

110TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# H. R. 2574

To implement the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group.

---

## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 5, 2007

Mr. UDALL of Colorado (for himself, Mr. WOLF, Mr. McCaul of Texas, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. ROSS, Mr. CASTLE, Mr. MOORE of Kansas, Mr. CULBERSON, Ms. HARMAN, Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia, Mr. SALAZAR, Mr. DENT, Mr. CUELLAR, Mr. EHLERS, Mr. ISRAEL, Mrs. EMERSON, Mr. SHULER, Mr. ENGLISH of Pennsylvania, Mr. FORTENBERRY, Mr. BOSWELL, Mr. FORTUÑO, Mr. LINCOLN DAVIS of Tennessee, Mr. GERRLACH, Mr. MATHESON, Mr. GILCHREST, Mr. HILL, Mr. HOBSON, Mr. BOUCHER, Mr. JONES of North Carolina, Mr. WU, Mr. KINGSTON, Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota, Mr. KUHL of New York, Mr. MAHONEY of Florida, Mr. REICHERT, Mr. MORAN of Virginia, Mr. REGULA, Mrs. BOYDA of Kansas, Mr. SHAYS, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. TIBERI, Mr. UPTON, Mr. WAMP, Mr. WHITFIELD, and Mr. WICKER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services, Financial Services, Judiciary, Budget, and Select Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

---

## A BILL

To implement the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group.

1       *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2       *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Iraq Study Group Rec-  
3 ommendations Implementation Act of 2007”.

4 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

5 Congress makes the following findings:

6 (1) On March 15, 2006, the Iraq Study Group  
7 was created at the request of a bipartisan group of  
8 members of Congress.

9 (2) The United States Institute of Peace was  
10 designated as the facilitating organization for the  
11 Iraq Study Group with the support of the Center for  
12 the Study of the Presidency, the Center for Stra-  
13 tegic and International Studies, and the James A.  
14 Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice Univer-  
15 sity.

16 (3) The Iraq Study Group was composed of a  
17 bipartisan group of senior individuals who have had  
18 distinguished careers in public service. The Group  
19 was co-chaired by former Secretary of State James  
20 A. Baker, III and former chairman of the House  
21 Foreign Affairs Committee Lee H. Hamilton, and  
22 the other members were former Secretary of State  
23 Lawrence S. Eagleburger; Vernon E. Jordan, Jr, the  
24 Senior Managing Director of Lazard, Freres and  
25 Company; former Attorney General Edwin Meese  
26 III; former Supreme Court Associate Justice Sandra

1 Day O'Connor; former White House Chief of Staff  
2 Leon E. Panetta; former Secretary of Defense Wil-  
3 liam J. Perry; United States Senator Charles S.  
4 Robb; and United States Senator Alan K. Simpson.

5 (4) On June 15, 2006, President George W.  
6 Bush signed into law the Emergency Supplemental  
7 Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on  
8 Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006 (Public Law  
9 109-234), which provided \$1,000,000 to the United  
10 States Institute of Peace for activities in support of  
11 the Iraq Study Group.

12 (5) The Iraq Study Group consulted nearly 200  
13 leading officials and experts, including the senior  
14 members of the Government of Iraq, the United  
15 States Government, and key coalition partners and  
16 received advice from more than 50 distinguished  
17 scholars and experts from a variety of fields who  
18 conducted working groups in the areas of economy  
19 and reconstruction, military and security, political  
20 development, and the strategic environment in Iraq  
21 and the Middle East.

22 (6) While the Iraq Study Group recommended  
23 shifting the primary mission of United States mili-  
24 tary forces in Iraq from combat to training, and  
25 while the Iraq Study Group described actions and

1       conditions that could allow for a redeployment of  
2       troops not necessary for force protection out of Iraq  
3       by the first quarter of 2008, the Iraq Study Group  
4       did not set a fixed timetable for withdrawal and said  
5       it could support a short-term redeployment of  
6       United States combat forces, complemented by com-  
7       prehensive political, economic, and diplomatic ef-  
8       forts, to stabilize Baghdad or to speed up the mis-  
9       sion of training and equipping Iraqis if the United  
10      States commander in Iraq determines that such  
11      steps would be effective.

12                   (7) The report of the Iraq Study Group in-  
13           cludes a letter from the co-chairs of the Iraq Study  
14           Group, James A. Baker, III and Lee H. Hamilton,  
15           which states, “Our political leaders must build a bi-  
16           partisan approach to bring a responsible conclusion  
17           to what is now a lengthy and costly war. Our coun-  
18           try deserves a debate that prizes substance over  
19           rhetoric, and a policy that is adequately funded and  
20           sustainable. The President and Congress must work  
21           together. Our leaders must be candid and forthright  
22           with the American people in order to win their sup-  
23           port.”

24                   (8) The Republicans and Democrats who com-  
25           prised the Iraq Study Group reached compromise

1 and consensus and unanimously concluded that their  
2 recommendations offer a new way forward for the  
3 United States in Iraq and the region, and are com-  
4 prehensive and need to be implemented in a coordi-  
5 nated fashion.

6 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF**  
7 **IRAQ STUDY GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS.**

8 It is the sense of Congress that the President and  
9 Congress should agree that the way forward in Iraq is to  
10 implement the comprehensive set of recommendations of  
11 the Iraq Study Group, particularly those specifically de-  
12 scribed in this Act, and the President should formulate  
13 a comprehensive plan to do so.

14 **SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN**  
15 **IRAQ.**

16 It is the sense of Congress that, consistent with the  
17 recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, the United  
18 States Government should—

19 (1) establish a “New Diplomatic Offensive” to  
20 deal with the problems of Iraq and of the region;

21 (2) support the unity and territorial integrity of  
22 Iraq;

23 (3) encourage other countries in the region to  
24 stop the destabilizing interventions and actions of  
25 Iraq’s neighbors;

4 (5) prevent the expansion of the instability and  
5 conflict beyond the borders of Iraq;

10 (7) energize the governments of other countries  
11 to support national political reconciliation in Iraq;

16 (9) assist the Government of Iraq in estab-  
17 lishing active working embassies in key capitals in  
18 the region;

19 (10) help the Government of Iraq reach a mu-  
20 tually acceptable agreement on the future of Kirkuk;

21 (11) assist the Government of Iraq in achieving  
22 certain security, political, and economic milestones,  
23 including better performance on issues such as na-  
24 tional reconciliation, equitable distribution of oil rev-  
25 enues, and the dismantling of militias;

12 (14) engage directly with the Governments of  
13 Iran and Syria in order to obtain their commitment  
14 to constructive policies toward Iraq and other re-  
15 gional issues;

16 (15) provide additional political, economic, and  
17 military support for Afghanistan including resources  
18 that might become available as United States com-  
19 bat forces are redeployed from Iraq;

20 (16) remain in contact with the Iraqi leader-  
21 ship, conveying the clear message that there must be  
22 action by the Government of Iraq to make substan-  
23 tial progress toward the achievement of the mile-  
24 stones described in section 11, and conveying in as  
25 much detail as possible the substance of these ex-

1 changes in order to keep the American people, the  
2 Iraqi people, and the people of countries in the re-  
3 gion well informed of progress in these areas;

4 (17) make clear the willingness of the United  
5 States Government to continue training, assistance,  
6 and support for Iraq's security forces, and to con-  
7 tinue political, military, and economic support for  
8 the Government of Iraq until Iraq becomes more ca-  
9 pable of governing, defending, and sustaining itself;

10 (18) make clear that, should the Government of  
11 Iraq not make substantial progress toward the  
12 achievement of the milestones described in section  
13 11, the United States shall reduce its political, mili-  
14 tary, or economic support for the Government of  
15 Iraq;

16 (19) make clear that the United States Govern-  
17 ment does not seek to establish permanent military  
18 bases in Iraq;

19 (20) restate that the United States Government  
20 does not seek to control the oil resources of Iraq;

21 (21) make active efforts to engage all parties in  
22 Iraq, with the exception of al Qaeda;

23 (22) encourage dialogue between sectarian com-  
24 munities and press religious leaders inside and out-

1 side of Iraq to speak out on behalf of peace and rec-  
2 onciliation;

3 (23) support the presence of neutral inter-  
4 national experts as advisors to the Government of  
5 Iraq on the processes of disarmament, demobiliza-  
6 tion, and reintegration of militias and other armed  
7 groups not under the control of the Government of  
8 Iraq; and

9 (24) ensure that reconstruction efforts in Iraq  
10 consist of great involvement by and with inter-  
11 national partners that actively participate in the de-  
12 sign and construction of projects.

13 **SEC. 5. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON SECURITY AND MILI-**  
14 **TARY FORCES.**

15 It shall be the policy of the United States to formu-  
16 late and implement with the Government of Iraq a plan,  
17 consistent with the recommendations of the Iraq Study  
18 Group, that—

19 (1) gives the highest priority to the training,  
20 equipping, advising, and support for security and  
21 military forces in Iraq and to supporting  
22 counterterrorism operations in Iraq; and

23 (2) supports the providing of more and better  
24 equipment for the Iraqi Army by encouraging the  
25 Government of Iraq to accelerate its requests under

1 the Foreign Military Sales program and, as United  
2 States combat brigades redeploy from Iraq, provides  
3 for the transfer of certain United States military  
4 equipment to Iraqi forces.

5 **SEC. 6. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON STRENGTHENING THE**  
6 **UNITED STATES MILITARY.**

7 It shall be the policy of the United States to formulate  
8 and implement a plan, consistent with the recommendations  
9 of the Iraq Study Group, that—

10 (1) directs the Secretary of Defense to build  
11 healthy relations between the civilian and military  
12 sectors, by creating an environment where senior  
13 military leaders feel free to offer independent advice  
14 to the civilian leadership of the United States Government;  
15

16 (2) emphasizes training and education programs  
17 for the forces that have returned to the United States  
18 in order to restore the United States Armed Forces to a high level of readiness for global  
19 contingencies;

21 (3) provides sufficient funds to restore military  
22 equipment to full functionality over the next 5 years;  
23 and

24 (4) assesses the full future budgetary impact of  
25 the war in Iraq and its potential impact on—

- 1 (A) the future readiness of United States
- 2 military forces;
- 3 (B) the ability of the United States Armed
- 4 Forces to recruit and retain high-quality per-
- 5 sonnel;
- 6 (C) needed investments in military pro-
- 7 curement and in research and development; and
- 8 (D) the budgets of other Federal agencies
- 9 involved in the stability and reconstruction ef-
- 10 fort in Iraq.

## 11 SEC. 7. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON POLICE AND CRIMINAL

12 JUSTICE IN IRAQ.

13        It shall be the policy of the United States to formulate  
14 late and implement with the Government of Iraq a plan,  
15 consistent with the recommendations of the Iraq Study  
16 Group, that—

17 (1) transfers the Iraqi National Police to the  
18 Ministry of Defense, where the police commando  
19 units will become part of the new Iraqi Army;

20 (2) transfers the Iraqi Border Police to the  
21 Ministry of Defense, which would have total respon-  
22 sibility for border control and external security;

23 (3) establishes greater responsibility for the  
24 Iraqi Police Service to conduct criminal investiga-  
25 tions and expands its cooperation with other ele-

1       ments in the judicial system in Iraq in order to bet-  
2       ter control crime and protect Iraqi civilians;

3               (4) establishes a process of organizational  
4        transformation, including efforts to expand the capa-  
5        bility and reach of the current major crime unit, to  
6        exert more authority over local police forces, and to  
7        give sole authority to the Ministry of the Interior to  
8        pay police salaries and disburse financial support to  
9        local police;

10               (5) proceeds with efforts to identify, register,  
11        and control the Facilities Protection Service;

12               (6) directs the Department of Defense to con-  
13        tinue its mission to train Iraqi National Police and  
14        the Iraqi Border Police, which shall be placed within  
15        the Iraqi Ministry of Defense;

16               (7) directs the Department of Justice to pro-  
17        ceed with the mission of training the police forces  
18        remaining under the Ministry of the Interior;

19               (8) provides for funds from the Government of  
20        Iraq to expand and upgrade communications equip-  
21        ment and motor vehicles for the Iraqi Police Service;

22               (9) directs the Attorney General to lead the  
23        work of organizational transformation in the Min-  
24        istry of the Interior and creates a strategic plan and

1 standard administrative procedures, codes of con-  
2 duct, and operational measures for Iraqis; and

3 (10) directs the Attorney General to establish  
4 courts, train judges, prosecutors, and investigators,  
5 and create strongly supported and funded institu-  
6 tions and practices in Iraq to fight corruption.

7 **SEC. 8. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON OIL SECTOR IN IRAQ.**

8 It shall be the policy of the United States to formu-  
9 late and implement with the Government of Iraq a plan,  
10 consistent with the recommendations of the Iraq Study  
11 Group, that—

12 (1) provides technical assistance in drafting leg-  
13 islation to implement the February 27, 2007, agree-  
14 ment by Iraq's Council of Ministers on principles for  
15 the equitable sharing of oil resources and revenues;

16 (2) encourages the Government of Iraq to accel-  
17 erate contracting for the comprehensive oil well  
18 work-overs in the southern fields needed to increase  
19 oil production, while ensuring that the United States  
20 no longer funds such infrastructure projects;

21 (3) supports the Iraqi military and private secu-  
22 rity forces in their efforts to protect oil infrastruc-  
23 ture and contractors;

1 (4) implements metering at both ends of the oil  
2 supply line to immediately improve accountability in  
3 the oil sector;

4 (5) in conjunction with the International Mone-  
5 tary Fund, encourages the Government of Iraq to  
6 reduce subsidies in the energy sector;

7 (6) encourages investment in Iraq's oil sector  
8 by the international community and by international  
9 energy companies;

10 (7) assists Iraqi leaders to reorganize the na-  
11 tional oil industry as a commercial enterprise, in  
12 order to enhance efficiency, transparency, and ac-  
13 countability;

14 (8) encourages the Government of Iraq to post  
15 all oil contracts, volumes, and prices on the Internet  
16 so that Iraqis and outside observers can track ex-  
17 ports and export revenues;

18 (9) supports the efforts of the World Bank to  
19 ensure that best practices are used in contracting;  
20 and

21 (10) provides technical assistance to the Min-  
22 istry of Oil for enhancing maintenance, improving  
23 the payments process, managing cash flows, improv-  
24 ing contracting and auditing, and updating profes-

1 sional training programs for management and tech-  
2 nical personnel.

3 **SEC. 9. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON IMPROVING ASSIST-  
4 ANCE PROGRAMS IN IRAQ.**

5 It shall be the policy of the United States to formu-  
6 late and implement a plan, consistent with the rec-  
7 ommendations of the Iraq Study Group, that—

8 (1) provides for the United States to take the  
9 lead in funding assistance requests from the United  
10 Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other  
11 humanitarian agencies;

12 (2) creates a new Senior Advisor for Economic  
13 Reconstruction in Iraq reporting to the President,  
14 with the authority to bring interagency unity of ef-  
15 fort to the policy, budget, and implementation of  
16 economic reconstruction programs in Iraq and the  
17 authority to serve as the principal point of contact  
18 with United States partners in the overall recon-  
19 struction effort;

20 (3) gives the chief of mission in Iraq the au-  
21 thority to spend significant funds through a program  
22 structured along the lines of the Commander's  
23 Emergency Response Program, with the authority to  
24 rescind funding from programs and projects—

(A) in which the Government of Iraq is not demonstrating effective partnership; or

(B) that do not demonstrate substantial progress toward achievement of the milestones described in section 11;

(4) authorizes and implements a more flexible security assistance program for Iraq, breaking down the barriers to effective interagency cooperation; and

(5) grants authority to merge United States assistance with assistance from international donors and Iraqi participants for the purpose of carrying out joint assistance projects.

13 SEC. 10. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON BUDGET PREPARA-  
14 TION, PRESENTATION, AND REVIEW.

15 It shall be the policy of the United States to formulate  
16 late and implement a plan, consistent with the re-  
17 commendations of the Iraq Study Group, that—

18 (1) directs the President to include the costs for  
19 the war in Iraq in the annual budget request;

20 (2) directs the Secretary of State, the Secretary  
21 of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence  
22 to provide United States military and civilian per-  
23 sonnel in Iraq the highest possible priority in obtain-  
24 ing professional language proficiency and cultural  
25 training;

5 (4) creates training for United States Govern-  
6 ment personnel to carry out civilian tasks associated  
7 with complex stability operations; and

8 (5) directs the Director of National Intelligence  
9 and the Secretary of Defense to devote greater ana-  
10 lytic resources to understanding the threats and  
11 sources of violence in Iraq and institute immediate  
12 changes in the collection of data about violence and  
13 the sources of violence to provide a more accurate  
14 picture of events on the ground in Iraq.

15 SEC. 11. CONDITIONS FOR CONTINUED UNITED STATES  
16 SUPPORT IN IRAQ.

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—It shall be the policy of the United  
18 States to condition continued United States political, mili-  
19 tary and economic support for Iraq upon the demonstra-  
20 tion by the Government of Iraq of sufficient political will  
21 and the making of substantial progress toward achieving  
22 the milestones described in subsection (b), and to base the  
23 decision to transfer command and control over Iraqi secu-  
24 rity forces units from the United States to Iraq in part  
25 upon such factors.

1       (b) MILESTONES.—The milestones referred to in sub-  
2 section (a) are the following:

3               (1) Promptly establishing a fair process for con-  
4 sidering amendments to the constitution of Iraq that  
5 promote lasting national reconciliation in Iraq.

6               (2) Enacting legislation or establishing other  
7 mechanisms to revise the de-Baathification laws in  
8 Iraq to encourage the employment in the Govern-  
9 ment of Iraq of qualified professionals, irrespective  
10 of ethnic or political affiliation, including ex-  
11 Baathists who were not leading figures of the Sad-  
12 dam Hussein regime.

13               (3) Enacting legislation or establishing other  
14 binding mechanisms to ensure the sharing of all  
15 Iraqi oil revenues among all segments of Iraqi soci-  
16 ety in an equitable manner.

17               (4) Holding free and fair provincial elections in  
18 Iraq at the earliest date practicable.

19               (5) Enacting legislation or establishing other  
20 mechanisms to ensure the rights of women and the  
21 rights of all minority communities in Iraq are pro-  
22 tected.

23 **SEC. 12. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON REDEPLOYMENT OF**  
24 **UNITED STATES FORCES FROM IRAQ.**

25 It is the sense of Congress that—

1 (1) with the implementation of the policies  
2 specified in sections 5 through 11 and the engage-  
3 ment in the increased diplomatic efforts specified in  
4 section 4, and as additional Iraqi brigades are being  
5 deployed, and subject to unexpected developments in  
6 the security situation on the ground, all United  
7 States combat brigades not necessary for force pro-  
8 tection could be redeployed from Iraq by the first  
9 quarter of 2008, except for those that are essential  
10 for—

11 (A) protecting United States and coalition  
12 personnel and infrastructure;

13 (B) training, equipping, and advising Iraqi  
14 forces;

15 (C) conducting targeted counterterrorism  
16 operations;

17 (D) search and rescue; and

18 (E) rapid reaction and special operations;

19 and

20 (2) the redeployment should be implemented as  
21 part of a comprehensive diplomatic, political, and  
22 economic strategy that includes sustained engage-  
23 ment with Iraq's neighbors and the international  
24 community for the purpose of working collectively to  
25 bring stability to Iraq.

1 **SEC. 13. REPORT ON POLICY IMPLEMENTATION.**

2       Not later than 90 days after the date of the enact-  
3 ment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Presi-  
4 dent shall submit to Congress a report on the actions that  
5 have been taken to implement the policies specified in sec-  
6 tions 4 through 11.

○