

109TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

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To provide for a comprehensive, new strategy for success in Iraq that includes a sustainable political solution and the redeployment of United States forces tied to specific political and military benchmarks.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

NOVEMBER 10, 2005

Mr. KERRY introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To provide for a comprehensive, new strategy for success in Iraq that includes a sustainable political solution and the redeployment of United States forces tied to specific political and military benchmarks.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Strategy for Success
5 in Iraq Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 The Senate makes the following findings:

1 (1) The men and women of the Armed Forces
2 have performed with valor, honor, and courage in
3 Iraq.

4 (2) United States military commanders and in-
5 telligence community personnel agree that the insur-
6 gency in Iraq draws substantial support from dis-
7 affected Iraqi Sunnis.

8 (3) The new Iraq constitution was adopted in a
9 national referendum on October 15, 2005, despite
10 the opposition of a great majority of Iraqi Sunnis.

11 (4) Iraq cannot be stable without a sustainable
12 political solution embraced by the Sunni minority as
13 well as the majority Shias and Kurds.

14 (5) Senior United States military commanders
15 and Administration officials have acknowledged that
16 the insurgency cannot be defeated without a political
17 solution.

18 (6) The commander of the Multinational
19 Forces-Iraq, General George Casey, told the Com-
20 mittee on Armed Services of the Senate on Sep-
21 tember 29, 2005, that “[i]ncreased coalition pres-
22 ence feeds the notion of occupation . . . contributes to
23 the dependency of Iraqi security forces on the coali-
24 tion . . . [and] . . . extends the amount of time that

1 it will take for Iraqi security forces to become self-
2 reliant”.

3 (7) General Casey also said that “[r]educing
4 the visibility and, ultimately, the presence of coaliti-
5 on forces as we transition to Iraqi security self-reli-
6 ance remains a key element of our overall
7 counterinsurgency strategy”.

8 (8) The United States Armed Forces have es-
9 tablished a training program for the security forces
10 of Iraq that continues to make possible the assump-
11 tion of security responsibilities by such security
12 forces.

13 (9) The number of members of the United
14 States Armed Forces in Iraq has risen to more than
15 160,000 to provide protection for the recent con-
16 stitutional referendum and the upcoming December
17 elections in Iraq.

18 (10) The people of Iraq will elect their first per-
19 manent government since the 2003 invasion on De-
20 cember 15, 2005.

21 (11) The success of the December elections will
22 constitute an important benchmark in transferring
23 political responsibilities to the people of Iraq.

24 (12) The phased redeployment of United States
25 Armed Forces based on achieving benchmarks for

1 the transfer of political and security responsibilities
2 to Iraq is a critical part of a successful strategy in
3 Iraq.

4 **SEC. 3. STRATEGY FOR SUCCESS.**

5 To complete the mission in Iraq and bring our troops
6 home, the President must implement a comprehensive new
7 strategy for success in Iraq that simultaneously pursues
8 a sustainable political solution and the redeployment of
9 United States forces tied to specific political and military
10 benchmarks.

11 **SEC. 4. IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGY.**

12 To implement the strategy under section 3, the Presi-
13 dent must undertake aggressive diplomatic, political, mili-
14 tary and economic measures, including actions to achieve
15 the following:

16 (1) Reduce the sense of United States occupa-
17 tion of Iraq by—

18 (A) committing publicly not to establish
19 permanent United States military bases in Iraq,
20 or to maintain a large United States combat
21 force on Iraq soil indefinitely;

22 (B) drawing-down at least 20,000 United
23 States troops upon the successful completion of
24 the December 2005 elections as the first step in
25 the process of reducing the United States force

1 presence in Iraq as political and military bench-
2 marks are met; and

3 (C) reducing the visibility of United States
4 forces by placing as many as possible in rear
5 guard, garrisoned status for security backup
6 purposes.

7 (2) Give Sunnis a real stake in the future of
8 Iraq by—

9 (A) convincing Iraqi Shias and Kurds to
10 address legitimate Sunni concerns about re-
11 gional autonomy and the allocation of oil reve-
12 nues;

13 (B) hosting a conference of the neighbors
14 of Iraq, the United Kingdom, other key mem-
15 bers of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, and
16 the Russian Federation, immediately after the
17 December elections, to develop a collective
18 strategy to bring the parties in Iraq to a sus-
19 tainable political compromise that also includes
20 mutual security guarantees among the peoples
21 of Iraq; and

22 (C) urging the Sunni neighbors of Iraq to
23 immediately set up a reconstruction fund tar-
24 getted to the majority Sunni areas to show Iraqi

1 Sunnis the benefits of participating in the polit-
2 ical process.

3 (3) Appoint a high-level presidential envoy to
4 strengthen United States diplomatic efforts with re-
5 spect to Iraq.

6 (4) Develop a new regional security structure
7 with United States participation to enlist the sup-
8 port of the Sunni neighbors of Iraq.

9 (5) Accelerate reconstruction efforts in Iraq by
10 providing the necessary civilian personnel to do the
11 job, establishing civil-military reconstruction teams
12 throughout Iraq, streamlining the disbursement of
13 funds to the provinces of Iraq, expanding job cre-
14 ation programs in Iraq, and strengthening the ca-
15 pacity of Iraqi government ministries.

16 (6) Create the military conditions for the rede-
17 ployment of United States forces by—

18 (A) intensifying the training of Iraqi secu-
19 rity forces through expanded in-country train-
20 ing and the acceptance of outstanding offers
21 from other countries to do more training;

22 (B) transferring military and police re-
23 sponsibilities on a phased basis to Iraqi security
24 forces as their capabilities increase; and

1 (C) working with the new Iraq government
2 to secure international support for a multi-
3 national force to help protect the borders of
4 Iraq until a capable national army is formed.

5 **SEC. 5. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.**

6 (a) **REPORTS REQUIRED.**—Not later than June 30,
7 2006, and every six months thereafter, the President shall
8 submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report
9 the actions taken to implement the strategy set forth in
10 section 3 including the actions specified in section 4.

11 (b) **APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-**
12 **FINED.**—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
13 tees of Congress” means—

14 (1) the Committees on Foreign Relations and
15 Appropriations of the Senate; and

16 (2) the Committees on International Relations
17 and Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

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