# S. 1565

Relating to United States adherence to the ABM Treaty.

### IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER, 18, 2001

Mrs. Feinstein (for herself, Mr. Wyden, Mr. Feingold, Mr. Corzine, Mr. Harkin, and Mr. Leahy) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services

## A BILL

Relating to United States adherence to the ABM Treaty.

- Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
   SECTION 1. FINDINGS.
   The Senate makes the following findings:
- 5 (1) On May 26, 1972, President Nixon and 6 General Secretary Brezhnev signed the Treaty Be-7 tween the United States of America and the Union 8 of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of 9 Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. The ABM Treaty was 10 ratified by the Senate on August 3, 1972, by a vote 11 of 88–2, and entered into force on October 3, 1972.

- 1 (2) The ABM Treaty sought to end an emerg2 ing competition in defensive systems between the
  3 United States and the Soviet Union that threatened
  4 to spur an offensive nuclear arms race, and to create
  5 more favorable conditions to further limit strategic
  6 nuclear weapons.
  - (3) The ABM Treaty was designed to address the major threat to the United States at that time, the threat of a nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union, and did not contemplate the potential emergence of other strategic missile threats.
  - (4) The ABM Treaty remains important to arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, and United States national security because it promotes strategic stability, facilitates reductions in offensive nuclear weapons, and encourages movement toward more secure and stable nuclear alert postures.
  - (5) The ABM Treaty is of unlimited duration, but each party to the treaty has the right to withdraw on six months notice if the party decides that its supreme interests are jeopardized by "extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty".
  - (6) The mid-course hit-to-kill national missile defense system is currently in the early stages of re-

- search and development. The fourth research and development intercept test of the system was conducted on July 14, 2001. A total of twenty-one developmental intercept tests are planned, and subsequent operational testing of the system is not scheduled to begin until fiscal year 2005.
  - (7) On July 12, 2001, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated that "[t]he United States is not going to violate the [ABM] Treaty. If we get to the point where we need to get beyond the treaty and we haven't been able to negotiate something, obviously, there's a provision you can withdraw in six months and that's what you'd have to do.".
  - (8) Unilateral abrogation or withdrawal from the ABM Treaty by the United States will have profound implications for global security and stability and for United States national security interests, and is viewed with apprehension by United States allies as well as other states.
  - (9) While unilateral abrogation or withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would have negative consequences for United States security, negotiated modest modifications of the Treaty could preserve the essential effectiveness of the Treaty with respect to Russia, and allow the United States to address

1	threats	that	have	emerged	since	the	ABM	Treaty
2	was dra	fted i	n 197	2.				

10) At their July 22, 2001 meeting in Geneva,
Presidents Bush and Putin agreed "that major
changes in the world require concrete discussion of
both offensive and defensive systems. We already
have some strong and tangible points of agreement.
We will shortly begin intensive consultations on the
interrelated subjects of offensive and defensive systems.".

### 1 SEC. 2. SENSE OF SENATE ON UNITED STATES ADHERENCE

12 TO THE ABM TREATY.

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It is the sense of the Senate that—

- (1) all research, development, test, and evaluation programs and activities of the United States for missile defense purposes should remain consistent with United States commitments to and obligations under the ABM Treaty;
- (2) the United States should pursue good faith consultations with Russia to address such modest modifications of the ABM Treaty as may be necessary to address threats which have emerged since the Treaty was signed and lead to an agreement on appropriate limits on strategic nuclear offensive and

1	defensive systems that is in the national security in-
2	terest of the United States;
3	(3) the United States should not unilaterally
4	abrogate or withdraw from the ABM Treaty; and
5	(4) the United States should not deploy a na-
6	tional missile defense system until—
7	(A) operational tests of a fully integrated
8	version of the system have been conducted uti-
9	lizing realistic test parameters; and
10	(B) the operational tests have dem-
11	onstrated, in a manner consistent with the pro-
12	visions of section 2399 of title 10, United
13	States Code, that the system, whether part of
14	a fully integrated system or an emergency de-
15	ployment, is operationally effective and suitable
16	for use in combat.
17	SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR MISSILE DE-
18	FENSE PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES.
19	(a) Limitation on Use To Abrogate ABM Trea-
20	TY.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
21	funds may be obligated or expended for any test, evalua-
22	tion, or deployment of a National Missile Defense system,
23	or any program or activity relating to a National Missile
24	Defense system, that would result in the abrogation of or
25	withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

- 1 (b) Limitation on Use Inconsistent With Fu-
- 2 Ture Agreements.—Notwithstanding any other provi-
- 3 sion of law, if an agreement with Russia to amend the
- 4 ABM Treaty, or an agreement with Russia governing stra-
- 5 tegic nuclear offensive and defensive systems, comes into
- 6 force after the date of the enactment of this Act, no funds
- 7 may be obligated or expended after the date such agree-
- 8 ment comes into force for any test, evaluation, or deploy-
- 9 ment of a National Missile Defense system, or any pro-
- 10 gram or activity relating to a National Missile Defense
- 11 system, that would by inconsistent with such agreement.
- 12 (c) Scope of Limitation.—For purposes of this
- 13 section, a test, evaluation, or deployment of a system shall
- 14 include any construction required to carry out the test,
- 15 evaluation, or deployment of the system.
- 16 SEC. 4. REPORTS ON DECISIONS RELATING TO DEPLOY-
- 17 MENT OF A NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYS-
- 18 **TEM.**
- 19 (a) Report by Secretary of State Before De-
- 20 CISIONS.—Not later than 120 days before any decision by
- 21 the President described in subsection (c), the Secretary
- 22 of State shall submit to Congress a report, in writing, con-
- 23 taining the following:
- 24 (1) A description of the specific national secu-
- 25 rity threat that justifies such decision.

1	(2) An assessment of the extent to which test-
2	ing not compliant with the ABM Treaty, and the de-
3	ployment of an integrated missile defense system or
4	emergency capability using test assets, will enhance
5	overall United States national security, which assess-
6	ment shall take into account—
7	(A) the likelihood of the missile threat that
8	the testing or deployment, as the case may be,
9	is designed to counter;
10	(B) the impact of the testing or deploy-
11	ment, as the case may be, on United States re-
12	lations with our allies, and with Russia and
13	China; and
14	(C) the impact of the testing or deploy-
15	ment, as the case may be, on existing nuclear
16	arms control agreements, nuclear risk reduction
17	objectives, and United States nonproliferation
18	goals and treaty commitments.
19	(b) CERTIFICATION BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BE-
20	FORE DECISIONS.—(1) Not later than 120 days before a
21	decision by the President described in subsection $(c)(1)$ ,
22	the Secretary of Defense shall certify to Congress, in writ-
23	ing, that—
24	(A) operational tests of a fully integrated
25	version of the missile system or emergency capability

1	concerned have been conducted utilizing realistic test
2	parameters, including countermeasures and decoys
3	and

- (B) such operational tests have demonstrated,
  in a manner consistent with the provisions of section
  2399 of title 10, United States Code, that the missile system or emergency capability, as the case may
  be, whether part of a fully integrated system or an
  emergency deployment, is operationally effective and
  suitable for use in combat.
- 11 (2) A certification under this subsection shall be sub-12 mitted in both classified and unclassified form.
- 13 (c) COVERED DECISIONS.—The decisions described 14 in this subsection are as follows:
  - (1) A decision to deploy a missile system designated to defend the territory of the United States against ballistic missile attack, including the deployment of an emergency capability utilizing missile defense assets.
- 20 (2) A decision to notify Russia of the intention 21 of the United States to withdraw from the ABM 22 Treaty.

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1	SEC. 5. ANNUAL ASSESSMENTS ON THREAT OF ATTACK ON
2	THE UNITED STATES USING WEAPONS OF
3	MASS DESTRUCTION.
4	Not later than six months after the date of the enact-
5	ment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President
6	shall submit to Congress a report containing the following:
7	(1) An assessment, current as of the date of
8	such report, of the threat posed to the United States
9	and its allies by the use of a weapon of mass de-
10	struction by both foreign states and transnational
11	groups, including—
12	(A) an assessment of the scope and nature
13	of the threat of delivery of such a weapon of
14	mass destruction by a variety of means of deliv-
15	ery; and
16	(B) a comparison of the threat posed by
17	delivery of such a weapon of mass destruction
18	by ballistic missile with the threat posed by de-
19	livery of such a weapon of mass destruction by
20	another delivery system, whether conventional
21	or unconventional, including by cruise missile,
22	truck, suitcase, boat, or airplane.
23	(2) The total estimated cost, current as of the
24	fiscal year ending in the year preceding the year in
25	which such report is submitted, of all research, de-
26	velopment, test, and evaluation, deployment, and op-

- 1 eration and maintenance activities with respect to
- 2 the national missile defense system during the pe-
- 3 riod beginning on January 1, 2002, and ending on
- 4 December 31, 2020.
- 5 (3) A determination whether or not, during the
- 6 fiscal year in which such report is submitted, the al-
- 7 location of funds for the national missile defense
- 8 system will impair the allocation of funds for pri-
- 9 ority programs of the Department of Defense (as de-
- termined by the Secretary of Defense), including
- programs relating to force structure, force readiness,
- force training, force modernization, homeland de-
- fense, and research, development, test, and evalua-
- tion.

#### 15 SEC. 6. ABM TREATY DEFINED.

- In this Act, the term "ABM Treaty" means the Trea-
- 17 ty Between the United States of America and the Union
- 18 of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-
- 19 Ballistic Missile Systems, signed at Moscow on May 26,
- 20 1972, and includes the Protocol to that treaty, signed at
- 21 Moscow on July 3, 1974.

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