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S. J. RES. 6

Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to planning the reconstruction
of Iraq.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 13, 2003

Mr. LIEBERMAN introduced the following joint resolution; which was read
twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

JOINT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to planning
the reconstruction of Iraq.

Whereas the United States may soon confront the need to defend with military force its national security and the security of its allies from the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his regime in Iraq;

Whereas such action will serve not only to end Saddam's pernicious threat to peace and security, but also to give the people of Iraq a new dawn of hope, liberated from a disgraceful tyrant who oppresses their liberty, abuses their humanity, and robs them of their future;

Whereas the President's January 20, 2003 report to Congress pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (P.L. 107-243) provides a brief conceptual overview of the future of Iraq

but provides no detail on executive branch planning or legislation that may be necessary and, most importantly, no estimates of the funding and other support from Congress that would be necessary for carrying out the reconstruction of Iraq;

Whereas Congress has become increasingly concerned that the President has not provided adequate information regarding plans for the reconstruction of Iraq following a war, should that eventuality arise;

Whereas United States experience with reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan offers useful lessons for improving future post-war reconstruction efforts;

Whereas the lessons learned during the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, a far less complex and difficult endeavor, suggest that United States policymakers should give careful attention to planning the task of reconstruction in Iraq following a war;

Whereas with Iraq the United States has the opportunity and the responsibility to avoid the mistakes made during the reconstruction of Afghanistan;

Whereas success in the reconstruction of Iraq will require answers to many critical questions in advance; and

Whereas United States actions in Iraq may well present the opportunity for diplomatic initiatives in the broader Middle East region: Now, therefore, be it

- 1 *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives*
- 2 *of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
- 3 That it is the sense of Congress that the President
- 4 should—

11 (B) the composition of the security force,
12 whether composed of United States military
13 personnel, civilians, or contractors, foreign na-
14 tionals, personnel or troops contributed by other
15 nations, or other individuals;

16 (C) the utility of asking other nations to
17 contribute to such a security force;

18 (D) plans to assure the personal security
19 of the interim Iraqi leadership; and

20 (E) the additional funds and personnel
21 that may be necessary for support of the secu-
22 rity force;

23 (3) develop a plan to reconstitute security, law,
24 and justice institutions in Iraq and to restore to
25 Iraqis the responsibility for managing their own af-

1 fairs as quickly as is practicable, taking into consid-
2 eration—

3 (A) actions necessary to dismantle Iraq's
4 military forces and its multiple security forces
5 and replace them with reconstituted military,
6 police, law enforcement, and judicial institu-
7 tions;

8 (B) standards and methods for recruiting
9 Iraqi nationals to those institutions and for
10 purging from the existing forces individuals
11 loyal to Saddam Hussein or guilty of serious
12 human rights abuses;

13 (C) the question of which officials in the
14 executive branch of the United States Govern-
15 ment are appropriate to perform United States
16 responsibilities for carrying out the plan; and

17 (D) the additional funds and personnel
18 that may be necessary to carry out the plan;

19 (4) develop a plan to respond to the humani-
20 tarian needs of an Iraqi population already in hu-
21 manitarian crisis, taking into consideration—

22 (A) mechanisms and methods for carrying
23 out humanitarian relief efforts;

24 (B) the appointment of a transition coordi-
25 nator, transitional administrator, or other indi-

1 vidual responsible for ensuring coordination of
2 both civilian and military efforts to organize re-
3 lief;

4 (C) the utility of urging Iraqi opposition
5 groups to appoint individuals to undertake re-
6 lief coordination, in cooperation with the coordi-
7 nator, in order to avoid pursuing conflicting
8 purposes, duplicating efforts, or so failing to
9 address issues in a timely fashion that the
10 issues become humanitarian disasters; and

11 (D) any need for a more robust response
12 to calls for pledges toward a relief fund, a fund
13 to which the United States has to date pledged
14 only \$15,000,000;

15 (5) carefully consider the most crucial security
16 threat, the need to secure Iraq's weapons of mass
17 destruction, including biological and chemical pre-
18 ursors, in order to ensure that they are neither sto-
19 len nor transferred to terrorists or other parties in-
20 imical to the United States during the immediate
21 aftermath of the collapse of Saddam Hussein's gov-
22 ernment;

23 (6) develop measures necessary to temporarily
24 steward Iraq's natural resources, in order to ensure
25 that—

6 (B) Iraq's oil fields, particularly those in
7 the southern part of the country, are secured
8 from sabotage by Saddam Hussein as his re-
9 gime collapses;

10 (C) contingency plans exist to react to and
11 repair any damage Saddam Hussein may
12 choose to inflict in retreat; and

13 (D) mechanisms and systems, including
14 anti-corruption measures, are implemented to
15 ensure in the interim that Iraqi oil revenues are
16 properly collected and accounted for and used
17 in accordance with the wishes and best interests
18 of the Iraqi people;

1 elections, maintain security, and execute other appropriate functions;

3 (8) plan to organize debtor and donor conferences in order to restructure Iraq's debt and post-Persian Gulf War obligations and accumulate sufficient resources to fund the needs of an interim government during transition; and

8 (9) develop plans for diplomatic initiatives to take advantage of any opportunity to influence political developments in the Middle East following a conflict in Iraq, including—

12 (A) pressing for a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;

14 (B) engaging Syria and Lebanon in ending their sponsorship of terrorism; and

16 (C) offering Iran the opportunity to discuss with the United States an end to Iran's support of terrorism and weapons proliferation.

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