

110TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 3134

To prohibit the use of funds for training and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 23, 2007

Ms. WATERS (for herself, Ms. LEE, and Ms. WOOLSEY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To prohibit the use of funds for training and equipping
the Iraqi Security Forces.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Responsible Security
5 in Iraq Act”.

1 **SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR TRAINING**
2 **AND EQUIPPING THE IRAQI SECURITY**
3 **FORCES.**

4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
5 ings:

6 (1) Over the past 4 years, the United States
7 has invested more than \$19,000,000,000 in the or-
8 ganization, training, and equipping of 346,500 per-
9 sonnel of the Iraqi Security Forces.

10 (2) As of October 28, 2006, \$133,000,000 of
11 the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund has been
12 used to purchase more than 370,000 weapons for
13 personnel of the Iraqi Security Forces.

14 (3) According to the Special Inspector General
15 for Iraq Reconstruction, only about 10,000 of the
16 370,000 small arms delivered to Iraq through
17 United States assistance programs have had their
18 serial numbers recorded.

19 (4) Despite making significant progress in gen-
20 erating a sizeable national security force, the Iraqi
21 Security Forces have not developed as fast as Coali-
22 tion countries had planned and, as a result, the
23 Iraqi Security Forces are not yet ready to take re-
24 sponsibility for Iraq's security.

25 (5) As the number of personnel of the Iraqi Se-
26 curity Forces trained and equipped has increased,

1 the overall violence in Iraq has not diminished, and
2 the Iraqi Security Forces have not offset United
3 States manpower to allow United States Armed
4 Forces and other personnel in Iraq to be redeployed.

5 (6) Initial assumptions that the Iraqi Security
6 Forces could be reformed and prepared to defend
7 the Iraqi people from insurgents and warring fac-
8 tions were seriously flawed.

9 (7) Neither the Department of Defense nor the
10 Government of Iraq can determine how many of the
11 nearly 350,000 personnel of the Iraqi Security
12 Forces who have been trained by Coalition forces are
13 still serving in the Iraqi Security Forces and whether
14 such personnel have been properly vetted or
15 trained.

16 (8) Many elements of the Iraqi Security Forces
17 remain loyal to local sectarian and militia interests.

18 (9) Involvement by the Iraqi Security Forces in
19 extrajudicial killings and kidnappings throughout
20 Iraq has been widely reported.

21 (10) According to a recent poll, 51 percent of
22 Iraqis think attacks on United States Armed Forces
23 are acceptable.

4 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
5 gress that—

6 (1) without a strong central government to
7 which Iraqis are loyal, the United States is arming
8 different sides of a civil war in Iraq;

23 (c) PROHIBITION.—

24 (1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other
25 provision of law, no funds available to the Depart-

1 ment of Defense or any other department or agency
2 of the Government of the United States may be
3 used, directly or indirectly, to—

6 (B) sell or otherwise transfer arms to the
7 Iraqi Security Forces, unless such sale or trans-
8 fer of arms is specifically authorized by an Act
9 of Congress enacted after the date of the enact-
10 ment of this Act.

14 (d) IRAQI SECURITY FORCES DEFINED.—In this sec-
15 tion, the term “Iraqi Security Forces”—

16 (1) means all security and military personnel of
17 the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Inter-
18 rior, including the Iraqi Army, Special Forces, Navy,
19 Air Force, national and local police, and border se-
20 curity units; and

21 (2) includes any Iraqi militia, insurgent forces,
22 or local forces.

