

107TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# S. 2478

To promote enhanced non-proliferation cooperation between the United States  
and the Russian Federation.

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## IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 8, 2002

Ms. LANDRIEU (for herself and Mr. SMITH of Oregon) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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## A BILL

To promote enhanced non-proliferation cooperation between  
the United States and the Russian Federation.

1       *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2       *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3       **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4       This Act may be cited as the “Nuclear and Terrorism  
5       Threat Reduction Act of 2002”.

6       **SEC. 2. ENHANCING THREAT REDUCTION.**

7       (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—

8               (1) It is the policy of the United States to work  
9       cooperatively with the Russian Federation in order  
10      to prevent the diversion of weapons of mass destruc-

1       tion and materials relating thereto, including nu-  
2       clear, biological, and chemical weapons, as well as  
3       the scientific and technical expertise necessary to de-  
4       sign and build weapons of mass destruction.

5           (2) With respect to enhancing threat reduction,  
6       there should be three primary objectives, as stated  
7       in the President's review of 30 different United  
8       States-Russia cooperative programs, as follows:

9           (A) To ensure that existing United States  
10       cooperative non-proliferation programs with the  
11       Russian Federation are focused on priority  
12       threat reduction and non-proliferation goals,  
13       and are conducted as efficiently and effectively  
14       as possible.

15          (B) To examine what new initiatives might  
16       be undertaken to further United States threat  
17       reduction and non-proliferation goals.

18          (C) To consider organizational and proce-  
19       dural changes designed to ensure a consistent  
20       and coordinated United States Government ap-  
21       proach to cooperative programs with the Rus-  
22       sian Federation on the reduction of weapons of  
23       mass destruction and prevention of their pro-  
24       liferation.

1           (3) The goal of United States programs to as-  
2           sist the Russian Federation should be to have them  
3           work well, be focused on priority tasks, and be well  
4           managed.

5           (4) In order to further cooperative efforts, the  
6           following key programs should be expanded:

7                   (A) The Department of Energy Material  
8                   Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A)  
9                   program to assist the Russian Federation se-  
10                  cure and consolidate weapons-grade nuclear ma-  
11                  terial.

12                  (B) The Department of Energy Warhead  
13                  and Fissile Material Transparency Program.

14                  (C) The International Science and Tech-  
15                  nology Center (ISTC).

16                  (D) The Redirection of Biotechnical Sci-  
17                  entists program.

18                  (E) The Department of Defense Coopera-  
19                  tive Threat Reduction project to construct a  
20                  chemical weapons destruction facility at  
21                  Shchuch'ye, Russia, to enable its earliest com-  
22                  pletion at no increased expense.

23           (5) Other programs should be adjusted, re-  
24           focused, or reexamined, including—

1 (A) approaches to the current plutonium  
2 disposition program in the Russian Federation,  
3 in order to make the program less costly and  
4 more effective;

5 (B) the project to end production by the  
6 Russian Federation of weapons-grade pluto-  
7 nium, in order to transfer the project from the  
8 Department of Defense to the Department of  
9 Energy;

10 (C) consolidation of the Department of En-  
11 ergy's Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) with the  
12 Initiative for Proliferation Prevention (IPP),  
13 with a focus on projects to assist the Russian  
14 Federation in reduction of its nuclear warheads  
15 complex; and

16 (D) acceleration of the Department of En-  
17 ergy's Second Line of Defense program to as-  
18 sist the Russian Federation install nuclear de-  
19 tection equipment at border posts.

20 (b) INCREASED FUNDING OF CERTAIN KEY PRO-  
21 GRAMS.—In order to guarantee that the United States-  
22 Russia non-proliferation and threat reduction efforts oper-  
23 ate as efficiently as possible, certain key programs should  
24 receive additional funding above current levels,  
25 including—

1           (1) the United States-Russia Highly Enriched  
2           Uranium Purchase Agreement;

3           (2) the Second Line of Defense program;

4           (3) the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention;

5           (4) the Fissile Materials Disposition program;

6           (5) the Redirection of Biotechnical Scientists  
7           program;

8           (6) the Department of Energy Material Protec-  
9           tion, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program;

10          (7) the International Science and Technology  
11          Center; and

12          (8) the Warhead and Fissile Material Trans-  
13          parency program.

14          (c) REPORT.—Not later than six months after the  
15          date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit  
16          to Congress a report containing recommendations on how  
17          to enhance the implementation of United States-Russia  
18          non-proliferation and threat reduction programs, which  
19          shall include—

20                (1) recommendations on how to improve and  
21                streamline the contracting and procurement prac-  
22                tices of those programs; and

23                (2) a listing of impediments to the efficient and  
24                effective implementation of those programs.

1 **SEC. 3. COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORIES AND DATA EX-**  
2 **CHANGES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES**  
3 **AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON WEAP-**  
4 **ONS-GRADE MATERIAL AND NUCLEAR WEAP-**  
5 **ONS.**

6 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that inventories of  
7 weapons-grade material and warheads should be tracked  
8 in order, among other things—

9 (1) to make it more likely that the Russian  
10 Federation can fully account for its entire inventory  
11 of weapons-grade material and assembled weapons;  
12 and

13 (2) to make it more likely that the sources of  
14 any material or weapons possessed or used by any  
15 foreign state or terrorist organization can be identi-  
16 fied.

17 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the  
18 United States to establish jointly with the Russian Fed-  
19 eration comprehensive inventories and data exchanges of  
20 Russian and United States weapons-grade material and  
21 assembled warheads, with particular attention to tactical,  
22 or “nonstrategic” warheads, one of the most likely weap-  
23 ons a terrorist organization or terrorist state would at-  
24 tempt to acquire, and with particular attention focused on  
25 weapons that have been removed from deployment.

1       (c) ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING COMPREHENSIVE  
2 INVENTORIES.—Notwithstanding any other provision of  
3 law, the United States Government shall work with the  
4 Russian Federation to develop comprehensive inventories  
5 of Russian weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched  
6 uranium programs and assembled warheads, with special  
7 attention to be focused on tactical warheads and warheads  
8 that have been removed from deployment.

9       (d) DATA EXCHANGES.—As part of this process, to  
10 the maximum extent practicable, without jeopardizing  
11 United States national security interests, the United  
12 States is authorized to enter into ongoing data exchanges  
13 with the Russian Federation on categories of material and  
14 weapons described in subsection (c).

15       (e) REPORT.—Not later than six months after the  
16 date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter  
17 until a comprehensive inventory is created and the infor-  
18 mation collected from the inventory exchanged between  
19 the governments of the United States and the Russian  
20 Federation, the President shall submit to Congress a re-  
21 port, in both an unclassified and classified form as nec-  
22 essary, describing the progress that has been made toward  
23 that objective.

1 **SEC. 4. COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE TRANSITION FROM**  
2 **MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION (MAD)**  
3 **TO MUTUALLY ASSURED SECURITY (MAS).**

4 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—With the end of the  
5 Cold War more than a decade ago, with the United States  
6 and the Russian Federation fighting together against  
7 global terrorism, and with the Presidents of the United  
8 States and the Russian Federation agreeing to establish  
9 “a new strategic framework to ensure the mutual security  
10 of the United States and Russia, and the world commu-  
11 nity”, the United States and the Russian Federation  
12 should increase significantly their efforts to put dangerous  
13 and unnecessary elements of the Cold War to rest.

14 (b) ESTABLISHMENT.—In order to assist with the  
15 policy expressed in subsection (a), the President is author-  
16 ized to conclude an agreement with the Russian Federa-  
17 tion for the establishment of a Joint United States-Russia  
18 Commission to Assess the Transition from Mutual As-  
19 sured Destruction (MAD) to Mutual Assured Security  
20 (MAS) (in this section referred to as the “Commission”).

21 (c) COMPOSITION.—The United States delegation of  
22 the Commission shall consist of 13 members appointed by  
23 the President, as follows:

24 (1) Three members, after consultation with the  
25 Speaker of the House of Representatives.



1           (2) Three members, after consultation with the  
2       Majority Leader of the Senate.

3           (3) Two members, after consultation with the  
4       Minority Leader of the House of Representatives.

5           (4) Two members, after consultation with the  
6       Minority Leader of the Senate.

7           (5) Two members as the President may deter-  
8       mine.

9       (d) QUALIFICATIONS.—The United States members  
10   of the Commission shall be appointed from among private  
11   United States citizens with knowledge and expertise in  
12   United States-Russia strategic stability issues.

13       (e) CHAIR.—The chair of the Commission should be  
14   chosen by consensus from among the members of the  
15   Commission.

16       (f) RUSSIAN COMMISSION.—The President should  
17   make every effort to encourage the Government of the  
18   Russian Federation to appoint a Russian Federation dele-  
19   gation of the Commission that would jointly meet and dis-  
20   cuss the issues described in subsection (g).

21       (g) DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION.—The duties of the  
22   Commission should include consideration of how—

23           (1) to ensure that the reduction of strategic nu-  
24       clear weapons announced by the United States and  
25       the Russian Federation in November 2001 take ef-

1       fect in a rapid, safe, verifiable and irreversible man-  
2       ner;

3           (2) to preserve and enhance START I moni-  
4       toring and verification mechanisms;

5           (3) to develop additional monitoring and  
6       verification mechanisms;

7           (4) to preserve the benefits of the unratified  
8       START II agreement, especially those measures that  
9       affect strategic stability;

10          (5) to ensure the safety of warheads removed  
11       from deployment;

12          (6) to safely and verifiably dismantle warheads  
13       in excess of the ceiling established by the President  
14       Bush at the November 2001 United States-Russia  
15       summit;

16          (7) to begin a new high-level dialogue to discuss  
17       United States and Russian Federation proposals for  
18       a global and theater level missile defense systems;

19          (8) to extend presidential decision-making time  
20       as it relates to nuclear weapons operations;

21          (9) to improve Russian-American cooperative  
22       efforts to enhance strategic early warning, including  
23       but not limited to the Joint Data Exchange Center  
24       and the Russian-American Observation Satellite; and

1           (10) to increase cooperation between the United  
2       States and the Russian Federation on the programs  
3       and activities described in sections 2 and 3.

4       (e) COOPERATION.—In carrying out its duties, the  
5       Commission should receive the full and timely cooperation  
6       of United States Government officials, including providing  
7       the Commission with analyses, briefings, and other infor-  
8       mation necessary for the fulfillment of its responsibilities.

9       (f) REPORT.—The Commission shall, not later than  
10      six months after the date of its first meeting, submit to  
11      Congress an interim report on its findings and, not later  
12      than six months after submission of the interim report,  
13      submit to Congress a final report containing its conclu-  
14      sions.

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