

108TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# S. 2681

To establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iran.

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 16, 2004

Mr. SANTORUM (for himself and Mr. CORNYN) introduced the following bill;  
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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## A BILL

To establish a program to support a transition to democracy  
in Iran.

1       *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2       *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3       **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4       This Act may be cited as the “Iran Freedom and  
5       Support Act of 2004”.

6       **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7       Congress makes the following findings:

8               (1) The people of the United States have long  
9       demonstrated an interest in the well-being of the  
10      people of Iran, including through the work of mis-

1 sionaries whose work in Iran dates back to the  
2 1830s.

3 (2) Famous Americans such as Howard Bas-  
4 kerville, Dr. Samuel Martin, Jane E. Doolittle, and  
5 Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., made significant contribu-  
6 tions to Iranian society by furthering the educational  
7 opportunities of the people of Iran and improving  
8 the opportunities of the less fortunate citizens of  
9 Iran.

10 (3) Iran served as a key ally of the United  
11 States following World War II and through the late  
12 1970s serving as an important regional ally and a  
13 key bulwark against Soviet influence.

14 (4) In November 1979, following the arrival of  
15 Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi in the United States,  
16 a mob of students and extremists seized the United  
17 States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, holding United  
18 States diplomatic personnel hostage until January  
19 1981.

20 (5) Following the seizure of the United States  
21 Embassy, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of  
22 the repressive revolutionary movement in Iran, ex-  
23 pressed support for the actions of the students in  
24 taking American citizens hostage.

1           (6) Despite the historic victory of Mohammad  
2           Khatami in the presidential election of May 1997,  
3           an election which Khatami won with 69 percent of  
4           the vote and in which an estimated 91 percent of the  
5           electorate participated, control of the internal and  
6           external affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran is  
7           still exercised by the courts in Iran and the Revolu-  
8           tionary Guards, Supreme Leader, and Council of  
9           Guardians of the Government of Iran.

10          (7) The election results of the May 1997 elec-  
11          tion and the high level of voter participation in that  
12          election demonstrate that the people of Iran favor  
13          economic and political reforms and greater inter-  
14          action with the United States and the Western world  
15          in general.

16          (8) Despite the election of President Khatami  
17          and the outreach of the Clinton administration to  
18          ease sanctions and to promote people-to-people ex-  
19          changes, Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah  
20          Ali Khamenei, the Militant Clerics' Society, the Is-  
21          lamic Coalition Organization, and Supporters of the  
22          Party of God have all opposed efforts to open Ira-  
23          nian society to Western influences and have opposed  
24          efforts to change the dynamic of relations between  
25          the United States and Iran.

1           (9) For the past two decades, the Department  
2 of State has found Iran to be the leading sponsor of  
3 international terrorism in the world.

4           (10) In 1983, the Iran-sponsored Hezbollah ter-  
5 rorist organization conducted suicide terrorist oper-  
6 ations against United States military and civilian  
7 personnel in Beirut, Lebanon, resulting in the  
8 deaths of hundreds of Americans.

9           (11) Intelligence analysts and law enforcement  
10 personnel have linked Iran to attacks against Amer-  
11 ican military personnel at Khobar Towers in Saudi  
12 Arabia in 1996 and to al Qaeda attacks against ci-  
13 vilians in Saudi Arabia in 2004.

14           (12) Iran has provided a safe haven and a base  
15 of operations for terrorist groups, including al  
16 Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, and Ansar al Islam, and to  
17 terrorist leaders, including Abu Musab al Zarkawi,  
18 Zayman al Zawahiri, and members of the bin Laden  
19 family.

20           (13) Iran currently operates more than 10  
21 radio and television stations broadcasting in Iraq  
22 that support violent actions against United States  
23 and coalition personnel in Iraq.

24           (14) The current leaders of Iran, Ayatollah Ali  
25 Khamenei and Hashemi Rafsanjani, have repeatedly

1 called upon Muslims to kill Americans in Iraq and  
2 install a theocratic regime in Iraq.

3 (15) The United States intelligence community  
4 believes the Government of Iran is pursuing a clan-  
5 destine nuclear weapons program.

6 (16) The Government of Iran has failed to meet  
7 repeated pledges to arrest and extradite foreign ter-  
8 rorists in Iran.

9 (17) The United States Government believes  
10 that the Government of Iran supports terrorists and  
11 extremist religious leaders in Iraq with the clear in-  
12 tention of subverting coalition efforts to bring peace  
13 and democracy to Iraq.

14 (18) The Ministry of Defense of Iran confirmed  
15 in July 2003 that it had successfully conducted the  
16 final test of the Shahab-3 missile, giving Iran an  
17 operational intermediate-range ballistic missile capa-  
18 ble of striking both Israel and United States troops  
19 throughout the Middle East and Afghanistan.

20 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES POLICY**  
21 **TOWARD IRAN.**

22 It is the sense of Congress that it should be the policy  
23 of the United States to support regime change for the Is-  
24 lamic Republic of Iran and to promote the transition to  
25 a democratic government to replace that regime.

1 **SEC. 4. ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT TRANSITION TO DEMOC-**  
2 **RACY IN IRAN.**

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized to  
4 provide assistance to foreign and domestic pro-democracy  
5 groups opposed to the non-democratic Government of  
6 Iran, including the award of grants to qualified pro-de-  
7 mocracy radio and television broadcasting organizations.

8 (b) ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE.—Financial assist-  
9 ance may only be provided under this section to individ-  
10 uals, organizations, or entities that have—

11 (1) officially renounced the use of terrorism;

12 (2) pledged to adhere to nonproliferation re-  
13 gimes for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons  
14 and materiel;

15 (3) pledged to support the destruction of all  
16 prohibited stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction  
17 in Iran; and

18 (4) supported the adoption of a democratic  
19 form of government in Iran.

20 (c) POLITICAL ASSISTANCE.—

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized  
22 to provide assistance to support foreign and domes-  
23 tic pro-democracy groups opposed to the non-demo-  
24 cratic Government of Iran that—

25 (A) are dedicated to democratic values;

1 (B) show a commitment to human rights,  
2 equality of women, and freedom of religious  
3 worship;

4 (C) demonstrate a commitment to fos-  
5 tering equality of opportunity; and

6 (D) support freedom of the press, freedom  
7 of speech, and freedom of association.

8 (2) FUNDING.—The President may provide as-  
9 sistance under paragraph (1) using—

10 (A) funds available to the Middle East  
11 Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and National  
12 Endowment for Democracy (NED); and

13 (B) amounts authorized to be appropriated  
14 under subsection (g).

15 (d) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—The President  
16 shall notify the Committees on Foreign Relations and Ap-  
17 propriations of the Senate and the Committees on Inter-  
18 national Relations and Appropriations of the House of  
19 Representatives at least 15 days in advance of each obliga-  
20 tion of assistance under this section in accordance with  
21 the procedures under section 634A of the Foreign Assist-  
22 ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394–l).

23 (e) COORDINATION OF POLICY.—In order to ensure  
24 maximum coordination among Federal agencies, the Presi-  
25 dent shall appoint a senior member of the National Secu-

1 rity Council as special assistant to the President on Iran  
2 matters.

3 (f) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIPLOMATIC ASSIST-  
4 ANCE.—It is the sense of Congress that—

5 (1) contacts should be expanded with opposition  
6 groups in Iran that meet the criteria under sub-  
7 section (b);

8 (2) support for transition to democracy in Iran  
9 should be expressed by United States representatives  
10 and officials in all appropriate international fora;

11 (3) official meetings with representatives of the  
12 Government of Iran should be terminated;

13 (4) efforts to bring a halt to the nuclear weap-  
14 ons program of Iran, including steps to end the sup-  
15 ply of nuclear components or fuel to Iran, should be  
16 intensified, with particular attention focused on the  
17 cooperation of the Government of Russia with that  
18 nuclear weapons program; and

19 (5) officials and representatives of the United  
20 States Government should strongly and unequiv-  
21 cally support indigenous efforts in Iran to call for a  
22 national referendum on the form of government in  
23 Iran, including drawing international attention to  
24 the violations by the Government of Iran of human



1 rights, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, and  
2 freedom of the press.

3 (g) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is  
4 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State  
5 \$10,000,000 to carry out activities under this section.

6 **SEC. 5. DESIGNATION OF DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION ORGA-**  
7 **NIZATIONS.**

8 (a) INITIAL DESIGNATION.—It is the sense of Con-  
9 gress that, not later than 90 days after the date of the  
10 enactment of this Act, the President should designate at  
11 least one democratic opposition organization as eligible to  
12 receive assistance under section 4.

13 (b) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—At least 15 days  
14 before designating a democratic opposition organization as  
15 eligible to receive assistance under section 4, the President  
16 shall notify the Committees on Foreign Relations and Ap-  
17 propriations of the Senate and the Committees on Inter-  
18 national Relations and Appropriations of the House of  
19 Representatives of the proposed designation.

20 **SEC. 6. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**

21 Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize  
22 or otherwise approve of the use of the Armed Forces of  
23 the United States in carrying out activities under this Act.

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