

110TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. CON. RES. 45

Expressing the sense of Congress on the new strategy in Iraq.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 24, 2007

Mr. WOLF submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of Congress on the new strategy in
Iraq.

Whereas we respect the constitutional authorities given a President in article II, section 2, which states that “The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States;” it is not the intent of this resolution to question or contravene such authority, but to accept the offer to Congress made by the President on January 10, 2007 that, “if members have improvements that can be made, we will make them. If circumstances change, we will adjust.”;

Whereas the United States strategy and operations in Iraq can only be sustained and achieved with support from the American people and with a level of bipartisanship;

Whereas over 137,000 American military personnel are currently serving in Iraq, like thousands of others since March 2003, with the bravery and professionalism consistent with the finest traditions of the United States armed forces, and are deserving of the support of all Americans, which they have strongly;

Whereas many American service personnel have lost their lives, and many more have been wounded in Iraq, and the American people will always honor their sacrifices and honor their families;

Whereas a failed state in Iraq would present a threat to regional and world peace, and the long term security interests of the United States are best served by an Iraq that can sustain, govern, and defend itself, and serve as an ally in the war against extremists;

Whereas Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating and ever widening problem of sectarian and intra sectarian violence based upon political distrust and cultural differences between some Sunni and Shia Arabs and Kurds;

Whereas Iraqis must reach political settlements in order to achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the Iraqis to reach such settlements to support a truly unified government greatly contributes to the increasing violence in Iraq;

Whereas the responsibility for Iraq's internal security and halting sectarian violence must rest primarily with the Government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces;

Whereas in the fall of 2006, leaders in the Administration and Congress, as well as recognized experts in the private sector began to express concern that the situation in Iraq was deteriorating and required a change in strategy, and,

as a consequence, the Administration began an intensive, comprehensive review of the Iraq strategy, by all components of the Executive branch;

Whereas in December 2006, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group issued a valuable report, suggesting a comprehensive strategy that includes “new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly.”; and

Whereas the recommendations in this resolution should not be interpreted as precipitating any immediate reduction in, or withdrawal of, the present level of forces: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate*
2 *concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that the*
3 *House supports the recommendations of the Iraq Study*
4 *Group, most importantly—*

5 (1) the repositioning of United States troops to
6 reflect strategic and tactical needs as determined by
7 United States commanders in Iraq that meet the ob-
8 jective of training and equipping the Iraqi military,
9 containing terrorism through special operations and
10 rapid reaction forces, and ensuring the transfer of
11 responsibility from United States to Iraqi control;

12 (2) that the United States establish an explicit
13 framework for cooperation and coordination with
14 Iraqi leaders that includes the achievement of spe-

1 cific milestones and objectives within a reasonable
2 time frame;

3 (3) that the United States government launch
4 a new diplomatic initiative to unite the region and
5 build international consensus for stability and recon-
6 struction in Iraq; and

7 (4) that any policies enacted by the Administra-
8 tion with regard to Iraq are implemented in direct
9 and continued consultation with Congress and rel-
10 evant House and Senate committees.

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