

108TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# S. CON. RES. 73

Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.

---

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 15, 2003

Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself and Mr. KLY) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

## CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.

Whereas environmental sampling by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at Iran's Natanz nuclear facility revealed the presence of 2 types of highly enriched uranium that can be used to develop nuclear weapons;

Whereas the traces of highly-enriched uranium detected by the IAEA at the Natanz facility and the Kalaye Electric Company could indicate that Iran has been secretly at-

tempting to produce weapons-grade uranium at these facilities;

Whereas, in March 2003, the Director of the IAEA announced that Iran was constructing a facility to enrich uranium, a key component of advanced nuclear weapons;

Whereas, on January 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (the “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”);

Whereas the June 6, 2003, report of the Director General of the IAEA expressed concern over the failure of the Government of Iran to report material, facilities, and activities at its nuclear facilities, including those that have the potential to enrich uranium and develop nuclear weapons, in contravention of its obligations under the safeguards agreement it signed in connection with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;

Whereas the Board of Governors of the IAEA adopted a resolution on September 12, 2003, that calls on Iran to provide the IAEA a full declaration of all imported material and components relevant to the uranium enrichment program, to grant unrestricted access, including environmental sampling, to the IAEA, to resolve questions regarding the conclusion of the IAEA experts who tested gas centrifuges in that country, to provide complete information regarding the conduct of uranium conversion experiments, and to provide such other information and explanations and take such other steps as the IAEA determines necessary to resolve by October 31, 2003, all outstanding issues involving Iran’s nuclear materials and nuclear activities;

Whereas, in June 2003, Iran conducted a successful test of the 800-mile range Shahab-3 missile, and Iran is also seeking to produce a 1,200-mile Shahab-4 missile;

Whereas the construction by Iran of nuclear facilities, coupled with its ties to terrorist groups, constitutes a threat to international peace and security; and

Whereas, by signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signatories such as Iran that are not declared nuclear powers commit themselves to abstaining from the acquisition of nuclear weapons, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and achieving nuclear disarmament: Now, therefore, be it

1       *Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives*  
2       *concurring)*, That Congress—

3           (1) deplores the development by Iran of a nu-  
4       clear weapons program and the failure of the Gov-  
5       ernment of Iran to report material, facilities, and ac-  
6       tivities to the International Atomic Energy Commis-  
7       sion in contravention of its obligations under the  
8       safeguards agreement it signed in connection with  
9       the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear  
10      Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow  
11      July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970  
12      (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the “Nu-  
13      clear Non-Proliferation Treaty”);

14           (2) concurs with the view of the Department of  
15      State, as delivered in testimony to the U.S.-Israel

1 Joint Parliamentary Committee on September 17,  
2 2003, by the Assistant Secretary of State for  
3 Verification and Compliance that the explanations  
4 provided by the Government of Iran for its nuclear  
5 activities are not credible;

6 (3) concurs with the conclusion reached in the  
7 Department of State's Annual Report on Adherence  
8 to and Compliance with Arms Control and Non-  
9 proliferation Agreements and Commitments that  
10 Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weap-  
11 ons;

12 (4) calls on the President to use all appropriate  
13 means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weap-  
14 ons, including—

15 (A) urging the Government of Iran to ac-  
16 cept in full the resolution adopted by the Board  
17 of Governors of the International Atomic En-  
18 ergy Agency on September 12, 2003 (hereafter  
19 in this resolution referred to as the "IAEA res-  
20 olution"), that calls on Iran to—

21 (i) provide the Agency a full declara-  
22 tion of all imported material and compo-  
23 nents relevant to the uranium enrichment  
24 program;

1 (ii) grant unrestricted access, includ-  
2 ing environmental sampling, to the Agency;

3 (iii) resolve questions regarding the  
4 conclusion of the Agency experts who test-  
5 ed gas centrifuges in that country;

6 (iv) provide complete information re-  
7 garding the conduct of uranium conversion  
8 experiments; and

9 (v) provide such other information  
10 and explanations and take such other steps  
11 as the Agency determines necessary to re-  
12 solve by October 31, 2003, all outstanding  
13 issues involving Iran's nuclear materials  
14 and nuclear activities;

15 (B) taking such diplomatic measures as  
16 are necessary to encourage other nations, espe-  
17 cially Russia, to urge the Government of Iran  
18 to fully and immediately comply with the such  
19 resolution; and

20 (C) working with the United Nations and  
21 other nations to urge the Government of Iran  
22 to sign the Model Additional Protocol to give  
23 the International Atomic Energy Agency great-  
24 er access in Iran to ensure that—

1 (i) no undeclared facilities exist in  
2 Iran; and

3 (ii) no materials or technologies have  
4 been diverted from safeguarded facilities in  
5 Iran;

6 (5) calls on Russia to—

7 (A) use all appropriate means to urge Iran  
8 to accept in full the IAEA resolution; and

9 (B) suspend all nuclear cooperation with  
10 Iran until Iran fully and completely complies  
11 with the IAEA resolution;

12 (6) calls on member states of the United Na-  
13 tions to join the United States in preventing the  
14 Government of Iran from continuing to pursue and  
15 develop programs or facilities that could be used in  
16 a nuclear weapons program;

17 (7) calls on the United Nations Security Coun-  
18 cil to immediately undertake consideration of—

19 (A) the threat to international peace and  
20 security posed by Iran's nuclear weapons pro-  
21 gram; and

22 (B) the passage of a Security Council reso-  
23 lution or the taking of other actions that may  
24 be necessary to impose diplomatic and economic  
25 sanctions against Iran if it fails to meet its obli-

1           gations to the International Atomic Energy  
2           Agency by October 31, 2003; and

3           (8) calls on the Government of Iran to cease all  
4           efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities until  
5           it is able to provide specific assurances that it is not  
6           engaged in a clandestine nuclear weapons program  
7           by—

8                   (A) coming into complete and verifiable  
9                   compliance with its obligations under the IAEA  
10                  resolution, including the prompt and uncondi-  
11                  tional implementation of the Model Additional  
12                  Protocol; and

13                  (B) fully meeting its obligations under the  
14                  Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

○