagraphs (A) and (B)
19 of section 4(b)(2) of this Act, if appropriate and
20 agreed to by the signatory parties.

21 **SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.**

22 In this Act:

23 (1) COALITION COUNTRIES.—The term “Coali-
24 tion countries” means those countries identified by
25 the Department of State and Department of Defense
26 as contributing military forces, materiel, diplomatic

1 support, and economic, technical, and training as-
2 sistance to the Government of Iraq in support of Op-
3 eration Iraqi Freedom.

4 (2) COALITION FORCES.—The term “Coalition
5 Forces” means the military forces of Coalition coun-
6 tries operating in support of Operation Iraqi Free-
7 dom.

8 (3) UNBIASED, UNIFORM, AND EQUITABLE
9 MANNER.—The term “unbiased, uniform, and equi-
10 table manner” means without regard to religion,
11 race, ethnic identity, gender, age, or geographic loca-
12 tion.

13 (4) VARIOUS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT IN
14 IRAQ.—The term “various levels of government in
15 Iraq” means the national, capital city, regional, pro-
16 vincial, provincial capital city, and strategic munic-
17 ipal levels of government in Iraq.

18 (5) VIOLENT TRANSNATIONAL ENTITY.—The
19 term “violent transnational entity” means a global,
20 regional, or local entity that threatens the national
21 security of the United States by acts or threats of
22 violence, terrorism, illicit trafficking of arms (to in-
23 clude nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and
24 technology), piracy, or international organized crime
25 (to include financial transactions, the smuggling of

1 narcotics or persons, uncontrolled refugee migration,
2 and environmental damage conducted across inter-
3 national borders).

○