107TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION

S. 2822

To prevent publicly traded corporations from issuing stock options to top management in a manner that is detrimental to the long-term interests of shareholders.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

July 30, 2002

Mr. Wyden introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

A BILL

To prevent publicly traded corporations from issuing stock options to top management in a manner that is detrimental to the long-term interests of shareholders.

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
- 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
- 4 This Act may be cited as the "Prevention of Stock
- 5 Option Abuse Act".
- 6 SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
- 7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—
- 8 (1) granting stock options to corporate direc-
- 9 tors and executive officers can promote the interests

- of shareholders, by enabling corporations to attract and retain top managerial talent and by giving management a strong personal interest in improving the corporation's performance; and
- (2) recent corporate accounting scandals suggest that, in some instances, grants of stock options to directors and executive officers may have failed to serve their intended purpose of aligning the interests of management with the long-term interests of the corporation. Instead, stock options grants in some instances may have created perverse incentives for directors and executive officers to pump up the corporation's short term share price, without regard to the corporation's long-term financial health.

(b) Purposes.—The purposes of this Act are—

- (1) to increase shareholder input and oversight with respect to stock option compensation plans by requiring shareholder approval;
- (2) to ensure that stock options provide incentives for corporate directors and executive officers to act in the best long term interests of their corporations, rather than to stimulate short term run-ups in the stock price, by establishing substantial vesting periods for options and holding periods for stock shares; and

1	(3) to improve the transparency of stock option
2	grants to corporate directors and executive officers,
3	by providing better and more frequent information
4	to shareholders and investors.
5	SEC. 3. RULEMAKING.
6	Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment
7	of this Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission shall
8	issue final rules that—
9	(1) require any publicly traded corporation to
10	obtain prior shareholder approval of stock option
11	compensation plans;
12	(2) require that any stock options issued by a
13	publicly traded corporation to any of its directors or
14	executive officers have a vesting period of not less
15	than 5 years;
16	(3) prohibit any person who acquires stock,
17	whether through the exercise of stock options or by
18	any other means, in a publicly traded corporation for
19	which such person serves as a director or executive
20	officer from selling—
21	(A) any of such stock until 180 days after
22	the date of acquisition;
23	(B) more than 25 percent of such stock
24	until 3 years after the date of acquisition; and

1	(C) more than 75 percent of such stock
2	until 180 days after such person ceases to serve
3	as a director or executive officer of such cor-
4	poration; and
5	(4) require every publicly traded corporation to
6	include, in each regular quarterly filing to the Secu-
7	rities and Exchange Commission, a separately head-
8	ed section or subsection on stock options that
9	includes—
10	(A) information on the total quantity of
11	outstanding stock options held by directors, ex-
12	ecutive officers, and other employees of such
13	corporation;
14	(B) information on the number, terms, and
15	status of stock options that have been issued or
16	that the corporation has committed to issue to
17	individual directors and executive officers of
18	such corporation; and
19	(C) such other information as the Securi-
20	ties and Exchange Commission determines may
21	be useful in ensuring that investors fully under-
22	stand the potential impact of the corporation's

stock option practices on shareholder value and

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- 1 on the incentives of corporate directors, execu-
- 2 tive officers, and employees.

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